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
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
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INDEX OF ARTICLES.

CALVIN, AN EPIGONE OF THE MIDDLE AGES OR AN INITIATOR OF MODERN TIMES? By E. Doumergue.....	52
CALVIN AND COMMON GRACE. By Herman Bavinck.....	437
CALVIN'S DOCTRINE OF GOD. By Benjamin B. Warfield.....	381
CALVIN'S DOCTRINE OF THE KNOWLEDGE OF GOD. By Benjamin B. Warfield	219
CALVIN'S DOCTRINE OF THE TRINITY. By Benjamin B. Warfield....	533
JEWISH PARTIES IN THE FIFTH CENTURY BEFORE CHRIST. By J. Oscar Boyd	29
JOHN CALVIN—THE MAN. By John De Witt.....	369
JOHN HOWIE OF LOCHGOIN. By D. Hay Fleming.....	1
MUSIC IN THE WORK OF CALVIN. By Émil Doumergue.....	529
THE REFORMATION AND NATURAL LAW. By A. Lang.....	177

INDEX OF CONTRIBUTORS.

Armstrong, William P.....	132, 133, 337, 674
Bavinck, Herman	437
Beach, Sylvester W.....	167
Beecher, Willis J.....	467, 655, 662
Benson, Louis F.....	695, 696
Boyd, J. Oscar.....	29 , 341, 343, 476, 477, 510
Davis, John D.....	121, 122, 336, 339, 340, 665, 666
DeWitt, John	369
Doumergue, E.	52, 529
Dulles, J. H.....	368, 470
Erdman, Charles R.....	163, 164, 167, 168, 169, 170, 517, 519, 521 522, 524, 667, 669, 690, 694, 698, 699, 700
Fleming, D. Hay.....	I
Greene, George Francis.....	702, 703, 704
Greene, William Brenton, Jr.....	119, 120, 172, 333, 334, 335 362, 466, 467, 471, 657, 687
Hodge, C. W.....	358, 361, 515, 685
Hunt, Theodore W.....	703
Jack, W. M.....	105, 117, 118, 475, 512, 654, 661
Johnson, George	366
Johnson, Wm. Hallock.....	140, 351, 497
Kellogg, Edwin Henry.....	473, 653
Lang, A.	177
Laughlin, J. H.....	114
Machen, J. Gresham.....	126, 348, 351, 491, 670
Macloskie, G.	701
Macmillan, Kerr D.....	169, 171, 684, 691
McPheeters, W. M.....	477
Minton, Henry Collin.....	116
Mudge, Lewis Seymour.....	165, 166
Paist, Benjamin F., Jr.....	137, 513, 694
Smith, H. W.....	524, 700
Vos, Geerhardus	123, 343, 493, 498, 667
Warfield, B. B.....	106, 112, 131, 134, 135, 141, 152, 166 219, 326, 352, 381, 500, 513, 678, 553
Welsh, E. B.....	161

LIST OF BOOKS REVIEWED.

Adam, <i>The Religious Teachers of Greece</i>	471
Allen, <i>A Parable of the Rose and Other Poems</i>	703
Allen, <i>Freedom in the Church</i>	152
Astley, <i>Prehistoric Archaeology and the Old Testament</i>	666
Auburn Theological Seminary, Addresses by the Faculty of. <i>What Shall I Believe?</i>	524
Auchincloss, <i>Bible Chronology from Abraham to the Christian Era</i>	336
Auchincloss, <i>Christian Era</i>	336
Auchincloss, <i>How to Read Josephus</i>	336
Auchincloss, <i>To Canaan in One Year</i>	336
Avebury, <i>Peace and Happiness</i>	702
Ayres, <i>Jesus Christ our Lord, an English Bibliography of Christology</i>	470
Banks, <i>Sermons Which Have Won Souls</i>	168
Barton, <i>A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Book of Ecclesiastes</i>	122
Bavinck, <i>Psychologie der Religie</i>	112
Bavinck, <i>The Philosophy of Revelation</i>	657
Beach, <i>Individual Evangelism</i>	170
Bennett, <i>The Life of Christ according to St. Mark</i>	132
Bennett, <i>The Religion of the Post-Exilic Prophets</i>	123
Best, <i>Beyond the Natural Order</i>	116
Bobertag, <i>Isaak August Dorner</i>	513
Bornhausen, <i>Die Ethik Pascals</i>	105
Breslauer, <i>Documente frühen Deutschen Lebens, Erste Reihe</i>	171
Brown, <i>The Why and How of Foreign Missions</i>	694
Burrell, <i>A New Appraisal of Christian Science</i>	169
Campbell, <i>Paul the Mystic</i>	497
Carrick, <i>Wycliffe and the Lollards</i>	513
Carus, <i>God. An Inquiry and a Solution</i>	653
Carus, <i>The Dharma or the Religion of Enlightenment</i>	119
Carus, <i>The Philosopher's Martyrdom</i>	467
Chadwick, <i>The Pastoral Teaching of St. Paul</i>	163
Clark, <i>The Christian Method of Ethics</i>	362
Clifton, <i>The Miller and the Toad</i>	702
Coffin, <i>The Creed of Jesus</i>	165
Coit, <i>National Idealism and the Book of Common Prayer</i>	695
Couard, <i>Die religiösen und sittlichen Anschauungen der alttestamentlichen Apokryphen und Pseudepigraphen</i>	667
Cremer, <i>Rechtfertigung und Wiedergeburt</i>	358
Crooker, <i>The Church of To-day</i>	691
Currie, <i>The Letters of Martin Luther</i>	352

Curry, <i>Vocal and Literary Interpretation of the Bible</i>	524
Dau, <i>The Logical and Historical Inaccuracies of the Hon. Bourke Cockran</i>	703
Du Bose, <i>Natural and Apologetic Theology</i>	114
Dulles, <i>The True Church</i>	517
Edwards, <i>God and Music</i>	167
Faulkner, <i>Erasmus: The Scholar</i>	684
Faunce, <i>The Educational Ideal in the Ministry</i>	522
Fernald, <i>A Working Grammar of the English Language</i>	704
Fitchett, <i>The Beliefs of Unbelief</i>	335
Forsyth, <i>Positive Teaching and the Modern Mind</i>	519
Funk, <i>The Next Step in Evolution</i>	120
Gardiner, <i>The Bible as English Literature</i>	163
Gibb and Montgomery, <i>The Confessions of Augustine</i>	678
Gilbert, <i>Interpretation of the Bible</i>	348
Gordon, <i>The Early Traditions of Genesis</i>	665
Greene, <i>Saint Peter</i>	700
Gregory, <i>Canon and Text of the New Testament</i>	477
Hastings, <i>Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics</i>	326
Herridge, <i>The Coigne of Vantage</i>	694
Herrmann, <i>Offenbarung und Wunder</i>	515
Horton, <i>My Belief</i>	334
Hulley, <i>Studies in the Book of Psalms</i>	340
Hoyt, <i>The Preacher</i>	698
Jackson, <i>The New Schaff-Herzog Encyclopædia of Religious Knowledge</i> Vols. I and II.....	467
Jackson, <i>The New Schaff-Herzog Encyclopædia of Religious Knowledge</i> . Vol. III	655
Jevons, <i>An Introduction to the Study of Comparative Religion</i>	333
Jones, <i>India, Its Life and Thought</i>	690
Jordan, <i>Comparative Religion</i>	120
Kent, <i>The Historical Bible</i>	340
Kleiser, <i>How to Develop Power and Personality in Speaking</i>	700
Kolde, <i>Historische Einleitung in die Symbolischen Bücher der Evangelisch-Lutherischen Kirche</i>	137
Krüger and Köhler, <i>Theologischer Jahresbericht, 1906</i>	135
Krüger <i>Das Papsttum, Seine Idee und ihre Träger</i>	512
Lectures delivered before the Glasgow University Society of St. Ninian. <i>Religion and the Modern Mind</i>	473
Leeds, <i>The Christian Philosophy of Life</i>	168
Leipoldt, <i>Geschichte des Neutestamentlichen Kanons</i> . Vols. I, II..	674
Locy <i>Biology and its Makers</i>	701
Lüttke, <i>Das heilige Land im Spiegel der Weltgeschichte</i>	510
Marshall, <i>The Book of Ecclesiastes</i>	122
McLaren, <i>Expositions of Holy Scriptures, Second and Third Series</i>	164
McLeod, <i>A Comfortable Faith</i>	524
McNeile, <i>An Introduction to Ecclesiastes</i>	121
Meinertz, <i>Jesus und die Heidenmission</i>	493
Merle-Smith, <i>Giving a Man another Chance</i>	165

Mezger, <i>Entwürfe zu Katechesen</i>	161
Misch, <i>Geschichte der Autobiographie</i>	500
Milligan, <i>St. Paul's Epistle to the Thessalonians</i>	126
Moisant, <i>Psychologie de l'Incroyant</i>	654
Morgan, <i>The Analysed Bible</i>	167
Mott, <i>The Future Leadership of the Church</i>	521
Mullins, <i>The Axioms of Religion</i>	366
Murray, <i>A Handbook of Christian Ethics</i>	687
Nicol, <i>The Four Gospels in the Earliest Church History</i>	351
Oesterley and Box, <i>The Religion and Worship of the Synagogue</i> ..	498
Otto, <i>Naturalism and Religion</i>	106
Peabody, <i>Mornings in the College Chapel</i>	166
Richardson, <i>An Alphabetical Subject Index and Index Encyclopæ-</i> <i>dia to Periodical Articles on Religion, 1890-1899</i>	368
Richter, <i>Die Epistel Pauli an die Römer</i>	351
Pick, <i>Hymns and Poetry of the Eastern Church</i>	167
Presbyterian Brotherhood, <i>Reports of Conventions 1907, 1908</i>	169
<i>Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, New Series, Vol. VIII</i>	466
Richard, <i>Christian Worship: Its Principles and Forms</i>	696
Robertson, <i>A Short Grammar of the Greek New Testament</i>	491
Robertson, <i>Epochs in the Life of Jesus</i>	133
Schauffler et al., <i>Training the Teacher</i>	699
Schlatter, <i>Der Zweifel an der Messianität Jesu</i>	343
Schmiedel, <i>The Johannine Writings</i>	670
Sérol, <i>Le Besoin et le Religieux</i>	475
Shaw, <i>The Precinct of Religion in the Culture of Humanity</i>	661
Shearer, <i>The Sermon on the Mount</i>	669
Smith, <i>Jerusalem, the Topography, Economics and History from</i> <i>the Earliest Time to A. D. 70</i>	339
Smith, <i>The Christ of the Cross</i>	141
Smyser et al., <i>Modern Poets and Christian Teaching</i>	166
Speer, <i>The Master of the Heart</i>	170
Stacy, <i>Handbook of Prophecy</i>	667
Stalker, <i>The Atonement</i>	685
<i>Standard Bible Dictionary</i>	662
Steward, <i>Sheldon Jackson</i>	140
Streatfeild, <i>The Self-Interpretation of Jesus Christ</i>	131
Strong, <i>Outlines of Systematic Theology</i>	361
Thomas, <i>A Devotional Commentary. Gen. xxv. 11-xxxvi. 8</i>	476
Thomas, <i>A Devotional Commentary. Gen. xxxvii. 1-1</i>	477
Weseloh, <i>Die Herrlichkeit Gottes in der Natur</i>	117
Willock, <i>A Scots Earl in Covenanting Times</i>	134
Wilson, <i>Myths of the Red Children Retold</i>	172
Wiener, <i>Notes on Hebrew Religion</i>	343
Wolf, <i>Ursprung und Verwendung des religiösen Erfahrungsbe-</i> <i>griffes in der Theologie des 19 Jahrhunderts</i>	361
Wright, <i>Light from the Egyptian Papyri</i>	666
Zöckler, <i>Gottes Zeugen im Reich der Natur</i>	118

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JOHN HOWIE OF LOCHGOIN: HIS FOREBEARS AND HIS WORKS.

Throughout Scotland and beyond it, John Howie has been a power for good for more than a century. Strictly speaking, he ought to be described as John Howie *in* Lochgoin, not *of* Lochgoin, as he was merely the tenant, not the owner; but the Howie family have occupied that moor-land farm for so many generations that they are constantly and naturally spoken of as the Howies of Lochgoin; and of the many Johns in that family the author of *The Scots Worthies* is preëminently known as John Howie of Lochgoin.

There is no certainty as to the precise year, not even as to the precise century, in which the Howie's first went to Lochgoin; nor is there any certainty as to the district or country from which they came. The origin of the Howies, indeed, like that of many of the oldest landed Scottish families, is lost in the haze of antiquity.

In one passage, the author of *The Scots Worthies* thus refers to the origin of his family:

"Our house had been very ancient in suffering for religion; (some have said that our first progenitors in this land fled from the French persecution in the 9th century)."¹

It will be noticed that he does not vouch for the truth of

¹ *Memoirs*, 1796, p. 153.

the tradition, for he cautiously qualifies it—"some have said".

In the old *Statistical Account of Fenwick*, printed in 1795, and written by the Rev. William Boyd, there is this paragraph:

"Far up in the moor grounds of the barony of Rowallan, there is a farm called *Serdgoin* [plainly a misprint for *Lochgoin*]. It is entirely a sheep farm. It has been possessed for many successive generations by a family of the name of Howie. The tradition of the family is, that the first who settled there was a refugee from the persecution of the Waldenses. There is no doubt, but they have resided there for some hundred years. The place is exceedingly remote. And it is not likely that any, at that time, would have taken up their residence there, had they not considered it as a place where they were not in danger of being molested. The master of the family has been a John Howie for many generations, till within these few months, that both father and son—both Johns—died."

It may be noted in passing that John the father, whose death is thus referred to, was the author of *The Scots Worthies*. But at this point it is more important to note that in the hands of later writers than John Howie and the Rev. William Boyd, the traditional origin of the family becomes much more definite.

Thus we are gravely told that, in the year 1178, "three brothers of the name of Hoi, or Hoy, now Howie, came from one of the Waldensian valleys to escape the fury of the persecution, and found refuge in Lochgoin".² The date has been given less definitely as "towards the close of the twelfth century"; and the three brothers have also been represented as Albigenses from the south of France, and are alleged to have respectively settled in the parish of Mearns, the parish of Craigie, and at Lochgoin.³ It has likewise been affirmed that the present worthy occupier is "the twenty-eighth John Howie in the direct line".⁴ But

² Thomson's *Martyr Graves of Scotland*, 1875, i., p. 140.

³ W. H. Carlaw's edition of *The Scots Worthies*, p. ix.

⁴ Kerr's *Lochgoin Conventicle*, p. 3.

in support of these very definite statements no satisfactory proof has been produced; nothing, indeed, beyond tradition, and a date incised on the lintel of a door. Now it can never be safe to trust to any tradition which professes to go back through so many centuries; and as for the date on the lintel, too much reliance has been placed on it, when it is regarded as evidence that the brothers came to this country in the year 1178.

On the lintel referred to there are three dates and the initials J. H. The three dates are 1178, 1710 and 1810. It has been supposed, and the supposition is a reasonable one, that the dates were intended to refer to "changes that have taken place either upon their family or their abode". But between the first two dates there is a very long gap, a gap of 532 years. How is that gap to be accounted for? During all these centuries was there no great outstanding fact in the history of the family or the abode calling for the incision of a date on the lintel?

Judging from the appearance of the three dates and the initials on the present lintel, they have been all cut at one time; and it may therefore be assumed that that time could not be before the latest of the three dates—1810. In the old house there was an older lintel with dates; and these dates were very much worn and weathered. As I understood Mr. John Howie, on my visit in September, 1906, it was because these dates were so worn out that they were reproduced on the present lintel. It is, therefore, extremely likely that the earliest date was misread.

Arabic numerals do not seem to have been used for inscriptions in Britain before the fifteenth century; and when they came into use they differed considerably from their present forms. The 5 of the sixteenth century may easily be mistaken for a 1; and personally I have little doubt that the earliest date on the old lintel at Lochgoin was 1578, not 1178.

If the Howie's bore that name in 1178 they must have been among the earliest families in Scotland to bear a sur-

name. According to Cosmo Innes, even the race of Stuart was distinguished by no surnames for several generations after the Norman conquest. Surnames were first used in Scotland, he says, in the twelfth century, and came into general use in the thirteenth.⁵

One of the nineteenth century editors of *The Scots Worthies*, himself a Howie, backs up the tradition, of the three refugee brothers arriving in the twelfth century, by affirming that the tradition receives "confirmation from the fact that this [the district of Ayrshire and Renfrewshire] is almost the only part of Scotland where persons bearing this name [the name of Howie] are to be met with." The basis of this argument, as will be immediately shown, is utterly worthless.

Although I doubt the accuracy of the earliest date on the lintel of the door, and question the soundness of the inference that has been drawn from it, I am convinced that the Howie's have been in Lochgoin for a very long period. Paterson, in his *History of the County of Ayr* (ii., p. 58), cites a few clauses from the will of "Johnne Howie in Lochgoyne", who died in February, 1614. From these clauses it is learned that his wife's name was Dorothy Gemmill, and that he had five sons and a daughter, whose names were—Arthur, William, Stein, Andrew, Alexander, and Agnes. Even though this John Howie had been the first of his name in Lochgoin, the line would be carried back in him for three centuries; and many of his forebears may have been there before him. How many, it may now be impossible to find out; but there is record evidence (in the *Register of the Great Seal* and other official registers) to show that long before his time the Howies were widely sprinkled over Scotland.

There was a Nicholas Howye in Brechin before 1469, an Andrew Howy near Abernethy in 1490, a John Howe at "Craganis", Renfrewshire, in 1515, a William Howe at Dirleton in 1519, an Andrew Howe at Aberdeen in 1523,

⁵ *Concerning Some Scotch Surnames*, pp. 4, 5.

a Nicholas Howie in Berwickshire and a Lawrence Howy in Edinburgh in 1527, a William Howie (or Howye) in Brechin in 1528, a John Howie vicar of Kilmaurs in 1538, a Geoffrey Howe at Dunure in 1541, a Pait Howe on the Borders in 1544, an Alexander Howe at Tealing in Forfarshire in 1548, an Helen Howye at "Camesesken" in Ayrshire in 1552, a Dand (*i. e.*, Andrew) Howe (or Howy) near Kelso in 1567, an Helen Howy (or Howie) in Kennoway in 1576, a Bernard Howye and a Henry Howye in Gullane in 1578, an Effie Howie in St. Andrews in 1584, Robert Howie (afterwards Principal of St. Mary's College, St. Andrews) was a minister in Aberdeen by 1591, and in 1595 there was a Thomas Howye in Northumberland.

There were Howisons in St. Andrews by 1430; and in Edinburgh by 1450; and there must have been Howies before there were Howisons.

Such references could easily be multiplied, but these are enough to show that Howies were scattered over a great part of Scotland long before the close of the sixteenth century.

The name is spelled in various ways: Howe, Howye, Howy, Howie, Houye. Bernard Howye in Gullane has his surname given in three different forms, one of these being Holly. This last may be due to a clerical error, for in the handwriting of the sixteenth century *w* is frequently very like *ll*. It has been suggested by one of those who suppose that the Howies originally came from the south of France, that the French form of the name was *Huet*. In this connection it may be mentioned that one of Queen Mary's cooks, after her return from France, was named Martin Huet. He was the "potager", the cook who made the soups.⁶ In Fife, perhaps in other parts of Scotland, *Howie* is commonly pronounced *Hooie*.

The most interesting personal details concerning John Howie and his forebears are learned from a little book pub-

⁶ Teulet's *Papiers D'État*, ii., p. 131.

lished in 1796, and which is now extremely rare. It bears the title:

"Memoirs of the Life of John Howie: who lived in Lochgoin, parish of Fenwick, and died January 5th, 1793. Containing a series of religious exercises, soul-soliloquies, meditations, and an account of the Lord's goodness to him in general. [Psalm lxvi. 16 quoted.] To which is subjoined a short later (*sic*) will, or dying testimony of James Howie, who lived in Lochgoin, and died soon after the Revolution. Glasgow: Printed for James Howie, Lochgoin. 1796."

The bulk of this little book was written by John Howie himself; and his narrative runs in the first person singular. But there is a prefatory epistle "to the reader", signed "publishers", and dated "Lochgoin, August 22, 1796". At the end of the autobiographical portion there is a section entitled "Observations concerning the author". At the end of this section there is this intimation:

"As the Memoirs have fallen short of the pages specified in the proposals, it was thought proper to subjoin the author's great-grandfather's dying testimony, who lived in the time of the late persecuting period, and came through a series of hardships therein, upon account of his non-compliance with the tyrannical measures of the then powers."

This was the testimony of James Howie,⁷ who died on the 19th of November, 1691, and the testimony is followed by another section entitled:

"A short narrative of James Howie's sufferings in the late persecution: with some of his last words at the time of his death."

One cannot read this supplementary matter without feeling thankful that room was found for it, especially for the "short narrative". It states that this James Howie "was born in the parish of Mearns, in the shire of Renfrew, and was married to Isabel Howie, oldest daughter of John

⁷ John Calderwood of Clanfin included this testimony in the "Collection of the Dying Testimonies" which he published in 1806. He knew, of course, that it had been printed in 1796; but the edition of the *Memoirs*, he says, was small, and so he reprinted it with the other testimonies "according to the original MS. copy."

Howie in Lochgoin"; that " he came to Lochgoin and lived along with his father-in-law till he died"; that his hardships began in the winter of 1666, the winter after the battle of Pentland Hills, and known as "Pentland Hills winter", because those who had been at that battle "had to flee into corners and muir places, of which Lochgoin was one; and in these concealed places they spent their time in prayer and religious conference in a social way". Lochgoin was admirably adapted as a place of refuge. In the *New Statistical Account of Fennyck*, it is said that:

"The Howies of Lochgoin . . . selected one of the most inaccessible places in the whole country for their residence. The house is altogether inaccessible on the east to horsemen, and an active man could not, even though acquainted with the locality, at night cross the moss by which it is defended, but at the risk of his life; and no stranger could venture across it with safety, even in day-light, without a guide. On the west, the only direction from which it can be approached, a sentinel was always stationed in times of danger, whence he could command an extensive view of the whole country as far as Ailsa Craig and the hills of Arran, and thus no body of troopers could reach the house, before the inmates had time to escape into the morasses. A situation like this was invaluable as a place of resort to the Covenanters."

Notwithstanding the difficulty of access in former times, the soldiers frequently found their way to Lochgoin, and the inmates had several narrow escapes. On one occasion old John Howie (the father-in-law of James, and the great-great-grandfather of the author of *The Scots Worthies*) had gone to bed, worn out with an attack of asthma, and fell asleep. He dreamed that he was at Kilmarnock Cross, and heard General Dalzell give orders to a party of his men to go to Lochgoin and search for Pentland rebels. They compelled him to go with them as guide; and, after accompanying them two miles, one of the soldiers maltreated him so badly that he awoke. He again fell asleep, and again dreamed that he was acting as guide to the soldiers; and that, when they were crossing a water, one of them took

him by the shoulders and pushed him into the stream. He awoke; but again fell asleep and again he dreamed that he was leading the soldiers; and that he accompanied them until "he came to his own hill-foot", where they again ill-treated him. He awoke for the third time, and was so impressed by the dream that he cried aloud to those who were sheltering in the house to look out. They ran to "a little height at the house-end", and, in the grey light of the morning, discerned the gleaming bayonets within forty fathoms of the house. They had just time to rush into a low-lying ground and moss, which led into a brook, under the banks of which they got out of sight. Old John Howie was too frail to flee; and, throwing his cloak about him, he went out and met the first party of the soldiers as they reached the end of his house. The story told by the breathless old man, as to why the fire was on so early in the morning, allayed their suspicions; and, after taking food enough to satisfy their hunger, they went back to Kilmarnock.

Among those who frequented Lochgoin were Ker of Kersland, Captain Paton, Alexander Shields, and Balfour of Kinloch, better known as Burley. Once at least Renwick took refuge there; and, as by his continuous wanderings, his shoes were worn out, James Howie, it is stated, "got a new pair for him to keep his feet dry".

One morning before sunrise young John Howie was hastily awakened by his mother, who charged him to run out of the house. Before he was ten fathoms from the door, several guns were fired at him; but he was not hit, and being young and swift of foot, he out-distanced his pursuers; and, getting into a place sometimes occupied by otters, he drew in a heather turf after him and so escaped observation. His father, James Howie, being older, was not so able to run, but had started earlier, and the soldiers lost sight of him. They caught a shepherd, however, and, putting him on his oath, demanded whether he had seen a black dog, with white hose and shoes on his feet, pass him. The man replied, I did not see a black dog with white hose and shoes on his

feet. He had indeed seen James Howie, but, before he saw him, James had cast off his coat, which was black, and also his shoes and hose, and was running bare-footed.

Isabel Howie, James' wife, was a brave woman. On one occasion, when five of the sufferers had spent the whole night with her husband in prayer and conversation, they were surprised in the morning. The night had been very stormy, and, on that account, they felt the more secure. Suddenly the door was opened, and a sergeant, who had left his men outside, stepped in. Isabel Howie at once rushed up to him, and, exerting all her strength, pushed him backwards towards the door. In the struggle he fell, and the gun dropped out of his hand. The Covenanters ran into the byre, which communicated with the house, and emerged in two parties, James Howie and his son John leaving the byre by one of its two doors, and the rest leaving it by the other. The larger party had to run four or five miles in order to escape. From that day, Isabel Howie was a marked woman; and many a cold night she had to spend in a moss-hag with a young child at her breast. Before the Revolution came, the house of Lochgoin had been plundered twelve times.

All these incidents and many more concerning the hardships and dangers to which his ancestors and their friends had been subjected, must have been known to the author of *The Scots Worthies* from his childhood. As already mentioned, James Howie died in November, 1691. His son John, who was born in the year before Pentland Rising, lived to the great age of 90 and died in the summer of 1755. By that time his grandson, John, who was destined to achieve literary fame, was already in his twentieth year, having been born in November, 1735; and, although brought up at Black's Hill, in the adjoining parish of Kilmarnock, he must have learned much from his venerable grandsire in Lochgoin.

Although there are many interesting details in the *Memoirs*, published in 1796, the little volume may be

Free Public Library, Newark, N. J.

searched in vain for many things that one would like to know concerning the personal history of the author of *The Scots Worthies*. For the omissions, John Howie is not to be blamed. The portion which he wrote himself was not intended as an autobiography, but was entitled: "A brief narrative of some Religious Exercises", etc. It begins thus:

"Although I had a religious education, and my grandfather and grandmother (with whom I was brought up from the time I was a year old, at Black's Hill in the parish of Kilmarnock) were reputed, in the place where they lived, for honest, religious persons; yet in my younger years, I was mostly taken up with the common vanities of childhood and youth, having no certain views of religion, or my own depraved, lost state, and condition."

It may be noted that he neither gives the year of his birth, nor states how long he lived at Black's Hill; that he neither gives the names of his grandfather and grandmother, who lived there, nor states whether they were his paternal or maternal ancestors; that he makes no reference to his father or mother; that, although he tells that he himself was twice married, he does not give the name of either wife, or the date of either marriage. Eighty years ago, M'Gavin thought of giving a short account of his life; but was informed, by one of Howie's nephews, that his family possessed ample materials for a volume, and therefore he left the subject untouched, in the hope that a Howie would do it justice. If these materials were in the chest containing his papers, they have probably perished, for some fifty years ago it was found that the mice had got into the chest, and reduced its contents to "mulins".

Fortunately, in 1835, the Rev. John Carslaw, of Airdrie, prefixed a short memoir to his edition of *The Scots Worthies*. From this memoir it appears that the old John Howie, who died in 1755, had a son John who lived with him; that this son John was twice married, his first wife being Martha Thomson,⁸ by whom he had two sons and two daughters;

⁸ Carslaw gives October, 1784, as the date of this marriage. This is probably a misprint for October, 1734.

that he died suddenly in 1754, that is, a year before his aged father; that the eldest of the two sons borne by Martha Thomson was the author of *The Scots Worthies*; and that it was to Martha's father, John Thomson in Black's Hill, that he was sent when he was a year old. Carslaw also states that, in his boyhood, he attended two schools, one taught by his uncle, James Howie, at Whirlhall, the other by Adam Millar at Horsehill; that his first wife was named Jean Lindsay, and the second Janet Howie; that by the first he had one son, and by the second five sons and three daughters; and that, as his step-mother remained several years at Lochgoin after his father's death, he did not occupy the farm until shortly after his first marriage, that was, in or about the year 1762.

We now turn again, for a little, to the Memoirs of 1796. John Howie confesses that in his youth he was thoughtless and careless; but the only vice with which he could charge himself was his inclination "to too much vain and unprofitable discourse when in company". He says, however, that, after he was grown up, he soon found "predominant evils" ingrained in his constitution, which, through the want of restraining grace and the omission of secret prayer, overcame him. The early death of his first wife "somewhat affected" him; but his corruptions revived upon him, and he was reproached by some of his neighbours and relations, who thought that he was much worse than he really was, and some people rashly blamed him for things that he was innocent of. Regarding his slanderers he says: "I wish the Lord may give them forgiveness, as I wish and expect forgiveness for what occasion I gave them, and for what I was justly chargeable in the sight of a holy God with." All this time he had kept up family worship, and attended divine ordinances and society meetings. In a formal way he usually prayed in secret; but sometimes neglected even the formal performance of this duty.

"At last", he says, "I married again a cousin of my own [this was Janet Howie], who was of a quiet disposition,

and under the character of a religious woman; after which I kept more to the form of an outward profession; and having, from my younger years, had great pleasure in reading biography, the eminent lives and comfortable deaths of Christ's faithful witnesses, both under Antichrist Popish and Prelatic, and having thereby gained a strong regard for the memories and contendings of our *Scots Worthies*, both in the reforming and suffering period; in process of time I thought of publishing Mr. James Renwick's large life, which was wrote by Mr. Alexander Shields; but, upon second thoughts, I took up a resolution to collect what materials I could obtain, and write a kind of lives of a number of them, which I did at leisure hours, with small views that ever anything I could do should merit the publishing of them: however, my motives were ingenuous, out of love to them and their contendings or cause they contended for: and the Lord determined that they should both be published and much esteemed by men of all ranks and denominations. While I was writing and collecting the first draught of the *Scots Worthies*, sometimes in the morning; one morning my wife, who was not without an inclination to religion, being in bed in the little closet where I was writing, she was just going to give me a reproof for my folly in writing; what would I do but make people laugh at my folly; immediately these words came into her mind, Mark vii. 37. *He hath done all things well; he maketh both the deaf to hear, and the dumb to speak.* After which she durst never speak against it."

Such is John Howie's simple, artless story as to how he came to write his first and most popular book, and how he managed to accomplish it. The title is:

"Biographia Scoticana: or a Brief Historical Account of the Lives, Characters, and Memorable Transactions of the most eminent SCOTS WORTHIES, noblemen, gentlemen, ministers, and others: from Mr. Patrick Hamilton, who was born about the year of our Lord 1503, and suffered martyrdom at St. Andrews, Feb. 1527, to Mr. James Renwick, who was executed in the Grass-market of Edinburgh, Feb. 17, 1688. Together with a succinct account of the lives of other seven eminent divines, and Sir Robert Hamilton of Preston, who died at or shortly after the Revolution. Collected from the Historical Records, Biographical Accounts,

and other Authenticated Writings:—the whole including a period of near two hundred years. By a Friend to the covenanted Testimony of the Church of Scotland. The Righteous shall be had in everlasting remembrance, Psal. cxii. 6. And of Zion it shall be said, This and that man was born in her. Psal. lxxxvii. 5. Glasgow: Printed and sold by John Bryce Bookseller, at his shop, opposite Gibson's Wynd, Salt-Market, M.DCC.LXXV."

Like so many old title-pages, this one is crowded with information concerning the substance of the book. The preface is signed "John Howie", and is dated "Lochgoin, July 21, 1775". The most distinctive feature of this, the first edition, is "the Life of Mr. William Vetch . . . wrote by himself". This life, which extends to 73 pages, is altogether out of proportion to the rest of the book. In the preface Howie explains that he had no opportunity of seeing it, as it was "sent in to the printer from a private gentleman, who had the original copy wrote by Mr. Vetch himself". This is the same life which, fifty years later, was edited, from a copy of the original, by Dr. M'Crie, who does not appear to have known that the memoir was already in type. In all likelihood, he had never seen the first edition of the *Scots Worthies*, which even by that time had become scarce. It is so scarce, indeed, that it is not mentioned in Lowndes' *Bibliographer's Manual*, and Mr. Johnston, in his *Treasury of the Scottish Covenant* (1887, p. 452), says: "No copy is known to exist."⁹ This scarcity is due to its popularity, not to the limited number published, for there was a fairly large impression. The book, in fact, has been thumbed almost out of existence. It contains a list of "the subscribers". In this list there are no fewer than 693 names; and of these people fifteen took 149 copies among them, while each of the others took one copy. Thus 842 copies were subscribed for before the book was issued.

The title-page of the second edition, which is dated 1781,

⁹I happen to know of eight copies, two of which are in my own collection.

is almost the same as that of the first. But it bears the author's name, and there is this material addition:

"As also, an appendix, containing a short historical hint of the wicked lives and miserable deaths of some of the most remarkable apostates and bloody persecutors in Scotland from the Reformation to the Revolution."

This appendix, which is both instructive and entertaining, has a title-page of its own, and is dated 1782. The chief difference in the book itself is in the life of William Vetch, which is cut down to 12½ pp.; and the reasons for doing this are given in an addition to the preface, which addition is signed "John Howie", and dated "Lochgoin, June, 1781".

These were the only two editions which John Howie saw, but other editions followed in rapid succession. Some of the earlier of these may be briefly noted: Edinburgh, 1796; Glasgow, 1797; Dundee, 1809; Edinburgh, 1812; Glasgow, 1813; Glasgow, 1816; Leith, 1816; Glasgow, 1821.

In all these eight editions the old name, *Biographia Scotiana*, has been retained; but a grave injustice to the author has been perpetrated in all of them. John Howie's name has been kept out of the title-page; and at the end of the preface the words "the editor" have been substituted for "John Howie;" and the word "Lochgoin" has been struck out. His name has also been removed from the appendix on bloody persecutors and apostates. In short, in these eight editions John Howie's name is not to be found!¹⁰

John Howie has suffered many things from many editors. One or two examples must suffice. In telling of Captain Paton's wonderful feats as a swordsman, he adds in a footnote:

"This sword or short shabble yet remains, and may now be seen in the hands of the publisher of this collection. It was then by his progenitors counted to have twenty-eight

¹⁰ An abridged edition was also issued, the anonymous editor of which suppressed Howie's preface, introduction and appendix. Howie's name was also kept out. This abridgment, which was "offered to the public" at one-half the price of the complete work, went through at least two editions; the second was published in 1823, and the preface is dated 1816.

gaps in its edge, which made them afterward observe that there were just as many years in the time of the persecution, as there were steps or broken pieces in the edge thereof."

In the 1796 edition, the first edition after John Howie's death, the clause—"and may now be seen in the hands of the publisher of this collection"—was omitted. By the "publisher" Howie meant himself, and the "progenitors," who counted the gaps in the edge of the blade, were his own progenitors; but the omission of the clause turned them into Captain Paton's progenitors;¹¹ and, as he was an old man when he suffered martyrdom, this was rather perplexing. This perversion was copied into edition after edition; and Sir Walter Scott, in quoting the foot-note from one of these editions, interjects the remark that by progenitors Howie meant descendants, and adds that it was "a rather unusual use of the word". Notwithstanding this criticism, the foot-note, in its perverted form, continued to appear in later editions of *The Scots Worthies*. In one of these, which professes to be "revised from the author's original edition", and is stereotyped, the perverted note has been lifted into the text!

One editor who made so many alterations and additions that he said "the present will be found, in a great measure, a new work," candidly owned that "the propriety of distinguishing his own [notes], by affixing some mark to them, did not occur to him while the work was in the press." Perhaps the most stupid of all the editorial blunders is to be found in an edition which bears to be "revised and corrected by James Howie, A. M." In that edition a good many sentences have been introduced into the life of Alexander Henderson. These sentences were borrowed, without acknowledgment, from Aiton of Dolphinton, whose work did not appear until forty-three years after John Howie's death. It was bad enough to make John Howie "crib" from such a much later writer; but the editor was capable of much worse

¹¹ The wife of the present Mr. John Howie of Lochgoin is a descendant of the valiant Captain Paton, and one of their daughters is a missionary in China.

than that. In discussing the date of Henderson's admission to Leuchars, Aiton makes this statement: "In the *Biographia Scoticana*, it is said that Henderson entered to Leuchars about the year 1620." Apparently James Howie, A.M., did not know that *Biographia Scoticana* was the old name of *The Scots Worthies*, the work which he was editing, and so, in borrowing from Aiton, he refers to the *Biographia Scoticana* as if it were a different book!

I am not quite certain how many editions of the *Scots Worthies* have been published: but my own collection contains nearly twenty, and I feel safe in asserting that there are probably fifty. How few of the most prominent literary men of the present day can expect to rival in long continued popularity the imperfectly educated farmer of Lochgoin!

Though John Howie had produced nothing else than *The Scots Worthies*, he would have erected a noble monument to his own memory, as well as to the men whom he admired and wished to honour. But when he was once in touch with the reading public, he issued volume after volume. The first of these appeared in 1779, and is entitled:—

"A collection of Lectures and Sermons, preached upon several subjects, mostly in the time of the late persecution. Wherein a faithful doctrinal testimony is transmitted to posterity for the doctrine, worship, discipline and government of the Church of Scotland against Popery, Prelacy, Erastianism, etc. By these faithful and eminent servants of Jesus Christ: Messrs. William Guthrie, Michael Bruce, John Welwood, Richard Cameron, Donald Cargill, Alexander Peden and Alexander Shields. To which are added some sacramental discourses by Mr. John Livingston and Mr. John Welch, and a sermon on the breach of Covenant, by Mr. John Guthrie. Carefully collected and transcribed from several manuscripts by J. H.; and now published at the desire of the owners of that cause, which some of the worthy authors sealed with their blood. [Isaiah lii. 7 partly quoted.] Glasgow: Printed and sold by J. Bryce. M.DCC.LXXIX."

In the preface (dated "Lochgoin, March 9th, 1779") Howie explains that the discourses were mostly taken from the mouths of the preachers in shorthand "by the common

auditory, and mostly by men of a rural education;" and that he had collected them (with the exception of a few, which were formerly in print) "from ten or twelve volumes mostly in an old small cramp hand." As the book extends to considerably over 600 pp., some idea may be formed of the tedious work involved in transcribing it for the press. This book had been well taken up. The list of subscribers' names fills more than 27 double-columned pages. I have not counted the names; but from a rough calculation they must number about 2400. The list would well repay a careful study. It is a most interesting one, and, among other things, it gives a good idea of the class of people who at that time prized the sermons to which their ancestors had listened at the peril of their lives.¹²

The next of John Howie's volumes is one of his most valuable but least known. It was issued in 1780, and is entitled:—

"Faithful Contendings Displayed: being an historical relation of the state and actings of the suffering Remnant in the Church of Scotland, who subsisted in Select Societies, and were united in General Correspondencies during the hottest time of the late Persecution, viz.: from the year 1681 to 1691. Together with an account of the state of the land in general, and of the Society People in particular, in the intervals betwixt each of their general meetings, with some pertinent remarks upon these historical occurrences, and many letters to and from the general correspondent meetings, etc. Collected and kept in record by Mr. Michael Shields, who was clerk unto these General Societies, and personally present at most of their meetings."

The preparation of this volume for the press must have cost Howie much labour. He not only made the transcript, but he abridged some of the papers which he thought of minor importance, and inserted others which he deemed

¹² This volume was republished in 1880, without the subscribers' names, but with a commemoration sermon and biographical notices by the late Dr. James Kerr. This reprint is entitled: "Sermons delivered in Times of Persecution in Scotland, by Sufferers for the Royal Prerogatives of Jesus Christ."

more momentous. He also added an appendix, to shew "upon what footing the more faithful party stood their ground" at and after the Revolution. This was supplemented by James Guthrie's *Considerations of the Dangers that Threaten Religion in Scotland*. This last has a separate title-page, but the pagination and signatures are continuous. To all this there was added:—

"A collection of very valuable sermons preached on several subjects and in divers places in the time of the late persecution, by these eminent servants of Jesus Christ, Messrs. John Kid, John King, John Welch, John Blackadder, John Dickson, and Gabriel Semple. Collected and transcribed from different manuscripts by John Howie. . . ."

This "collection" has a separate title-page and a separate preface, and the pagination and signatures begin afresh; but it was issued as part of the *Faithful Contendings Displayed*, being mentioned on the general title-page. The "collection" had evidently been prepared first, for its preface is dated, "Lochgoin, July 28, 1780;" while the preface to Michael Shields' portion is dated, "Lochgoin, Sept. 27th, 1780." The whole extends to 686 pp.; and another 20 pp. are filled with the "subscribers' names." These names must run up to about 1800 in number. When I first read this book, some thirty years ago, I thought that it was one of the most interesting I had ever gone through. Notwithstanding the large impression that was printed, the book is now by no means common.

In 1780 John Howie issued another book, or rather pamphlet, entitled:—

"An alarm unto a secure Generation; or a short Historical Relation of some of the most strange and remarkable appearances of comets, fiery meteors, bloody signs, ships of war, armies of foot and horsemen fighting, etc., that have been seen since the birth of our Saviour (as the tokens or forerunners both of promised mercies, and threatened judgments) through different ages; particularly those lately observed in the parishes of Finwick, Eglesham, and Kilmarnock: with some arguments and observations upon the

whole, in way of application to our present circumstances. In a letter from John Howie to William Young, student in the University of Glasgow."

This is a very curious little book, and was popularly called *The Fenwick Visions*. I only know it from the second edition, which was printed in Kilmarnock in 1809. The preface is signed "John Howie"; and is dated, "Lochgoin, Feb. 18th, 1780."

It might have been supposed that that little book, and the *Faithful Contendings Displayed* were quite enough to fill his hands at one time; but not so. At the desire of one of the elders of Fenwick parish, he wrote a pamphlet on patronage, which was then a burning question in that parish. This pamphlet is entitled:—"Patronage anatomized and detected," and is dated "Lochgoin, March 19th, 1780." It was sent to Fenwick at that time; but was not published until two years later, the preface "to the public" being dated, "Lochgoin, July 9th, 1782." By allowing it to remain so long unpublished, he was able to complete the history of the Fenwick case: and when he did publish it, he did so "by consent and at the desire of the committee, eldership, and people of Finwick."¹⁸ Until this time, the parish, he says, had not "actually felt the callous claws of patronage."

He anticipated the objection that might be raised against his intervention. He did not fear the indignation and resentment that might be evoked "both against the writer and

¹⁸ Here is the full title of the pamphlet as printed:

"Patronage anatomized and detected, or the rise, reign, nature, tendency, effects and evil consequences of Patronage laid open; some objections noticed; and popular election in a few particulars vindicated. In a letter from John Howie to the Eldership and Congregation of the parish of Finwick. To which is prefixed, by way of introduction, a short historical narrative of the whole process betwixt the people of Finwick and the judicatories of the Established Church, setting forth what treatment they have received from said judicatories anent their consent or choice in calling of their own minister. Published at the desire of the said parish of Finwick. [Isa. xxviii. 14, Psal. lxxxii. 2, Lam. iii. 36, John x. 1 partly quoted.] Glasgow: Printed by John Bryce, and sold at his shop, opposite Gibson's Wynd, Salt-Market. 1782."

his small performance." Truth, he says, will be truth, whoever speaks it: and he adds:—"It is hoped these arguments have Scripture to support them; and for historical facts they are stubborn things, and will not yield to every wanton and impudent attack made upon them." In his opinion, patronage was a despotism, and therefore ought to be opposed.

The opposition in Fenwick did not prevent the settlement of the Rev. William Boyd. The parishioners "barricaded the church door and filled the lock with stones to prevent his access, while the beadle refused to ring the bell." He was ordained, not at Fenwick, but at Irvine, on the 25th of June, 1782. For more than 46 years he continued to be the parish minister of Fenwick.¹⁴ After some twelve years' experience of the place, he wrote the old *Statistical Account* of his parish; and, in speaking of the population, he candidly says: "Of these, the great majority are of the class called Burgher-Seceders, who left the establishment at the settlement of the present incumbent." Howie, it need hardly be said, was a Cameronian, not a Seceder.

His next publication was entitled:—"Faithful Witness-Bearing Exemplified." It comprises three distinct items:—

I. Hugh Binning's Useful Case of Conscience.

II. A solemn Testimony against Toleration and prevailing errors, by the Commissioners of the General Assembly and sundry ministers in Perth and Fife.

III. Brown of Wamphray's History of the Indulgence.

These were introduced by John Howie in a preface, "concerning association, toleration, and what is now called Liberty of Conscience." This preface is dated, "Lochgoin, Jan. 18th, 1783". Both editions of *The Scots Worthies*, the volume of sermons, *Faithful Contendings Displayed*, and *Patronage Anatomized*, had all been printed and published by John Bryce, Glasgow. This volume was printed and sold by J. Wilson, Bookseller, Kilmarnock, who is now chiefly remembered as the printer of the first edition of Burns' Poems. The "subscribers' names" at the end of

¹⁴ Scott's *Fasti*, ii., pp. 169, 170.

Faithful Witness-Bearing Exemplified fill ten double-columned pages. The first name under Kilmarnock is: "Reverend Mr. John Russell, minister of the Gospell." This is the Russell who figures in five of Burns' poems, viz., in "The Twa Herds," the "Epistle to John Goldie," "The Holy Fair," "The Ordination," and "The Kirk of Scotland's Alarm." In the first of these he is thus referred to:—

"What herd like Russell tell'd his tale?
His voice was heard thro' muir and dale."

Howie also took part in the "lifting controversy," which controversy led to a split in the Anti-Burgher branch of the Secession Church. The disruption was led by David Smyton, the aged minister of Kilmaurs congregation. Howie took Smyton's side in the dispute, that is, he maintained that in the administration of the Lord's Supper the minister ought to take or touch or lift the elements before giving thanks, as Christ had done. Smyton's case was set forth in a pamphlet entitled:—

"An Apology and Vindication, or the practice and binding obligation of following Christ's institution and example in the administration of the Supper asserted and defended. To which is added, an appendix, containing copies of some original papers, with some short account of what transpired at last meeting of Synod in the case of the Rev. Mr. David Smyton, and a copy of his Declaration of Secession from them, and his reasons for so doing. Published by a committee appointed by (*sic*) order and in name of the Petitioners and Remonstrators in the Associate Congregations in Kilmaurs, Beith, Paisley, and Kilwinning. [Num. ix. 2, Luke xx. 19, I Cor. xi. 2 quoted.] Glasgow: Printed by John Bryce for the authors, and sold by G. Caldwell, Paisley; G. Laird, Greenock; and J. Wilson, Kilmarnock; etc. M.DCC.LXXXIII."

Howie's share in this pamphlet seems to have cost him more thought and study than any volume which he wrote or edited. His name does not appear in it; but the portion entitled, "The practice and binding obligation of following

Christ's institution and example in the administration of the Supper asserted and defended", may be safely assigned to him. This portion extends from p. 17 to p. 84. The books cited in it are of the kind which he possessed, and with which he was familiar. And here it may be mentioned that, for an eighteenth-century, moorland farmer, he had a pretty extensive and well-selected library of theological, historical, and controversial books and pamphlets. Though it has been plundered by dishonest borrowers since his death, enough still remains to show that the items had been chosen with care and judgment. The genuine pleasure of possessing such a library was no doubt enhanced by the self-denial and economy which had rendered its formation possible.¹⁵

In 1787 he issued another volume. It was entitled: "*Reformation Principles, etc., Re-exhibited*". It was printed in Glasgow by David Niven, for Robert Farie, bookseller, Saltmarket. It contains (1) The Covenants as they were renewed at Douglas in 1712; and (2) Plain Reasons for Presbyterians dissenting from the Revolution-Church in Scotland. The first of these had been originally published in 1712; and the other in 1731. The "Plain Reasons" were amended and enlarged by Howie, whose address "to the understanding reader" is dated "Lochgoin, March 22d, 1787". The subscribers' names fill eight double-columned pages.

The last book which Howie prepared for the press was written by John Brown of Wamphray. Here is the title-page:—

"A mirror: or Looking-Glass for Saint and Sinner. The important doctrines of the Law and Gospel opened up in a practical essay, from Gal. ii. 19. *For I through the law am dead to the law, that I might live unto God.* &c. By that eminent and laborious servant of Christ, Mr. John Brown, sometime minister of the Gospel at Wamphray.

¹⁵ A description of the books and relics still preserved at Lochgoin is given in Thomson's *Martyr Graves of Scotland*, 1875, i., pp. 150-164; 1903 ed., pp. 83-91. Some of them I have described in *Scottish National Memorials*, 1890, pp. 107-115.

Glasgow: Printed for Peter M'Arthur, Bookseller, Paisley. M.DCC.XCIII."

In the preface (which is dated "Lochgoin, August 1792"), Howie says:

"This amongst others of his [i. e. Brown's] last remains in manuscript has undergone a very remarkable providence as to its particular discovery on the very eve of inevitable wreck, which affords a powerful motive for its preservation by publication. And if any doubt of the authenticity thereof, in whole or in any article, they may be satisfied in a view of the author's own hand-writ (as is more than supposable), from which it was transcribed, not without some toil and trouble."

The MS. which Howie copied for the press was, he apparently believed, in Brown's own hand-writing. The volume is 12mo. and extends to 211 pp. besides the preface and the list of subscriber's names.

In 1809, John Calderwood, Clanfin, edited two of Howie's papers, to which he gave the title:

"Humble Pleadings; or a Representation of Grievances for the consideration of the Reformed Presbytery, wherein their defections, declinings and corruptions, both in principle and practice, is held forth. . . . Likewise a letter to a friend, containing I. Punitive Justice. II. The Mediator's Power. III. A few Remarks or Observations, in answer to some of the groundless reflections cast upon faithful contenders by lukewarm professors. By John Howie in Lochgoin. . . ."

This pamphlet was printed in Kilmarnock by H. & S. Crawford. Three years before this (viz., in 1806), Calderwood had published:

"A Collection of the Dying Testimonies of some holy and pious Christians, who lived in Scotland before and since the Revolution."

It does not appear whether he used John Howie's transcripts for this "Collection"; but it is quite certain that Howie had made copies of at least some of these testi-

¹⁰ *Faithful Contendings*, p. 488, and *Memoirs*, p. 20.

monies.¹⁶ It seems that Howie also intended to publish an edition of Stevenson's *History of the Church and State of Scotland*, and to complete it by a supplement;¹⁷ but death frustrated this project.

It is amazing how a man in Howie's position, with his other daily duties to perform, and far from public libraries, could find time to write and edit so much. By looking into the *Memoirs* this wonder is increased, for there it is made evident that a great part of his time was taken up every day with private prayer and meditation, and family devotions. Doubtless, when engaged with the necessary duties of his moorland farm, his mind was frequently filled with his beloved literary work. At such times many a thought would be crystalized; many of his happiest expressions would assume their final form. In this way his daily open-air avocations would rather help than hinder his more enduring work.

Except on Sabbaths and fast days, he usually took a nap after dinner in summer; in the early evening, in winter. This custom tended to keep him awake in the mornings before it was time to rise. That his mind might be profitably employed on these wakeful mornings, he had texts or truths selected for meditation.

The *Memoirs*, and especially the portion written by himself, show that he was a truly God-fearing man, genuinely sincere and conscientious, striving to walk in the narrow way that leadeth to eternal life. His "predominants", as he calls them, frequently got the better of him, or at least he thought they did. One of these "predominants" was a hasty temper; and, when through provocation he gave way to it, he bitterly bewailed his weakness. He often prayed that he might be kept straight in the way, from falling into anything in his practice that would dishonor God, be offensive to God's people, bring a reproach on religion, or discredit the cause he had done so much for in public. He kept private and family fasts and thanksgivings, over and

¹⁷ Thomson's *Martyr Graves of Scotland*, i., p. 146.

above the public ones appointed by the Reformed Presbytery. He owns that he did not profit so much from hearing sermons as he might have done. This, he says, was partly due to the deceitfulness and treachery of Satan and his own heart; but he thought it was also partly due to the ministers, who might have preached with more caution and faithfulness. Nevertheless, he went long distances to hear sermons and wait upon ordinances. On one occasion he was greatly grieved by the behaviour of a number of the people at Sandihills sacrament. The preaching was in the open air, and there were crowds of hearers; but many were running to and fro drinking, and talking as if they had been in a public market. On the very skirts of the congregation, half dozens were talking and laughing. When in the evening one of the ministers made it a matter of thanksgiving that so many had been present, John Howie thought that had the minister seen what he had seen, it might rather have been a matter for lamentation and grief. He was very fond of singing; and often went into his garden, or little orchard as he sometimes calls it, or out to the muir, to sing psalms. For this purpose he usually carried a psalm-book.

He occasionally went to public executions, not that he had any pleasure in seeing criminals hanged; but he had always "a great desire to hear the last or dying words of people, whether on a death-bed or scaffold", whether *viva voce*, or in print or writing. At an execution in Glasgow he was greatly disappointed, for he heard nothing that could leave an inspiring impression on his mind. Yet when the drop fell (the execution being carried out after the English manner) he thought it left the sound of death in his ears.¹⁸

His disposition, he states, was somewhat soft, and his bodily constitution weak or tender. In his youth he had small-pox, and afterwards fell into a lingering fever, which

¹⁸ "William Penn, for whom exhibitions which humane men generally avoid seem to have had a strong attraction, hastened from Cheapside, where he had seen Cornish hanged, to Tyburn, in order to see Elizabeth Gaunt burned." (Macaulay's *History of England*, 8th edition, i., p. 659.)

threatened to end in consumption. About twelve years before his death, he happened to be driving home peats. The horse was strong and young and restive; and, having bolted, dragged him through a dam of water. He was violently dashed against the dyke or sluice, and let go his grip, and the cart-wheel went over him. Fully three years later he was at a religious meeting in Darvel, and left for home after it was dark. The night was wet and misty; and a thaw was melting the snow. He had to ford three swollen burns; and had great difficulty in getting through them, especially the one he calls "our own burn". The water, which was running above the ice, carried him off his feet, but at last he got hold of a rash-bush, and was able to drag himself out. Such adventures were not good physically for a man who had never been over robust. In 1791 he was troubled with rheumatism, and by and by his illness developed into what was described as "a complex of various disorders", which he was unable to throw off.

In September, 1792, one of his sons went home with small-pox; and the rest of his family, one after another, took the disease. His son John—his son by his first wife—died; and he was himself so frail that it was with difficulty he reached his son's bed-side on the morning of his death. It was a solemn occasion, as he himself said, "two dying persons speaking to one another". Kneeling beside the bed, he "in prayer made a free and ample acknowledgment to the Lord in his son's behalf, as to his sins, original and actual, omission and commission; and then interceded to the Lord for mercy to his soul; and also confessed his own neglect in duty towards him; implored for mercy to them both, to the great surprise of those standing by, being both long and particular as ever they had heard; and he being so weakly in body, became the the more wonderful". A friend continued to pray beside the young man, while the anxious father retired to the byre and prayed alone. While thus wrestling in secret with his Covenant-God, one went into the byre and told him that his son had passed into the

world of spirits. "Has the Lord done this, and hid it from me", he exclaimed, "it wont not to be so in times past; what poor sinful creatures are we! I see I must yet have more haggling. 'O my son Absalom, my son, my son Absalom! would God I had died for thee, O Absalom, my son, my son!' If I had known this, I had rested none this night; O what is this!"

The stricken father lingered on for a few months, as he had confidently expected he would after hearing this verse of a Psalm sung:

"O spare thou me, that I my strength recover may again,
Before from home I do depart, and here no more remain."

Though a true believer, he never attained to the full assurance of faith; and had always a lurking dread of death. In a foot-note to *Reformation Principles Re-exhibited* (p. 244), he thus, unconsciously perhaps, pictured his own case: "Some have advanced unto heaven's threshold (so to speak) wrestling through the dark avenues of doubts and fears, and yet have anchored safe within the vail at last."

Late in the evening of the 5th of January, 1793, "his soul was removed from its clay tabernacle and weary wilderness of sin and corruption". The last words he was heard to utter were: "Christ would come."

The elements of John Howies' literary success are plain and palpable. He had not only a strong and vigorous intellect, but he confined himself to one line of study, and greedily read everything he could lay hands upon that seemed likely to be helpful; and his line of study was not so much chosen by him, as it gradually grew upon him. From his boyhood he loved to hear and read of the martyrs, reformers, and confessors. And thus he was not only imbued with his subject, but was passionately fond of it. It was this engrossing passion which at first compelled him to write, though he had then no idea of publishing. From the beginning of his career, he was an enthusiast and a spe-

cialist; and, by constant application, he became an authority and an expert. His style is less simple and less natural than Patrick Walker's; but it has a calm dignity and stateliness which Patrick could not reach; and unlike Patrick he loved to introduce, now and again, a Latin phrase. From the pecuniary point of view his reward does not seem to have been great; but that was not the object he had in view. In one passage he explains that, before writing anything "which was designed for the public", it was his never-failing custom "to pray to the Lord for light and direction"; and that the work "might be frustrated", if it was not for God's honour and glory. He rejoiced to know that his writings had been useful and beneficial to others, and was gratified by the new friendships they brought him.

All that he wrote bore more or less directly on the principles and contendings of the afflicted Church of Scotland. A faithful Cameronian himself, he not only cherished the memory, but tenaciously adhered to the principles, of those who counted no sacrifice too great in the cause of revealed truth, and regarded no truth as too insignificant to die for. Had he been spared, each edition of his *Scots Worthies* would have been improved in details and enlarged. As it is he has the honour of having become one of the first three of the old-fashioned, popular, religious writers of Scotland. These three are William Guthrie of Fenwick, Samuel Rutherford, and John Howie. It was fitting that the third should write biographies of the other two; and it is a noteworthy coincidence that the first and the third—Guthrie and Howie—should have spent the best part of their lives in the same country parish. Hard behind these three in popularity come Thomas Boston of Ettrick, and Ralph Erskine of Dunfermline, both of whom far surpassed Guthrie in the quantity of their literary output; but no work of their's reached an eightieth edition as Guthrie's *Saving Interest* seems to have done, or a sixtieth as Rutherford's *Letters*, or even a fiftieth as *The Scots Worthies*.

Edinburgh.

D. HAY FLEMING.

JEWISH PARTIES IN THE FIFTH CENTURY BEFORE CHRIST.¹

The inhabitants of the little province of Judæa, under the Persian Empire a part of the great satrapy of Syria, were, like the other parts of the empire, divided in interests by those fixed lines of cleavage that in all ages and places have set men off one against another in persistent opposition amounting often to deadly hatred. It appears that the bitterness of party strife is enhanced by the narrowness of the limits within which the factions develop. The proverbial "tempest in a teapot" appears insignificant to the observer, yet it would surpass the wildest storms of ocean, could we but contract our scale of measurements to the standard of microscopic life. For this reason, instead of disregarding the petty and changing factions common to the history of every city-state or little commonwealth, we rather do well to study them with the more care the smaller the community that develops them.

In Judæa in the fifth century before Christ all the elements were present that constitute those fixed lines of cleavage to which we have referred. There were differences, racial, social, political, religious. These we shall take up, one after another, before we attempt to combine them into a general sketch of the parties that arose through the interplay of these conflicting forces.

In the first place, racially, the population consisted of three distinct elements. There were, first, the Persian; second, the Jew; third, the non-Jewish Palestinian. Of the Persian we need say little, for his figure and his position in Asia during this century are well known to us from our

¹ An address delivered at the opening of the ninety-seventh session of Princeton Theological Seminary, on Friday, September 18, 1908.

classical authors. There were probably few Persians resident in the Province of Judæa, and these were there undoubtedly in civil and military positions, and subject to constant change. Few in number, they were of an altogether disproportionate importance, but this importance, being political, can best be noted later in connection with the political phase of Jewish life.

The Jew formed the only considerable homogeneous racial element of the population, though the proportion of Jews to strangers in this province, "Judæa" though it was in name, doubtless fluctuated greatly with the ebb and flow of military and commercial tides that swept through Syria during the century. Racially the Jew was indeed a mixture of many elements, but the exclusiveness that tended to conserve the ancient Israelitish strain was by no means a novelty of this century, gotten up by Ezra and Nehemiah for party reasons. The offspring of intermarriages between Jews and non-Jews within the province were at best the exception, not the rule, and the bulk of the population that could be described as "Jewish" was of at least as pure Hebrew stock as were the subjects of King Josiah or King Zedekiah.

The population outside of this compact Jewish mass consisted mostly of Palestinians who had moved in from the surrounding peoples. We read particularly of Ammonites, Arabians, Ashdodites or Philistines, Tyrians or Phoenicians, and Samaritans. In those last named we are of course to recognize a closer racial affinity with the Jew than in the other Palestinian elements.

Representatives of all these nations, and doubtless of many others, such as Egyptians, Greeks and Babylonians, dwelt together, fought side by side in the armies of the Persian kings and satraps, carried on commerce and the peaceful arts, without any difficulty on the score of language. The medium of communication in all the western half of the Persian Empire was Aramaic. Official documents of the Persian courts, letters of merchants, memor-

anda and records of all sorts, in which the parties interested were not of the same mother-tongue, were written in the Aramaic language and the simple, practical Aramaic script. And both in Judæa and among Jews outside of Judæa this dominant language was by the fifth century more and more displacing the Hebrew tongue, even in the daily intercourse of Jew with Jew.

Before leaving this subject, we should observe that there was no particular bond to unite these heterogeneous racial elements, except the negative bond of being all of them non-Jews. Against the Jews they might unite, temporarily, even on the basis of racial considerations; for any other purpose they were a centrifugal, disruptive force, making for the progressive leveling of the province up, or down, to the plane of the general Palestinian type,—in short, for the denationalizing, or internationalizing, of Judæa, and therefore for its disappearance from the field of history.

The second line of cleavage in the community was the divergence of social conditions and interests. Here, as elsewhere, prevailed the distinction between high-born and low-born, the noble and the commoner. But to this in Judæa was added the distinction between slave and freeman; that is, a purely social distinction between slave and freeman, not coinciding with the usual racial distinction between the master and his slave. Repugnant as this enslaving of brother by brother must have been to all wholesome and humane feelings, it was doubly so to a nation with the moral and religious heritage of the Jew. It was utterly foreign to the Hebrew conscience to permit the enslaving of a Jew by his fellow-Jew in any manner corresponding to the usual relation of master and slave. We do not have to go to the Pentateuch to discover this sentiment, for it emerges in the prophets, as in Jeremiah, and again with great vehemence in Nehemiah.

The causes of this intra-Jewish slavery were economic. To trace the development of the social classes of the fifth century out of the cataclysms of the sixth century, its de-

portations and migrations, would be beyond our present purpose. It is enough to note here the three causes which Nehemiah assigns as the immediate occasion of that intolerable social condition which he found in Judæa and attempted to remedy. These three causes, all of them economic, were the following: (1) dearth in production, (2) oppressive taxation, (3) usury in lending. (Neh. v. 2-5.)

The first it was not in the power of the governor to remedy. The second Nehemiah had already largely mitigated by his own voluntary sacrifice of the perquisites of his office: in all the time he was governor, he and his attendants "did not eat the bread of the governor" (Neh. v. 14). That is, he had not levied a special tax for his own private support and the maintenance of his court and table. The third cause he was resolved at once to remove, if it lay within his power. It seems that the wise provisions of ancient law had been habitually disregarded by the wealthy Jews, respecting the lending of money and the terms of service for those who pledged their own persons for debt. Instead of the liberal and fraternal treatment there enjoined, the rich had taken advantage of their needy brethren in every way. They had loaned money (probably that required for the royal taxes) only upon the mortgaging of the fields and vineyards of their inheritance by the poor; and they had precluded the possibility of redeeming the property so mortgaged, by exacting a usurious rate of interest, probably one per cent. a month (Neh. v. 11). For if these lands could scarcely support their owners from year to year without any interest to pay, it would be impossible for them to yield this with a twelve per cent. interest in addition,—to say nothing of any surplus to apply to the reduction of the debt. Once started on this downward course, there was no end for the Jew but serfdom. And even this was not the humane serfdom of the old law, but a real slavery, that might and often did result in his being sold to a foreigner and transported far from his home and nation. (Neh. v. 8.) Nehemiah's remedy was the exaction of a public oath from the wealthy Jews.

that they would restore to their poor brethren their inheritances, and commute the interest heretofore exacted.

Nobles and common people, masters and slaves, rich and poor: all these social distinctions within the bounds of so small a state, where the contrasts in condition were the more galling because constantly in evidence, rendered Judæa in the fifth century peculiarly subject to the passions of party strife.

The third line of cleavage was the divergence of political views. This was in Judæa the divergence natural in a dependent state,—the different answers given to the question, how shall we deport ourselves toward our masters, and toward our neighbors subject like ourselves to the same masters? From the nature of the case two opposite views would emerge: the patriotic policy, and the international policy, if we may so designate them.

No long or elaborate explanations need be entered into, in order to make plain the distinction intended. The situation, considered purely from the political side, is so similar in all subject states, that any instance with which we happen to be familiar will serve to illustrate the situation in Judæa under the Persian sway. No illustration could be better than this same Judæa in the period familiar to us all, the period of Roman domination, the Judæa of Christ and of Paul. The same forces that were at work to produce the parties of the first century of our era, politically considered,—the Herodians, the Zealots, and the rest,—were at work to produce parties in the fifth century B. C.

The internationalist would minimize his Jewish citizenship as a distinctive honor; would "cultivate" the Persian in a manner often suggestive of time-serving and opportunism; would enter into friendly alliances of every sort with the neighboring peoples, especially that element in them that shared his own political views; and finally, would resist every effort to preserve distinctively Jewish laws and customs, national defense, local associations and ambitions. Free play for the individual would emerge as a corollary to

his theory, for it is local government and society, rather than the pressure of imperial authority, that restricts the individual within the bounds of common law or custom.

On the other side, the patriotically inclined Jew, speaking politically, would pride himself most upon being a Jew, maintaining all the inherited national laws and customs, and adapting them to his own age; he would comport himself toward the Persian overlord as a master to be obeyed from the force of circumstances, but to be cultivated and beloved only in proportion to his more or less friendly attitude toward the Jewish people as such; and finally, towards the neighboring peoples he would maintain an attitude of reserve, distrusting the encroachments of friendship and alliance with them, as much as he feared their malice and opposition, dreading most of all absorption with them into the mass of denationalized subjects of "the great king". Here again would follow as a corollary the willing sacrifice of the individual for the sake of the state, the subordination of personal comfort, ambition and tastes to the interests of the community—that ideal which passed for the Jew of that day variously under the designation of "Jerusalem", "Israel", or "Judah".

The fourth and last of these lines of cleavage in the Jewish people was their diversity of religious views. Here we may leave out of account those Jews who completely denationalized themselves by forsaking the God of their fathers and going over to the worship of other gods. After the exile this movement was so comparatively small as to be a negligible quantity. But within the bounds of the worshippers of Jehovah, there were two general tendencies manifest: first, the tendency to make religion an external cultus, splendidly maintained indeed after the traditional forms, but regarded as simply the Jewish analogue to the religious establishments of temple, priesthood and ceremony universally prevalent among the nations. The other tendency was to regard the worship of Jehovah as something wholly unique, from the person of the Deity, down through

His laws, His ministers, His habitation, His peculiar people, His providence, His promises, even to the minutiae of daily life and thought. This latter tendency is too faithfully reflected throughout the Old Testament, in Psalm and Proverb, in Law and Prophecy and History, to need any further exposition or illustration. What God, what Israel, what Jerusalem, what religion as a whole, meant to a man of Judah, say to Isaiah, in the eighth century, just that—no more, and no less—did they mean to a man of Judah in the fifth century who belonged to this stricter tendency, let us say, to Nehemiah. In this age, as in that earlier age, it was possible for the man of laxer tendency to be very much devoted to the ceremonies of the temple, and to set store by the priesthood or, if a priest, pride himself upon his birth and magnify his office. But this interest in religion would not extend to the point of voluntary self-sacrifice for it, nor tolerate the burden of its demands upon the conscience in regulating the hidden life of the soul or even the succession of little acts of which life is made up.

Here again we may best illustrate the two directions of religion in Judæa of the fifth century B. C. by the Judæa of the first century after Christ. Sadducee and Pharisee were by no means distinguished by their attitude toward the sanctuary, the former neglecting, the latter maintaining it. The high-priest and his whole connection in the period most familiar to us from the New Testament belonged to the party of the Sadducees. But the well-known difference between Pharisee and Sadducee in the regulation of all life by religion represents the difference between the stricter and the laxer religious tendency in this earlier age: though we must of course guard against the crude notion that Pharisee and Sadducee may be simply projected back through five centuries, retaining all the accretions of those five centuries of development. If we want an approximate picture of the best type of strict Jew of this fifth century, we may doubtless find it in such characters as Luke's Zachariah and Elizabeth, Mary and Simeon. In fact, Malachi in his third

chapter has painted for us a portrait of his godly contemporaries, less distinct in outline than his companion-portrait of the "proud" man, yet clear enough to exhibit the same features as in Luke's immortal figures.

We are now in a position to sketch the parties that existed in Judæa in the fifth century, by combining these conflicting elements, racial, social, political and religious, in their interplay within the narrow limits of this little province.

There are two such parties, clearly indicated for us on the pages of Ezra and Nehemiah, the histories of the period, and of Malachi, the contemporary prophet.

We take up first the party that for convenience we shall designate, from its political principles, the international party.

Racially, this could count upon the support, first, of resident Persians, under all ordinary circumstances; second, of all the non-Jews of the province—these for obvious reasons; and third, of those Jews who had some particular interest in strengthening the ties that united Jews with foreigners and with residents of non-Jewish birth. What were such particular interests?

There was, first, the commercial bond. In this age, as both earlier and later, Judæa sent corn and wine, raisins, figs and oil to Philistia and Phoenicia, and received, mainly, the products of the useful arts in exchange. Nehemiah mentions specifically the Tyrians of his time as middlemen in the trade in "fish and all manner of ware" (Neh. xiii. 16). It was naturally to the interest of the men of Judæa who were engaged in such commerce, to strengthen the bonds of international friendship.

Again, there was the bond of personal ambition. Those who were anxious to pose before Persian and Palestinian as "men of the world", to shake off the provincial and narrowly Jewish, would attach themselves to this international party.

Finally, there was the bond of intermarriage. We should make a great mistake in estimating the forces at work among the races inhabiting Judæa, were we to suppose that

the marriages contracted between Jew and non-Jew were unions prompted by a preference of Jewish men for non-Jewish women. This probably had nothing to do with the case. It was in fact the same commercial interest and personal ambition that have just been mentioned, which led to these mixed marriages. But the point is this, that they were both result and cause of this internationalism that permeated Jewish circles: result, insofar as commercial and other bonds already contracted or sought led to the consummation of these marriages to seal the extra-Jewish friendship desired; cause, insofar as such marriages committed their contractor to the alien interests with which he was now publicly allied. These considerations are, however, so closely bound up with the social conditions of the province, that we pass at once to the social phase of this international party.

To it were attracted the rich and the noble. From the nature of the case we could affirm this with confidence, had we no facts to prove it. But there is abundance of material scattered through Ezra, Nehemiah and Malachi, to exhibit its truth to fact by concrete illustrations. One such will suffice.

Tobiah, called "the Ammonite" by Nehemiah, of whom he was one of the three leading opponents, was in close touch with the nobles of Judah. They were in a correspondence with Tobiah that Nehemiah justly regarded as treasonable and treacherous, in view of Tobiah's well-known hostility to the Jewish governor. The reason given for this interest of the nobles in Tobiah is that he was son-in-law of one noble, and his son had married the daughter of another noble; hence, "many in Judah were sworn unto him" (Neh. vi. 17-19). But I believe we may with a high degree of probability go one step further. How came this "Ammonite" to be named "Tobiah", a name as Jewish as "Nehemiah"? And how came this "Ammonite" to have a chamber prepared for him, by Eliashib the high-priest, in the courts of the house of God, during Nehemiah's temporary absence from Jerusalem? Is it not the most reasonable

explanation that Tobiah was himself one of those unfortunates, the offspring of the mixed marriages that Ezra broke up a decade or two previous? In these, we are told, the "princes and rulers" were "chief" (Ezra ix. 2), and the priests, indeed the "sons of Jeshua", that is, the high-priestly family, were leading offenders (Ezra x. 18). Offspring of a member of the priestly, or even high-priestly, circle and an Ammonitish woman whose wealth or position or family made her an attractive alliance, Tobiah bore a Jewish name, passed his youth in Jerusalem among the Jewish kinsmen of his father, perhaps had already been initiated into those priestly functions to which his father's rank gave him the right. Suddenly Ezra descends upon the province, armed with the full authority of Artaxerxes' firman. The famous commission on the mixed marriages is appointed. With scores of others, he and his mother are cast out of the Jewish congregation. Henceforth he is neither Jew nor Ammonite. A "man without a country", he is an international, an embittered soul, whose spiteful, tireless, resourceful enmity to Nehemiah and his party is not only explicable, but natural, as recorded on the pages of Nehemiah's memoirs.

After this illuminating story of Tobiah's connections and career, it will hardly be necessary to say more in explication of the social appeal of the international party. The peculiarly close affiliation of the priesthood with this party will be remarked again in connection with its religious phase.

It is from the sphere of politics that we have borrowed the word international, which we are using for a convenient designation of the party. International ideals made a peculiarly powerful appeal to the Jewish provincial of that day, as they do in any little state subject to a mighty empire like the Persian. Unless offset by racial, social or religious considerations—in other words, "other things being equal"—these ideals were those most attractive to the broad-minded, thinking men of the day. The very language of internationalism has a sweep, a poetry, a fascination, that at once puts its opponent at a disadvantage. Having regard to

politics only, you and I feel instinctively that were we Jews of the fifth century B. C., we would adopt the views and the policy of this party. This was the safe course for a little subject-people; it was the practical course; it was the easiest course; it meant peace and material prosperity. Doubtless this is one reason why modern writers on this period so often identify themselves in sympathy with this party and attack the policy of men like Nehemiah. In any case, we find the international party in Judæa attracting to itself men of the province who had largest opportunity for culture, travel, political training: again the rich and noble, of the Jews;—the resident non-Jewish population was of course to a man on the same side.

Lastly, this party attracted to itself all those Jews who, while interested in maintaining established religion, were not disposed to be over-religious. Nor need we be surprised to find in this class the leading members of the Jewish clergy. Analogies are too plentiful in other lands and ages to permit us to regard this as an anomaly. In fact, it is the high-priestly family, the supreme family of the Jewish nation in point of position and influence throughout Jewish history except in the times of Zerubbabel, of Nehemiah, and of the earlier Asmonæans,—it is this high-priestly family that almost invariably heads the “international” party. Personal interest dictated to these leaders of the nation a type of religion that subtracted nothing from the dignity and power of their office, yet that also imposed no restraints upon the cultivation of their masters, upon whose favor the attainment or maintenance of that office depended. Eliashib and his grandsons in this fifth century find their counterparts in many a high-priest of the Egyptian and Syrian period, and of the Roman period.

The important thing to guard against in estimating the religious phase of this international party, is the supposition that it had any hostility to the religion of Jehovah, at least as an external cultus. It was not the successor of the strictly heathen element in the ancient Southern Kingdom. Its

affinity was rather with the men whom the prophets of that kingdom denounced for their purely formalistic conception of the religion of Jehovah, their *opus operatum* notion of ritual and sacrifice, their reliance upon the mere mechanics of expiation.

If such was the international party in Judæa, what now was the patriotic party?

Racially, it was necessarily exclusively Jewish. It had no attraction for the Palestinian whose lineage was not of Israel, unless he gave up all his bonds of kinship, "separated himself from the filthiness of the peoples of the land" (to use the contemporary phrase); in a word, became a proselyte. And only a religious motive could accomplish this remarkable, yet increasingly common, miracle.

Socially, the rich had nothing, the poor had everything, to gain through the dominance of a party that stood for the enforcement of ancient Hebrew law and custom, with its humanity to the slave and the impoverished, and with its leveling equality in position and property, in forensic and civil rights. Under the Persian system, it is plain to see on the pages of both oriental and classical records, the rich grew richer and the poor grew poorer, the noble not the man was the unit, the serf was the abject subject of whim and passion. The Greek felt rightly, from the days of Thermopylae to the days of Alexander, that Persia stood for the opposite of the Greek idea and whatever of individualism it has bequeathed to the world in society and in politics. No; the poor Jew, the everyday citizen of Jerusalem, of the towns and of the country-districts, and of course the enslaved Jew—these all were on the side of the patriotic party. It was from them that Nehemiah obtained his strongest backing, next to the royal authority itself.

Politically speaking, again, the patriotic party represented the toleration of Persia as a necessary, but temporary, overlord, whose domination must soon cease, but, as long as it existed unimpaired, must be loyally obeyed. Every effort should be made to enlist its kings, satraps, governors and

lesser officials, in the service of Jehovah's people. But there should be no compromise of principle, and even the Persian must be made to feel that the God of the Jew was supreme Arbiter even of Persia's destiny.

This brings us to the religious side of the party. Its power of appeal would lie in its devotion to what was peculiarly Hebrew in the national religion: to the voices of its prophets, with their inward, spiritual interpretation of the national law and religion; and with their pictures of a unique mission and future for Israel. The moral and the Messianic, roughly speaking, would be the features of Jehovahism that would be uppermost in the patriotic party's religious characteristics. These Jews would yield to none in their devotion to Jehovah's house, His chosen mountain and city, His ordinances and representatives; but they would not confine their devotion to these things. However unworthy might be individual adherents of this party, the party as such would stand for a strict observance of Jehovah's law in the whole realm of individual and national life.

Such, in brief, was the party known to us chiefly through the ideals and activities of Ezra and Nehemiah, its remarkable leaders.

It is apart from the present purpose to depict the fortunes of these parties. To do so would be precisely to write the history of the Jews in the fifth century. What has been done has been to outline a necessary chapter in the prolegomena to a history of Judaism. The choice of this subject for the present occasion has had for its motive the proper relation of the latest important discovery of archæology to what we already know of the century to which this find belongs. And it has become plain by this time, we believe, that a knowledge of the party-issues is essential to any adequate estimate of Judæa and the Jews in that century. This done, we proceed to the archæological contribution to the subject in hand.

Few of the "finds" that of late years have so enriched the

materials available for reconstruction of the ancient orient can be compared, in value and interest for the Old Testament student, with the three Aramaic papyri discovered recently on the island of Elephantine in Upper Egypt and published last year by Eduard Sachau of Berlin. Proof of this assertion will not be demanded by any who so much as read the text of these three papyri. For on the face of the documents is stamped their near relationship to the history of the Jews as we read it in the closing historical books of the Old Testament. So that Sachau is justified in declaring at the end of his comments on this ancient correspondence, "the excavations in Elephantine have enriched the Old Testament by the addition of a whole chapter, as new as it is rich in contents".

Instead of giving the translation of these documents, it will perhaps better serve the present purpose to mention some of the features referred to above, as of prime interest to the Biblical scholar.

(1) They are dated, and these dates, unlike those in many similar documents, are beyond dispute either in the reading or in the meaning of them. They come to us from "the 17th year of King Darius". This must be the second Persian monarch of that name, who reigned from B. C. 424-406, (the man whose name begins Xenophon's *Anabasis*), for Cambyses (529-522) is referred to in the papyri as having reigned long, long ago, in the days of the "fathers". Darius I, who was practically the successor of that Cambyses, is thus out of the question. And Darius III., whom Alexander conquered in 330, did not reign 17 years. This fixes the date at the year 408-407 before our era, the age of Socrates and Alcibiades and Thucydides, the time when Carthage was overrunning Sicily and Rome was still struggling for existence against the neighboring states.

(2) The authors of the documents are Jews settled in Yeb, the Egyptian name for Elephantine, that ancient border-fortress opposite Syene on the upper Nile, for centuries the chief bulwark of kingdom or empire (as the case might

be) against the Ethiopians. We are hereby confirmed in the knowledge we already possessed from other recent discoveries, that there was a large and flourishing colony of Hebrews in this fortress, who had been there for at least a century and a half.

(3) More particularly, these writers call themselves priests: "Jedoniah and his companions, the priests in the fortress Yeb." And the matter of which they write centers in a certain local temple of the God "Yahu". It was in this temple of their God, whom they term "our Lord the God of Heaven", that these "priests" officiated, and that too with true priestly functions, for we read of an altar, of gold and silver vessels for the sacrificial blood, of incense, and of bloody and unbloody offerings, exactly as in the ritual at the Jerusalem temple then standing. This temple at Yeb had been built, according to our documents, "in the days of the kings of Egypt," that is, previous to the conquest by Cambyzes, B. C. 525. At the time when that Zoroastrian overran the country and "destroyed all the temples of the Gods of Egypt," he spared this temple of the Jews at Yeb. But in 411-410, three years before our documents were composed, the "idolatrous priests" (the writer uses the same word *Chemarim* that is used in Zeph. i. 4 and twice elsewhere in the Old Testament) of the Egyptian God Chnub had brought about the complete destruction of the Jewish temple, through conspiracy with a local official in the absence of the Persian governor of Egypt. The writers proceed to tell of the fasts, prayers and efforts of the Jewish colony during the three years that had since elapsed, looking toward a restoration of their ruined house of God. Their language leaves no room to doubt that not only for these priests, but also for the whole Hebrew population of the place, their temple was the center of their religious life, and its restoration the supreme object of their desire as a community.

(4) Two of the three documents that constitute this "find" are practically duplicates. They are copies of the letter addressed by the priests above described, to "Bagohi,

governor of Judah at Jerusalem". It is to this Persian official, the supreme representative of imperial authority so far as it directly and exclusively touched the Hebrew people, that these men of Upper Egypt, hundreds of miles from Jerusalem, turned for aid and comfort in their project of rebuilding their temple of Yahu. The word for governor is the same (*Pechah*) as that uniformly used in the Old Testament for the same office, held by Nehemiah in the fifth century. We know from Biblical chronology that Nehemiah was *Pechah* of Judah as late as about 430 B. C. Here we have, then, proof (1) that an early, if not the immediate successor of Nehemiah was named Bagohi; (2) that he was a Persian, as Nehemiah's predecessors also had probably been (*cf.* Neh. v. 14); (3) that he was known to be favorable to the nation of which he was governor and, specifically, friendly to its religion; and (4) that he had been governor at least since 411, and was supposed to possess such influence even in Egypt, that a letter from him would secure for the Jews of Elephantine that interest with their superiors requisite for prosecuting their work of rebuilding the temple.

(5) We turn now to others in Palestine involved in this correspondence. The priests of Yeb mention not only a previous letter to this same Bagohi, written in 411-410, but also letters written at that time to "Jehohanan, the chief-priest, and his companions the priests in Jerusalem, and to his brother Ostan, who is Anani, and the nobles of the Jews." Furthermore, at the close of this document, its authors mention the fact to Bagohi that they are sending a letter with similar contents to "Delaiah and Shelemiah, the sons of Sanballat, the governor of Samaria." The third of these documents, a brief writing of only eleven short lines, confirms this information, for it commences: "Memorandum of what Bagohi and Delaiah said to me, memorandum, as follows."

Every reader of the book of Nehemiah will recognize at once the familiar name of Sanballat, whom we here for the first time learn positively to have been, or at least ulti-

mately to have become, "governor" (*Pechah*) of Samaria. The name of the chief-priest, Jehohanan, is not so familiar as that of Sanballat, yet it too is known from the book of Nehemiah. Jehohanan was the grandson of that Eliashib who was the high-priest contemporary with the activities of both Ezra (458) and Nehemiah (444—c. 430). This Eliashib, both because of his long incumbency, and in view of his separation by only one intermediate generation from Joshua, the high-priest of Cyrus' reign (537), must have been a very old man by 430. This agrees admirably with the fact recorded by Nehemiah (xiii. 28) that by that date Eliashib had a grandson already married, and with the fact revealed by our documents, that within 20 years or less, the grandson, Jehohanan, and not the son, Joiada, of this Eliashib, was at the head of the priesthood. These same considerations would indicate that even this grandson Jehohanan had in 411 already reached middle life.

This is as far as the Bible takes us in our nearer approach to the acquaintance of these persons. Is there no other source of information to aid us? Happily Josephus in his *Antiquities* xi. 297-301 (*ed.* Niese) comes in to supplement our meagre knowledge of this first age of post-Biblical Judaism.

He tells us of a shocking tragedy in the high-priestly family during the governorship of a certain Bagoses, and the high-priesthood of Joannas. It appears that a brother of this high-priest, named Jesus, relying upon the special friendship entertained for him by Bagoses, assumed so much that he angered the high-priest, who slew him in the temple itself. Hereupon Bagoses, claiming with very good show of reason that his own person was no more defiling to the temple, even though a foreigner, than the presence in it of the fratricide who presided over it, entered the sacred edifice and so defiled it. He also laid a tax upon the people, exacting 50 drachmae for each lamb of the daily sacrifice, contrary to the custom of the Persians and ostensibly as an expiation for the crime committed.

In this brief narrative of Josephus, two of the three persons are easily identified. Bagoses and Joannas are of course merely the Greek forms of the names Bagohi and Jehohanan. Joshua (Jesus), the brother slain by Jehohanan, is otherwise unknown to us, though he bears a name exceedingly likely to reappear in the high-priestly family of that period in any given generation. He cannot reasonably be identified with the "Ostan who is Anani" of our papyri, for this brother already has two names, one of them genuine Hebrew.

Our acquaintance with the high-priestly family is growing. We know now three sons of Joiada, son of Eliashib, namely, Jehohanan, Joshua, Anani. Do we know any more?

Nehemiah in his closing chapter (xiii. 28) tells us that "one of the sons of Joiada, the son of Eliashib, the high-priest, was son-in-law to Sanballat the Horonite." He adds, "therefore I chased him from me. Remember them, O my God; because they have defiled the priesthood, and the covenant of the priesthood, and of the Levites. Thus cleansed I them from all strangers." Was this leader of the priests, whom Nehemiah expelled from Jerusalem because of his connection with aliens, one of the three brothers we have already learned to know? Here again Josephus can probably give us light. In the paragraph that in his book follows the incident of Johanan and Joshua and Bagohi recounted above, Josephus tells the story of the fortunes of a certain member of the high-priestly family whom he names Manasses. This man he makes the husband of Nikaso, daughter of Sanballat, governor of Samaria. But he also calls him the brother of Joaddous, that is, Jaddua, who was the son and successor of our high-priest Jehohanan. Not only so, but Josephus also mingles the story of Sanballat's plans and Manasseh's adventures with the story of Alexander's relations with Jews and Samaritans; that is, he places all these persons and events in the second half of the fourth century instead of the second half of the fifth century.

There are two alternatives here. One is to suppose that

there were two Sanballats, governors of Samaria, who had each a daughter married to a member of the high-priestly family in Jerusalem. The other is the more natural supposition, adopted all but unanimously by scholars, that Josephus, here as elsewhere in this eleventh book of his work, is astray in his chronology, and has combined names and events that really belonged a century apart. If so, Manasseh is doubtless the correct name for that "son of Joiada, son of Eliashib", whom Nehemiah "chased from him" about 430 B. C.; and we may attribute to this person, in the main, those fortunes and achievements which entitle him to be regarded as the father of the Samaritan sect that figures so conspicuously in the New Testament.

Eliashib, the high-priest contemporary with Ezra and Nehemiah; Joiada, his son and successor; Jehohanan, *his* son and successor, in office at least during 411-408; his brothers Manasseh, Joshua and Anani, who was also called Ostan; and Jehohanan's son and successor, Jaddua. Here is a growing acquaintance with an interesting family!

But what was the relation of these persons whom we have thus learned to know, to the parties subsisting in Judæa in their day? Where lay the party sympathies and interests of the Jews of Elephantine, as evidenced in these documents? And what light can be thrown upon their actions by our analysis of those parties?

I. What was the relation of Bagoses, of Sanballat and his family, and of Jehohanan and his brothers, to the parties with which we have made acquaintance in the earlier part of our study? By referring to the results there reached, the answer to this weighty question becomes a simple matter. We cannot be deceived, as we might otherwise be, into the mistaken supposition that because there was strife, now between Bagoses and Johanan, now between Joshua and Johanan, now between Manasseh and his brothers, there was therefore any radical difference between the persons at variance. It becomes evident that they all sided with one and the same

party—the one that we have been terming the international party. It is so obvious that the interests of all these persons lay on this side that it is unnecessary to argue the matter in the case of each individual. Their strifes, then, as recorded by Josephus, sink from the level of strife for principle, the irreconcilable variance that arises out of fundamental differences, and appear in their true light as the struggles of personal ambition, to get or to keep, the shifting coalitions and oppositions of individual interest.

II. With which party in Judæa lay the sympathies and interests of the Jewish colony at Elephantine? Here again our previous inquiry enables us to give a decisive answer. That they should turn themselves to Bagohi, the Persian governor, for interest with their own Persian superiors; that they had been on good terms with the Persians in Egypt; even that they should have written for help in their first days of despair to the high-priest of their nation, Jehohanan, the Jew of highest station of that day; these things do not prove that they felt any more sympathy with the “international” party than with the “patriotic” party in Jerusalem. But when we find that they wrote not only to Jehohanan, but also to his brother, and to the nobles of the Jews, it is clear that they had interest, or at least sought to make interest, with the high-priestly family and coterie, and that in writing to Jehohanan, it was probably not simply as high-priest that they addressed him, but as the most influential leader of the party in Jerusalem that stood for the social, religious and political ideals and aims which we have already described at some length. If any doubt remained on this point, it would be quite removed by noticing that these Jews of Upper Egypt make the sons of Sanballat also their patrons. That name stood in Judæa for the bitterest opposition to “patriotic” Jewish ideals that they had ever encountered. The events of 444, when Nehemiah built the walls of the Jewish capital, in sight and defiance of an army under this Sanballat, were not “done in a corner.” The memory of Nehemiah’s “chasing from him” of Manasseh, son-in-law of this

Sanballat, was not effaced in twenty years. It is impossible, therefore, to suppose that these Jews in Elephantine did not know the conditions prevailing in Syria, and just happened upon the sons of this Horonite as their chosen correspondents. On the contrary, they show very well by the persons they select, that they are well acquainted with the powers-that-be in Jerusalem. This high-priestly family and the family of Sanballat were intermarried; they were hand-in-glove with one another; their sympathies were as identical now as twenty years before when Eliashib made room for Sanballat's confederate Tobiah in the courts of the temple. And the answer came to Yeb as favorable from Samaria as from Jerusalem. Delaiah, son of Sanballat, is linked with Bagohi in the memorandum of the third papyrus, as the patron of this temple of Yahu in Egypt. Why should he not be? And why should not all his father's house, and all the house of his brother-in-law, Manasseh, and all the rest of the broad-guage Jews, clerical and lay, who could see a Gerizim beside a Zion without scandal? These Jews of Elephantine were wise men, and they used their knowledge of men and conditions with tact and success.

III. What light, then, we ask in conclusion, can be thrown upon the colony in Egypt by our analysis of contemporary parties in Judæa?

For one thing, it is clear that they were not so far away from Palestine as to be in ignorance of what was passing there. This community of Yeb was not the counterpart of that isolated colony of Chinese Jews, which modern travelers have discovered and described.

Again, the zeal that the Egyptian community felt for its local temple cannot in itself determine for us its attitude towards Hebrew religion. That it was the rallying point of the colony is evident; but that this fact, taken by itself, indicates a satisfactory type of religious life, as judged by the standards of the nation's best past, is to be strenuously denied. On this side the way is left clear for us, until more light comes with the publication of other documents, to infer

the character of their religion, collectively considered, from the religious characteristics of the Judæan party with which they were in sympathy. Granted even that it was primarily on the political side that they came into touch with the international party at Jerusalem, still it is incredible that religious considerations would not have outweighed these political interests, had there been any real antagonism at this point.

We conclude, therefore, finally, that this Yahu-temple at Yeb, surprising as it seems on first acquaintance, is actually to be estimated by the same standards as the temples on Mt. Gerizim for the Samaritan sect, and at Leontopolis for the dissenters of Lower Egypt. All alike represent a defection from the type of religion known to us from the Old Testament. And although this latest temple to come to our knowledge was earliest of the three in point of origin, yet the conditions that produced it were essentially the same as those that produced its counterparts of Gerizim and Lower Egypt. There is no more light thrown upon the existence and currency of the law of one national altar in the sixth century by this earliest temple, than upon the currency of the same law in the fifth century by the Samaritan temple or in the second century by the temple at Leontopolis.

Any attempt, therefore, to exploit this temple at Yeb built in the sixth century and (presumably) rebuilt in the fifth, as a witness to the alleged late origin of Jerusalem's unique claim to the central sanctuary, must fail when the true situation is understood. What it does flatly disprove is the assertion often made, that in the sixth and fifth centuries,—just when, according to this class of critics, the Priest-Code was being constructed,—a single sanctuary for the whole nation was a matter of course and was therefore presupposed, not enjoined. It is certainly true that the Priest-Code presupposes a central sanctuary. But criticism will now have to look for some earlier age than the sixth and fifth centuries B. C., to find a time when this presupposition was possible. For we now know that at that date a plurality of temples of Jehovah was not only conceivable, but an actual fact. It is

becoming increasingly plain that the period after the exile differs from the period before the exile, with respect to this law of the one sanctuary, rather in degree than in kind. In both periods alike sanctuaries are erected for the worship of Jehovah wherever and whenever political or religious differences create sects and schisms. When men could not, or would not, worship together, a new altar arose to meet the need. The study of parties, and their relation to the growing Diaspora, is the key to the situation. And to allege that the plurality of Jehovah-shrines in the Northern and Southern Kingdoms proves that Leviticus was then unwritten, is to disregard at once the analogy of post-exilic schismatic temples, and the adequate explanation, for all of them alike, in the schisms that arose from racial, political or religious differences.

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CALVIN,
AN EPIGONE OF THE MIDDLE AGES OR AN
INITIATOR OF MODERN TIMES?*

Was Calvin a reformer? This is the question discussed to-day. Was Calvin Protestant or was he Catholic? Is the Reformation a part of modern times? This is discussed to-day.

We might be surprised that these questions should be discussed, that they could be discussed. Yet is it not to-day a matter of debate whether St. Paul was Christian or not? In reality these amazing questions are logical and natural. We shall show this, while confining ourselves to the sphere within which the discussion is now carried on, the social sphere.

I. RITSCHL.

I. Are there beginnings in history that are altogether new? It may be doubted. Yet we may, with sufficient exactness, regard Ritschl as the originator of a Chauvinism, at once theological and Germanic, and of a kind of Lutheran nationalism, whose methods and views are no less obnoxious than the methods and tendencies of the most vexatious political Chauvinism and nationalism.

It is Ritschl who has given to Lutheran theology this anti-Calvinistic watchword: "In so far as the ideal of Calvinism is anti-Catholic, this is due to the instigation of Luther; in so far as it departs from Luther, it goes back to the ideal of the Franciscans—of the Franciscans and Anabaptists."¹

Every one who knows the exegetical and historical violence by which Ritschl deduces his theological system from

* This article was translated for the REVIEW by the Rev. Joseph Heatly Dulles, A.M.

¹ Albrecht Ritschl, *Geschichte des Pietismus*, 1880, I. p. 76.

the Bible, can surmise how he treats the texts of Luther and Calvin. As to Luther, he himself confesses that he interprets him, not as he has formally expressed himself, but according to what his words seem to him to suggest.² And as to Calvin—we have mere fiction, mere romance. In our opinion Ritschl makes him say exactly the opposite of that which he thought.

The great thing with Ritschl is the monastic tendency of Calvinistic asceticism: "a near approach to monastic flight from the world that is easily recognizable."

In order to prove it, Ritschl goes back to Egypt and Gaul. "I recall that the ancient monachism, developed in Egypt, was first accepted in Gaul." It is easy to pass from Gaul to France, to the great reforms of monachism: those of Cluny, Chartreux, Citeaux. This shows the French temperament. Then, France was the country of the Crusade. After that the University of Paris furnished "a strong proof of the submission of many persons to discipline (*Disciplinierung*)".³ In the 17th century there were the Trappists, Jansenism, Quietism. This last, it is true, was not born in France. But it matters little, since it found there an important representation. And the French reformers are Frenchmen. Then Calvin resembles a Catholic monk. He had no need of distraction (we shall see the contrary). He combatted many things that pertained to free living, to the delights of art, as did the Franciscans (we shall see the contrary).

On the other hand, over against Calvin, with his French temperament and its defects, stands Luther, with his German temperament and its traits. On the one side, the instinct of severity; on the other, the instinct of liberty. "Along with the coarseness, noted by Luther, the independence of the Germans, is their sense of personal liberty, and also of moral liberty, which is the true reason of their resistance to a general law of ecclesiastical discipline. While, on the other hand, the Frenchman (Calvin, for instance), who thought

²"So legt Luther doch diese Beobachtungen nahe". *Ibid.*, I, p. 70.

³*Ibid.*, I, p. 75.

it natural to put into universal practice the rules of discipline found in the New Testament, relied upon the instinct of equality and upon the propensity to permit all sorts of discipline. It is in this that his French fellow citizens are distinguished from the Germans."⁴

We must pass by the development, not less suggestive, that Ritschl gives to this fundamental thesis, and confine ourselves to mentioning the method of treating texts and facts, which reduces Calvinism to the rank of a mere Prussian corporal, relieved of the creation through German Lutheranism of the type of the Huguenots, the Mendicants and the Puritans.

2. This Ritschlian and pan-Germanic method of writing history has had an enormous success, and many German theologians have regarded as the word of the Gospel the affirmations of the theologian, who, after all, suits the Gospel to his fancy. We cite only two theologians, otherwise moderate and remarkable for their scientific attainment.

F. Kattenbusch⁵ is willing to grant a place of honor to Calvin alongside of the two great German Reformers, because he was "the most gifted organizer" of churches. But he has made "the idea of Protestantism" submit to a "certain mutilation" (*eine gewisse Verkümmern*). He has given it a form that cannot be regarded entirely authentic.⁶ Without doubt he belongs "to the epoch of the epigones". This epoch did not have the "energy", the "vivacity" of the preceding. Calvin had a "mechanical conception" of the examples left by the theocracy of the Old Testament and by the Apostolic communities. "In what measure was he influenced by the ideas of certain reformers of the Middle Ages?" This question must be left open for the present.

⁴ *Ibid.*, I, pp. 74-75.

⁵ *Jahrbücher für deutsche Theologie*, 1878. But Ritschl had published the first chapter of his History of Pietism in the *Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte*, July 1, 1877, II, pp. 1 ff., and Kattenbusch quotes these pages, p. 514.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 354.

In any event, he did not have the "spiritual liberty" of Luther and Zwingli.⁷

3. That we find these ideas entertained by scholars as distinguished and as moderate as Professor Loofs of Halle, shows to what extent they are disseminated and in what degree they are fixed in stereotyped formulas. "It is certain that Calvin, because of his practical activity, should be regarded as a Reformer, but as a theologian he is an epigone of the Reformation."⁸ All that may be conceded is that in the first edition of the *Institutes* he seems to be a Lutheran of Upper Germany (*Oberdeutscher Lutheraner*).⁹ But Catholic influence came. "As with Zwingli, the Augustinian-Catholic leaven must be recognized here (*à propos* of the Sacraments)."¹⁰

4. This Ritschlian conception of Calvinism has taken a new start with two treatises published by Martin Schulze.¹¹

The honorable theologian believes that he is the author of a discovery; for according to him only two authors have pointed out his idea: the aged de Wette, who limits himself to a brief reflexion, and Pierson, the Dutch author. The latter is well known to all historians of Calvin by his paradoxical theses, based on critical and exegetical exaggerations and on a blind opposition to Calvinism. Why does Schulze not cite Ritschl? Is it on account of the "varieties" that he introduces in his thesis? Schulze joins a Platonic to a Catholic influence, but the result is always the same: Lutheran superiority, Calvinistic inferiority, because of the ascetic and monastic tendency.

"Calvin differed from Luther in this, that with him, Calvin, salvation is essentially a matter of hope, and so relations

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 365.

⁸ Loofs, *Leitfaden der Dogmengeschichte*, 1906, p. 876. All the citations we shall make are found in the edition of 1893.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 877.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 893.

¹¹ *Meditatio futurae vitae, ihr Begriff und ihre herrschende Stellung im System Calvins. Ein Beitrag zum Verständniss von dessen Institutio.* 1901. *Calvins Jenseits Christentum in seinem Verhältniss zu den religiösen Schriften des Erasmus.* 1902.

with this world (*Meditatio*) take an ascetic form."¹² "After all, it must be said that Calvin did not, in principle, rise above the monastic ideal of life." Although life had for him a more profound meaning, and the effort to obtain it was far purer with him than in monachism.¹³ Moreover, Calvin's conception of life resembles exactly that sketched here, essentially after the Phædo. The agreement extends, as I have shown, even to the detail of exposition and expression.¹⁴

5. The views of Schulze have been indicated in the *Bulletin de la Société de l'histoire du protestantisme français* (Art. Th. Schoell), in these terms: "Calvin, in principle, at least, did not rise above the monastic ideal of life. . . . These ideas went back to the Bible only in a measure, and proceeded rather from Plato. . . . The theologian remained humanist. But Calvin was not conscious of this fusion of Christian and Platonic elements. . . . Erasmus and Calvin preached the monachism of sentiment."

And after having been so indicated these opinions are approved: "We conclude. The first impression of the reader is that Schulze defends a preconceived thesis, inasmuch as every one of his chapters issues fatally in the same result. However, after a close study of his numerous citations and his synoptic tables, one is persuaded that these conclusions agree, on the whole, with the reality, which (he makes us aware of this from the beginning) lessens the originality of Calvin only in an insignificant way."¹⁵

We make this citation without asking how the fact that he did not, in principle, surpass the monastic ideal of life, could not at all lessen the originality of a Protestant Reformer!

6. A recent author has united and, as it were, condensed and popularized the ideas of Ritschl and Schulze, namely,

¹² *Meditatio*, p. 1.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 18.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 81.

¹⁵ *Bulletin* LVI, Sept.-Oct., 1907, pp. 475-479.

Bernhard Bess in *Unsere religiösen Erzieher*.¹⁶ Between Luther and Calvin there is the difference of the two nations which they represent, Germany and France. In France we have monachism, the organization of asceticism, the discipline of the masses; in Germany, we have the almost sickly leaning to individual liberty. With Zwingli, also, there is a German feeling for liberty ("*ein germanisches Freiheitsgefühl*"). For Calvin's nature, sanguine to the point of fanaticism, servile submission to the letter was contentment.¹⁷ At first Calvin showed himself to be Lutheran, and it is only in 1539 that his fall occurred. Bess takes from Calvin what his predecessors still allowed him, for example, the preëminence of his ecclesiastical conceptions.

The reverse is true, according to our author. "On no other point is it seen so clearly that Calvin was not a theologian of original significance (*kein Theolog von originaler Bedeutung*), and that the penetration (*der Schärfe*) of his understanding deserted him, when opposing interests struggled within him. In the chapter on the Church he has reproduced partly Luther, partly Zwingli."¹⁸ Alongside of recollections of Luther there is also the doctrine of the Middle Ages, that the State is only the body, but the Church is the soul On one side, an attempt to keep to the words and ideas of Luther; but under the surface a profound and contrary current, in which the ideas of the Middle Ages, pure and simple, are seen. "And it is this current that, in fact, tore him away." What happens as to the Church, happens as to morals: the Middle Ages again! All that has been said by Ritschl and by Kattenbusch recurs: "his very contemporaries saw a new monachism (*Möncherei*) in his laws on morals."¹⁹

7. Finally, this movement has produced an article that

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 893.

Lebensbilder, 1908. The first volume begins with Moses and the second ends with Bismarck. It contains also a sketch of Jesus.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 71.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 78.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 82.

we shall not discuss. But, for the just punishment of those who have laid down so many false principles, we will point out the conclusions which the Rev. Thomas C. Hall, Professor of Christian Ethics in Union Theological Seminary of New York, draws from them. They may be found in an article which bears the title: "Was John Calvin a Reformer or a Reactionary?"²⁰

Here is the truth (as a simple matter of fact), which has escaped Schweitzer, Lobstein, Kuyper, Städlin, de Wette, Gass, Ziegler. One asks why Dr. Hall does not cite those, precisely, whom this truth has not escaped, and who have pushed these principles to the extreme, Ritschl, Schulze, *et al.* We read: "As a simple matter of fact, the ethical system of Calvin is profoundly reactionary, scholastic and Roman Catholic in both method and aim."²¹ "The whole conception of the Christian life, as Calvin draws it, is Roman Catholic rather than Protestant."²² "In the relation of the authoritative Church to the authoritative State, Calvin adopts, substantially, the traditional Roman Catholic point of view, save only that it must be a true Biblical Church to be authoritative."²³ "In point of fact, Calvin's State is a theocracy after the type of Gregory the Great, with the 'divine ministry' in the place of the pope."²⁴ "On such a basis no Protestant ethics can be built up. Calvinism has, in point of fact, been singularly barren in ethical work. Even her casuistry has been poor and feeble."²⁵ "Hence it is quite comprehensible how barren Calvinistic theology has been on its ethical side."²⁶ "Hence on ethical grounds we may say that Calvin was one of the last, though not one of the greatest, of the schoolmen. Thomas Aquinas is really greatly his superior in almost every particular as an ethical

²⁰ "Was John Calvin a Reformer or a Reactionary", in *The Hibbert Journal*, Oct. 1907, pp. 171-185.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 171.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 184.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 175.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 182.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 176.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 171.

thinker." It is not enough, even, to speak of Thomas Aquinas. The ethics of Calvin calls to mind the ethics of Loyola. "Holiness plays a large part in Calvin's thought, just as it does in that of Thomas Aquinas and Ignatius Loyola, whose ethical system is most nearly akin to that of Calvin."²⁷

We shall take good care not to discuss this rare, this unique series of oddities. We would be afraid of weakening the convincing force of this *reductio ad absurdum* of the Ritschlian theories. Only, at the risk of being accused of real cruelty, after having inflicted on the Ritschlian school the reading of the criticism with which it has inspired Dr. Hall against Calvin, we shall afflict it with the reading of his praise of Luther. Calvin has all the faults and Luther all the virtues. Dr. Hall is an admirer of Luther. And truly we are sorry for Luther, who is as much above these eulogiums as Calvin is above his criticism. "On the intellectual and philosophical reconstruction of ethics Calvinism has left no such mark as that made by one single work of Luther's, *Die Freiheit des Christenmenschen*."²⁸

In order to prove this it suffices to declare anti-Lutheran the doctrines of Luther on the sacraments and on the subject will,—precisely the doctrines which the Reformer held most tenaciously. And then to lend Calvin Luther's ideas!

We read: "In Luther's system sacramentalism was an unfortunate and illogical intrusion upon his fundamental thought."²⁹ "In spite of Luther's most unfortunate realism in his interpretation of *hoc est corpus meum*, he remains substantially unaffected in his ethics (though not wholly) by the element of sacramental magic." And it is not Luther, it is Calvin, who attached too great importance to the sacraments. "In Calvin the sacraments are essential to the Christian ethical life."³⁰ And the same is true of the subject

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 176.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 172.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 183.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 183.

will: "Thus, again, Luther's unfortunate incursion into the realm of metaphysical speculation on the freedom of the will had a genuine ethical interest and can be resolved into a relatively harmless though unfortunate psychological determinism. This is not the case with Calvin's doctrine of decrees."⁸¹

The only conclusion that can be drawn from this is that there are indeed theologians who have no fear of ridicule.

II. TROELTSCH.

Unhappily, before the Ritschlian system had fallen under the efforts of such a *reductio ad absurdum*, it was caught up by Prof. Troeltsch, whom one of his critics calls "the very learned, penetrating, able and spiritual representative of the systematic theology of Heidelberg."⁸²

The address which he made on the 21st of April, 1906, at Stuttgart, in the Ninth Congress of German Historians, was much talked of. Its echoes still reverberate. The subject was: "The Importance of Protestantism for the Rise of the Modern World."⁸³

The discourse is noteworthy. With very great ability the author speaks of the Church, the State, science, art, sociology, political economy, and in all these subjects compares the Catholic, the Lutheran, the Calvinistic and modern ideas. It is a whole religious encyclopædia condensed into 66 pages.

It is not the least remarkable that Troeltsch divests himself of all chauvinistic, nationalistic passion; he speaks as a historian; and if he receives his idea from his master Ritschl, he presents it with true impartiality and true knowledge.

Thus, all at once, the idea is entirely changed. What Ritschl had said against Calvin Troeltsch maintains must

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, p. 184.

⁸² Fr. Loofs, *Luthers Stellung zum Mittelalter und zur Neuzeit*, 1907, p. 5.

⁸³ Ernst Troeltsch, *Die Bedeutung des Protestantismus für die Entstehung der modernen Welt*, 1906. At the same time Troeltsch published a history of Protestantism, well developed and the result of much labor, in the collection entitled *Die Kultur der Gegenwart*, Series I, Part iv: *Die christliche Religion*, 1906, pp. 253-458.

be applied equally to Luther. Calvin, an epigone? Yes, but Luther also an epigone; two epigones of the Middle Ages. Calvin an ascetic? Yes, but Luther also an ascetic; two monastic ascetics, etc.

And then it is truly amusing to observe the attitude of certain Lutheran theologians. What they found quite correct when said of Calvin, they found out of place and injurious when said, texts and facts in hand, with equal justice, of Luther. They are like children, who, after having played with dangerous weapons, are terrified when they perceive that they themselves are wounded. We have a conspicuous refutation of Troeltsch by Loofs.

As for us, we congratulate the Heidelberg professor on his serenity, his scientific impartiality. When one speaks of the Reformers—not of this or that detail of their work, but of the work itself—they may not be separated. They stand or fall together. And there is no need of changing our point of view, as we look at men and facts. The thesis which we found false, when directed against Calvin alone, appears no more true when directed against the entire Reformation. Only we add, that under this new form, the old idea of Ritschl has become what it was not, specious,—at times seductive. It appears supported by many arguments. Hence it is worth while to examine it and discuss it carefully.

2. According to Troeltsch the influence of Protestantism should neither be denied nor exaggerated (*einseitigüber-treiben*).³⁴ We have to do with three terms and their reciprocal relations: Catholicism, identified with the Middle Ages, Protestantism and Modern Times. Let us define them, according to Troeltsch.

Catholic or mediæval culture is characterized by two elements: authority and asceticism; a divine authority exercised by the Church, and in virtue of which everything is related to God; and asceticism, that is to say, the concentration of every activity of life in God.

³⁴ Troeltsch, p. 12.

Modern culture is the reverse of mediaeval culture. To authority it opposes autonomy, with its resultant individualism; to asceticism it opposes the enjoyment of this world's goods. No more heredity corruption, and no more extramundane deliverance from this corruption! Life finds its aim and its ideal more and more here below.

And what of Protestantism? Naturally, it is not a question of modern and modernized Protestantism, but of the old, primitive, only authentic Protestantism.³⁵ This latter wished to produce and did produce a culture of authority and asceticism. "The old, true Protestantism, in its Lutheran and Calvinistic form, is altogether an ecclesiastical culture, in the mediæval sense. It would regulate the State and society, civilization and science, political economy and law, according to the supernatural rules of revelation."³⁶

Hence the modern world begins, in reality, not at the opening, but at the close of the century of the Reformation, with the second half of the 17th century, in such sort that Protestantism still belongs to the culture of the Middle Ages. Indeed, more often it has reinforced the mediaeval spirit of this culture. "It endeavors to cause the conception of ecclesiastical civilization, etc., to triumph with its own methods, and to make it triumph more sternly (*sévèrement*), more profoundly, more personally, than the hierarchical institution of the Middle Ages could do. The authority and the salutary force of the Bible alone effect that which bishops and popes could not do with their external means and the vast secularisation of their Institution."³⁷

³⁵ And even here the historian should make a reservation. Without doubt authentic Protestantism must be sought in the Protestantism of the 16th century and of the reformers, and not in the Protestantism of this or that theologian of the 20th century. Yet there must be no exaggeration. In going out from Roman Catholicism, in separating itself from it, Protestantism preserved, in spite of itself, this or that trace or remnant of Catholicism, to divest itself of which completely required some time. Luther did not lay aside his monkish robe the very day of his rupture with Rome.

³⁶ Troeltsch, p. 14.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 15.

Troeltsch concludes that the influences of Protestantism upon the modern world are above all indirect, unconscious, accidental (*zufällig*),³⁸ involuntary. As to the "direct, immediate" influences,—these are due, not to Protestantism, properly so-called, but to two intimate adversaries of the old Protestantism, so vigorously repulsed and attacked by it, the rationalism of the Renaissance (incarnated in Arminianism and Socinianism) and the spiritualism of the Anabaptists."³⁹

Certainly, all this looks very simple. Although Troeltsch has simplified his study by overlooking a fourth term. And what is that? Christianity. Neither more nor less!

The Middle Ages present a culture in which Christianity (which does not come from the Middle Ages) and Catholicism are mingled. Protestantism received Christianity, which it tried to lead back to its primitive purity: it rejected Catholicism. As to the modern world, it includes Christian and anti-Christian elements. It is the boast of Protestantism that it has transmitted to it the Christian elements; it is useless to prove that Protestantism has not transmitted the anti-Christian elements; it boasts of this also! Such is the thesis of the true Protestants, who think themselves the legitimate successors of the Reformers. As Troeltsch refutes another, altogether different thesis, they might well content themselves with opposing Troeltsch's demonstration with a simple dismissal. Far from having transfixed them by his brilliant assault, Troeltsch has not even touched them. He has been fencing with a phantom. But this is precisely what we have to explain.

4. Let us begin with the more general principles. According to Troeltsch, Protestantism is limited to stating the old question of salvation: "This (he tells us repeatedly), is only the old question (*durch und durch nur die alte Frage*)".⁴⁰ Now this question,—What must I do to be

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 28.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 16-17.

⁴⁰ Troeltsch, p. 19.

saved? is not at all a specifically Catholic and mediæval question; it is, on the contrary, the specifically Christian question, that of the Apostles, that of the Gospels, that which Christ came to answer. What is Catholic is the answer which the Middle Ages gave to this question. But Troeltsch declares that "Protestantism came only to bring a new answer."⁴¹ It answers, not by sending man to the saving institution of the hierarchy, the Church of the priests, to the *opus-operatum* of the sacraments, but by speaking to him "of a personal decision of faith (*einen persönlichen Glaubens Entschluss.*)"⁴² Yet Protestantism is a different form of religion from Catholicism; it gives men another attitude toward the Church, toward God. Man (believing) in the view of Protestantism is different from man (believing) in the view of Catholicism. So over against the old man of the Middle Ages there is a modern man that the Reformation sets up. And, once more, the scaffolding erected by Troeltsch crumbles at its base.

5. Let us urge a particular example which is supplied by Loofs. This theologian presents, *à propos* of justification by faith, some observations which might be presented *à propos* of a mass of resemblances between the Middle Ages and the Reformation. Too often the old proverb is forgotten: When two say the same thing, they do not say the same thing. "Troeltsch emphasizes the tie that unites Luther's doctrine of justification with the Augustinian tradition of the Middle Ages. There is nothing new in this for a dogmatician. Luther has not merely exhumed the Pauline conceptions; the evolution, often secular, of ideas did not pass before him without exercising some influence upon him . . . But, verily, where is there in history anything new for which there has not been some preparation? The ideas of Luther on justification are new with respect to the Middle Ages, although their genesis can only be understood in their relation to the Middle Ages. For

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 19.

⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 19.

Dilthey is mistaken, when he thinks that St. Augustine, St. Bernard, Tauler and what is called "German Theology", had already taught the doctrine of justification that Luther taught. Without doubt, the thesis, according to which man becomes just before God only by faith, is not unknown in the Catholic Church, as has been shown since the affirmations of Dilthey. It is much in evidence, not in the work of St. Augustine, but in the West, in his time, and up to the middle of scholasticism. But what was understood by this doctrine was only that God demanded faith alone, that is to say, the acceptance of ecclesiastical belief, in the man who presented himself for baptism, and who in baptism received the pardon of all his sins committed up to that time. With Luther this doctrine has a totally different meaning. With him it was a question of the foundation upon which the long since baptised believer, built his assurance that he could stand before God. He replies: not upon any act whatsoever, but solely upon the grace of God, received with confidence by faith. Here is what was new over against the Middle Ages. Religion was, in principle, distinct from all the perversions, often worldly, of the mystical and metaphysical moralists. With Luther the idea is entirely clear. To be justified is to stand before God in the posture in which man should be, upheld by the experience of grace. And this idea was the fulcrum, desired by Archimedes, which permitted the overthrow of the whole papal Church."⁴³

6. But, returning to the more general ideas, we must notice the asceticism with which Ritschl and his school have so much reproached Calvin, and which Troeltsch discovers equally in the entire Reformation.⁴⁴ As to this equality he

⁴³Loofs, *Luthers Stellung zum Mittelalter und zur Neuzeit*, pp. 11, 12.

⁴⁴The accusation, as to asceticism, is not new. It is found among the rationalists of the 18th century, for example, in Michael Ignaz Schmidt, counsellor of the court of Joseph II and theologian, who in his *Histoire des Allemands*, speaks of the monachism of the Reformers. "The Reformers had added to their *esprit* as Reformers a pretty dose of monastic and melancholic *esprit*, and had taught a sad religion, that made men sad". Loofs, *Luthers Stellung*, p. 21.

is not wrong. Far from having put an end to asceticism, Protestantism, says Troeltsch, has preserved heaven and hell, while it has suppressed purgatory, which made the other world a little less terrifying.⁴⁵ Now in the Gospel, of which Troeltsch does not speak, heaven and hell are mentioned, but purgatory is not. Must it be inferred from this that the primitive Gospel is reinforced mediaeval Catholicism?

Further, says Troeltsch, the central question of Protestantism is always the certainty of salvation, deliverance from the deserved condemnation of original sin. And Protestantism has, on this point, strengthened the Augustinian dogma.⁴⁶ But once more, the question of salvation is, *par excellence*, the evangelical question. And St. Paul is more strict than Pelagius. Must we conclude from this that the primitive Gospel is strengthened by mediaeval Catholicism?

Troeltsch admits that in Protestantism the ascetic idea has changed "only" its form and meaning (*nur die Form und den Sinn gewechselt*).⁴⁷ But one has the right to ask what is an idea, which has changed its form and meaning? And what can two ideas, which have neither the same form nor the same meaning, have in common?

We proceed: "Protestantism", says Troeltsch, "has rejected monachism and the monastic life of the clergy. But it has not done this because it regarded the values and possessions of this world as ends in themselves (*Selbstzwecke*)

. . . The world . . . is the natural soil, the condition of the Christian life. This natural condition must not be artificially avoided . . . This would only encourage the illusion of events, of the cooperation of man with grace, and conceal the real difficulty, which is to possess the world as if one possessed it not."⁴⁸ All this is true, but all this is authentic Christianity, no less authentic anti-Catholicism. How shall we conclude from the fact that Protestantism has

⁴⁵ Troeltsch, p. 24.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 25.

broken from the Middle Ages in order to return to the Gospel, that it has continued the Middle Ages in an aggravated form?

Indeed, Troeltsch becomes embarrassed, confused; he flounders about with facts and words. "Without doubt", says he, "there is here a higher instinctive estimation of the order of creation than in Catholicism; . . . there is here a more intimate union of the natural order and the redemptive order, than in Catholicism . . . We must live in the world and overcome it, while remaining in the midst of it, resting our salvation, our happiness, solely in our justification and in the expiatory death of Christ. We ought never to trust in the world, never to forget the penalty of sin

. . . There is an asceticism which is not less ascetic, because it does not show itself in the form of monachism, because it denies the world inwardly and from within, instead of fleeing from it outwardly. It might be designated asceticism in the world (*innerweltliche Askese*) in contrast with Catholic asceticism, which is characterized by a life without and alongside of the world."⁴⁹ Here then is the Protestant asceticism which is contrary to Catholic asceticism. How can it be said that the one is a continuation of the other? Do not these two asceticisms suppose a contradictory conception of the religious life and of the world? Why keep the same name to designate two contrary things, —and does not the adjective here devour the substantive? What is this intra-mundane, one might say this almost mundane, asceticism, this asceticism that permits the use of the world? It is true that this is not the conception of the Renaissance, or of modern poetry. Assumedly not, no more than Christianity is paganism.

Troeltsch ends by distinguishing Lutheran asceticism, which is "essentially an adaptation (*sich fügen*), a surrender (*ein Ergeben*), a transference of all hope in the happy beyond, and a martyr's joy in the world, from Calvinistic asceticism, which had an altogether different character. "It

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 25, 26.

is, like all Calvinism, active, aggressive; it would transform the world, to the honor of God. In order to this end, it rationalizes and disciplines all life by its ethical theories and by its ecclesiastical discipline. . . . It sees in pure sentimentality (*Gefühligkeit und Stimmung*) idleness and a want of seriousness; it is filled with a fundamental sentiment: labor for God, for the honor of the Church! Thus the spirit of Calvinistic ethics produces a lively activity, a severe discipline, a complete plan, a social-Christian aim".⁵⁰ Is it not, truly, an abuse of words to speak thus of asceticism?

In reality, when one thus sees that Protestantism, and (note it well) very commonly Calvinism, inspires souls with this anti-Catholic conception of life, of activity in society, one can but be surprised at Troeltsch's conclusion: "In these conditions it is evident that Protestantism was not able immediately to prepare the modern world for its mission. On the contrary, it appeared at first as a renovation and a reinforcement (*Verstärkung*) of the ideal of civilization by compulsion, as a complete reaction from the thought of the Middle Ages, which suppresses (*verschlingt*) the first efforts of a free and secular civilization . . . Whoever studies the history of religion and science cannot escape the impression that it is the great struggle for freedom of the close of the 17th and of the 18th centuries, which marks the end of the Middle Ages."⁵¹ This conclusion is diametrically opposed to what may be deduced from the facts and ideas presented by Troeltsch himself.

7. If Troeltsch has such a confused conception of the religious principles of the Reformation, it is not surprising that in a manner no less confused he presents the application of these principles to society. Let us consider the relation of the Church and State.

As to the Church, Troeltsch claims that Protestantism holds to the idea of an "institution for salvation, purely di-

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 27.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p. 28.

vine and founded upon authority". Of the Catholic conception Protestantism rejects only (*nur*) the divine right of the hierarchy, superiority of the hierarchy over the State, the sacraments as means of grace, in the possession of the Church alone and bestowing something other than what faith gives, and finally tradition. *Nur!* Only! Everything is brought back to the Bible, everything is replaced by the Bible. We do not dispute it; we accept it (*concesso, non dato*). Are the two churches the same Church? Are they not contradictory?

Troeltsch claims that, with Protestantism, the problem of the relation between the State and the Church has no place, for he does not see in State and Church two distinct organizations, but two different functions of a single social body, the *corpus christianum*. Only (*nur*, always the same formula!) Protestantism organizes the relation between these two functions in a new way: no more supremacy of the hierarchy over the civil power! The State, like the Church, is subject to the Bible directly. Once more, we do not dispute it; we accept it. Can it be said that this is still (*toujours*) the "ecclesiastical civilization of the Middle Ages, and even exaggerated? Is a Christian society identical with an ecclesiastical society? Why call this Christian Society a 'theocracy', when one is immediately obliged to change the accepted meaning of the word 'theocracy'? It is the theocratic idea, only the exercise of theocracy is different. It is no longer the hierarchy that commands the magistrate, it is the Bibliocracy."⁵² Is there not an abyss between the theocracy of the Middle Ages and the Bibliocracy of the 18th century?

Finally as to the State. Protestantism has not created a political ethic for it (*eine selbständige Ethik der Politik*).⁵³ Although it has freed the State from legal submission to the hierarchy; it has affirmed the "definitive, formal, fundamental autonomy (*Verselbstständigung*)" of the State. And

⁵² *Ibid.*, pp. 22, 23.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, p. 33.

yet Protestantism did not have the modern idea of the State, since in it the State remains a religious institution, concerned with morality, with Christian duties.⁵⁴ Does not the word ecclesiastical seem to become, little by little, synonymous with religious, and the word modern with non-religious? In such sort that Protestantism belongs to the Middle Ages simply because it was religious, and that it did not found modern times simply because these are non-religious?

8. We are reminded that the conception of the State depends upon the conception of natural rights and that there are three forms (*Gestaltung*) of natural rights, that of the Middle Ages, in which Stoicism, Aristotle and the Bible are mingled, that of Lutheranism and that of Calvinism. We do not ask what are these three forms of natural rights, which produce three entirely different states, and we pass, over without consideration, the natural rights of Lutheranism, which is conservative, which aims at territorial absolutism, and pushes this absolutism to the extreme.⁵⁵

The natural rights of Calvinism are "sufficiently conservative". When it is entirely free, it favors a "moderate aristocracy". But in the great conflicts with the Catholic powers, persecutions of the word of God, among the Huguenots and in the Netherlands, in Scotland, in England, Calvinism has developed its natural rights in a much more radical sense". Troeltsch speaks of the right of resistance, granted by Calvinism to lower magistrates (which is correct), even to the individual (which is less correct), and extending inclusively even to tyrannicide (which is more incorrect). And here there appears "an ideal of the State specifically reformed". A little while ago there was no specific political ethic. Now there is a specific ideal of the State, at least for the Reformed, and so specific that this ideal comes from the new ideal of the Calvinistic constitution of the Church. "The primitive cell, this is the Presbyterio-Synodal consti-

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 23.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 35.

tution of the Church, with its representative system."⁵⁶ In the Church, elections and colleges of elders; in the State, elections and colleges of chosen men. . . . Finally, an entirely logical conclusion, the Calvinistic natural rights accept the idea of governmental contract. The Covenants appeared.

Here, then, is not only the foundation of the modern state, its autonomy, but its whole constitution, governmental contract, representation, college of representatives. . . . And is not this the modern State? No, for all this is of religious origin, all this remains religious, according to the Calvinistic idea. Then, once more, whatever is religious comes from the Middle Ages. Yes? No?

What confusion there is in such explanations as these: "The trend of the modern world to democratic government ought not to be referred solely (certainly, no one maintains this) and directly to Calvinism. The mere natural right of rationalism, devoid of religious conception, [why is mere natural right devoid of religious conception, if religion is natural? and by what authority is it denied that religion is natural?] is a more powerful factor in this, although Calvinism has a very great part (*hervorragend Anteil*) in the birth of the tendencies manifest in the democratic spirit."⁵⁷

We have at length reached the subject of natural rights. Troeltsch says: "Here we find ourselves, according to Jellinek, in the presence of an extremely important influence of Protestantism, which realized a fundamental law, a fundamental ideal of the modern world." And yet Troeltsch here again denies this honor to Protestantism. "In a general way, the exposition of Jellinek constitutes a truly luminous discovery." But if the discovery is to the honor of M. Jellinek, it is not to the honor of Protestantism. Indeed, after having stated a fact, Jellinek is mistaken in the attribution which he has made of it. For, "the Puritanism, which, according to his view, was the father of this idea, and the cre-

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 36, 37.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 37.

ator of these formulas of right, is not Calvinistic,—it is Anabaptist.” What is there to say?

Troeltsch changes the historical formula: “The rights of man”, to this: “The rights of man and of liberty of conscience”, and concerns himself only with the second part of the formula, which he has added. He observes that this liberty of conscience was proclaimed in Rhode Island by Roger Williams, who went over to the Baptists, and in Pennsylvania by Penn, who was a Quaker. He concludes: “The father of the rights of man is then not Protestantism, properly speaking, but the hated Baptists, expelled by it.”⁵⁸

However, he hastens to correct himself in part: “The Anabaptism which proclaimed the rights of man, is not Anabaptism, properly speaking, but a modified Anabaptism, which has abandoned its *apolitie* [that is, the absence of the idea of government, anarchism], and which is mixed with Calvinism in many respects (*in mancherlei Verschmelzungen*)”, an Anabaptism revived (*neu belebt*) and merged with a radical Calvinism.”⁵⁹ It has thus created a civilization by which “the State and the religious community are completely separated”, and in which, however, the State keeps strict watch over the fundamental Christian principles of morality and purity of life.⁶⁰ “This, precisely, is the design of the idea of the civilization of the Middle Ages.”⁶¹

It is, indeed, a pity that it cannot be known definitely what belongs to Anabaptism and what to Calvinism; a pity, truly, that it should be a question of Anabaptism, which is not Anabaptism, but an Anabaptism transformed by Calvinism; and finally, it is truly a pity that these inextricable confusions should have as their result the doing honor to an Anabaptism which is not Anabaptism; a conception of the State, which, according to all the preceding definitions, is altogether mediaeval, and which affected the rupture with the Middle Ages!

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 40.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 41.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 40.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, p. 41.

10. There remains the paradox of Troeltsch to which this conception leads up, and according to which Puritanism did not come from Calvinism. Upon what does Troeltsch base this paradox? His discourse does not say.

We may be permitted to oppose Troeltsch with an authority which he will find it hard to refute, that of his own master, Ritschl. Ritschl not only says, but expounds what follows: "For Protestant theologians, it is certain that the Reformation of Luther and of Zwingli [Ritschl does not say: and of Calvin], in principle at least, surpassed the form of Christianity which was constituted at the end of the second century, and which is especially designated as a Catholic form. On the contrary, it is evident that the motives and aims, the means and the special regulations of Anabaptism, all continue in line with the Middle Age and find their most immediate analogies in that epoch. As proof of this assertion I go back to the suggestion of Bullinger. Whilst the Anabaptists announce that they are the only true commonwealth, agreeable to God, they put the accent on activity, on "the manifest amelioration of life, which was as little pursued (*erstrebt*) in the evangelical Church as in the papal Church. Hence, they reject the evangelical doctrine of the satisfaction of Christ, and of justification by faith, to wit, that man becomes righteous before God by faith and not by works. They reject, consequently, the doctrine of a law that cannot be kept, since all Scripture commands the keeping of the law. In these two fundamental principles the Anabaptists are in agreement with Catholicism. Consequently, they deduce from the obligation to love the conclusion that there should be neither property nor wealth, since love has everything in common with the brethren. This principle is only the generalization of a law which has always been regarded by monachism as a condition of Christian perfection."⁶²

⁶² Ritschl, *Geschichte des Pietismus*, 1880, I, p. 24. See also p. 25, where Ritschl shows the origin of the ideas of Anabaptism in the principles of Gregory, etc.

Moreover, the statements of Ritschl are confirmed by a historian as little Ritschlian as Lang, who has made the study of the relation between Anabaptism and the Reformation a specialty. The Anabaptists, says he, did not accept justification by faith; they made a new law of Christianity, "in this respect they are incontestably on the platform of the Catholicism of the Middle Ages". Only—and this is the original part of Lang's studies—the valuable, the serious elements of Anabaptism (there were such), instead of making their appearance in the 17th century, in opposition to Calvinism and by virtue of an incomprehensible transformation, were absorbed, from the beginning of the 16th century, by Calvinism itself. It cannot be denied that the reformed, without sacrificing the Palladium of the Reformation, justification by faith, allied themselves with Anabaptism through their idea of the Church". "The ecclesiastical idea of Calvin had its historic cradle not so much in Geneva as in Strassburg—the citadel of Anabaptism on the upper Rhine. To what extent the efforts of these men influenced the ecclesiastical organization of Calvin, by means of the Church of Strassburg, is a question which has not yet been sufficiently explored, and as to which perfect clearness has not been reached."⁶⁸ We do not here try to lift this veil. But in case Lang should be led to exaggerate his discovery a little, it is seen in what direction the truth must be sought.

We add, for good measure, the conclusion of Loofs: "Troeltsch works with an idealized conception of the Renaissance and of Anabaptism. Certainly the Anabaptism of the 16th century would scarcely have been capable of creating a modern world, if it had attained to hegemony! And it is not only the events of Münster that prove this. The attitude of Anabaptism, as a whole, with respect to asceticism and the State, is, originally, much more mediaeval than is that of primitive Protestantism. It is a monstrosity (*Ungeheulichkeit*), which no amount of sympathy for Anabaptism can excuse, and of which Troeltsch is guilty when he

⁶⁸ "Albrecht Ritschl als Reformations-Historiker", in the *Reformirte Kirchenseitung*, 1908, pp. 252, 253.

abandons himself to an unreflecting forgetfulness of all the forms of Anabaptism of the 17th century, when he represents Anabaptism as having abandoned its "*apolitie* (non-political character), and when, nevertheless, he accords to this Anabaptism, despised by the Reformers and cherished by modern spiritualism, the honor of having been one of the two principal factors of the modern world. He who grants this to Anabaptism, that is to say, to certain ideas derived from Anabaptists and elsewhere, under the influence of long persecutions, thanks to the progress of civilization in England, and by the admixture of Calvinistic tradition, has certainly lost all right to oppose the new Protestantism with the old as a child raised in a strange family, which betrays its family traits only to the eyes of the nearest relatives."⁶⁴

II. We might stop here. This then is the thesis of Ritschl in its latest evolution, the thesis of Ritschl in all its force and all its consequences. It not only strikes at Calvinism, it strikes at the entire Reformation; and even Calvinism is found to be less touched by it than Lutheranism itself; a just recoil and a merited punishment for so many chauvinistic assaults. The evil weapons have pierced the hand of those who forged them.

Happily for Luther, even more than for Calvin, and happily for the Reformation, the thesis of Ritschl, presented logically, brilliantly, acclaimed by an entire congress of German theologians, is found buried in its very triumph.

Presented in its most scientific form, it offers no resistance to scientific study. Under an exact analysis, this dazzling thesis, supported by wonderful erudition, becomes hesitating, obscure, full of confusions and distinctions, all alike unjustified. The continual concessions, which it is obliged to make, suffice for its refutation, and after all it remains an immense ambiguity; in such sort that, after having refuted Troeltsch, step by step, we might say that in the end we are in accord with him. Finally, with Troeltsch, true Christianity is not the Christianity of the Middle Ages (as

⁶⁴ Loofs, *Luthers Stellung*, p. 15, n.

to which he is certainly right), but no more is it apostolic and evangelical Christianity that the Middle Ages have more or less affirmed or contradicted.

What is not said in the lecture that we have analyzed, but is implied in it, is explained in the other works of Troeltsch. We let Loofs, who is less under suspicion in this matter than we, speak. "Luther, says Troeltsch, stops in the Middle Ages because he did not go back to Jesus but to Paul, who changed the teaching of Jesus to a Gospel of supernatural salvation; and the root of the Middle Ages was in this Gospel."⁶⁵ Here it is, the Middle Ages, that is Paul! Loofs goes on with his resume of Troeltsch: "Erasmus appears as the ideal type of this humanistic theology. With him Christ was the incarnation of religion that is the same everywhere. It is he who began the retreat from Paulinism toward the Sermon on the Mount, toward the simple religion of the faith of Jesus. In the presence of Luther he was not only the moralist before the religious genius, but also the representative of the modern conception, of the anti-supernatural and universal religion."⁶⁶

After this all is clear. From the moment when St. Paul is the Middle Ages, and Erasmus is the modern world, it is evident that the Reformation, which fought Erasmus (and who fought him more than Luther?), and which preached St. Paul (and who preached him more than Calvin?), was against the modern world and for the Middle Ages. But there was no reason for proving this in a great number of learned pages. It would suffice to say it: we should have agreed at once, *a priori*.

What is perhaps more curious, is that we find ourselves also almost in accord as to the two reflections with which Troeltsch resumes his study. Protestantism, says he, was above all a religion; it wished to indicate "a new means",

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 20. This idea is developed by Troeltsch in *Kultur, etc.*, pp. 257 ff.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 15. n.

faith (*sola fides*), for attaining the old end, salvation: "the end was the same, the path was radically new".⁶⁷ And once again, this is evident. Who could contradict this? Not we. Religions, indeed, could scarcely be differentiated by their aim. All, even fetish religions, seek to assure their adherents of salvation. To say that two religions seek salvation by "radically different" means, is to say that they are "radically different". And two radically different religions give birth to two radically different civilizations. There is then an abyss between Catholicism (as Catholicism) and Protestantism; between the culture of the Middle Ages and Protestant culture.

Troeltsch afterwards admits that modern times have made the means the end. They announced that they had the end when they had the means, according to Lessing's saying, the search for truth is of more value than the truth. The idea of faith has everywhere triumphed over the content of faith.⁶⁸ In this sense it is very evident that the modern times do not come from the Reformation; that they come from Semler, from Lessing, from rationalism, mystical or not mystical, from the Renaissance and from Anabaptism, in so far as these are contrary to the Reformation and evangelical Christianity. But once more, who denies this? In any event, not we,—above all, not we. This is our favorite thesis.

Hence nothing of all this is the true question. This is the true question: Does what is best in the modern times come from this mystical rationalism or from the Reformation? And above all, the true question is this: Has modern culture in itself, apart from the principles of the Reformation, the future, the certainty of its continuance, of its perpetual triumph? Troeltsch doubts this. And he has written these very significant words: "Modern culture is in every instance characterized by a prodigious diffusion and intensity of the idea of liberty and personality. This is

⁶⁷ Troeltsch, pp. 60, 61.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 62, 63.

the best thing about this culture. The idea is spontaneously (?) developed in all the domains of life, thanks to a particular conjunction of circumstances, and has received from Protestantism only (*nur*) a metaphysico-religious basis, very strong, but in itself independent. The point is to know if this conjunction of circumstances, if this fecundity which it has obtained for the idea of liberty will be maintained. It is hard to think so—yet I think I can conclude—at least this is my particular conclusion: let us keep the metaphysico-religious principle of liberty. Otherwise there might be an end of liberty and of personality at the moment when we vaunted ourselves most of their progress”.⁶⁹ Truly, what should we add?

III. MAX WEBER.

Our readers must pardon us: in putting Troeltsch after Ritschl, we have neglected a link of the chain, and certainly not the least remarkable one: Max Weber, and his study on “Protestant Ethics” and “The Spirit of Capitalism”, a study which appeared in 1904 and 1905.⁷⁰ This study has been much less spoken of than Troeltsch’s address. And yet, it seems to us almost more worthy of attention. We have rarely met with pages richer and more suggestive than these two articles of 164 pages, cram full of erudition and of ideas. Taking them up after the preceding section, we can be brief and yet, we hope, show their true worth.

Troeltsch and Weber are Professors in Heidelberg and appear almost as collaborators. Troeltsch cites once with praise the works of Weber. Weber cites many times the works of Troeltsch that have appeared, and that are to appear. One might then almost speak of a Heidelberg school. At least, Troeltsch would not dispute the authority of Weber.

Weber and Troeltsch treat of the same subject in the

⁶⁹ Troeltsch, pp. 65, 66.

⁷⁰ Max Weber, “Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus”, in *Archiv für Sozial Wissenschaft und sozial Politik*. Vol. XX, 1904, and Vol. XXI, 1905.

same general spirit. Only Weber has a more special, a more central point of view. He embraces a little less; he grasps much more. Now, there are singular differences between these Heidelberg colleagues, in the midst of a mass of analogies; and if the principles and the facts seem the same with both, the conclusions are entirely different.

Weber like Troeltsch makes a distinction in Protestantism between Lutheranism and Calvinism, and accords to Calvin a much higher social influence than to Lutheranism. On this point, the thesis of Ritschl and of Lutheran chauvinism may be considered as definitely overthrown. Troeltsch borrowed from Weber his conception of intra-mundane (*inner-weltlich*) asceticism, of Protestant asceticism. And indeed this is Weber's central idea.

But there is in Troeltsch an idea that is not found in Weber, the idea that Protestantism continues the culture of the Middle Ages, is a part of the Middle Ages, and neither opens nor begins modern times, is not a part of modern times. Now it is precisely this idea that has attracted the attention of the general public to Troeltsch's lecture, and gave it its vogue. And not only is it absent from Weber's article, but this article in reality refutes it. This is the extremely interesting and important fact that should be stated.

Weber sums up modern culture in the word, Capitalism. "The Spirit" of capitalism is the modern spirit. Then, he sums up the moral, practical and social tendency of Protestantism in this word, Asceticism; but a very special asceticism, which must always be accompanied by two epithets: Protestant and intra-mundane. And finally Weber's special thesis is that this Protestant asceticism of the 16th century has been one of the great factors of the capitalistic or modern spirit.

This is how he expresses himself: "The spirit of labor", of "progress", or whatever you wish to call it, to which one is inclined to attribute the awakening of Protestantism, must not, as it is the habit nowadays to do, be taken in a rationalistic sense (*aufklärerisch*). The old Protestantism of

Luther, Calvin, Knox, Voet, concerned itself little with what to-day is called "progress". If, then, there is an intimate kinship between the old Protestant spirit and modern capitalistic culture, we must try to find this relationship, rightly or wrongly, not in a pretended "worldly joy" (*joie du monde*), more or less materialistic, or at least anti-ascetic, but rather in purely religious principles. Montesquieu (*Esprit des Lois*, XX, 7) says of the English: "They are the people of the world who have best known how to excell at the same time in three great things: religion, commerce and liberty". Did their superiority in the domain of industry and their capacity for appropriating liberal political institutions, of which we shall speak elsewhere, depend on the religious ideas which are a matter of record, according to Montesquieu? Such is the question to which Weber answers Yes, with a knowledge that can be called positive, avoiding equally rationalism (*Aufklärung*) on the one hand, and the Middle Ages on the other. "The modern conception, indicated by the expression, 'Spirit of Capitalism', would have been proscribed in antiquity as well as in the Middle Ages, as sordid avarice and mentality without dignity".⁷¹ In the Middle Ages it was the general opinion that the merchant could not please God (*Deo placere non potest*); that there was something shameful (*pudendum*) in a mercantile estate. And it was necessary to break away from this "tradition" of antiquity and of the Middle Ages in order to make way for modern times.

Who broke with this tradition? The Protestantism of the 16th century; the Protestantism and not the rationalism. Those who are tempted to believe that the capitalistic "spirit" is a product of rationalism, and that Protestantism intervenes only so far as it is a forerunner of rationalism, Weber confronts simply with the facts.⁷²

Protestantism has worked through its religious conceptions, properly so-called, in the number of which Weber

⁷¹ Weber, XX (1904), p. 19.

⁷² *Ibid.*, XX (1904), p. 34.

puts the great idea of vocation. The Latin-Catholic peoples have no word, any more than has classical antiquity, to express this idea of vocation (*Beruf*), in the sense of social estate, life in a determined sphere. On the other hand this word exists among all Protestant peoples.⁷³ "And as the significance of the word is new, so also is the idea; it is a product of the Reformation. Without doubt, already in the Middle Ages certain attempts at appraising daily toil in this way are found. But what is entirely new in this: the esteeming the accomplishment of duty, in the earthly vocation, as the ideal of personal morality. This it is that has logically produced the opinion of the religious importance of the daily task in this world and which has given birth to the idea of vocation. Thus, that which finds its expression in this idea of vocation, is the central dogma of all the old Protestant denominations, which rejects the distinction between the precepts and the counsels of Christian ethics, which indicates, as the only means of leading a life agreeable to God, not the excelling of worldly morality by monastic asceticism, but the being content solely with the fulfilment of one's duties in the world, as the situation of each requires, that is to say, fulfilling his vocation."⁷⁴

"That this moral character of 'vocation' is one of the merits of the Reformation, whose consequences have been most important and that it is specially due to Luther, is incontestable and of common notoriety."⁷⁵ However, if Luther began, he did not continue. Luther became more and more a traditionalist.⁷⁶ "The new theoretical basis on which the relation between vocation and religious principles rests has not been found."⁷⁷ So the simple idea of vocation, in a Lutheran sense, remains (in the domain in which we are), of problematical importance."⁷⁸

⁷³ *Ibid.*, p. 36, and n. 1.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 41.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 43.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 46.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 48.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 50.

But Calvinism came. "Calvinism, historically, is one of the incontestable factors of the capitalistic 'spirit'."⁷⁹ And it is Calvinism that has been the most opposed to the Middle Ages. "It is with reason that Catholicism has regarded Calvinism, from its origin until to-day, as its real enemy."⁸⁰ Luther created Protestantism; Calvin saved it.

It is seen how the article of Weber excludes the thesis of Troeltsch, and how it proves that the Reformation broke with the Middle Ages, and inaugurated the modern times. Undoubtedly, in Weber's work, aside from the fundamental thesis, there are points upon which we are not in agreement with the author. But it matters little here.

We confine ourselves to formulating two regrets. The first is that Weber has called the "spirit" with which the Reformation has inspired modern culture, the capitalistic spirit. Of course, I know Weber's reservations. I know that he is not concerned with capitalism, but with its "spirit", with that which has been its quality, to wit, a power of incessant toil systematically disciplined. This spirit, which does not urge on to pleasure, but to production, is so contrary to human nature that it could only arise through the influence of an extremely efficacious spiritual power. . . . However, there are two ideas in the word capitalism, as in all the words in *ism*, one good and another evil, the exaggeration of the good, which, by its exaggeration, makes a false and dangerous idea out of the good idea. But I know also how dangerous it is to designate by the same word two things so different. The words in *ism* have two senses: yet, generally, it is the contemptuous sense that is intended, when the word is pronounced. And we can see this in the abuse which the adversaries of Protestantism can make of this word capitalism. They will say: Protestantism is the father of Capitalism, of that Capitalism, which is so horrible, so nefarious, so anti-Christian, so hateful, etc. Further, all the precautions that Calvin took against the evil

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 26.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 51.

Capitalism, the idea of which is perfectly contrary to Calvinism, should be noted. It is not sufficient, in our opinion, to have reiterated that Calvinism itself is shown many times to be in disagreement with Calvin.⁸¹

Not less regrettable is the use of the word asceticism. All the abuse that Ritschl has made of it was known, as well as that which Troeltsch was going to make. Here, again, I am aware that with Weber Protestant asceticism is contrary to Catholic asceticism. If there are points of resemblance, Weber gives the following excellent reason for this: "All asceticism that arises out of Biblical soil ought to have, necessarily, certain common traits".⁸² Just so. So much the more since, if Weber, like Troeltsch, does not broach the question, essential nevertheless, of the evangelical teaching on pretended asceticism, he allows his theological idea, which is the idea of the modern school of theology and of Troeltsch, to emerge, namely, that the Middle Ages have their origin in St. Paul and in the New Testament. "The Apostolical epoch", which speaks in the New Testament, and especially in Paul, because of the eschatological expectations, has either an indifferent or an essentially traditionalistic attitude with respect to this life as a vocation."⁸³ In this way we might say, on the one hand, that what Protestant asceticism has in common with the asceticism of the Middle Ages comes from St. Paul and the Gospels: and on the other hand, that what does not come from St. Paul and the Gospels is contrary to the asceticism of the Middle Ages.

Indeed, instead of being external, this asceticism is internal; instead of fleeing from the world, it seeks it out. Further, according to Weber, Protestant asceticism impels to the acquisition of this world's goods, makes this acquisition lawful, shall we say, the will of God? It only combats the temptations allied to riches . . . not mortification (*nicht Kasteiung*), but the use of possessions for the neces-

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, XXI (1905), p. 19 and n. 27; pp. 35, 76, 93, n. 52, 96, n. 55.

⁸² *Ibid.*, XXI, p. 63, n. 123.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, XX (1904), p. 46.

sary and practically useful purposes, is its ideal. The idea to which this asceticism tends, logically and in fact, is that of "comfort".⁸⁴

Then we ask: why take a single word to designate contrary things? Why take the word asceticism in a sense opposed to that which ecclesiastical history and ordinary usage give it? Is there not risk of provoking misunderstandings and equivocations?

To sum up, the prodigious and admirable work of Max Weber results in the anticipated correction of Troeltsch's paradox, and we should accept willingly Weber's conclusion, were there not two words that are in danger of being taken in a sense, in which Weber does not take them.

IV. CALVIN.

We now come to our Reformer. If we had to do only with Ritschl and his three faithful disciples, we could say: since Calvin is of all the Reformers the one whom you regard as the least a reformer, the most mediaeval, by showing how far Calvin broke with the Middle Ages, we have proved *a fortiori* how the whole Reformation was reformative. But, according to Troeltsch, we cannot use this language. Troeltsch, indeed, with his independent knowledge of Lutheran chauvinism, has made it apparent that the accusations of Ritschl hit Luther even harder than Calvin. In this, Troeltsch has come back to the unanimous opinion of the Catholics (and in this they may be believed), who have recognized in Calvin their most dangerous adversary, because he was the most logical reformer.

But, in reality, the disagreement between Ritschl and Troeltsch little concerns us. To our mind there is no contradiction between Luther and Calvin. Coming after Luther, Calvin has profited by this, and has carried on the Protestant results of all Protestantism. It suffices us to concern ourselves with Calvin; by justifying Calvin we shall justify Luther and the entire Reformation. I add that we

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, XX (1904), pp. 99, 100.

shall only treat of a single point of the Calvinistic conception, the pretended asceticism of Calvin. Nothing but his asceticism, because it is upon this that Ritschl and the whole Ritschlian school build their theories. And we confine ourselves to this point, because even with this restriction, the subject in its entirety is still too vast for full treatment here.

1. "Self-denial" is the means of attaining the end of human life. The difference between paganism and Christianity is shown in this. Paganism preaches the autonomy and pride of men. Christianity preaches heteronomy,⁸⁵ and humility. "Christian philosophy bids reason withdraw itself in order that it may give place to the Holy Spirit, and be subject to His guidance, so that the man no longer lives of himself, but has Christ living and reigning in him."⁸⁶ Saint Paul said: It is not I that live, it is Christ that liveth in me; and in a highly oratorical unfolding of this theme Calvin repeats: "We are not our own . . . we are not our own . . . we are the Lord's . . . we are the Lord's . . ."⁸⁷

And yet it is said: this self-denial is asceticism,—the beginning, the root of asceticism. But one is certainly mistaken, who holds to appearances and sees in Calvinistic renunciation only a negative meaning. On the contrary, it is positive, essentially and doubly positive; denying oneself means the giving oneself to men and to God. Calvin says this in so many words: "This self-denial,⁸⁸ which Christ requires so carefully of all his disciples, has respect partly to men and partly to God."⁸⁹

Men. The particularly difficult thing is to seek the good

⁸⁵ This is not the place to discuss, fully, the ideas of heteronomy and autonomy. We are far from wishing to say that Christianity is hostile to the true autonomy of the soul and of man.

⁸⁶ *Institutio*, III, vii, 1.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸⁸ The Latin word, *Abnegatio*, is translated by *abnegation* in 1541, and by *renouncement* in 1560.

⁸⁹ *Institutio*, III, vii, 4.

of our neighbor; and only self-denial removes this difficulty: "All that we have received of the Lord has been granted us on this condition, that we use it for the common welfare of the Church . . . The lawful use of this grace is a loving and liberal sharing of it with our neighbors . . . no member has his powers for himself, and he does not apply them to his own particular use, but for the profit of others . . . the common benefit of the Church."⁹⁰ Thus this "self-denial" is the basis of solidarity (and we must forego here to indicate the very beautiful development given by Calvin to this idea).

God. Self-denial for the sake of God will be in its turn the basis of integrity and tranquillity of spirit. "Whoever rests in the divine blessing, will not by wicked and crafty means seek any of those things that men seek with mad desire. And he will have a solace in which he can better acquiesce than in all the riches of the world . . ., he will account all things to be ordered of God, as is expedient for his salvation."⁹¹ Thus self-denial is the great means of activity in the world, for men. We see how far words must be distrusted.

2. It is true that with Calvin self-denial is a manner of "bearing his cross", and that this cross is frequently mentioned. But here again it is not at all a matter of suffering for the sake of suffering, and of a seeking after suffering. Calvin writes the very opposite of this in one of the numerous passages in which he has branded the ascetic folly of Stoics, fakirs and monks. "To bear the cross patiently is not to be altogether stolid, and to feel no grief, like the Stoic philosophers . . . There are even among Christians fellow creatures who think that it is vicious not only to groan and weep but also to be sad and anxious. These wild opinions proceed from idle natures . . . For our part we will have nothing to do with this hard and rigorous philosophy."⁹²

⁹⁰ *Institutio*, III, vii, 5.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, III, vii, 9.

⁹² *Ibid.*, III, viii, 9.

And again: "If we were like a block of wood or a stone, there would be no virtue in us . . . the brute beasts sometimes have no feeling, but this does not make them virtuous."⁹³ And yet again: "No one need be astonished if we esteem the tears and groans of David more than the hardness and stolidity of many, a hardness and stolidity which many praise as the highest virtue."⁹⁴

3. In addition to self-denial, another means of attaining the end of the Christian life is meditation on the life to come. And here, in his great fervor, Calvin makes use of some of those violent expressions, to which he is addicted. He is speaking of condemning the present life. For his anti-aesthetic temperament is concerned only with the "two extremes", "either the earth must be despised by us, or else it enslaves us by an intemperate love of it."⁹⁵

But, once again, we must not forget the vehement forms of speech affected by Calvin. And the proof is that if he says here: there is no mean between the two extremes, elsewhere he declares that "there is as much danger of falling into one extreme as the other".⁹⁶ We should, then, avoid both. And after having given the reasons for despising this earth and this life, Calvin makes haste to inform us that we must not put a wrong construction on his words and come to a "hatred of the present life or ingratitude toward God". On the contrary, this life is among "the blessings of God, which are not to be condemned".⁹⁷ And he shows its advantages and benefits. God reveals Himself here as our Father, in the smallest details, we are here preparing for the glory of His kingdom, etc. Furthermore, the earthly life seems despicable to us only in comparison with the heavenly life.⁹⁸

4. However, it must be observed that these utterances

⁹³ Sermons on Job, *Opera*, XXXIII, p. 93.

⁹⁴ Homilies on I Sam., *Opera*, XXX, p. 681.

⁹⁵ *Institutio*, III, ix, 2.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, III, x, 1.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, III, ix, 3.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, III, ix, 4.

are only preliminary. Could one speak of the monastic asceticism of Calvin even if these prefatory statements were all? Certainly not.

Calvin speaks to us "of the right use of earthly blessings". It is here that we find the true nature of his asceticism. Let us read attentively. We do not have to abstain from this world's goods, Calvin declares, not even from those "which seem more conducive to pleasure (*oblectationi*) than to our necessities". On the contrary, we are to use them "as well for our needs as for our delectation (*oblectamentum*)".⁹⁹ Such is the exordium of the alleged panegyric on monastic asceticism.

Some good persons among the "saints" have permitted man to use this world's goods only in so far as necessity demanded. Undoubtedly, these saints were well intentioned; they were none the less mistaken; "they practiced a too great rigor"; they were more "strict" than God's word. And this overstrictness is "very dangerous". Yet it is not necessary to believe them and to imagine that it is unlawful "to add anything to the brown bread and water".¹⁰⁰ This is monastic asceticism, and—its formal condemnation.

There follows a charming passage of good sense, as realistic, as poetic: "If we consider for what purpose God created food, we shall find that He wished to provide not only for our necessity, but also for our pleasure and recreation (*oblectamento ac hilaritati*). So as to raiment, beside necessity, He has regard to that which is proper and becoming (*decorum et honestas*). As to herbs, trees, and fruits, beside their various useful qualities, He has enhanced them by their beauty (*aspectu gratia*), and gives us added pleasure in their perfume (*jucunditas, odoris*). If this were not so, the prophet would not have numbered among the divine blessings the wine that rejoiceth man's heart and oil that maketh his face to shine . . . The good qualities that all things have by nature (*naturales rerum dotes*) show us how

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, III, x, 1.

¹⁰⁰ This last phrase was added in 1559. *Institutio* III, x, 1.

we ought to enjoy them . . . Do we think that, our Lord having given such beauty to the flowers, which present themselves to the sight (*qual ultro in oculos incurret*), it is not lawful to be touched with pleasure in seeing them? Do we think that He has given them so sweet an odor (*tantum odoris suavitatem*) and does not wish that man should delight to smell them? . . . Have done then with that inhuman philosophy, which . . . not only maliciously (*maligne*) deprives us of the lawful fruit of the divine beneficence, but also cannot be realized without depriving man of all sentiment, and making him like a block of wood."¹⁰¹

And Calvin preached this anti-asceticism from his pulpit after having recommended it in his dogmatics. "It is said in Ps. civ., that God has not only given man bread and water for the necessity of life, but that He added as well wine to comfort and rejoice his heart . . . He might well have made the corn grow for our nourishment without any preceding bloom. He might well have made fruits and trees without leaves and blossoms. We see that our Lord wills that we should rejoice through all our senses . . ."¹⁰² "The world was created for us, and our God wills not that we should be deprived of anything whatever."¹⁰³

5. Self-denial is a form of asceticism; asceticism is a form of pessimism. But truly, we do not think it necessary to enter into a detailed discussion of the reasons by which the attempt is made to prove, in spite of everything, that Calvin taught monastic pessimism. Moreover, it would be necessary to define pessimism and the different kinds of pessimism. This would take time and space. If one were to speak of pessimism without particularizing, is there not a Biblical, Christian pessimism,—an evangelical pessimism even? And does this kind of pessimism prevent Christianity from being a doctrine of optimism, of the greatest and only true optimism that the world has known?

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, III, x, 2, 3.

¹⁰² Sermon on Deuteronomy, *Opera*, XXVIII, p. 36.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, *Opera* XXVI, pp. 163, 164.

Leaving to our readers the task of combining them, we cite some of the texts at random. "The world lieth under the power of the evil one" (I John v. 19); "The wages of sin is death" (Rom. vi. 23); "The sorrow of the world worketh death" (I Cor. vii. 10). . . . And, indeed, must we not go higher than St. Paul and St. John? Are not the Beatitudes a strange cry of mingled pessimism and optimism? "Blessed are the poor in spirit; blessed are they that mourn; blessed are they that hunger and thirst after righteousness; blessed are they that are persecuted for righteousness sake" (Matt. v. 3, 4, 6, 10).

Then, technical terms are resorted to, scholastic discussions, and all that theological art, which consists in contemplating the trees in such a way as not to see the forest. We are told that Calvin's pessimism has all the characteristics of real pessimism; it is eschatological, negative and ascetic . . . The pessimism of Calvin is all that!

We limit ourselves to the consideration for a moment of the first of these sinister words: eschatological. It is one of the great words of real theology. What does it mean? Does it mean that the supreme good exists only in the other life?¹⁰⁴ Or, rather, that the felicity of salvation begins to be our heritage in this life, although it is complete only in the other life? Whatever is thought of the first statement, it is the second that Calvin sets forth; and it is difficult to see in the second anything else than an evident truth for every Christian.

Calvin writes: "As to us, already in this earthly pilgrimage (*in hac quoque terrena peregrinatione*) we know what is the only and perfect felicity (*Nota est unica et perfecta felicitas*), but in such sort that it inflames [more exactly: this felicity, which inflames] our hearts daily more and more with desire for it (*sui desiderio*), until we shall be satisfied with its full possession (*donec plena fruitio nos*

¹⁰⁴ Schulze sums up thus the eschatological character of the thought of Calvin: "The future life includes in itself the supreme good (*schliesst das höchste Gut in sich*); the presence of God and therewith happiness and salvation". *Meditatio*, p. 8.

satiet).¹⁰⁵ Could one wish anything more clear? This happiness of salvation is not merely eschatological.

This text annoys the inventors of the pessimism and asceticism, etc., of Calvin. They summon exegesis to their aid, and declare that Calvin has in mind here, for this earth, only an abstract knowledge of perfect happiness. "This is not the object of our present pleasure."¹⁰⁶ We shall not stop here to show that this exegesis does too much violence to the text; that a knowledge (*nota*) which inflames the heart with desire (*desiderio corda ascendit*), and gives us already a partial joy (*fruitio*), awaiting complete happiness (*donce plena*), never was an abstract notion. But of what use is this exegesis? Calvin has himself explained clearly his thought and his phraseology: "We begin (*incipimus*) here to enjoy the sweetness of His kindness in His benefits (*divinae benignitates suavitatem delitare*), so that our hope and desire are incited to expect the full revelation (*quo spes ac desiderium nostrum acuatur ad plenam ejus revelationem expectendam*)."¹⁰⁷

Even Schulze is obliged to admit the existence of passages that "seem to contradict his thesis explicitly". (*Manches scheint dem direct zu widersprechen*).¹⁰⁸ But, truly, what is to be said? This is to be said, which Troeltsch confesses, that the Reformers did not make this earthly life, the possessions of this life, ends in themselves, but means to arrive at the true goal: the possession of God, eternal life in God. Only, if this is eschatological pessimism, this eschatological pessimism is found in all the Reformers, as well as in Calvin; and, indeed, before the Reformers, in St. Paul. This pretended eschatological pessimism is an authentic Pauline conception. "For verily in this tabernacle we groan, longing to be clothed upon with our habitation which is from heaven" (2 Cor. v. 2). "For our citizenship is in heaven; from whence also we wait for a Saviour, the Lord

¹⁰⁵ *Institutio*, III, xxv, 2. This text is that of 1559.

¹⁰⁶ Schulze, *Meditatio*, p. 8.

¹⁰⁷ *Institutio*, III, ix, 3.

¹⁰⁸ *Meditatio*, p. 50.

Jesus Christ" (Phil. iii. 20). "For me to live is Christ, and to die is gain. But if to live in the flesh—if this is the fruit of my work, then what I shall choose I wot not. But I am in a strait betwixt the two, having the desire to depart and be with Christ, which is far better" (Phil. i. 21-23). "Forgetting the things which are behind and reaching forth to the things which are before, I press on toward the goal, unto the prize of the high calling of God in Christ Jesus" (Phil. iii. 13). "For our light affliction, which is for the moment, worketh for us more and more exceedingly an eternal weight of glory; while we look not at the things which are seen, but at the things which are not seen: for the things which are seen are temporal; but the things which are not seen are eternal" (2 Cor. iv. 17-18).

Our readers may multiply these citations at will. We only add that in case some objector rejects St. Paul altogether, and proclaims him to be the founder of asceticism and of eschatological, monastic pessimism, it matters little. Jesus remains. Is it not He who spoke so often of the necessity for His disciples to deny themselves (Matt. xvi. 24), to give up everything (Luke xiv. 33), to bear their cross (Matt. x. 38), to love Him more than their fathers and mothers (Matt. x. 37), to lose, to hate their own life (Matt. xvi. 25, Lk. xiv. 26), not to lay up treasures on earth (Matt. vi. 19), not to set their hearts on treasures on earth but on treasures in heaven (Matt. vi. 20), to make themselves maimed, halt, blind, if hand, or foot, or eye stays the course toward eternal life (Matt. xvii. 8-9)? "Sell all that thou hast and give alms . . . make for yourselves treasures in heaven. . . . For where your treasure is, there will your heart be also" (Lk. xii. 33-34). "How hardly shall they that have riches enter into the kingdom of God! And the disciples were amazed at his words. But Jesus answereth again and saith unto them, Children, how hard is it for them that trust in riches to enter into the kingdom of God! It is easier for a camel to go through a needle's eye than for a rich man to enter into the kingdom of God. They were

astonished exceedingly, saying unto him, then who can be saved? Jesus looking upon them saith: With men it is impossible, but not with God; for all things are possible with God" (Mk. x. 23-27). Is all this different from St. Paul? And had Calvin a different conception than that of St. Paul and Jesus Christ?

The conclusion is always the same: the attacks on Calvin and the Reformation do not strike the Reformers only; they go back to St. Paul and the historic Christ Himself.

6. After what Weber has said of vocation, we may here pass by in complete silence this chief element of the Calvinistic conception. The idea of vocation is one of the principle ideas of the Reformation. But it is only with Calvin and the Calvinists that it has developed its practical and decisive consequences. Giving to the life of every man and to every detail of that life a divine value, it suffices of itself to overturn all the exploitations of the pretended pessimism of Calvin.

But there is another point, which must be insisted upon, for it is upon this point that the accusations of pessimism and asceticism are ultimately based—the more securely, it is believed; I mean Calvin's conception of the body.

It is said: "Calvin especially likes the comparison of the body to a tent (quickly pitched) or even to a prison (instead of *carcer* there is also *ergastulum*)."¹⁰⁹ This is true. It might be added that Calvin sees in the deliverance from the body a condition of complete deliverance from sin. "There always remain many infirmities", he says, "while we are shut up in our mortal body (*mole corporis nostri*)."¹¹⁰ "While we inhabit this prison of our body (*in carcere corporis nostri*) we must always and without ceasing combat the corruption of our nature."¹¹¹ But are not these precisely the words and thoughts of St. Paul? "I am carnal, sold under sin. . . . O wretched man that I am, who

¹⁰⁹ Schulze, *Meditatio*, p. 7.

¹¹⁰ *Institutio*, III, iii, 14.

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, III, iii, 20.

shall deliver me out of the body of this death?" (Rom. vii. 24).

To tell the truth, Schulze has forgotten to notice the most scornful word that Calvin uses to designate the body, a word that occurs more than once in his discourses, when he is trying to smite as with rod and hammer (these are his own expressions) the hardened consciences of his hearers, "We are enveloped in our bodies, which are but car-casses."¹¹²

It is seen that we conceal nothing. But just where Calvin, with his way of speaking extravagantly, most abuses the body, does he most exalt it: "Our bodies, although they are wretched corpses, do not cease to be temples of the Holy Spirit, and God would be adored in them. . . . We are the altars, at which He is worshipped, in our bodies and in our souls."¹¹³

But let us go further and from words pass to ideas. With the aid of a passage relative to Osiander, it is thought that it can be proved that Calvin excluded the body from what is called "the image of God". This is wrong. What Calvin reproaches Osiander with, is not that he placed the image of God in the soul and in the body, but that he did this "confusedly" (*promiscue*) and "equally" (*tam ad corpus quam ad animam*). As to himself, if he did not do this confusedly and equally, he did not put it in the one less than in the other. "The image of God embraces the entire dignity, by which man is exalted above all the animal species." And he expressly says: "there is no part of man, including the body itself, in which there is not some luminous spark" of that divine image.¹¹⁴

Hence, while the ascetic conception tends to the abase-ment of the body, the Calvinistic conception tends to respect for and care of the body.

¹¹² Sermons on Daniel, *Opera* XLV, p. 459.

¹¹³ Sermons on Deuteronomy, *Opera* XXVII, pp. 19, 20.

¹¹⁴ *Institutio*, I, xv, 3. This is the text of 1559. It shows the sense in which Calvin's thought is developed, and rectified the earlier texts of the *Psychopannychia*. *Opera*, V, p. 180.

Calvinism makes it the strict duty of the faithful to keep the body clean and healthy, as much as possible. "God deigns to dwell within us; let us endeavor then to walk in such purity of body and soul, that our soul, especially, may be purified from all evil thoughts and affections; and then, that our bodies also may be kept with such decency that we shall not callously commit improprieties before men, and that we be not ashamed; for this would cause us to forget the duty we owe to God."¹¹⁵ That is to say that there is no place in Calvinism for any St. Labre of repulsive memory (*de pouilleuse memoire*). And this explains how and why it is that the most Calvinistic peoples, the Scotch and the Dutch, are the most noted for their cleanliness.

Cleanliness and health. Health (as far as it depends upon ourselves) is a duty toward God, like cleanliness. Recommendations abound: "We must beware of a too great austerity, for God does not wish that man should commit suicide."¹¹⁶ Man ought to be as mindful of his health as possible, and this not so much for his own welfare as that he may study to do good."¹¹⁷ If we are sick, we must use the remedies that are offered us; "it is God's will that we should use them; it is devilish pride that makes us willing to abstain from their use".¹¹⁸ Is it then "comely for an Apostle of Jesus Christ to exhort a man to drink wine"? Certainly. "In everything and everywhere, even in drinking and eating, God wills that our life should be regulated, to the end that by using His creatures (*choses créées*) we may serve Him, that we should be fit for doing good."¹¹⁹ *Mens sana in corpore sano*. If there has ever been a philosophy which explained, justified and preached this adage, it is certainly the Christian philosophy of Calvin.

Far from leading to asceticism, this philosophy has led—very logically—to such a union of cleanliness and piety, of

¹¹⁵ Sermons on Deut., *Opera*, XXVIII, p. 101.

¹¹⁶ Sermons on I Tim., *Opera*, LIII, p. 536.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 534.

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 537.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 533.

joy and health, as alone can make our soul and body do their greatest service for God and humanity. Hence one understands why the body of the Calvinist, not less than his soul, has been so fit for the conquest of the modern world through all the most intense enterprises of commerce and industry, in the old and in the new world.¹²⁰

Finally, let us note—over against all theologians sufficiently blinded by their prejudices to speak still of the monastic and Platonic asceticism of Calvin—let us note the belief in the resurrection of the body, a belief unknown to the Greek philosophers, and upon which Calvin insists in this wise: “The error of those who imagine that the soul will not resume the body with which it is now clothed, but that a new one will be made for it, is so enormous that we shall regard it as a detestable monster.”¹²¹

Here is a hymn in honor of the body. The body is a temple of the Holy Spirit: “Can it sink into putrefaction without hope of resurrection?”¹²² “The body is a member of Jesus Christ. God asks that our tongues and our hands worship Him. If He does such honor to our bodies, what madness is it in mortal man to reduce them to dust without hope that they shall be raised again?” “Shall the body of St. Paul”, exclaims Calvin, “which bore the marks of Jesus Christ”, which “glorified him exceedingly”, be deprived of the reward of the crown?”¹²³

Schulze is here again disturbed by the text. He is even obliged to admit “that there is a real difference between the eschatology of Calvin and that of Plato”. “But”, says he, “it is an unconscious contradiction, that is all.” “Calvin was not at all conscious (*er ist sich gar nicht bewusst*) how

¹²⁰ The first sentence of the celebrated Heidelberg Catechism, which does not separate soul and body in salvation, must not be forgotten: Sect. I, Dem. I: “What is thy only comfort in life and in death? Ans. That I, with body and soul, both in life and in death, am not my own, but belong to my faithful Saviour, Jesus Christ, etc.”

¹²¹ *Institutio*, III, xxv, 7.

¹²² *Ibid.*

¹²³ *Ibid.*, III, xxv, 8.

little this agrees with his small esteem for the body."¹²⁴ Let the reader decide.

7. In order to sum up and as it were make all these ideas and opinions concrete, nothing remains but to read the chapter on "Christian Liberty" (and some pages of the discourses treating of this same subject). This chapter is usually passed over in silence. And undoubtedly it is not written with the lyric charm of Luther's analagous treatise. But it is this, in one view, that gives it its value. It is not, indeed, a copy, an imitation. It is not a theme newly treated, but as of necessity because the plan of the work required it. Calvin here is perfectly original, with a robust, spontaneous and most characteristic originality.

At the outset he denies all monastic asceticism, as if God took pleasure in these material sacrifices. He shows that the ground is slippery; and that once the foot is set on the slope, one must go to the end. The history of certain saints proves it. With his virile good sense he writes: "When once the conscience is bridled and held in check (*in laquem*), it enters an infinite labyrinth and a deep abyss, whence it is not easy to escape. If one begins to doubt whether it is lawful for him to use linen sheets, shirts, handkerchiefs and napkins, he will not long be sure about using hemp, and at last he will vacillate as to the use of tow. For he will wonder if he might not eat without a napkin and do without handkerchiefs. Should he deem a daintier food unlawful, he will at last not dare to eat either bread or common viands, with an assured conscience before God, since it will always occur to him that he might sustain life with still meaner food. If he scruples to drink good wine (*suaviori*), he will afterward not dare to drink the worst with a good conscience, or water that is unusually sweet and pure; in fine, it will come to this, that he will hold it a great sin to trample on a straw in his path."¹²⁵ Liberty! Liberty! says Calvin. We ought, "without scruple of conscience or

¹²⁴ *Meditatio*, p. 86.

¹²⁵ *Institutio*, III, xix, 7.

trouble of spirit, to make such use of the gifts of God as has been ordained".¹²⁶

And from theory, Calvin goes on to practice, to examples. We find in Calvin a man of the 16th century, who loves to banquet, to make good cheer and to drink a few glasses of good wine with his friends. "The feast of Nabal was not blameworthy in itself; the divine law surely permitted him to invite his friends to a feast (*convivium*), and to treat them hospitably (*liberalius*). . . . God sometimes permits us to live more freely, more sumptuously (*lautius*), by special divine favor. Nabal sinned through excess; he was drunken.

Now Calvin is pitiless toward drunkards. For drunkenness turns us into unclean (*sues*) beasts. Elsewhere Calvin expresses himself in this wise: "If a man knows that he has a weak head, and that he cannot carry three glasses of wine without being overcome, and then drinks indiscreetly, is he not a hog?"¹²⁷ We notice the "three glasses of wine", the minimum that harmed the weak heads only, and we strongly suspect that Calvin did not rank himself among them.

He takes up again his story of the banquet of Nabal: "The liberality of God toward the human race is so great, that He supplies us not only with that which is necessary for the nourishment of our bodies, but also with that which provides plenty and pleasure (*jocunditatem*). Thus wine has been given, not only to strengthen man's heart, but also to make him joyful (*ad illum exhilarandum*)." It is only necessary to use these good things in such a way that we can always call upon God and serve Him. "In short, that the gaiety (*hilaritas*) and pleasure (*voluptas*) which we get from wine (*quam ex vino capimus*) may not disturb our worship of God . . . let us use wine and other created things soberly, with temperance, in order that satisfied by them we may receive new strength for the fulfilment of our

¹²⁶ *Ibid.*, III, xix, 8.

¹²⁷ Sermons on Deut., *Opera*, XXVI, p. 510.

vocation."¹²⁸ Consequently, he altogether approves of the assembling of the sons of Job; "also that they had a merry time with one another, that they might continue in amity". And in a general way "we should not have scruples or superstitions . . . when we are at table, let us eat in order to be refreshed, as if God were feeding us".¹²⁹

What Calvin says of drinking and eating he repeats à propos of all the other joys of life. And he writes pages full of the most significant realism. Have his critics never read them? "Why are the rich cursed, who have now received their consolation, who are full [*saturati*, i. e. *ras-sassiés*], who laugh, who sleep on beds of ivory, who add possession to possession (*agrum agro*), at whose feasts are harps, lutes, tambourines and wine. Surely the ivory and gold and riches are good creatures (*creaturae*, i. e. creations, things created by God) permitted and even appointed for the use of men, and nowhere is laughing forbidden, or being full (*saturari*, *se rassasier*), or the acquiring of new possessions (*novae veteribus atque avitis adjungere*), or delight in musical instruments (*concentum musico delectare*), or drinking wine, etc. . . ."¹³⁰ Gold, fields, dinners, banquets, concerts; all this is permitted! What becomes of the stereotyped remarks about the sombre, morose and "Franciscan" asceticism of Calvin?

Ritschl wrote in 1880: "As Calvin, personally, did not need any recreation, he saw only pressing temptations to sin in the social forms of recreation and in the luxury that followed them. . . . For this reason he combatted everything that pertained to the gay and free joyousness of life and luxury."¹³¹ These phrases have been circulated from hand to hand, from book to book, like current coin, and they may be found, for example, in the most recent popular work, that of Bess: *Nos éducateurs religieux*, 1908. Bess repeats religiously: "This agreed with his personal char-

¹²⁸ Homilies on I Sam., *Opera*, XXX, p. 565.

¹²⁹ Sermons on Job, *Opera*, XXXIII, pp. 39, 41.

¹³⁰ *Institutio*, III, xix, 9.

¹³¹ Ritschl, *Geschichte des Pietismus*, I, p. 76.

acter, which despised (*verachtete*), which, it may be said, held in horror (*ja zum Teil verabscheute*) all that could refresh and adorn life (*alle Mittel der Erholung und Verschönerung*). He was endowed with a seriousness and with an ability to work that had no need of diversion (*Ablenkung*).¹³²

Pure legend! Caricature, the fruit of ignorance and prejudice. It is sufficient "to use the gifts of God with a pure conscience", to observe "the rule of proper use". Importance does not attach to the things themselves, but to the way in which they are used. "A royal courage often dwells in a coarse and homely garb, and an humble heart is often hidden under silk and velvet." Poverty, a comfortable estate, wealth,—none of these is essential. "The law of Christian liberty . . . is to be content with what we have"; it is to know alike how to bear humiliation and honor, hunger and abundance, poverty and wealth. "If this temperance is wanting, the common and ordinary pleasures are excessive."¹³³ It would, in truth, be as easy to caricature Calvin as a Rabelaisian *bonvivant*, as to caricature him as a Franciscan monk; as easy, I should say as difficult. Calvin was simply a Christian of the type of Luther and the Reformation, of the type of St. Paul and of Christ, a Christian, who has for his ideal, man created by God, in a world which is fallen and yet is the handiwork of God.

It is then by a wrong interpretation of certain passages, or by disregarding them under the pretext of unconscious contradiction, when, although wrongly interpreted, they are still vexatious, that the conclusions of the school of Ritschl are formed, to wit, that in Calvinism there is "an undervaluation (*Unterschätzung*) of man's task in the world"; that "as to the work to be done in the world and as to its multiform content, one, from this point of view, could not be much concerned about it"; that nothing shows more clearly the tendency of morality, in the Calvinistic

¹³² *Unsere religiösen Erzieher*, II, p. 82.

¹³³ *Institutio*, III, xix, 9.

sense, to turn away from the world (*den Welt abgewandten Character*), than the relation indicated between the chapter in which self-denial is treated, and that in which "bearing the cross patiently" is spoken of, and likewise the one on "meditation on the life to come. . . . As the theatre of our moral preparation for heaven, this life, contemptible in itself, has a value. But this moral preparation becomes a habit of despising life (considered in itself) and a habit of endeavor after the life to come. This means that this life has this consequence, that while in it we should detach ourselves from it and live for the life to come. Thus the moral earnestness of Calvinistic Christianity does not overcome the habit of the soul that longs for death (*die Stimmung der Todessehnsucht*). On the contrary, that state finds in it new nourishment."¹³⁴

With a slight modification of the formula of Ritschl we might say that in this appreciation, all that is correct is found in St. Paul; and that what is not found in St. Paul is not correct. But of what use is further discussion amidst all these subtleties, and the loss of time in correcting the meaning of the passages cited, or accumulating neglected ones? This whole conception runs foul of something more solid even than clear and numerous texts; it encounters reality, the reality of facts and of all history. The centuries and whole peoples, in the full sunlight of life, protest against these adroit or violent feats of the learned in the half-light of their closets.

Calvinism, lost in the mists of eschatology, living in the pessimistic expectation of death, paralyzed by the bonds of asceticism! Where has a Calvinist of this sort ever been seen? If Calvinism is what Ritschl and Schulze think, there is only one conclusion: there have never been men less Calvinistic than the Calvinists! Far from being a man who seeks retirement or turns from the world, and from the present life, the Calvinist is one who takes possession of the world; who, more than any other, dominates the world; who

¹³⁴ Schulze, *Meditatio*, pp. 13, 14.

makes use of it for all his needs; he is the man of commerce, of industry, of all inventions and all progress, even material.

And yet, after having shown this colossal error, we shall not close with saying it is inexplicable. Not at all; the explanation, on the contrary, is very easy. The critics of our Reformation have found themselves confronted with the contradictions, which we have indicated elsewhere. They are restricted to the choice of one of two terms,—that one which seems to them to justify their theological *a priori*, without once asking if there is not some psychological explanation, capable of harmonizing the terms, contradictory in appearance, and even of making one the profound cause of the other. For example, some critics do not comprehend how the doctrine of the subject-will (*serf-arbitre*), pushed to the extreme by Calvinists, has made of these Calvinists, precisely, the founders, *par excellence*, of moral austerity and civil liberty. Yet it is a fact, verified by the counter testimony of Pelagianism, which,—the party of absolute free-will, leads to the abasement of morality and to social slavery. Very well! As to self-denial in life, and the use of life, exactly the same thing happens and from the same motives, as happened in the case of the subject-will and liberty. In spite of appearances, the former is not the denial of the latter; it is its cause. With Calvin, indeed, self-denial is not a mere negative, privative conception . . . in it we find ourselves simply in the presence of a principle, a law, one of the most important laws of the spiritual and moral world. *Per crucem ad gloriam!* Which sometimes means, through slavery to liberty; and sometimes through self-denial to possession. It is the law which Christ Himself formulated with solemnity, and with éclat, when He said: "Whosoever would save his life shall lose it: and whosoever shall lose his life for my sake shall find it" (Matt. xvi. 25). And again: "and every one that hath left houses, or brethren, or sisters, or father, or mother, or children, or lands, for my name's sake, shall receive a hundredfold, and shall inherit eternal life" (Matt. xix. 29). And again:

"But seek ye first the kingdom of God and His righteousness; and all these things shall be added unto you" (Matt. vi. 33).

We disregard all special intervention by God, all miraculous blessings. The psychological law is as simple as it is incontestable. To renounce everything in order to give everything to God and the brethren,—this is to be in the religious and moral state most fitted to assure liberty of spirit, sureness of action, the employment of the normal, the moral, that is to say, the most efficacious, the most productive means. Egoism, the passions, and vices are not the true means for the domination of the world, for drawing from it its hidden resources. Instead of making us the master, they make us slaves. That which rules the world is calmness, self-possession, virtue, and, consequently, piety and faith. In the tempest the pilot, who is most certain to save his own life and that of the ship, is not he who holds life so tenaciously that he dotes upon it; it is he who is so ready to die that he is calm and cool.

Matter brings nothing out of matter. It is the spirit that makes of matter what it will. He who seeks the world for the world, loses it. He who loses it, for Christ's sake, for God's sake, gains it. He who seeks himself, loses himself,—loses himself, as to everything that is not his real self, in his evil desires and mad passions. He who denies himself for the sake of God and the brethren, wins his personality. Self-possession is necessary for self-giving; in the measure in which a man gives himself he takes possession of himself, he gains his true self, his higher, spiritual, moral self, the acting, powerful self. He who denies himself in order to put in the place of himself goodness, Christ, God, becomes a self, creative like God, in every sphere.

But why invoke the example of Calvinism in the history of the old or the new world? There is a more striking example in the history of humanity. Christ is certainly the Being who denied self the most, and what Being has more completely conquered men and the world? "He humbled

himself, becoming obedient unto death, even the death of the cross. Wherefore also God highly exalted him and gave him the name, which is above every name; that in the name of Jesus every knee should bow, of *things* in the heaven and *things* on the earth and *things* under the earth" (Phil. ii. 8-10).

Thus it is that the pretended ascetic pessimism of Calvin is, psychologically, the cause of his intense realism; I was about to say, of his "*vitalisme*". And it is thus that the Reformation in general, and Calvinism in particular, breaking with Romanism and Pelagianism, to reascend to St. Paul, to the Christianity of the Gospel and of Christ, closed the Middle Ages and opened modern times.

Montauban, France.

E. DOUMERGUE.

REVIEWS OF RECENT LITERATURE

PHILOSOPHICAL LITERATURE.

DIE ETHIK PASCALS von Lic. Karl Bornhausen. Studien zur Geschichte des neueren Protestantismus.

"Pascal's Ethics" is the title of a masterly and comprehensive tractate from the pen of Professor Bornhausen. As announced by the publishers it forms part of a series to be devoted to the study of the later Protestantism. During the course of the series, the English Deism, the developments of modern philosophy and theology, as well as certain transformations within the pale of Roman Catholicism itself, are all to receive suitable notice.

"Pascal's Ethics" is the second of the series. Within the compass of a mere book notice, it will be impossible to do more than give a hint of the mass of material stored away in this little book. The work opens with a sketch of Pascal's ethical development viewed under the three principal periods of his life. This in a sense constitutes the basis of the whole. The author feels that Pascal's ethical positions are so complex and contradictory that familiarity with this historical statement of his development furnishes us the key to the comprehension of him; since his views are frequently the fruit of the various stages in his career.

Pascal's fame rests, says our author, above all else upon his theory of religion, which is peculiar to himself. In comparison therewith, his ethics occupy, undeniably, a subordinate place. He never attempted to give to his ethics the completeness of an independent unity; but followed the method, in vogue until his time, of regarding ethics as a pendant of dogmatics. His significance turns upon the fact that he surmounted the conceptions in dogmatics which had reigned in the Church since Augustine. The peculiarity of his position amounts to this: that he is, in a sense, an uncompromising reformer in the heart of the Church herself; and though to the end he remained most loyal in his attachment to her, nevertheless he represents some most remarkable deviations from her authoritative teaching, which led to important consequences both in and out of the church. He effects, in short, a methodical transference of the liberation steadily at work in science and philosophy since the Renaissance, to the field of religion. The leverage by means of which this is accomplished is his grasp of the nature and needs of the individual soul, so that on the ground of his psychological observations he perceives the independence and distinctive peculiarity of the religious feelings. He is thus enabled to set

limits to the encroachments of science as over against religion, and individualize the mysticism of the Catholic faith in the sense of the modern conception of the rights of personality.

We indicate one or two of the salient features of his position. In his attitude to the church, though never dreaming of disloyalty, his keen appreciation of the inalienable rights of the individual brings him into uncompromising conflict with her authoritative decrees. She is, indeed, infallible, but strictly so, only in the deliverance of a decision as to the heresy or orthodoxy of certain dogmas; but she is incompetent to say, in fact, whether these dogmas are actually present in a given book or document. This, of course, found its application in the historic Jansenistic controversy. But even the help afforded by this innocent form of casuistry, Pascal is inevitably driven to renounce in his unwavering determination to put the personality into possession of its rights as over against the unwarrantable assumptions of church authority. For an attempted reconciliation of this contradiction by the medium of a self-resigning asceticism, see p. 37 *et al.*

The discussion of the Church as the preparatory medium of salvation, but salvation itself as the gift of God's Holy Spirit; the darkening of human reason by the Fall, and the consequent confusion in natural ethics to be rectified only by the supernatural agency of Christian ethics; the pernicious influence of egotism in the breast of the natural man; and the salutary power of humility and mortification of the flesh as the ground and pillar of all perfect morality; these we must leave to the investigation of the reader.

The book is clear, compact and comprehensive. With its 170 clearly printed pages, as a part of the series to which it belongs, it should furnish a welcome acquisition to readers who have a taste for first-hand acquaintance with noble spirits; and desire to see much that is in making in modern times laid bare in its incipency.

Middletown, N. Y.

W. M. JACK.

APOLOGETICAL THEOLOGY.

NATURALISM AND RELIGION. By Dr. RUDOLF OTTO, Professor of Theology in the University of Göttingen. Translated by J. Arthur Thomson, Professor of Natural History in the University of Aberdeen, and Margaret R. Thomson. Edited with an Introduction by Rev. W. D. Morrison, LL.D. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons; London: Williams and Norgate, 1907. Crown, 8vo, pp. xi, 374.

Dr. Otto is introduced by his English editor to his new audience as "a thinker who possesses the rare merit of combining a high philosophic discipline with an accurate and comprehensive knowledge of the science of organic nature." The appearance of the name of Professor Thomson on the title-page of the book as translator, may be taken as

an additional guarantee of the scientific competency of the author. The book itself fully meets the expectations so aroused. We do not, indeed, share the author's philosophical standpoint; and still less can we homologate the theological conceptions which may occasionally be read between the lines. But there can be no question that the book is ably thought and attractively written; or that its author is exceptionally well-informed in the current scientific discussion of Germany, and is exceptionally well equipped to expound it alike in its details and in its general drift. As a result we have in the book an admirable survey of recent German speculation on the origin and nature of the world and man, and a strong and convincing defense of the right of religion in the face of modern thought.

Dr. Otto calls his book, *Naturalism and Religion*, and explains its purpose as "in the first place, to define the relation, or rather, the antithesis, between the two; and, secondly, to endeavor to reconcile the contradictions, and vindicate against the counter-claims of naturalism the validity and freedom of the religious outlook" (p. 1). Or, as he somewhat more crisply expresses it at a later point, "to define our attitude to naturalism, and to maintain in the teeth of naturalism the validity and freedom of the religious conception of the world" (p. 278). The real subject of the book is, therefore, Naturalism; and its real purpose is to assert over against Naturalism the right of religion. Its primary purpose, in other words, is polemic rather than constructive. It is less concerned with the positive exposition and development of the religious conception of the world than with the vindication of the right of a religious conception of the world. Of course Dr. Otto has not written so much without suggesting what, in his view, the religious conception of the world includes. He has even formally outlined and briefly expounded and even argued its elements. But neither the strength nor the mass of the book is given to it, but is expended rather on a careful critical survey of current forms of Naturalism, with a view to exhibiting its essential failure. From our point of view the value of the book is immensely increased by this circumstance. For Dr. Otto's philosophical and even theological conceptions would necessarily dominate his positive construction of the world-view to which he would give the name of religious. And, as we have already explained, we do not particularly care for Dr. Otto's philosophical or theological views. But in his exposition and criticism of Naturalistic theories he is moving on ground common to all who would cherish a religious world-view of any sort. And here we can follow his lucid expositions and his trenchant criticisms with unalloyed satisfaction.

Dr. Otto's philosophical standpoint is that of a convinced Kantian idealism, or perhaps we ought rather to say he is a disciple of that mixed product of Kant and Jacobi, Jacob Friedrich Fries, who has lately been disinterred in Germany and given at least some semblance of renewed vitality. Although he doubtless transcends Fries' anti-teleological view of nature, some slight echo of it may perhaps be detected in his willingness to admit that a direct study of nature will not

yield a teleological view of it. The Friesian leaven is more in evidence, however, in his view of religion as rooted primarily in a sense of mystery, upon which he then engrafts, to be sure, the sense of dependence in which religion centers, and the conception of teleology in which, we may say, it culminates. The peculiar extension he gives to the implications of the feeling of dependance, by which he derives from it the assurance not only that man, the subject of this ineradicable and surely not misleading feeling, is a contingent being, but that so is the whole world itself, has, perhaps, its roots in the same idealism. The external world which is our creation, can scarcely be less dependent than the beings whose creation it is. One gets the impression that Professor Otto's objection to Naturalism turns less on the obliteration by Naturalism of the distinction between matter and mind, than on Naturalism's attempt to work this obliteration the wrong way about. The external world from which Naturalism would explain mind, he would rather explain from mind. And so it comes about that as the argument runs on it seems almost to become rather a plea for spiritualism than for what we commonly speak of as a religious interpretation of the world. Its thesis almost appears to be summed up in the striking and strikingly true remark (p. 283), that "mental science, from logic and epistemology up to and including the moral and aesthetic sciences, proves by its very existence, and by the fact that it can not be reduced to terms of natural science, that spirit can neither be derived from nor analyzed into anything else." At this point, however, we are a little puzzled by the rushing in of another current of Dr. Otto's thought, which almost sweeps away this spirit, the substantial existence of which he seems to have so firmly established. We must not talk, it seems, of its "substantial nature" (p. 330)—that is a matter of entire indifference (p. 331); what concerns us is only "its incomparable value" (p. 331). "What lives in us . . . is not a finished and spiritual being . . . but something that develops and becomes actual very gradually" (p. 298). Whence it comes . . . who can tell? Or whither it goes? All we know of it is, lo! it is here. And, that it is the manifestation of something that is. "There is no practical meaning in discussing its 'origin' or its 'passing away,' as we do with regard to the corporeal. Under certain corporeal conditions it is there, it simply appears. But it does not arise out of them. And as it is not nothing, but an actual and effectual reality, it can neither have come out of nothing nor disappear into nothing again. It appears out of the absolutely transcendental, associates itself with corporeal processes, determines these and is determined by them, and in its own time passes back from this world of appearance to the transcendental again." (p. 358). Is this only another way of saying that "the soul that rises with us, our life's star, hath had elsewhere its setting, and cometh from afar"? Or does it, as we much doubt, mean much more than this? Decidedly Dr. Otto's philosophy needs watching. And we may be glad it does not form the staple of his book but only lies in its background.

What forms the staple of his book is the exposition and criticism of Naturalism. Naturalism, he tells us, exists in two forms, naïve and speculative. And speculative Naturalism entrenches itself in two great contentions, the one embodied in the Darwinian doctrine of evolution, the other in the mechanical theory of life. To the exposition and criticism of these two great contentions of Naturalism Dr. Otto accordingly devotes himself. To the Darwinian theory chapters 4 to 7 (pp. 85-186) are given; to the mechanical theory of life, chapters 8 to 11 (pp. 187-359). The discussion in both cases is full, the exposition clear, the criticism telling.

In dealing with the Darwinian theory, Dr. Otto very properly distinguishes between the theory of descent in general and the specific form given this theory by Darwin's hypothesis of the indefiniteness of variations and the survival of the fittest in the struggle for existence. The former, he points out, has maintained its ground, or perhaps we may even say has strengthened its stakes. Dr. Otto intimates, almost as a matter of course, his own adhesion to it. The latter, on the contrary, has become in the estimate of wide circles, not merely suspect, but even disproved. Dr. Otto intimates that he himself will have none of it. But it is precisely in this peculiarly Darwinian theory of "natural selection" that the virus of Naturalism in current evolutionary speculation is prominent. The theory of descent is in no sense specifically Darwinian: it is far older than Darwin and remains the conviction of multitudes who are definitely anti-Darwinian. What is specifically Darwinian is the appeal to the factors of overproduction, indefinite variation, struggle for existence and consequent elimination of the unfit and the survival of the fittest as containing in themselves the true account of the modifications which have produced the multitudinous forms of life. Thus teleology was reduced to an illusion and suitability substituted in its place: utility became the one sufficient creator of all that is living. The widespread dissatisfaction with, and even rejection of, this account of organic development which marks the present state of discussion may be taken as at the same time, therefore, a refutation of the Naturalism which underlies it, because it is an exhibition of the inadequacy of mere utility to account for all things. As investigation has gone on it has become clearer and clearer to numerous students of the subject that variations do not occur indifferently in every direction, but turn up opportunely. As Du Bois-Reymond expressed it in his vivid way, Nature's dice are loaded: not accidentalism but purpose rules her acts. The greater organism of the animate world grows apparently like the lesser organism of the individual being along fixed lines by definite steps to determined ends. "Natural selection" may have a part to play in the process: but it is in wider and wider circles coming to be believed that it is a very subordinate part. It can work on only what is given it; and it does not seem to have indefinite variations in every direction to work on, but, rather, very definite variations in one direction. The goal attained is, therefore, not determined by it, but

by the inherent tendency of the developing organism. So, at least, an increasing number of students of nature are coming to think.

Dr. Otto's method is marked by a very large infusion of the concessive spirit. He betrays no tendency to drive antitheses into contradictions; and he does not permit the cause of teleology in nature to be identified with the extremest anti-Darwinian opinions. On the contrary, he is quick to point out that purpose has no quarrel with means; and can live, therefore, under the strictest reign of law. It is not law which is fatal to purpose, but chance. Nay, says he, "absolute obedience to law, and the inexorableness of chains of sequence are, instead of being fatal to 'teleology', indispensable to it". "When there is a purpose in view", he argues, "it is only where the system of means is perfect, unbroken, and absolute, that the purpose can be realized, and therefore that intention can be inferred" (p. 83). Accordingly, therefore, he considers it possible to embrace in a teleological interpretation "the whole system of causes and effects, which, according to the Darwin-Weissmann doctrine, have gradually brought forth the whole diversity of the world of life, with man at its head". For why may not this be looked upon "as an immense system of means", intricate no doubt, but working to its end with inevitable necessity—which may therefore be the manifestation of intention (p. 151)? At a later point, when dealing with the mechanical theory of life, he reverts to the same line of remark to show that mechanism has in it nothing inconsistent with purpose (pp. 222-3). Mechanism may be only the way in which purpose realizes itself. Of course, the danger here is that we may fall thus into a Deistic conception of the method of what we theologically call "Providence". But this does not seem necessary, even when the whole of what we call nature is conceived as "a machine". Though the guiding hand of purpose be conceived as everywhere and at all times immediately operative, nevertheless the whole account of the several phenomena would be found in the efficient, not in the final causes. In no case are the final causes to be conceived as additional efficient causes producing with them a resultant effect. They are and remain only final causes and operate only through and by means of the efficient causes. Each phenomenon finds its whole account when severally considered, accordingly, in its efficient causes. It is therefore indifferent to purpose whether the events which occur under its government occur as products of mechanical or free causes. "Providence", then, which is but another way of saying "purpose", is as consistent with a mechanical theory as with any other theory of life: because "purpose" is not discerned in the separate phenomena but in their combination. Romanes was quite right, therefore, when he regretfully said of his earlier mistake in ruling purpose out of the universe: "I had forgotten to take in the whole scope of things, the marvelous harmony of the all." Dr. Otto is anxious that his readers shall not make the analogous mistake of supposing that because a thing is "caused" it is therefore not "intended." He does not imagine, of course, that in this vindication of teleology in relation to mechanism,

he has done all that is necessary to validate the religious view of the world. He rightly supposes, however, that he has by it done something to remove some current objections to the religious view of the world; for there are still some who imagine that when they say mechanism they deny purpose. How far the alleged mechanism rules is another question.

The most striking feature of Dr. Otto's method is, however, his employment of exposition as argument. His book thus becomes a mirror of current thought on the subjects with which he is dealing. The inherent weakness of the Darwinian construction of the factors of evolution, for example, he exhibits less by direct argument of his own against it than by a running exposition of the course of evolutionary thought in latterday Germany. The first impression the reader gets from this survey is of the uncertainty of the conclusions which are from time to time announced. He soon perceives, however, that amid the apparent confusion there is a gradual and steady driftage in one direction, and that that direction is away from Darwin's conceptions. Whatever in the end he may come to think of Darwin's theory in its application to nature, he receives a strong impression that it is fairly illustrated in this section of human research and thought. Here is certainly exhibited indefinite variation in all directions, struggle for existence, and—let us hope—the survival of the fittest. It may become us to bear in mind, to be sure, that the survival of the fittest is not quite the same as the survival of the true. It may be only the survival of the theory that fits in best with the pre-suppositions and prejudices of the times. Nevertheless truth is strong; and we can scarcely doubt it will (finally) prevail. And one gets the impression that, in this case, what seems likely to prevail in the meantime is the truth, and that this truth is hostile to the anti-teleological schematization of Darwin; and, indeed, to his whole construction of the main factors of evolution. Indeed, it seems at times as if the new investigators were inclined to react from "natural selection" a shade too violently, and not content with assigning *Darwinismus* to the *Sterbebett* were determined to deny to "natural selection" not only any real effectiveness or capacity for species-forming, but even reality itself. Prof. Otto avoids this extreme. He not only recognizes its operation in nature as a *vera causa* but points out that its obvious reality and actual working is the main cause of the attractiveness of the theory which found in it the one great agency in species-forming (pp. 156-7). Nevertheless, he holds firmly with the more recent thought, which discovers for it only a very subordinate rôle to play in nature; and he points out with great clearness that its dethronement and the substitution for it of theories of evolution dominated by the recognition of inherent tendencies in the organism and progression along right lines, is the definite relegation of Naturalism too to the *Sterbelager*, so far as it had entrenched itself in the doctrine of evolution.

In dealing with the mechanical theory of life, Professor Otto em-

ploys much the same method which he uses in dealing with the doctrine of evolution. Here, too, he avoids dogmatism and relies largely on the effect a mere tracing of the history of research is fitted to produce. For the progress of investigation has been away from the mechanical view of life. We have lived to see the dawn of a new age of "vitalism"; and even where the name is scouted and the thing deprecated, the edges of the old mechanical theory have become very frayed. On the basis of present day thought, Dr. Otto is justified in emphasizing the mystery of life and in pointing decisively to the supremacy of mind, so making way for the religious view of the world from this point of sight also.

Enough has doubtless been said to manifest the high value we place of Dr. Otto's discussion. It would be difficult to find elsewhere in such brief compass so full and lucid a survey of the recent German literature on evolution and the nature of life. And it would be, we are persuaded, impossible to find another work of such compressed form in which the failure of Naturalism as a theory of the world is more tellingly argued.

Princeton.

B. B. WARFIELD.

PSYCHOLOGIE DER RELIGIE. Bijdrage van den Heer H. BAVINCK. Overgedrukt uit de Verslagen en Mededeelingen der Koninklijke Akademie van Wetenschappen, Afdeling *Letterkunde*, 4^e Reeks, Deel ix. Amsterdam; Johannes Müller; 1907. 8vo, pp. 32 (147-178).

In this interesting article Dr. Bavinck with his wonted clearness, gives a brief sketch of the origin, character and value of that psychological study of religious phenomena which has been attracting so much attention among us for the past ten years.

The way was prepared for its rise, he thinks, by the shifting of attention from the objective truth to the subjective experiences of religion which was consequent on the great religious movement of the end of the 17th and beginning of the 18th centuries, and which found in Kant its philosophical, and in Schleiermacher its theological exponent. The investigation of the religions of the world which naturally grew out of the advancing ethnological knowledge of the 19th century, also entered as a factor into this preparation; and all the more that it was soon discovered that it had little to teach us upon the deeper questions of the origin, nature, truth and right of religion. In these circumstances it was natural that men should turn to the study of religion psychologically and socially, in the hope of discovering along this pathway the significance and value it has for the life as well of the individual as of society; and it was equally natural that it should be in America that the first essays in this direction should be made, since it is precisely in America that, through the succession of "revivals" since 1740, the most striking forms of subjective religious experiences have most attracted attention. Beginning with G. Stanley Hall (*Harvard Lectures*, 1881), therefore, America has led the way in this new science (Burnham, Daniels, Lancaster, Leuba, Starbuck, Coe, James). France,

However, has followed promptly her lead (Flournoy, Bos, Murisier Bois). Germany, on the other hand, has remained almost unmoved, though now at last (since April, 1907) it has its *Zeitschrift für Religionspsychologie*, edited by Drs. Vorbrodt and Bressler.

Dr. Bavinck's sketch of the principles and features of the new science is very sympathetic, and shows a thorough knowledge of its literature, although he draws especially (as he should) upon James and Starbuck as sources. He dwells on its professions of unprejudiced observation, its employment of the empirical, inductive method, and its use of the *questionnaire* system. He points out its predilection for pathological, or at least extreme cases; its connection of the religious crisis with the great revolution of puberty; and its appeal to the unconscious or subliminal activities of the mind. In a few pages he manages to give quite a complete account of the suggestions made by Professors James and Starbuck, and he finds much in them which promises to be useful. The differences in the religious life of the child, the youth, the man and the gray-head; the connection of the religious development with the physical, psychical, moral growth; the relation of the religious awakening to puberty; the illustration of conversion from other transformations of the consciousness; the working of the subliminal forces in the religious process—"all this", he says, "and much more, too, broadens the view, deepens the insight into the religious life and brings to the theologian, the pastor, the preacher, the missionary, the teacher and the educator, gains which can not be despised" (p. 25).

Dr. Bavinck is far, therefore, from condemning the new enterprise out of hand. He rather expressly welcomes it. But he plainly thinks that its value is liable to over-estimation. "It is a young science", he warns us, "and therefore perhaps inclined to pluck the fruit before it is ripe." He does not think highly of the data of *questionnaires* as foundations for inductions. He does not look upon exceptional phenomena as a promising source for the explanation of the normal. He looks askance at the utilitarian test of the Pragmatism which is united with these investigations. Above all he considers the purely formal character of the investigation fatal to its highest value. To undertake to study movements of the soul, labeled religious, without regard to the nature, good or bad, true or false, of their content, he looks upon as a somewhat empty task. It may teach us, no doubt—at least in a certain measure—what religion is, how it is rooted in, and joins in with the whole human nature, but it says nothing of its content, of its truth and its right. Therefore Troeltsch, in his address at St. Louis, on *Psychology and Epistemology in the Sciences of Religion*, justly remarks that the psychology of religion, as it is cultivated in America, England and France, "offers certainly much that is important, but, because it lacks a good epistemology, does not raise the question of truth. And in the last analysis it is with *truth* that we are concerned in every science—even in the science of religion" (p. 30).

In expressing these doubts as to the value of the new science as hitherto presented Dr. Bavinck expressly remarks that—in the circumstances in which he was speaking—he leaves to one side all theological objections (such, no doubt, as may lie against the professed reduction of conversion to a natural movement of the soul) and confines himself to general scientific considerations.

Princeton.

B. B. WARFIELD.

NATURAL AND APOLOGETIC THEOLOGY: or The Fundamental Evidences of Christianity. By REV. HAMPDEN C. DuBOSE, D.D.

This is a book in Chinese, published, says the author, "as a Manual for Preachers; a Text-book for Colleges and Divinity Classes; a Reader for Student Missionaries; a Guide to Scholars Seeking the Truth."

The book was printed in 1906, but only recently came to the editors of the PRINCETON THEOLOGICAL REVIEW.

The author is a missionary of the American Presbyterian Church South, who has spent more than forty years in China. That he has been diligent is evident from the fact that, in addition to the ordinary evangelistic and educational efforts of the missionary, he has written and published four books in English and a half dozen in Chinese, besides introductions and commentaries on more than twenty of the books of the Bible. All honor to the missionary who thus multiplies himself, and sets in motion forces that shall be powerful for good long after he himself shall rest from his labors!

Both by scholarship and experimental knowledge of the fruits of the religions of which he treats, Dr. DuBose is well qualified to write such a work as this. The need of the nation for which he writes is familiar to him, and he has produced a book really helpful to the supply of that need. He has missed not far, if at all, the high aim he had set for himself, as attested by the first paragraph above.

One of the most useful and popular Christian books ever printed in Chinese is the *Evidences of Christianity*, by our own Rev. Dr. W. A. P. Martin. Dr. DuBose's work is of a larger scope and on a different plan. So bulky is it that the reviewer can not do more than give its table of contents, and testify that in his opinion the work is well done.

The following are the divisions and subdivisions of the work:

I. Fundamental Evidences of Natural Religion. 1. Natural Religion of the greatest importance; men should investigate it. The chief doctrine of the Christian religion is that there is one God, perfectly holy, loving, and powerful; and that men should love Him with all their heart. This God sent His Son to become incarnate, and reveal the love of the Father in saving a lost world. To worship many gods is a violation of man's intelligence, an injury to his emotions, and a confusion of his will. It is impossible to serve many masters all of whom cannot be of the same authority and power. 2. All men have a dispo-

sition to worship God. That is, a religious nature (The Ontological Argument). The more this disposition is exercised the larger it grows. In trouble man instinctively calls upon God. Man's religious nature points to the unity of God. Many evidences, which are interlinked and mutually supporting. 3. All things have a First Cause. (The Cosmological Argument). The First Cause is all-powerful and one—the Creator. 4. All things testify to God's omniscience and omnipotence. (The Teleological Argument). A. Witness of the Three Lights—sun, moon and stars. B. Witness of the Earth. C. Witness of the Five Elements—metals, wood, water, fire, earth. D. Witness of the Foods for Man—the five grains, the hundred plants, birds, beasts, and fishes. E. Witness of the Human Body—bones, brain, eyes, ears, nose, mouth, tongue, hand, foot, digestive organs, circulation and respiration. F. Propagation of Birds and Animals, with the Laws of Adaptation. 5. All things manifest the Attributes of God. A. There must be a God. A Creator and Governor. B. God is one. All things are in harmony. One law in the world. All things point to one God. C. God is a spirit. Omnipotent. Not to be represented by images. D. God is omniscient. Familiar with past, present and future. The fountain of all wisdom. Eternally with us. E. God is omnipotent. By a word made all things. Man's strength derived from Him. So also the forces of water, wind, fire and electricity. F. God is love. Proofs; clothing, food, happiness of mankind, medical remedies, and especially the gift of His son. 6. The heart of man testifies to the existence of God. (Anthropological Argument). A. The witness of man's intellect. B. The witness of man's conscience. C. The witness of man's sense of justice. (Reward of good, and punishment of evil.) 7. The immortality of the soul, a proof. The soul is preserved by God. It is of all things most precious. 8. God's preservation of all men, and sovereignty over the world, a proof. (The doctrine of Providence.) A. God preserves mankind. B. God rules over the world. Illustrations: Joseph, Moses, Paul. God transforms misfortune into happiness. God answers prayer.

II. Comparison of the Two Religions, and the Errors of False Systems. 1. The Religion of Lao-tz (Taoism) compared with that of the Apostle John. 2. Comparison of Confucian and Christian Ethics. A. Concerning Benevolence. B. Concerning Righteousness. C. Concerning Propriety. D. Concerning Wisdom. E. Concerning Faith. F. The Five Relations: a. That of ruler and ministers of state. b. That of father and son. c. That of husband and wife. d. That of elder and younger brother. e. That of friend and friend. A comparison of Confucius and the Bible as to the mutual duties and obligations of the parties in each of these relations. 3. The differences between Chinese sacrifices and those of the Bible. Sacrificing to heaven, gods, and Confucius, not in accord with the gospel. The same with sacrificing to ancestors. The sacrifice of Christ upon the cross, once for all, to redeem from sin, is sufficient. 4. Comparison of the Three Religions of China (Confucianism, Buddhism, Taoism), with the Gospel in

England and America. The latter beneficial to the country, to women, to education, to morality, to love for men (society), to Christians. 5. Errors of "God in all things" (Pantheism.) A. Concerning God. B. Concerning divine spirits. C. Concerning T'ai Chi. (The fundamental principle of things. D. Concerning the Spirit of Heaven and Earth. (The Spirit pervading the universe. In man it becomes the spirit of man; in things the spirit of things.) E. Concerning gods and evolution. F. Concerning Ying Yang. (Light and darkness. The dual principle, by which things are begotten.) G. Concerning reason and religion. 6. Concerning Buddhism and Taoism. The two religions compared, and their errors pointed out. 7. Confucian Cosmogony. A. Concerning T'ai Chi. B. Concerning Li Ch'i (The fountain of knowledge.) C. Concerning Ying Yang. D. Concerning evolution. The begetting of the Five Elements. Evolution founded upon T'ai Chi, and Li Chi. E. Concerning Heaven and Earth, the father and mother of the universe. 8. Errors of Huxley's Evolution and Ethics. 9. The Darkness of Skepticism. A. Chinese skeptics. B. Western skeptics: Huxley, Renan, and others.

III. Evidences of the Gospel (Christianity). 1. The power of the preacher, a witness to Christianity. 2. Man's wisdom insufficient; necessity of a revelation from Heaven. 3. Fulfillment of Old Testament prophecies, an evidence. A. Concerning Israel, fulfilled in the Old Testament. B. Concerning Christ, fulfilled in the New Testament. C. The prophecies of Christ, uniformly fulfilled. 4. Miracles, an evidence of Christianity. A. In the time of Moses. B. Those wrought by Jesus. C. Objections of the skeptics. D. Proof of miracles. E. False miracles; Buddhist and Roman. 5. Christ's Resurrection, an evidence of Christianity. 6. Converging of important evidences. 7. Christ the wonderful Saviour, an evidence of Christianity. 8. The power of the Gospel to conquer the false religions of the nations. The prophets foretold the success of the Gospel. The Lord commanded his disciples to preach it to all nations. The Gospel preached in Judea. The Gospel preached in Rome. The Gospel abolishes idolatry. The Gospel's gradual success in China. Why has the Gospel conquering authority?

San Francisco.

J. H. LAUGHLIN.

BEYOND THE NATURAL ORDER. Essays on Prayer, Miracles and the Incarnation. By NOLAN RICE BEST, Editor of *The Interior*. New York: Fleming H. Revell Company, pp. 149.

These papers were written without pretensions to theological scholarship or technically apologetic value. They were put forth rather as helps to the average Christian thinker than as a contribution to the learned literature of the subject. And as such they are marked by a fine evangelical tone, they are helpfully and sympathetically candid, and they are sufficiently marked by the personal equation of the author to

show that the difficulties answered as well as the answers essayed are not mere abstractions. The essay on prayer is rather boldly suggestive and assumes, for instance, that there exists in the spiritual world such a law as that of the Conservation of Energy in the material world. In the main the author's views are not only above criticism but also are exceedingly helpful in a fine and manly way. We are a trifle surprised to find him (p. 110) unhesitatingly admitting "that miracles do not help the modern man to have faith," just after he has made such a satisfactory accounting for them. Let "the modern man" read Mr. Best's words on the subject, and we believe he will not need the too generous concession here made. Nor do we regard the designed impression of the book as strengthened by the "sympathetic regard for the man who sifts out the miracles from the Bible that he may believe the remainder." The miracle, *miraculum*, is the little wonder, the manifestation here and there of the Great Supernatural Force that is beneath and above all. If we take the miracles away from Christ we have no Christ left; for He himself is the Mother-miracle of all. Granted that He is Himself "beyond the natural," and the presumption is rather for than against His use of miraculous power and method when adequate occasion requires.

Trenton.

HENRY COLLIN MINTON.

DIE HERRLICHKEIT GOTTES IN DER NATUR.

This is the caption of an attractive booklet from the pen of the Rev. H. Weseloh, of Cleveland, Ohio. The objection of prolixity frequently laid to treatises along philosophico-metaphysical lines cannot be urged in this case. The whole discussion does not extend beyond some 170 pages. Its German is clear and direct, while an abundance of neatly executed illustrations lend their aid to make the little volume an attractive presentation of this well worn theme of the Evidences of Design in Nature.

To this end, the author traverses almost all the classic regions that have ever been canvassed pro and con on the subject. The table of contents presents at a glance the multiplicity and the variety of the matter introduced. From the earth beneath to the heavens above; the world of wind and waters, the startling contrivances and coördinations of the animal kingdom; the overwhelming wonders of the deep firmanent and the ingenuity evinced in the organism of the human body—they are all here. One cannot help but admire the abundance of the material adduced to substantiate the position in hand. In addition to much valuable information, the devout reader will find at every turn structures and adjustments that to the mind of the author carry immediate conviction of the presence of a designing mind in productions of nature.

A different question emerges, however, when we consider the avowed purpose of the book as announced in its title: "*The Glory of God*,

etc." In the light of the final appeal at the close of the book it is evident that the author is well satisfied that his thesis has been abundantly established. His method is a clear, simple presentation of the facts, coupled with the unhesitating conclusion that only one construction can be put upon them—viz.: an acceptance of the author's position. This is at once the strength and the weakness of the book—its strength, in that it comes before us with the most naive confidence in the cogency of the bare facts themselves—its weakness, inasmuch as the same facts have been repeatedly adduced by men of the most avowed non-theistic tendency. Darwin himself, for example, has marshalled a host of startling facts of a similar nature; only to draw from them the conclusion of the glory of blind law in nature. Here is the testing point of the booklet in question. Perhaps it is not saying too much to affirm that many competent critics would rise from its perusal feeling that it scarcely amounts to a triumphant vindication of theistic positions. Of course, our sympathies are with the author, and we heartily endorse all that he has said in this connection. But whether his use of the facts is such as to place theistic contentions upon indubitable ground is another question.

Middletown, N. Y.

W. M. JACK.

GOTTES ZEUGEN IM REICH DER NATUR. Biographien und Bekenntnisse grosser Naturforscher aus alter und neuer Zeit. Von OTTO ZÖCKLER, ord. Prof. an der Universität Greifswald.

This is the title adopted by Professor Zöckler, of the University of Greifswald, for his recent production in the field of Natural Philosophy. The author has conceived the idea of casting the discussion into the mould of a series of "Life Pictures", in which, instead of an abstract treatment, he weaves the material around the leading names in the several departments of inquiry. Following this conception, the work naturally falls into the form of the "Biography and Avowals (*Bekenntnisse*) of the leading investigators in the realm of natural science, both of ancient and modern times."

The author is a theist of pronounced type. Of this fact no effort at concealment is made. Nevertheless, he cherishes the unfaltering assurance that an impartial inspection of the scientific position and personal convictions of the witnesses most worthy of a hearing, will reveal the fact that the findings of science are far from being antagonistic to what is commonly called revealed religion. He has specially in view the hasty conclusion of a superficial acquaintance with science, all too prevalent in our day, that "a comprehensive view of natural science and complete unbelief are one and the same thing."

It is to the demolition of this unfounded assumption that he advances. He adheres steadily to one line of procedure. He makes no claim to being a specialist in any of the branches of knowledge under discussion; and yet by reason of a wide acquaintance with the several lines

of enquiry, coupled with care and thoroughness in execution, he succeeds in bringing together much that may not be wholly devoid of interest to the specialist. He never, however, loses his aim: that is, to show that natural science and theistic belief are not only not necessarily hostile, but in the mouth of a majority of the most competent scientific witnesses, essentially and ineluctably harmonious. Within the last century, also, where Darwinian conceptions have played such a formative rôle, he makes no attempt to pass by in silence the names of a decidedly materialistic taint. So that, even his opponents will scarcely accuse him of excluding the witnesses "per contra" from court. In view, then, of its impartiality, and the preponderance of weight on the theistic side, which he believes to be the net result; the book is fitted to reassure the faith of many, who may have begun to falter. Especially at the present time, when science is so often and so uncere- moniously led captive to toil in the workshop of materialism, this work comes as a timely contribution to the things that may be said for reconciliation of the riven camp of knowledge, in the field of physical nature and that of written revelation.

The book will repay a careful perusal.

Middletown, N. Y.

W. M. JACK.

THE DHARMA, or The Religion of Enlightenment. An Exposition of Buddhism. By DR. PAUL CARUS. Fifth Edition, Revised and En- larged. Duod.; pp. vi, 169. Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Company. London: Kegan Paul, French, Trübner & Co. 1907.

This little book has four parts. Part First sets forth the "Twelve Articles Characteristic of Buddhism." Part Second outlines the "Abhidharma," or the "Philosophy which explains the nature of existence and especially of the soul." Part Third gives the "explanation" called for by the complexity and the strangeness of the views presented. Part Fourth brings to us "Gems of Buddhist Poetry." An accurate "Index" follows, and the volume closes with a helpful list of "Books on Buddhism."

The exposition aims to be simple and popular; and probably it is so, as far as the subject will allow. It is evidently written with a practical purpose. Its accomplished and learned author would make each of us the earnest Buddhist that he himself has long been. It may well be a question whether in popularizing Buddhism he has not unconsciously modified and modernized it. Thus, to refer to but one of many points that might be cited, he denies that Nirvana is a state or temper the result of which is extinction of existence. Nor would it be strange, if many such compromises had been made. From the first Buddhism has grown largely by compromise.

Princeton.

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

COMPARATIVE RELIGION. A Survey of Its Recent Literature. By Rev. LOUIS H. JORDAN, B.D., author of *Comparative Religion: Its Genesis and Growth*. Reprinted from *The Review of Theology and Philosophy*. 8vo, pp. 19. Edinburgh: Otto Schulze & Company; 20 South Frederick Street. 1906.

The recent literature reviewed in this paper embraces: Short Studies in the Science of Comparative Religion, by James George Roche Forlong; A Handbook of Comparative Religion, by Samuel Henry Kellogg; Comparative Theology, by John Arnott Macculloch; Das Wesen der Religion, dargestellt an ihrer Geschichte, von Wilhelm Bousset; Comparative Religion: Its Genesis and Growth, by Louis Henry Jordan; Das Wesen der Religion und der Religionswissenschaft, von Ernest Troeltsch. The aim and achievement of these works are discriminatingly set forth by our author. He quietly calls attention to the not generally recognized fact that to the United States belongs the honor of having inaugurated scientific inquiry in the great department of Comparative Religion. We do not think, however, that he gives to Dr. S. H. Kellogg his due. That the latter writes "from the standpoint of the militant Christian missionary," is not against his work. His classification of religions into Christianity as the one true one and all the others as false is not based on preconceived theories, but on facts the most palpable and the best attested. That many do not think so ought not to influence one who knows so. It is for them to upset his classification if they can, but it is not for them to rule him out for making it. Nothing is more unscientific than to insist that Christianity must be considered as one of the religions of this world, and ignore the vast mass of evidence that it is not of this world.

Princeton.

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

THE NEXT STEP IN EVOLUTION. The Present Step. By I. K. FUNK, D.D., LL.D.; duod., pp. 107, Fourth Ed. Funk & Wagnalls Company, Publishers, New York and London. 1908.

This is another attempt to explain Christianity in terms of evolution, and to adapt evolution to the Christian scheme. It does not impress us as any more successful than its predecessors. It can scarcely be Christian; for it denies the second coming of Christ in the body, and it has not a hint even of his sacrifice for sin, and it makes regeneration "as natural as growth is." Yet, on the other hand, it certainly is not evolution as that has been commonly understood; for at each of the gaps in the course of development it brings in the creative power of God. Moreover, the writer is so optimistic as to lead us to question whether he has grasped the situation to be explained. Instead of, with the Apostle, "looking for that blessed hope and the glorious appearing of the great God and our Saviour Jesus Christ," he rejoices in a great God and Saviour who are already come. Their regeneration of the world is "the present step in evolution."

Princeton.

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

EXEGETICAL THEOLOGY.

AN INTRODUCTION TO ECCLESIASTES WITH NOTES AND APPENDICES. By A. H. McNEILE, B.D., Tyrwhitt Hebrew Scholar and Crosse Scholar, Fellow and Theological Lecturer at Sidney Sussex College, Cambridge. Cambridge: at the University Press. 1904. 8vo; pp. vi, 170.

As the title of his work indicates Mr. McNeile deals with the larger questions that concern the book of Ecclesiastes; such as its canonicity, its text, its teaching, and its relation to other documents and systems of thought. As the result of an inquiry into the possible dependence of the Preacher upon the philosophies of the West, Mr. McNeile contends that the reasoning of Ecclesiastes was not influenced by Greek speculations, but was the natural product of Semitic reflection. This conclusion receives strong support from the evidence which Professor Barton has adduced (see below).

The author is mistaken, we think, in his conception of the religious condition of the Hebrew sage who wrote the book. The Preacher has not "lost the vitality of belief in a personal God." And it is wholly in accordance with the character of his argument that "he never uses the personal name, JHVH, but always the descriptive title, 'Elohim' or 'the Elohim'—the Deity who manifests Himself in the cosmic forces of Nature" (p. 46). The Preacher belonged to the class of men known to the Hebrews as "wise men", who sought by means of observation, experience, and reflection, to know things in their essence and reality as they stand related to man and God. The Preacher's restraint does not spring from disbelief in revelation, but from his purpose to restrict the investigation to observation and to interrogate experience only (1:13; cp. 2:3). It is a method employed by religious men today in philosophy and science. Accordingly the Preacher speaks of God only as God reveals himself to man in nature and history.

Two appendices on I. The Greek version, and II. The Greek text (pp. 115-168) furnish valuable material for textual criticism. In the principal emendations adopted by the author and made the basis for his interpretation of Ecclesiastes, however, subjective considerations have been decisive. The rejection of verses which are regarded as wisdom or *Hokma* glosses is of minor importance, for their elimination does not affect the doctrine of the Preacher. Not so, however, the verses assigned to the Chasid editor; for these are affirmed to have been deliberately introduced in order to change the character of the treatise and render it acceptable to Jewish orthodoxy. The criterion by which they are detected is their assumed contradiction of the Preacher's philosophy of life; but that they do so may be justly questioned, to say the least. Professor Barton pronounces the criticism of the text which is embodied in this volume to be "the best text-critical work hitherto done on Ecclesiastes"; and has practically made it his own, accepting all of Mr. McNeile's attributions to the Chasid editor

except 3:14b; 4:17 and 5:1-6, and adding no new passages to the list (see the review of Professor Barton's book that presently follows).

Princeton.

JOHN D. DAVIS.

An American Commentary on the Old Testament. THE BOOK OF ECCLESIASTES. By Principal J. T. MARSHALL, D.D., Manchester Baptist College, England. Philadelphia: American Baptist Publication Society, 1420 Chestnut Street. [1904]. 8vo; pp. x, 40.

This small commentary contains much suggestive exposition, but its author does not reveal the possession of a firm grasp upon the Preacher's thought, as a whole. The integrity of the book is argued and defended. "The only passage as to whose originality" Principal Marshall has "any doubts is 12: 8-12, which speaks *about* the Preacher, whereas in the rest of the book the Preacher *speaks*."

Princeton.

JOHN D. DAVIS.

The International Critical Commentary. A CRITICAL AND EXEGETICAL COMMENTARY ON THE BOOK OF ECCLESIASTES. By GEORGE AARON BARTON, Ph.D., Professor of Biblical Literature and Semitic Languages, Bryn Mawr College. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1908. 8vo; pp. xiv, 212. Price \$2.25 net.

The author of this latest commentary on Ecclesiastes rejects some twenty-nine verses or clauses as "wisdom or Hokma glosses" (p. 46); and, in addition, he excludes from the original treatise the following passages which he regards as the annotations of a Chasid revisor: 2:26; 3:17; 7:18b, 26b, 29; 8:2b, 3a, 5, 6a, 11-13; 11:9b; 12:1a, 13, 14 (p. 45). The number of excisions is not great, when compared with the work of some recent critics; but nevertheless several of the passages in the foregoing list are significant ones. Their removal modifies the teaching of the extant book, and, by detracting from the wholesome moral element in the instructions of the Preacher, contributes a quota towards making him appear despondent in mood instead of buoyant. Professor Barton, however, believes that he only eliminates inconsistencies and recovers the Preacher's philosophy of life from the perversion to which it has been subjected (p. 45 and comments on 2:26; 8:5; 11:9; 12:1). In this respect he disagrees with the late Professor Franz Delitzsch, with Dr. C. H. H. Wright, Professors Cornill and Sanday and James Robertson, with Dean Plumptre, Professor Genung and Dr. Briggs. Professor Driver also accepts these passages generally (Introduction). In the judgment of these students of the book, men who examine the work from different points of view, literary, theological and exegetical, and who represent the several schools of modern criticism, the thought of the Preacher as it appears in this treatise, barring some outbursts of his varying moods perhaps, is self-consistent, and is the logical unfolding of the fundamental principles of his philosophy.

As a commentary this book deserves a place beside the standard expository works on Ecclesiastes. Its discussions of the meaning are always worthy of the student's serious consideration as the author fol-

flows the thought of the Preacher through the stages of the argument. At a crucial point, however, there will be dissent, namely in the author's interpretation of the conclusion at which the Preacher ever arrives (2:24; 3:12, 13; 3:22; 5:18; 8:15; 9:7-9). Here is stated the Preacher's philosophy of life. According to the author's exposition the Hebrew sage finds no good in life beyond mere animal joy. But does not the wise man allude to a larger reward than that? Surely he has more in mind. He does not mention eating and drinking only; but he constantly directs men to find enjoyment in work and to make the soul, which includes the mental powers, get good; he observes that a season has been appointed for spiritual as well as physical activities (3:1-11); and he places domestic affection, we believe, among the joys in which man should find solace and reward (9:9).

Professor Barton puts his Babylonian studies to good use. He brings forward from ancient Semitic literature the conclusive evidence that renders it entirely unnecessary to suppose the Preacher to have been dependent upon Greek thought. The Hebrew sage discerns the same lessons in human experience that Semites had seen before his time and long before the rise of Greek philosophy.

The author allows himself considerable license in the matter of orthography. The opinion of Dean Plumptre is constantly cited throughout the volume, and invariably his name appears as Plumtre. The version of Theodotion is allotted a section of the book; and in the caption, the text of the paragraph, the index, and the list of abbreviations, the name is printed Thebdotian. Whenever Professor Margoliouth is mentioned his name is enlarged to Margouliouth, and on p. 53 Professor D. S. Margoliouth is confounded with the Reverend G. Margouliouth. In the titles of German works in which the name of Salomo occurs, the form Solomo is tolerated.

Princeton.

JOHN D. DAVIS.

THE RELIGION OF THE POST-EXILIC PROPHETS. By W. H. BENNETT, Litt.D., D.D., Professor of Old Testament Exegesis, New College and Hackney College, London. Sometime Fellow of St. John's College, Cambridge. (The Literature and Religion of Israel. Edited by James Hastings, D.D.) Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. 1907. Imported by Charles Scribner's Sons. Pp. 396. \$2.00 net.

The contents of this volume are largely biblico-theological. The first section, of 130 pages, is devoted to the isagogical problems connected with the post-exilic prophets and to a religious appreciation of the work of these prophets, individually considered. Post-exilic is taken in the sense of after the beginning of the exile, so that Ezekiel is included. The book opens with a brief sketch of the religion of Israel at the beginning of this period, in which the general positions of the Graf-Wellhausen school are adopted and the main elements entering into them succinctly and lucidly stated. In regard to the literary questions the following are the most outstanding points in the author's conclusions:

Ezekiel is recognized, in spite of the recent proposals of Zunz, Seinecke, Geiger, Vernes and Havet, as still one of the fixed points of Old Testament criticism, and a genuinely exilic product. The sections in the book of Isaiah, usually designated Deutero-and-Trito-Isaiah, are discussed separately, the former being assigned to the exile, the latter to the time of Malachi-Ezra-Nehemiah, because the situation is judged to be the same. Only it is held that the Trito-Isaianic chapters are not connected portions of a single work, nor homogeneous in tone and spirit. Even apart from editorial additions they are not the work of one author, but composite. On page 103, where reference is made to the view that these chapters reflect preëxilic conditions, the work of A. Rutgers, *De Echtheid van het Tweede Gedeelte van Jesaja*, 1866, might have been named. A special chapter deals with the Servant-of-Yahveh passages; the author formulates his conclusions to the effect that "the balance of evidence and the weight of authority seem to indicate that these passages are an exilic work written by some one other than the writer of the text of Isaiah xl-lv, and that the Servant is Israel. The difficulty which arises on this view in regard to Chap. xlix, 6, where the Servant's mission is represented as in part a mission to Israel, is scarcely met by paraphrasing the statement in question, "the nation is (not merely) elect for its own sake." Among the anonymous prophecies of the exile are named Is. xiii. 1-xiv. 23; Jer. l. li., and Zech. ii. 6-13. Of Zechariah's book, Dr. Bennett takes the current view which assigns only Chap. i-viii to the prophet and places ix-xiv in the Greek period. The hypothesis of Kusters in regard to the unhistorical character of the return from Babylon under Cyrus is rejected, and the old view adhered to. Here reference might well have been made to the careful and illuminating discussion of Dr. Boyd in the *Presbyterian and Reformed Review* for 1900. The view is adopted that originally in Zech. vi, 12, Zerubbabel's name stood side by side with Joshua's, and was erased by a later hand to glorify the ecclesiastic at the expense of the civil head of the community. Of the three views concerning the exact date of Malachi's activity that is favored which makes him prepare the way for the reforms of Ezra and Nehemiah, rather than co-operate with them or carry on their work after the final departure of Nehemiah. The discussion of the Greek period comprises Joel, Zechariah ix-xiv, Jonah and Is. xxiv-xxvii. As to the unity or duality of the authorship of Zech. ix-xi, and xii-xiv, Dr. Bennett is non-committal. Only a passing reference is made in a foot-note on page 130 to the burning question of the redaction or interpolation of the earlier prophetic writings in this period, although in the later pages of the work, where the development of doctrine is discussed, the hypothesis of such a redaction is accepted, but not carried to the extent of eliminating with Volz all the Messianic elements from the preëxilic period.

The biblico-theological discussion consists of thirteen chapters on the nature and attributes of God; God and the World, Nature; God and Man, the Gentiles; God and Israel; Revelation, Nature of Man; The

Normal Religious Life; Righteousness and Sin; Rewards and Punishments; Atonement and Final Reprobation; The Future of Israel and the World; The Kingdom of God; The Messiah; The Individual after Death. As may be surmised from these headings, what is given here is a complete theology of the Old Testament; at least, of the prophetic teaching as a whole, rather than an exposition of the teaching of the post-exilic prophets only. We have here one more demonstration of the impossibility of giving an intelligible account of the theology of a segment of the course of revelation by itself. In every chapter, in connection with every topic, we learn practically as much concerning the earlier development as concerning that stage with which the book properly deals. In itself this is no disadvantage but in a series planned with reference to periods, it must involve needless repetition. One thing, however, can be fairly asked, viz.: that in a work of this kind the individual and new aspects of the teaching of the several organs of revelation shall not be lost sight of for the effort to place their teaching in the light of common prophetic doctrine. We are not sure that Dr. Bennett has entirely escaped this danger. Especially from his own standpoint, which does not involve the absolute agreement of all Scripture, he seems to us to combine too easily statements of the several prophets so as to make out of them a sort of *consensus* or *analogia fidei*. One might ask whether, apart from the strict theory of inspiration, with its assumption of the unity of all Scripture teaching in the mind of God, the *auctor primarius*, such a combination had any real existence in a concrete consciousness. On the whole, however, the author's treatment of the whole range of teaching has many excellent qualities. It is always clear and instructive, and even where it leans to the modern hypothesis, remains free from the ultra-doctrinaire excrescences of the latter; e. g., in its refusal to consider the prophets on account of the demand of conversion, as thorough-going Pelagians (p. 274). There are, of course, many points to which expert readers will take exception. For instance, we must differ from the view expressed on p. 161, that the ascription of holiness to the deity is a later development than its ascription to the entourage of the deity. An exaggeration is the statement on p. 194 that in the description of Israel as it will exist in the ideal future, the holy nation "attains to divine attributes, it shares the eternity of Yahweh. We might almost say, to use the Nicene terminology, that Israel becomes of one substance with God." In discussing the mode of prophetic revelation on p. 215, Dr. Bennett correctly emphasizes that the prophets had an absolute conviction of receiving communications from God, but then proceeds to compare this conviction to the reliance of the modern preacher or hymn-writer on the inner life or guidance of the Spirit. Is it true, that the psychology of the prophets did not distinguish between the sensation caused by a voice from without and the impression due to the operation of a spiritual influence on the soul? Or was it at all necessary to the recognition of both modes of revelation as equally authoritative, that the distinction between them should not have entered into their consciousness?

The clause, "He declareth unto man what is his thought", of Amos iv. 13, is explained on p. 160 of the thought of man, and quoted to illustrate the divine omniscience; and on p. 200 of God's thought, to illustrate the divine self-communication. On p. 114, Antiochus III should be Artaxerxes III.

A fairly representative list of literature and index of subjects, and index of Scripture passages, are appended.

Princeton.

GEERHARDUS VOS.

ST. PAUL'S EPISTLES TO THE THESSALONIANS. The Greek text, with Introduction and Notes by GEORGE MILLIGAN, D.D., Minister of Caputh, Perthshire. Macmillan & Co., Limited, St. Martin's Street, London (The Macmillan Company, New York). 1908. Pp. cix, 195. \$2.60 net.

Up to the closing years of the nineteenth century, the Greek language of the New Testament period was studied almost exclusively in literary sources. Within the past fifteen years, however, the rubbish-heaps and mummy-cases of Egypt have yielded a great mass of private documents of all sorts, such as receipts, petitions, contracts, and private letters, which furnish excellent material for a study of the language of everyday life. Increased attention has also been devoted to the inscriptions, which, unlike the papyri, are found not in Egypt alone, but in all parts of the Greek world. These new materials have not been allowed to remain unused; they have been made accessible by many carefully-edited series of publications; and the lexicographers and grammarians have already begun to study their significance for linguistic science. Moreover, Deissman, J. H. Moulton and others have addressed themselves to the special task of showing the significance of the new discoveries for the study of the language of the New Testament. But Milligan is the first to make systematic use of the new materials in the exegesis of a continuous portion of the New Testament, and therein consists the chief significance of the commentary now before us.

The index on pp. 183-191, containing a list of the numerous publications of inscriptions and papyri that have been used, with the passages cited, will itself convey some impression of the diligence that the author has devoted to his task, and this impression is confirmed by a detailed study of the commentary. By the frequent references to papyri and inscriptions—at least three or four almost on every page—Milligan's commentary becomes at any rate something quite new; it is materially different from any exegetical work that has preceded it. But the author's study of the papyri and inscriptions has by no means made him neglectful of other material for illustration. Parallels from Greek literature are not ignored, and especially the Old Testament and later Jewish writings are estimated at their true worth as aids to the exegesis of the epistles. In general, the moderation with which Milligan applies the new methods to the linguistic study of the New Testament is worthy

of emulation. Though fully appreciative of the linguistic affinity existing between the New Testament on the one side and the papyri as representatives of the common spoken language of the Greek world on the other, Milligan does not feel it necessary to drive every "Hebraism" relentlessly from the field. In adopting the new methods, he has not discarded the old.

What then is the result of this diligent and judicious employment of the papyri and inscriptions as aids to the exegesis of two of the Pauline epistles? In the first place, the labor is not wasted, even if it leads, in a narrow sense, to failure; for it was necessary as an experiment. If Milligan has done nothing more than demonstrate by his honest effort the uselessness of the papyrus finds for New Testament exegesis, he has performed a useful service in clearing the way for future commentators. The new materials were of a kind at least to demand attention; a serious attempt at using them had to be made before New Testament exegetes could with anything like a good conscience continue to proceed along the old lines. As a matter of fact, however, the value of Milligan's work is not merely the value that belongs to an unsuccessful experiment. It is true that the papyri and inscriptions, as cited in the commentary, do not often solve definite exegetical problems. Whether *ἐν βάρει εἶναι* in I Thess. ii:7 (6) means "to be burdensome" or "to be in honor", whether *εἰς τέλος* in I Thess. ii:16 means "to the end" or "to the uttermost", whether *τὸ ἑαυτοῦ σκεῦος* in I Thess. iv:4 means "his own body" or "his own wife", whether *ἀπὸ προσώπου τοῦ κυρίου* in II Thess. i:9 means "separated from the presence of the Lord" or "by reason of the presence of the Lord"—these questions are just about as difficult to answer as they ever were. Grammatical or lexical usages, interesting for the exegesis of the epistles, are only very seldom discovered in the papyri or inscriptions alone, unconfirmed by the sources that were available before. Such at least is the general impression that results from the parallels adduced in the commentary now under examination. But the function of the commentator does not consist merely in solving a disconnected series of exegetical problems—he must also seek to reproduce and revivify as a whole in the minds of modern readers the thought of the ancient writing as it existed in the minds of the author and of those who were its first readers. It is chiefly in this less tangible but no less important task that the student of the New Testament may derive assistance from the papyri. They help him perhaps not so much in the details as in the general spirit of his work. They reproduce for him the everyday language of the Greek world of Paul's time, so that it becomes to a certain extent again a living language. By familiarizing himself with the forms of expression employed by the plain people of that day in their ordinary business and private affairs, he is made better able to listen to the epistles of Paul with the ears of those to whom they were originally addressed. Such is perhaps the chief value of the numerous citations in Milligan's commentary. Many of them contain only what was to some extent attested by the literary sources already available; many

of them will perhaps be dispensed with in future commentaries after they have come to be matter of course; but, as showing the special affinity of the New Testament language with the living, spoken language of the time, and as preparing the way for a more general knowledge of that colloquial language as a background for New Testament study, the citations collected by Milligan from the papyri and inscriptions could not have been curtailed without serious loss.

The abundant employment of the new materials for linguistic study does not, however, exhaust the value of Milligan's commentary, which is in general a useful contribution to the investigation of the Thessalonian Epistles. Milligan defends the authenticity and integrity of both epistles, devoting his attention, of course, chiefly to the defense of II Thessalonians (pp. lxxvi-xcii). To explain the remarkable similarity existing between the two epistles, which, especially since the appearance of Wrede's monograph in 1903, has been made the chief basis for the attack upon the genuineness of II Thessalonians, Milligan suggests (p. lvi, n.³) that "the words and phrases which, during that anxious time of waiting for the return of Timothy, he [Paul] had been turning over in his mind as the most suitable to address to his beloved Thessalonians", would naturally "have remained in his memory, and have risen almost unconsciously to his lips, as he dictated his second letter to the same Church so shortly afterwards." Less satisfactory is Milligan's appeal to the relation existing between Ephesians and Colossians, for in the first place those who reject II Thessalonians are very apt to reject Ephesians also; and in the second place similarity in linguistic detail between two epistles addressed to different churches at the same time is less surprising than such similarity in two epistles addressed to the same church at different times. To the objection derived from the supposed inconsistency of II Thessalonians with I Thessalonians in the view held of the nearness of the Parousia, Milligan replies that Paul's ideas on that point were in a state of flux. Here Milligan would have done better to abide by his more cautious form of statement that Paul emphasized different aspects of the Parousia at different times. The important argument for the genuineness of the epistle, that is derived from the difficulties involved in rival theories as to its origin, has not been developed with sufficient thoroughness, though what Milligan says is true enough.

The accounts of the city of Thessalonica and of Paul's relations to the Thessalonian Church are interesting and instructive. To overcome the apparent contradiction between I Thessalonians and Acts with regard to the movements of Timothy, Milligan suggests that Silas and Timothy joined Paul in Athens, that when Timothy was sent back to Thessalonica (I Thess. iii. 1) Silas was sent on some other mission, perhaps to Philippi, and that finally both Silas and Timothy rejoined Paul again at Corinth (Acts xviii:5)—a very natural hypothesis. From Paul's recapitulation of his labors in Thessalonica (I Thess. ii:1 ff.), Milligan infers that insinuations against the Apostle had been made in Thessalonica in his absence, and traces these insinuations to a Jewish

source. Here our author differs with Schmiedel, who makes the opponents Gentiles, and with Bornemann, who infers no such special attacks whatever.

The brief section on the general character and contents of the epistles produces a more effective picture both of the writer and of the recipients than does the intolerable diffuseness of Borneman. Milligan accepts only with a caution Deissmann's overdrawn distinction between "letter" and "epistle." The Pauline Epistles, though "letters", require a new category—they are religious letters. The section on language, style and literary affinities is remarkable for its insistence upon the resemblances (conveniently collected in parallel columns) between the Thessalonian Epistles and certain words of Jesus. These resemblances, Milligan believes, are "sufficient to show that St. Paul must have been well acquainted with the actual words of Jesus, and in all probability had actually some written collection of them in his possession". The vocabulary of the epistles, confirmed by the style, conveys to Milligan the impression that "St. Paul, when not directly indebted to the Greek O. T., was mainly dependent upon the living, spoken tongue of his own day." Whether, as Milligan supposes, he also borrowed "from time to time more or less consciously from ethical writers", is more doubtful. In the section on doctrine the comparatively scanty doctrinal content of the epistles is explained rather by the circumstances of the persons addressed than by immaturity in Paul's own thinking. After all, the Apostle had already been engaged for fifteen years in active missionary work, and, we may add, already had behind him the discussions of the Apostolic Council. There had been time enough and occasion enough for the development of the essentials of his system of doctrine. Furthermore, Milligan's exposition is an excellent preventive of underestimating the doctrinal element in the Thessalonian Epistles. Especially the exalted place occupied by the Person of Christ, even in these earliest extant epistles of Paul, is worthy of notice (cf. Additional Note D, The Divine Names in the Epistles).

Of the "additional notes", five are lexical (including the one just mentioned on the Divine Names); among the others the admirable note on "St. Paul as a Letter-Writer," deserves special mention. The private letters among the papyri are made to throw light upon the outward form and general structure of the epistles of Paul. The suggestion, however, that in the case of some of the Pauline epistles the scribe may perhaps have been allowed a certain discretion in throwing the letter into "more formal and complete shape", though it is attractive from some points of view, will probably be felt to encounter serious difficulties. The note on the question whether Paul used the epistolary plural arrives at what is probably the correct conclusion, that Paul's use of the plural can be reduced to no hard and fast rule. But even if Milligan is right in supposing that the regular use of the first person plural in the Thessalonian Epistles indicates a closer joint authorship than was the case in I Corinthians, Galatians, etc., it is yet surprising that he speaks repeatedly of the "writers" of the epistles. Paul may

have written in the name of Silas and Timothy, he may have had them constantly in mind during the composition of the epistles, yet even so he alone can be called the "writer".

The commentary itself, valuable as it is, is not free from serious faults. Milligan has apparently undertaken too little independent investigation of the textual questions. What is more serious, he has occasionally manifested an inability to disengage fundamental exegetical problems from what is merely accidental in the discussions of them. The worst instance of this fault is the note on the difficult phrase τὸ αὐτοῦ σκεῖνος κτᾶσθαι in I Thess. iv:4. σκεῖνος is here usually taken to refer to "his own wife". But Milligan, adopting the alternative view, takes σκεῖνος in the sense of "body". Against this interpretation, perhaps the chief objection is that if it be adopted κτᾶσθαι must apparently mean "possess". But no instance of the present tense of κτᾶσθαι used in the sense of "possess" has hitherto been found. The present tense means "to acquire"; it is the perfect tense that means "to possess". The present tense denotes an act; the perfect tense denotes the state resultant upon that act. "But", says Milligan, "to judge from the papyri it would seem as if at least in the popular language this meaning ['possess'] was no longer confined to the perf. (κέκτησθαι)." In proof of this, Milligan cites P. Tebt. 5, 241 ff., where κτᾶσθαι is by Milligan himself, following the editors, translated not "possess" but "take possession of"—really the opposite meaning to the one desired, for "take possession of", like "acquire", denotes an act of which "possess" denotes the resultant state, and therefore represents merely the common use of the present tense. (The other passage cited, P. Oxy. 259, 6, where the future is used, is no clear case in point, for it is hard to see why the meaning "acquire" or "obtain" will not fit the passage.) To make the confusion still worse Milligan finally says, "There seems no reason therefore why κτᾶσθαι should not be used in the passage before us of a man's so 'possessing' or 'taking possession of his body, as to use it in the fittest way for God's service in thorough keeping with the general Pauline teaching". Here the alternative renderings, "take possession of" and "possess", about which the entire discussion ought to have turned, seem finally to be taken as synonyms! Or if the word "possess" is to be understood in its less common sense of "seize", so that it is really equivalent to "take possession of", then it was an incorrect translation of κέκτησθαι. Of course the rendering "take possession of his own body" is linguistically possible. But the reader has no very clear conception of the reasons for its adoption. And the chief objection to it, namely that μὴ ἐν πάθει ἐπιθυμίας in v. 5 would become meaningless—is not even mentioned (cf. Lightfoot, Notes on Epistles of St. Paul, pp. 53ff.).

Milligan's discussion of the eschatological passage, II Thess. ii:1-12, is not particularly elaborate. He advocates the common view that τὸ κατέχον is the civil power, especially as embodied in the Roman state, the "man of lawlessness" being simply brought into connection with the Jewish doctrine of Antichrist, and the "temple of God" being

identified with the temple at Jerusalem. Any criticism of this view is here, of course, impossible. Milligan's historical review of the exegesis of the passage (Note J) is brief; but greater detail would have been useless repetition of what other commentators have done. More to be regretted is the rapidity with which Milligan passes over the deeper implications of the phrases *ὡς δι' ἡμῶν* in II Thess. ii. 2, and *ἐπε δε' ἐπιστολῆς ἡμῶν* in II Thess. ii. 15, and of the clause *ὃ ἐστὶν σημεῖον ἐν πάσῃ ἐπιστολῇ* in II Thess. ii. 17. For an advocate as well as for an opponent of the genuineness of II Thessalonians, Wrede (*Die Echtheit des zweiten Thessalonicherbriefs*, pp. 62ff.) deserves careful attention when he insists that the *ὡς δι' ἡμῶν* does not necessarily imply doubt on the writer's part of the genuineness of the epistle referred to, any more than Paul in I Cor. vii. 25 means to imply that he had not received mercy from the Lord when he writes *γνώμην δίδωμι ὡς ἡλεημένος ὑπὸ κυρίου πιστὸς εἶναι*. The passage may on this view be paraphrased (see Wrede, *op. cit.*, p. 63): "Do not allow it to disturb you that they are appealing to my word or letter on the ground that this word or letter came from me."

In a number of places, Miligan seems to use the term "*Κοινή*" in a sense that excludes the New Testament. This would only introduce confusion into the terminology. "*Κοινή*" should be used in a broad sense to include "the entire written and spoken development of the Greek language" (E. Schweizer) from about 300 B. C. to about 500 A. D. Milligan's use of the term "Judaistic writings" to designate the Jewish writings enumerated on pp. 188-190, is also open to criticism. "Judaistic" more properly designates a tendency in the Christian Church.

Though the commentary of Milligan can hardly be classed among the really great exegetical works, its employment of new illustrative material and its wealth in instructive lexical studies make it indispensable for every earnest student of the Thessalonian Epistles.

Princeton.

J. GRESHAM MACHEN.

THE SELF-INTERPRETATION OF JESUS CHRIST. A study of the Messianic Consciousness as reflected in the Synoptics. By Rev. G. S. STREATFEILD, M.A., Rector of Fenny Compton. New York: Eaton & Mains; Cincinnati: Jennings & Graham. (London: Hodder & Stoughton). n. d. Crown, 8vo. Pp. xv, 211. Price, \$1.25 net.

The point of departure of Mr. Streatfeild's discussion is the language of self-assertion or of self-exaltation which is placed on the lips of Jesus in the narrative of the Gospels. His immediate aim is to vindicate this language to Jesus, or as he himself expresses it, "to support" or "to confirm", "the belief, almost unquestioned until the nineteenth century," that this language "is substantially the language of Jesus Himself" (pp. vi: 4). His ultimate end is, on the basis of this language of self-assertion or of self-exaltation, "to place once more in the full-light the great alternative that Jesus Christ was either truly Di-

vine or not ideal man" (pp. vi, 4). The dilemma is, he thinks, not quite what it used to be,—*aut Deus aut non homo bonus*. Modern unbelief has found a way—so it thinks—to save the integrity of Jesus in the face of His high pretensions. But in saving His integrity it sacrifices His sanity. The dilemma is thus shifted to the form of: *aut Deus aut non homo sanus*. But it remains equally stringent, and Mr. Streatfeild wishes to press it to its issue. Was Jesus just an amiable fanatic, whose head was turned with His disordered estimate of His own importance? Or was He what He represented Himself as being? *Tertium non datur*. Mr. Streatfeild's book is thus an argument for the deity of Jesus. His argument has two steps. He undertakes to show that this language of self-exaltation is Jesus' own. He undertakes to show that this language of self-exaltation is sober and true. Jesus represents Himself as something more than human, and Jesus is what He represents Himself to be.

The reader is prepossessed from the outset by the modesty of Mr. Streatfeild's tone. Perhaps there is a little too much deference shown to modern opinion. The accumulation of the opinions of recent writers in the footnotes is valuable, and scarcely needed the apology which Mr. Streatfeild offers for it in his preface. One gets the impression, however, that Mr. Streatfeild is a little too much swayed by these opinions. He does, indeed, assert with emphasis, and argue convincingly, the main elements of his thesis, but he leaves a little to be desired on such matters as the inspiration and detailed accuracy of Scripture; and, in general, he seems to have the fear of modern criticism a little too strongly before his eyes. For the main purpose of his book, this, is, however, a small matter. Through chapter after chapter his quiet argument pursues its way, and few readers will rise from the book without feeling that the double thesis has been made good—Jesus did use this language of self-assertion, and His witness to Himself is sober and true.

Princeton.

B. B. WARFIELD.

THE LIFE OF CHRIST ACCORDING TO ST. MARK. By W. H. BENNETT, M.A., D.D., Litt.D., Professor, Hackney Coll. and New Coll., London. Sometime Fellow of St. John's Coll., Cambridge. A. C. Armstrong & Son, New York. 1907. Pp. xi, 295. \$1.75 net.

Beginning in 1903 a series of articles bearing the title of Dr. Bennett's book, ran rather slowly through *The Expositor*, the last appearing in February 1907. These articles have now been brought together in book form with only slight changes and the addition of four short appendices. The author has attempted to portray the impression that the narrative of the life and teaching of Jesus in the Gospel of Mark would produce on a reader supposed to have had no other knowledge of Jesus.

In speaking of the method of his book, Dr. Bennett remarks truly that "the impression sought to be constructed would clearly vary

according to the character, circumstances and experience of the imaginary reader, who is supposed to receive it," and suggests that his imagination may not have been "sufficiently alert and powerful to maintain such a standpoint consistently" (p. 278). Possibly the inability to maintain the standpoint of the book may be due to the lack of imagination on the part of the ordinary reader, who knows more of the life of Jesus than Dr. Bennett's imaginary reader. To such a reader, the book will not prove entirely satisfactory. It is admitted by Dr. Bennett that ultimately "we are bound to supplement and interpret Mark by the results of our study of other data" (p. 277); yet in attempting to fill out the gaps in Mark's narrative, probabilities are suggested which the knowledge of other data on the part of the ordinary reader renders improbable. At times it is difficult to escape the impression that the author exhibits too much care in guarding the imaginary reader of Mark against possible inferences in agreement with the data of the other Gospels.

The book presents a continuous narrative of the life of Jesus, following the Gospel of Mark. A large portion of the Gospel is introduced into the text, either in quotation or in paraphrase. The discussion is popular, having had its origin in a study of Mark for devotional purposes (p. 277). The treatment of many points is too concise to be satisfactory; the psychological analysis of Jesus' consciousness by the imaginary reader is not always convincing; and the method of interpretation adopted in some instances (as in the discussion of the Transfiguration) is based upon the supposition that the Evangelist did not clearly distinguish the natural from the supernatural (pp. 85, 105).

Princeton,

WILLIAM P. ARMSTRONG.

EPOCHS IN THE LIFE OF JESUS. A Study of Development and Struggle in the Messiah's Work. By A. T. ROBERTSON, M.A., D.D. Professor of New Testament Interpretation in the Southern Baptist Theological Seminary, Louisville, Ky. Charles Scribner's Sons, New York. 1907. Pp. xi, 192.

This little book attempts a straightforward constructive discussion of the career of Jesus, as set forth in the Gospels. There is no technical criticism of the sources, though the writer has reached conclusions on many of these points which come out incidentally. The eight chapters of the book were originally delivered as popular lectures at a summer Chautauqua at Pertle Springs, Mo., July, 1906, to an audience composed of ministers and a large and intelligent body of other Christian workers. The assembly requested the publication of the lectures. The lectures have been published in the hope that they may become useful to some who desire a positive presentation of the career of Jesus in the light of modern knowledge and in full sympathy with the position given to Christ in the Gospels (pp. viif.).

In Dr. Robertson's book the following subjects are discussed: "The Messianic Consciousness of Jesus", "The First Appeal of Jesus", "The New Departure", "The Galilean Campaign", "The Special Training of the Twelve", "The Attack upon Jerusalem", "The Answer of Jerusalem", "The Final Triumph of Jesus".

Dr. Robertson is master of an attractive style. His sentences are short and pithy. In fact, the book is full of strikingly bright remarks; antithetical statements and aphorisms abound. The reader is carried forward rapidly, and his interest is sustained to the end. And, what is more important, Dr. Robertson writes from the right point of view. He is in sympathy with the portraiture of Jesus as given in the Gospels, and has left to others the work of retouching or repainting the canvass which "old masters" have immortalized.

It would be a pleasure to call attention to numerous points of interest in Dr. Robertson's book, but the interest of discovering them may be left to the readers who discover the book. May these be many and may Dr. Robertson's service in this popular presentation of the Gospel story find the appreciation and the gratitude that it deserves!

Princeton.

WILLIAM P. ARMSTRONG.

HISTORICAL THEOLOGY.

A SCOTS EARL IN COVENANTING TIMES: being Life and Times of Archibald, 9th Earl of Argyle (1629-1685). By JOHN WILLCOCK, F. R. Hist. Soc. Edinburgh: Andrew Elliott, 17 Princes Street. 1907. 8vo.; pp. xxi, 448. With Index and fifteen portraits and other illustrations.

Mr. John Willcock, Minister of Lewick, in the Shetland Islands, has made himself favorably known to students of Scottish history by a series of biographical memoirs—one of them detailing some passages in the life of a Shetland minister of the eighteenth century, but most of them touching on phases of life in the century of the Covenants. Of these the *magnum opus* thus far consists of two volumes, published separately, but dealing with consecutive history as it wrought itself out around the figures of two notable men, father and son. The first of these two volumes, called *The Great Marquess*, presented the "life and times of Archibald, 8th Earl and first (and only) Marquess of Argyle". The second, now lying before us, presents "the life and times of Archibald, 9th Earl of Argyle."

The period covered by the two volumes embraces nearly the whole of the seventeenth century—from 1607 to 1685; and comprehends the entire significant history of the Covenants, which may be said to have closed with the Revolution of 1688. This history is presented, however, from the point of sight of its relation to the two Earls of Argyle, whose

fortunes furnish the central thread of the two volumes respectively. There is no doubt a difference in the handling of the history in the two volumes. The earlier one is more of a biography of its subject; the later more of a history of the times in which its subject lived. This is in accordance with, and perhaps has been determined by, the relative prominence of the two figures. Both occupied a great place in the history of their country: both died as martyrs for their country's liberties and the Covenant. But the father was indefinitely the greater man of the two, played incomparably the greater part in the history of his times, and stands out on the page of the story much more boldly—in black or white (we think, white) according to our judgment of his in any event great character and career.

Perhaps the task of writing the life history of "the great Marquess" and placing it in its proper perspective in the history of the times was more difficult than the task of writing the history of the times of "the ninth Earl" and pointing out his place in it. Perhaps the mass of controversial material which has gathered around the figure of "the great Marquess", necessitating a continual attitude of defense when dealing with his career, unavoidably hampered the presentation of his portrait in a historical narrative. In any case, we think, Mr. Willcock's second volume in this family history better than his first. We have read it with more pleasure and we think with more profit. We do not admire the ninth Earl as we admire the eighth: we do not look back to him with the gratitude which quickens in our hearts as we think of that great lord and Christian who, fortunately for Scotland, was virtually King in the land during some of the most fateful years of its history. But we follow his fortunes through Mr. Willcock's pages with, we think, an adequate appreciation of the high qualities of heart and mind which ultimately asserted themselves and enabled him too to accomplish a death which goes far to vindicate many passages of his checkered life. The volume, however, in its capacity of history rather of the times than of the mere life of the ninth Earl deals mainly with the fortunes of the Covenant in Scotland in the period of its depression. And it is Mr. Willcock's presentation of this history which chiefly grips the reader's attention. We do not fully share Mr. Willcock's attitude towards the several parties of the Covenanters: and there are accordingly passages in his narrative which we should have painted in colors the reverse of those which he employs. But we find the outlines of the narrative sound, and have risen from the perusal of the work with a sincere sense of satisfaction with it. The two volumes together give a clear and useful picture of the Covenanting century in Scotland which students of that period should not miss.

Princeton.

BENJAMIN B. WARFIELD.

THEOLOGISCHER JAHRESBERICHT. Herausgegeben von Prof. Dr. G. KRÜGER und Prof. Dr. W. KÖHLER in Giessen. Sechszwanzigster Band, enthaltend die Literatur und Totenschau des Jahres

1906. Vierte Abteilung: KIRCHENGESCHICHTE, bearbeitet von Krüger, Clemen, Vogt, Köhler, Herz, Werner, Raupp. Leipzig: M. Heinsius Nachfolger; New York: G. E. Stechert & Co. 1907. Large 8vo.; pp. xii, 601 (pp. 311-901). Price 25 marks.

This bulky volume shows that again for 1906 as for some years previously, theological activity has run very much on the lines of Church History. The section on Church History in this annual review of theological literature exceeds in bulk those on all the other departments of theological study put together. This new instalment of the survey continues to astonish the reader by its wonderful completeness and the remarkable accuracy of its observations. Of course, the several parts of the volume differ from one another in these matters, as in others. We have found most satisfaction in reading Köhler's survey of Reformation literature, which is exceptionally full in its comments and stands out in this respect in marked contrast with the skimpy treatment of mediæval research that immediately precedes it and is little more than a list of books. It is pleasant to read such an appreciative reference from one fellow-worker to another as that which Krüger gives to Loofs *à propos* of the new edition of his *Leitfaden zum Studium der Dogmengeschichte* (p. 313). Appearing first almost *incognito* in 1889, it reached its well-known form in its third edition in 1893—a crisp little book of 484 pages. Its fourth edition, 1906, has become a thick volume of 1002 pages. The chief event of the year in the region of Reformation history was the continued discussion of Troeltsch's brilliant essays on the significance of Protestantism, and this debate is excellently summarized for us by Köhler (pp. 485 sq.). The first volume of Prof. Lindsay's *History of the Reformation* is appreciatively welcomed, though, of course, not with the positive ecstasies with which it has been reviewed in some English-speaking organs. Köhler remarks that it may perhaps be best characterized for German readers as a combination of the works of Bezold and Kawerau. He finds it excellently worked out and in the best sense independent. The Introductory part, surveying the eve before the Reformation, he finds its best part: the text, though well done, offers little that is new. Prof. Williston Walker's *Calvin* is also appreciatively estimated (p. 603); and the appearance of a volume on Calvin (by A. Bossert) in Hatchett's series of *Les grands écrivains français* is appropriately noted as a sign of his coming to his rights in the history of French literature—in sequence to "Brunetière's famous lecture", as Köhler thinks. Bossert's book is spoken well of, and especially its remarks on Calvin's estimate of Art, especially Music, and his importance for the history of the French language are praised. It has been left to a Frenchman, we learn (p. 618), to publish the first independent study of John Knox's theology: Charles Martin: *De la genèse des doctrines religieuses de John Knox*, published in the *Bulletin Historique et Littéraire* of the Société de l'Histoire de Protestantisme Français (55: 193-211). M. Martin does not think Knox, who was above all a man of action,

an original thinker. He owed his dialectical-scholastic tendencies to John Major, Doctor of the Sorbonne; and was strongly influenced in his theology by the work of Balnaves on Justification by Faith. He thinks Knox was a Zwinglian before he came to Geneva: after that a Calvinist. The breadth of the survey of the literature of Church History in this work is illustrated by the minute care which it gives to chronicling even what has been published in Russian and the Greek Church. In Greece and its affiliated lands the burning question in 1906 was Cyril Lucar,—was he or was he not a Calvinist? (p. 864). Prof. Diomedes Kyriakos thinks that the popular effect of the controversy has been an impression that he was not: but he leaves the impression on our minds that "the people" for whom he speaks were very much predisposed to this opinion. It is supererogatory to say formally once more in closing that no student of theology in any of its branches can get along without this comprehensive *Jahresbericht*.

Princeton, May, 1908.

B. B. WARFIELD.

HISTORISCHE EINLEITUNG IN DIE SYMBOLISCHEN BÜCHER DER EVANGELISCH-LUTHERISCHEN KIRCHE. VON D. TH. KOLDE. Ordentl. Professor der Kirchengeschichte in Erlangen. (Sonderdruck aus J. T. Müller, Die symbolischen Bücher der evangelisch-Lutherischen Kirche, deutsch und lateinisch. Gütersloh, C. Bertelsmann. 10. Aufl.) Gütersloh. Druck und Verlag von C. Bertelsmann. 1907. Pp. iv, and lxxxiii.

Doctor Theodore Kolde is more than the ordinary professor of Church History at Erlangen. He is a modern champion of German Lutheranism in its historical aspects. Believing that our histories must be re-written to meet the needs of the present, he seeks to bring the history of his church and, in this instance, of its confessional statements up to date.

The present brochure is the result of this undertaking. In the preface, Dr. Kolde praises the *Introduction* by J. T. Müller (1848) as excellent in its time but, in view of modern scientific demands, he describes it as "wholly antiquated" (*völlig veraltet*). What he now attempts is a new introduction (not a revision of Müller's) which will contain everything necessary for the historical appreciation of the Lutheran Confessions. The method employed gives the origin of the symbols, their subsequent history and reception into the Book of Concord, the symbolical *complementum* of the Lutheran Church in Germany. The five Lutheran standards are taken up separately, viz.: the Augsburg Confession, the Apology of the Augsburg Confession, the Schmalkald Articles, the two Catechisms of Luther, and the Form of Concord, with a closing chapter on "The Book of Concord", which opens with a somewhat laborious German and Latin bibliography and closes with a passing notice of the Saxon Visitation Articles of 1592.

Dr. Kolde contends for the relative independence of Melancthon in

the preparation of the *Augustana*. In the Marburg Articles (1529), the Articles of Schwabach (1529) and the Articles of Torgau (1530), the three preparatory documents to the Augsburg Confession, Luther may be said to have shared in the latter. "But the direct share of Luther in the composition of the Confession was a very trivial one" (p. 21. Cf. pp. 8, 9). Yet it is carefully added: "Nevertheless, it cannot be said, as it has been, though without proof, constantly asserted, that anything un-Lutheran or Melanchthonian in the narrower sense had entered into it" (p. 21. Cf. Schaff: *Creeds of Christendom*, I, p. 229). This is Professor Kolde's contention—the doctrinal integrity of the *Augustana* as the unadulterated expression of sixteenth century Lutheranism—a contention which becomes more noticeable when the Latin quarto edition of 1540, known as the *Variata*, is considered (p. 25). Real doctrinal changes are noted, the special rock of offense being Art. X. on the Lord's Supper, in which the *cum pane et vino vere exhibeantur* in place of the *cum pane et vino vere et substantialiter adesse* of the Wittenberg Concord (May, 1536), and the giving up of the *et improbant secus docentes* of the edition of 1530, is interpreted as a possible compromise with the Zwinglians (p. 26). Professor Kolde does not go into the causes of Melanchthon's changes. Doubtless Luther disapproved of the *Variata*, but just let it pass, as he did many other things (p. 26). The tendency was to associate the *Invariata*, and Luther's ideas (p. 29), and this became the final norm (p. 30). Both originals—the German copy at Mayence and the Latin copy at Brussels—fell into the hands of the Romanists, and were lost or destroyed (pp. 30-32). The *Apology* is rightly described (p. 38) as a theological grounding of the *Augustana*, and so more a theological treatise than a confession. The name "Schmalkald Articles" is objected to on the ground that they are in no sense the common confessional document of the League of Schmalkald; and, moreover, it is entirely unhistorical to make Melanchthon's *Tract on the Power and Primacy of the Pope* an appendix of these articles, since it stands in no connection whatever with them, and since it was actually received as an appendix to the *Augustana*, and the *Apology* (pp. 50-51).

Luther's catechetical labors are traced to his sermons on the Decalogue and the Lord's Prayer (in Lent of 1516), his exposition of the former (1518), his manual on *How to Confess* (1519), his German exposition of the Lord's Prayer for the laity (1519), his "Brief Form of the Ten Commandments, the Creed, and the Lord's Prayer" (1519), the *Kinderfragen* of the Bohemian Brethren, and the universal lack of definite religious instruction for the young; but preëminently Luther's "German Mass" (1525). Whether Luther knew and used the catechetical efforts of Caspar Gröter (1528), John Brenz (1529?), and Andreas Althamer (1528), we do not know (p. 58). Nor is it certain when the term "Enchiridien" was first given to the Small Catechism. Three things, according to Professor Kolde, gave symbolical significance to Luther's Catechism: its early popularity; its brief exposition of Luther's views, making it a handy reference (with the Schmalkald

Articles) in the controversies following Luther's death; and the emergence of the Heidelberg Catechism in 1563 (pp. 63-64).

The chapter on "The Form of Concord" notes the attempts to preserve Protestantism in its Lutheran purity, the futility of these efforts in the growth of Melancthonism and Calvinism, the labors of Jacob Andreae, Chemnitz, Chyträus, Selnecker, *et al.*, leading by way of Andreae's *Eintrachtsformel* (1567), his six sermons (1573), his *Swabian Concord* (1574), worked over (mainly by Chemnitz) into the *Swabian-Saxon Concord* (1575), the *Form of Maulbronn* by Osiander and Bidembach (1576), and the *Torgau Book* (1576), finally to the "Berg Book" as the *Form of Concord* (1577). One misses in it, says Dr. Kolde, the pulse-beat of a direct confession; this was due to its aim, which was not union and compromise but separation and differentiation. Hence it is more a doctrinal writing than a confession, yet as a doctrinal writing it must be reckoned among the most pre-eminent achievements of the sixteenth century (p. 73), although there never has been a time when it would have been the confession of all Lutheranism (p. 74).

It is interesting to observe that the *Book of Concord*, under the direction of Jacob Andræ, assisted by Archdeacon Peter Glaser and Deacon Caspar Füger as correctors (p. 78), appeared in Dresden, June 25, 1580, the fiftieth anniversary of the reading of the Augsburg Confession (p. 80. Cf. p. 20), and Dr. Kolde is inclined to think that there is only one official Dresden edition of 1580. The first Latin text (1580), in reality a private undertaking of Nikolaus Schneckler, was so faulty that it was thoroughly revised; and this revision, appearing at Leipzig in 1584, became the Latin *textus receptus* of the Book of Concord.

Of the *Saxon Visitation Articles* it is stated that they prevailed in Saxony until 1836, but that otherwise they have "nothing whatever to do either with the Book of Concord or the symbols of the Lutheran Church" (p. 83)—a noble exhibition not only of historical perspective but also of ecclesiastical self-respect.

As to form, we note very copious foot-notes, a comprehensive and carefully selected literature, including the author's numerous and valuable investigations, the Roman numbering of the pages, making the present pamphlet ready to be inserted as an historical preface to some future edition of the "Book of Concord", and lastly, the old German type and spelling in quotations from the earlier sources. The arrangement of the literature, however, is unhappy. It is simply unkind to the reader's eyes to place before him such a jumble as we find on pages 54, 65, and 77, when a few more pages would have given room for spacing and separation.

That Dr. Kolde has succeeded is evident. He has given us an Introduction that is brief and up-to-date. It is not easy for one wholly to submerge one's dogmatic presuppositions. The Reformation is not quite over. The general spirit of the booklet is that of a devoted Lutheran, but it is none the less a genuinely *historical* production, and just

such a one as we need to-day. For, after all, the tendency of modern theological liberalism to put a quietus upon all creeds is due to a lack of historic perspective with regard to the creeds and a fixed unwillingness to investigate,—the one eternal prerogative of the self-complacent ignoramus. What we need to rewrite is, not our creeds, but their history. This is what Dr. Kolde has done for the German Lutheran Church. It is what Dr. Warfield has been doing all along for the Westminster standards (see former articles in this REVIEW). No Lutheran student ought wilfully to omit Dr. Kolde's *Introduction*, for it too gives "sound results in the shortest words", and among those who will especially appreciate it, will doubtless be many on the Reformed side.

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BENJAMIN F. PAIST, JR.

SHELDON JACKSON, Pathfinder and Prospector of the Missionary Vanguard in the Rocky Mountains and Alaska. By ROBERT LAIRD STEWART, D.D., Professor in the Theological Seminary of Lincoln University, Pa. Author of "The Land of Israel" and "Memorable Places among the Holy Hills". Illustrated. New York, Chicago, etc.: Fleming H. Revell Company. Pp. 488. Price, \$2.00 net.

In this life of Dr. Jackson we have the great home missionary biography. It is often assumed that foreign missions have a monopoly, if not of the heroism, at least of the romance of missionary work, and for the romance of missions we are apt to turn, for example, to the lives of Paton, Mackay and Hannington. Dr. Stewart is to be congratulated upon giving us not only an adequate record of a great home mission leader, but a book which for thrilling interest, and for its narrative of dramatic adventure, of apostolic zeal, and of events profoundly significant for civilization, can scarcely be excelled in foreign missionary annals. Dr. Jackson has been called "the Francis Xavier of Protestant America", "an Apostle Paul in his grasp of strategic points", a bishop with a diocese larger than Alexander's empire, "the Kit Carson of Presbyterianism", "a great religious explorer", and the founder of Christian Civilization in Alaska. The story of his labors is as fascinating as the novels of "Ralph Connor", and the reader can understand why Dr. Grenfell, of Labrador, has said that Sheldon Jackson was taken as his model.

Dr. Jackson has been most fortunate in his biographer. Dr. Stewart has collected and arranged with great care the rich material at his command, has told his story with the grace of an accomplished writer, and with the sustained enthusiasm of one who was himself a veteran of home missions. The history begins with Dr. Jackson in Indian Territory working under the Foreign Board, and follows his labors as an apostle of home missions who magnified his office, and claimed for Christ and civilization and Presbyterianism the empire of the "New West" from the Mississippi to the Aleutian Islands, and "dotted the

whole broad expanse with monuments of his wisdom and energy". The book will not only be of interest to all Presbyterians and lovers of missions, but will be of great value to historians of Alaska and of the winning of the West, and will besides have a broad human appeal as the marvelous record of what one man can accomplish. A comparison between Dr. Jackson and the Apostle Paul has often been made and is inevitable as we read of his tireless journeyings, his labors so varied in extent and in character, his hardships, dangers, imprisonment, "deaths oft" (three times so reported in the press), and care of all the churches. Dr. Spining's dramatic address, nominating Dr. Jackson for moderator of the Assembly of 1897, is given in full; and we have a detailed account of the introduction of reindeer, which an Alaskan has asserted will be worth more for the wealth and happiness of Alaska than the gold and silver of her mines.

One incident, told by a classmate in Princeton Seminary, may be of interest to readers of this "Review":

"In the course of his argument the Doctor (Dr. McGill in a missionary sermon) seemed to be inspired, and, looking right down on us students, he thrust forward his hand and said: 'Young man, if you can't be first, be foremost.' After the service was over, a young man who sat by me in the chapel—said, 'That was a very excellent sermon'—'Very fine', was the reply. But McMillan, did you notice that sentence?—'Young man, if you can't be first, be foremost.' 'I can't be first, I will be foremost.' That young man was Sheldon Jackson."

The volume has appeared just as Dr. Jackson has rounded out a half century of missionary work, the author perceiving "to lay his wreath of appreciation at his feet now", altho his labors are still incomplete. Portraits of many missionary pioneers and other illustrations, with a full index, add to the value of the book. Best of all, no one can read it without being inspired with greater zeal for the cause of Christ and for the missionary work of His Church at home and abroad.

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WM. HALLOCK JOHNSON.

SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.

THE CHRIST OF THE CROSS, or the Death of Jesus Christ in its relation to Forgiveness and Judgment. By Rev. J. GIBSON SMITH, St. Andrew's Church, Wellington, New Zealand. Wellington, N. Z.: Gordon & Gotch (London: Gordon & Gotch). 1908. Crown 8vo., pp. 363.

Mr. Smith's object in this strongly and even fervently written volume is to propose what he takes to be a new theory of the Atonement. It is not, however, as new as he takes it to be. It is in point of fact one of the most prevalent theories of the Atonement in this age of lowered conceptions of the guilt of sin, and heightened conceptions of man's

own part in the saving process. Stated in its barest outline, it is the theory that the ground on which God receives sinful man back into His favor is just man's own repentance and faith, while the part of Christ is simply to induce acceptable repentance and faith in man. This is, of course, only a form,—one of the highest forms, certainly,—of the so-called "Moral Influence" theory (see *The New Schaff-Herzog Encyclopædia* [1908], p. 352a).

Mr. Smith, to be sure, formally repudiates the "Moral Influence" theory,—as he states it, that is; and that means, in one of its special forms (p. 57: "as thus stated"). But his own theory is only another mode of stating essentially the same view. He thinks he draws away from the "Moral Influence" theory (of course, in the unacceptable form of it which he outlines) in two particulars,—inasmuch as he gives an essential place in his theory to the death of Christ, and makes this death "answer to some demand in the nature of God as well as to some need of man" (p. 57). The wariness of this language should not pass, however, without observation. If an essential place is given to the death of Christ, it is not that the salvation of the sinner is grounded in the death of Christ; it is grounded in the sinner's own repentance and faith and nothing more. The necessity which is vindicated for the death of Christ arises merely out of the sinner's need of influences issuing from the death of Christ to produce in him such repentance and faith as will be acceptable to God. And if the death of Christ may be said in this indirect way to "answer to some demand in the nature of God", it directly meets no demand of the nature of God at all. It operates only to secure from man the repentance and faith which meet the demand of God's "holy mercy". The death of Christ thus terminates solely on man, affecting him; and not at all on God, affecting Him,—save through the effect it works in man, by inducing in man acceptable repentance and faith.

Mr. Smith does occasionally, to be sure, incidentally use language which may seem to imply or assert that the death of Christ has an effect on God. Thus, we read (p. 54) of a "remission of sins on the ground of the death of Christ", and again (p. 36), of "obstacles to man's forgiveness in God" which Christ has come and removed. But these perhaps not unnatural reversions to the common language of Christianity must naturally be interpreted according to the terms of his own theory. And according to the terms of his theory Christ's work does not terminate on God supplying the ground on which He forgives sins, and does not remove any obstacles on God's part to the forgiveness of sin. In his view there is on God's part no obstacle to man's forgiveness, and God requires no death of Christ, or anything else of the kind, to enable Him to remit sin. All that is required to enable God's free mercy to flow forth to sinful man, is that the conditions of forgiveness necessarily imposed by a holy God on sinners should be fulfilled (pp. 106 sq.). And Christ's work does not fulfil these conditions. It terminates wholly on man, enabling him to comply with the necessary conditions of acceptance with God and so be saved.

"Therefore", we read (p. 106), "even though there is mercy eternally in God, and even though God requires no satisfaction to His retributive justice before He can show mercy, yet the mercy of God must remain eternally unavailable for sinful men unless, through the mediatorship of a Saviour from sin, he is enabled to comply with the conditions which God's holiness must always impose upon God's mercy." Man, in other words, is his own saviour, though, of course, only as empowered thereto by Christ. God accepts man only on the fulfilment by himself of conditions of salvation, not on the fulfilment of any conditions by Christ. Christ's whole work is to enable man to save himself: and only as man, thus enabled, saves himself can he be saved. The function which Christ performs in the saving process is not, then, that He does anything for man, but that He enables man to do all that it is necessary to do for himself.

This line of thought is very familiar. It is, moreover, the natural line of thought for one who occupies the general theological standpoint of Mr. Smith. Mr. Smith has turned his back upon the governing conceptions of his Reformed forefathers, and adopted instead the point of sight of their Arminianizing opponents. He considers himself in doing so only to be rising out of the "earth-born mist" of "fatalism", and to be according to men only "the full possession of their moral freedom" (p. 97). That is to say, in plain English, Mr. Smith takes his starting point in a Pelagianizing anthropology; his position relatively to the condition of the human race being as nearly as possible that of historical Semi-Pelagianism (pp. 125-7). Man being thus conceived to need only incitement to enable him to do all that God requires of him, God is, on the other hand, conceived as requiring no satisfaction for guilt, but freely extending mercy to all who return to Him in acceptable repentance and faith. The resultant soteriological scheme travels thus in an ellipse around the two foci of the divine offer of mercy up to the uttermost (p. 215), and the free dealing accorded to this offer by man. Man may accept this offer; and the power to accept it is native to him; he needs divine aid only to work fully out to their complete issues the results of his acceptance of it. Or man may reject this offer, and may not in any mechanical or miraculous fashion be deprived of his power to reject it, even up to "the point of the Breaking-Strain of the Soul",—beyond which he can but reject it, and before which, of course, he may equally readily accept or reject it. His destiny being thus determined by his own choice, he who accepts God's proposals of mercy will on this acceptance, being united by faith with Christ, be, through spiritual discipline received from Christ, more and more enabled to repent and believe, and on this beginning be accepted by God on the guarantee of Christ that this imperfect repentance and faith will ultimately ripen into perfect. There would seem to be implied here a doctrine of "Perseverance", and, though this is nowhere explicitly asserted, it is everywhere implied and frequently stated in less theological language. Otherwise the scheme is the familiar Arminian one and has nothing to distinguish it from what we hear on every side of

us, every day. And Mr. Smith's acumen is to be commended for perceiving that in this scheme there is no place for a doctrine of expiatory atonement; and for seeking another doctrine more conformable to his general theological point of view. If God's mercy is "free" and man's will is "free" in the senses of "freedom" ascribed to them respectively by this type of thought, a doctrine of expiatory atonement is an impertinence. And this is one of the most telling evidences of the falsity of the system. For the doctrine of an expiatory atonement is undoubtedly taught in the Scriptures, and no scheme of salvation can be the true one which, we will not say can find no place for it, but does not make it central.

Mr. Smith, of course, would deny that a doctrine of expiatory atonement is taught in the Scriptures. And it is in his effort to support this denial, if anywhere, that original material is presented by his book. He finds five "large tracts of Scripture which at least seem to be opposed to the theory" of "satisfaction to justice" in the blood of Christ (pp. 23 sq.). Three of these he subsequently, however (very justly), abandons,—apparently as raising only *prima facie* objections to the expiatory doctrine of the Cross,—and hangs his case on the other two (pp. 66 sq.). These, which he speaks of as "two great, important, perfectly plain and intelligible truths" of Scripture, hitherto neglected, he calls "the Truth of the Crime of the Crucifixion" and "the Truth of the Coming Judgment" (pp. 66-67). These two plain facts of Scripture, that the Crucifixion of the Lord of Glory was a terrible, "a unique and transcendent" crime, and that there looms before men a yet future judgment in which God's righteousness will be manifested in retributive justice,—he represents as utterly inconsistent with the expiatory theory of the Cross. "The former truth," he declares (p. 81), "leads us to reject that theory because it is *impossible*—for how can God's most holy justice be satisfied through the commission of a crime on the person of His Son, or through the Son's submission to have a crime committed upon His person? The latter truth calls upon us to reject the expiatory theory, because it is *unnecessary*, for how can it have been necessary that God's retributive justice, which is, in the future, to be satisfied to the full in the final Judgment, should already have been satisfied to the full upon the Cross?" A great portion of his volume is occupied with the elaboration and enforcement of these contentions, and he quite properly places one of them, in a quotation from Mr. W. L. Walker's *The Spirit and the Incarnation*, in its forefront as the motto of the whole. The entire argument, indeed, turns on them as on its hinge and stands or falls with them. And yet,—can it be necessary to point out the confusions on which both of them rest?

When Mr. Smith declares, "It is simply inconceivable that the crucifixion of Christ can be, at one and the same moment, a terrible crime which God is bound to regard as a crime, and also a means of satisfying God's retributive justice" (p. 73),—what can the astonished reader do but pause in wonder and ask, Why? Why does not the philosophy of Gen. 1. 20—"And as for you, ye meant evil against me; but God

meant it for good, to bring to pass, as it is this day, to save much people alive",—apply here as it applies throughout God's dealings with men? Of course, Mr. Smith cannot sustain his own contention. He finds himself compelled to admit that the Scriptures declare that "the death of Christ was divinely appointed and foretold, that Jesus endured it of His own free will, and that it was a death for sin, by which the salvation of believing sinners was secured" (p. 73); that in that death "the purposes of God were carried out" (p. 76), and the like. From which it emerges that the difference between him and those whom he opposes here does not concern the question whether the same transaction may be on man's part a crime deserving punishment and on God's part a vehicle of blessing for the race, but solely the question of what particular purpose of God is accomplished by this particular crime of the Cross. The tentative attempt to distinguish between *indirect* and *direct* utilization of man's crimes by God for the attainment of His ends (p. 92) may be neglected here as not directly applied by Mr. Smith to this question, and, indeed, as obviously not applicable to it. The plain fact is that Mr. Smith's whole contention at this point is but an attempt to confuse the reader's judgment by directing and holding his attention to the moral quality of the human acts involved in the crucifixion of Christ, to the exclusion of contemplation of the tremendous purpose of God in that great transaction. To say (p. 78) that it is "the supposition of the expiatory theory" "that there was practically no crime in the Cross at all, and that God's justice was satisfied thereby" is to set in collocation things which stand out of all relation to one another. Rather, on the supposition of the expiatory theory there was an immense crime committed in the crucifying of Christ, and God's justice was satisfied thereby.

When we say, however, that God's justice was satisfied thereby we are hard on the heels of Mr. Smith's second "great tract of Scriptural truth" which he represents as inconsistent with the doctrine of satisfaction in the blood of Christ,—the Truth, as he calls it, of the Coming Judgment. By this he means simply that if Jesus satisfied the Divine justice on the Cross, then there can remain no more remembrance of sin, and accordingly there can be left no place for a Coming Judgment. Did we not have it here repeatedly flaunted in our face, it would be incredible that anyone could fail to distinguish between the satisfaction rendered on the Cross for Christ's people and the judgment which still hangs over those who are "without". It is quite true that those who are in Christ Jesus do not come into judgment; but how that abolishes the judgment impending over those who are not in Christ, it is, we do not say difficult, but impossible, to see. What has blinded the eyes of Mr. Smith here is no doubt the strength of his revulsion from the Reformed doctrine of a "definite atonement", and his consequent zeal for a so-called "universal atonement". He is quite right in insisting that a universal satisfaction for sin on the Cross would have abolished all impending judgment. There is a certain validity, therefore, in his reiterated assertion that if, "according to the

expiatory theory, God's retributive justice" (*simpliciter*) "was satisfied on the Cross", if there was made on it "a complete satisfaction of retributive justice", so that "God's retributive justice has *already* been satisfied to the full on the Cross" (p. 74), there cannot remain any real judgment for the future. But it is safe to say no one but convinced Universalists,—who do abolish all future judgment and usher all into eternal life,—has ever taught such a universal atonement as this. The most convinced advocates of the so-called "universal" satisfaction for sin, Arminian as well as Calvinist, have made it hypothetical, conditioned in its efficacy on faith, so that its expiatory value inured only to believers, and a place of judgment remained for all unbelievers. We do not say that this hypothetical scheme will work: we do not think it will, and we commend recent Arminian thinkers for seeing that it will not work and discarding it. What we do not commend in them is that in discarding it they discard the expiatory doctrine and set themselves to invent lowered views of the atonement more conformable to Arminian principles. The unconformableness—which we believe to be real—of Arminian principles with the Biblical doctrine of the substitutive satisfaction of Christ, is the condemnation, not of that doctrine, but of the Arminian principles which cannot be united with it in a consistent system of truth. But all this aside, what Mr. Smith has set up in his universal expiatory atonement which satisfies the divine retributive justice *simpliciter*, leaving no retribution for the future, is a man of straw. Nobody holds to such a doctrine. Nobody holds that Christ has rendered satisfaction for the sins of any but "believers", whether these believers be conceived as the elect of God, who believe because God has bought them by the precious blood of His Son, or whether they be conceived as sinners who, by believing, have made themselves the beneficiaries of the atoning sacrifice of the Son of God. A satisfaction, however, for the sins of believers, cannot be said in any way to affect the necessity or the ethical value of the proclamation of a coming judgment for those who do not believe. Surely, if it is only by such confusions as these that the expiatory doctrine of the Cross can be attacked, it lies safely intrenched behind the mass of direct Scriptural evidence by which it is established.

The positive side of Mr. Smith's argument for his theory of the Atonement is no more solid than its negative side. What he has undertaken to commend to us in the stead of the expiatory doctrine of the Church is a theory of salvation on the ground of our own repentance and faith, induced in us by a work of Christ undertaken and accomplished for this end,—that He might lead us perfectly to repent of our sins and believe in God our Saviour. For the validation of such a theory it would be necessary to show, (1) that repentance and faith can avail to ground acceptance of sinners by God; (2) that a repentance and faith such as can avail with God can be exercised by sinful men; and (3) that the work of Christ was directed towards and was adapted to and was efficient for the production in sinful men of a repentance

and faith such as may avail with God. It cannot be said, however, that Mr. Smith has shown any of these things.

The first of them he does not even attempt to show. He simply assumes it, remarking lightly (p. 107 sq.) that as a self-respecting man will certainly require repentance and faith as conditions precedent to his own bestowals of forgiveness on any brother man who has sinned against him, so God will demand the same conditions "with this infinite difference, that God must demand not a relatively true repentance and a relatively genuine faith, but a *perfect repentance* and a *perfect faith*" (p. 109). Much effort is expended to show that this at least must be demanded by God,—that nothing but a perfect repentance and a perfect faith will suffice; but no effort is made to show that this will suffice with God. That is just assumed. After the late Professor Moberly's acute and sustained argument of this point—even which we can but judge ineffective—one would have anticipated that no subsequent writer would be able to pass it over. But cardinal point as it is to the whole theory, Mr. Smith leaves it a mere assumption that repentance and faith can avail to commend a sinner to God: and an assumption, let us add, which is at variance at once with all Scripture, all experience, and all the dictates of natural justice. In point of fact, for example, no man ever does, and no man ever contends that we ought to, "forgive", *e.*, absolve from punishment, criminals, say, on mere repentance: else no murderer who seriously repents of his crime would be hung. The speciousness of his argument here depends on treating sin for the nonce merely as something personally offensive to God, rather than as something morally wrong.

This initial difficulty, or rather impossibility, having been, we will not say transcended, but put out of sight, Mr. Smith's theory is immediately face to face with another equally intractable. How can sinful man render to God the repentance and faith which a holy God must require before extending mercy? We have seen that Mr. Smith is insistent in asserting—properly enough—that this repentance and faith must be perfect. Dr. McLeod Campbell cut the knot by affirming that Christ Himself, sympathetically identifying Himself with sinful man, offered up to God in his stead a perfect repentance. Mr. Smith, however,—very properly again—rejects this expedient as inoperative (pp. 61, 120). Where, then, is sinful man to get this perfect repentance and faith, accept anything less than which God cannot "without denying Himself" (p. 109)? Mr. Smith is no Pelagian and cannot say that it is the ineradicable privilege of every man to be perfect whenever he chooses. He is rather at pains to show that "natural men", though capable of repenting and believing (for Mr. Smith is a Semi-Pelagian), is not capable of such repentance and faith as God—the All-holy One—is able to accept as enough (p. 110). Here, clearly, we are at an *impasse*.

Mr. Smith gets over this *impasse* by teaching that God accepts the promise for the performance. After all, then, God does accept our imperfect repentance and faith (though He cannot do so "without denying Himself"), because He foresees that this imperfect repentance

and faith is after a while to become perfect. "The Scripture doctrine deals with possibilities which will by and by become actualities, and which in the sight of Him who is the Alpha and the Omega, are as good as actualities already" (p. 44). "It is because God, who sees the end of all things in their beginnings, sees that great day as though it were present now, that He is able, in entire consistency with His holiness, to grant forgiveness of sins to the sinful man who is united by faith to the Christ of the Cross" (p. 180). "It is because God finds in the faith of the Christian believer this certainty of becoming, in the end, perfect, assured knowledge that sin is worthy of death, that He is able, in entire consistency with His holiness, to bestow a full and free forgiveness on the sinner whose faith unites him to the Christ of the Cross" (p. 194). There is, of course, here confusion worse confounded. The question raised is, On what ground can God accept sinful man into His favor? The answer returned is that there can be no other ground than a perfect repentance and faith. It is admitted, however, that no man can render this perfect repentance and faith until after he has been received into the divine favor and as a result of that favor. It is the product in him of the Holy Spirit received in Christ, and, if we do not misunderstand the author, is never realized in this life (*e. g.*, p. 284). It is actually taught, however, that God receives man into His favor on the ground of this perfect repentance and faith foreseen as certainly to be realized by him who is in Christ (*e. g.*, p. 267). That is to say, man is received into the divine favor on the ground of the foreseen product of that favor! Of course, this is only a round-a-bout way of saying that sinful man is accepted by God on the ground of his weak and imperfect faith and repentance by which he becomes united with Christ, through whom he is enabled gradually to perfect his repentance and faith. Stripped of its labored verbiage, in other words, Mr. Smith's elaborate theory reduces simply to the common Arminian doctrine. Man's imperfect faith and repentance is the proper ground of his acceptance with God, who graciously accepts it as perfect and undertakes to make it perfect through spiritual influences brought to bear on man in Christ.

Thus we are brought to the part which Christ, according to Mr. Smith's theory, plays in the salvation of sinful man. Put briefly, this is the part of producer and guarantor of the perfect repentance and faith in man, on the ground of which alone a holy God can receive sinful man into His favor. The whole of Christ's work is, according to Mr. Smith, devoted to this end,—that He may qualify Himself to impart and then may actually impart to sinners the perfect repentance and faith on the ground of which alone a holy God can accept them as His children; while meanwhile he guarantees to the holy God this perfect repentance and faith on the part of those who believe in Him. "The holy God is able to accept" the sinner "as one of His own children because he is united by faith to a Saviour who is now able, because He has acquired through His experience on earth a perfect human hatred of sin, and a perfect human love of righteousness, and a perfect

human knowledge of God, to communicate these eternal possessions of His to all human beings who believe in Him, and thus to enable them in the end to comply to the uttermost with the conditions of divine mercy. God therefore knows that the Saviour is an all-sufficient surety for the ultimate perfection of all who trust in Him. . . . And therefore God, who sees the end of all things in their beginnings, is able even here and now to reckon as righteous every true believer in Jesus Christ" (p. 267).

In such passages as this,—which are rather frequent,—there are brought together in commodious succinctness all the essential elements of the theory. These concern (1) the qualification of Christ to communicate a perfect repentance and faith to those who believe in Him; (2) the method of communication by which the perfect repentance and faith are imparted by Christ to those who believe in Him; (3) the capacity of Christ in the meanwhile to act as guarantor of this perfect repentance and faith in His people.

It is to the first of these elements of his theory that the author addresses himself with most fulness, and we may say predilection. The whole volume may be said without unfairness, indeed, to be a sustained attempt to show that Christ "has through His death on the Cross become eternally qualified to impart through the Holy Spirit to all who believe in Him a perfect human hatred of sin, a perfect human love of righteousness, and a perfect human knowledge of God" (p. 267). The presupposition is that a divine, or an angelic, hatred of sin, love of God, knowledge of God is incommunicable to man (p. 149). If these things were to be communicated to man, therefore, it behoved the Son of God to become man, that in the way of a true and pure human experience he might acquire a hatred of sin, and a love of righteousness and a knowledge of God, which, while perfect, should be truly human, and thus capable of being communicated to man. This is the account, according to Mr. Smith, of the incarnation and the sufferings of the Son of God,—and what He did and all that He endured were necessary to the acquisition by Him in human experience of these great possessions (*e. g.*, p. 164). What the essential difference is between a perfect hatred of sin, love of righteousness and knowledge of God in the divine heart—or in an angel's heart—and in a man's heart, which renders the former incommunicable to those who are expected to be perfect even as their Father in Heaven is perfect, to be imitators of God, sharers in the divine nature, and partakers of His holiness, and to have the same mind in them that was in Christ Jesus when He was in the form of God and might well have clung to His equality with God—while the latter is communicable to them,—the author does not stay to tell us.

Nor, indeed, does he make it very clear how this humanly acquired hatred of sin, love of righteousness, and knowledge of God which he declares to be alone communicable, is actually communicated to those who believe in Christ. He tells us, certainly, broadly, that it is "imparted through the Holy Spirit" (pp. 221, 267, 283-4), and by a "process of Spiritual discipline" (pp. 194, 207), but he does not go into details

here. He does, indeed, make it plain that in his view there is no "irresistible" activity of the Spirit contemplated. The Holy Spirit, it seems, in taking the things of Christ and showing them to man does not operate "by way of force, or of overwhelming demonstration to the senses", nor "in such a way that men could not, if they chose, quench the Spirit; but by reasonable and spiritual persuasion; so that those who did not accept the salvation offered in Christ might do so of their own free and deliberate choice" (p. 283). "God Himself", therefore, "cannot render it certain that every man shall accept His offered mercy" (p. 213). Man's "moral freedom" must be preserved at all hazards! Thus the impartation by Christ to men of perfect repentance and faith cannot be a prevalent impartation. It is of the nature of a tender rather than of a true communication. We are told, therefore, that it is effected through, first, a revelation of the Truth, and next an impartation—doubtless through suasion only—of a spiritual power (p. 259). We read accordingly (p. 124): "He is able to declare the truth with certainty, authority, and assurance, and *so* [italics ours] produce in sinful man that all-essential, God-acceptable faith which, when it attains its culmination, ceases to be any longer merely faith, but is transmuted into certain and assured spiritual knowledge." This truth is "sympathetically communicated and willingly received" (p. 229), and it is only "by accepting the crucified Christ as their Saviour" that men "are enabled to become partakers of that perfect human hatred of sin and that perfect human love of righteousness which Christ through the Cross has acquired", and that God may possess for them "a guarantee that in the end they shall be freed from all complicity with sin and made worthy to enter fully into His holy kingdom" (p. 203).

Only, we miss the ground of this guarantee. If the Spirit's work is only suasive, and no recreating power is exerted, how are men who, by reason of sin, *cannot* repent and believe perfectly, to be made able to do so? Can suasion overcome an *inability*? And how can we call an act of mere suasion a true "communication"; or in such circumstances declare that the Saviour, who is able no doubt to supply "all the spiritual gifts" necessary to sinful man's perfection, in the way of proffer, is able also to guarantee the acceptance and improvement of these gifts by sinful man? Do we not find ourselves in the unfortunate position of being compelled to say, not merely that "God Himself cannot render it certain that every man shall accept His offered mercy" (p. 213), but that God Himself cannot render it certain that any man shall accept it? And by parity of reasoning, so far from God knowing "that there is not one of the Saviour's flock that will not in the end be presented before Him wholly spotless and clean, are we not compelled to say that He cannot know that any one will be so presented before Him? If the Saviour of the world is to be limited in His saving work to what is euphemistically described as doing "the best possible for man, by saving him while still respecting his freedom of will" (p. 155), it is absurd to speak of Him as able to "guarantee to the God of all holiness that the man who was truly His should at once,

in some degree, and at last perfectly, become partaker of that perfect, holy, human hatred of sin and that perfect, holy, human love of righteousness which He as the Sinless Man, by suffering sin to do its utmost worst upon Him, and thereby fulfilling to the uttermost the will of the Father, had made His own forever" (p. 166). If the very principle of our construction is to preserve to men as moral agents a moral freedom which in its very definition is made to involve uncertainty, we can obtain no certainty by assuming the play upon these men of any merely moral inducements.

We perceive, then, that Mr. Smith's theory of the Atonement fails at every salient point. Proclaiming salvation solely on the ground of perfect repentance and faith, it fails to show that perfect repentance and faith will avail with God, or can be supplied by man, or can be communicated to man by Christ. It stands indeed more completely bare before its task than is usual with theories of its class. Dr. Moberly had something at least specious to say of the atoning power of repentance and faith. Dr. McLeod Campbell had a perfect repentance to offer in the sympathetic expression of repentance by Christ. The Germans, with their inheritance from the Lutheran doctrine of the "Means of Grace", have something plausible to urge of the revolutionary effect of the Cross when brought home in its true meaning to the hearts of men—which the Andover divines were not slow to avail themselves of. Of none of these expedients to give a superficial appearance of completeness to his theory does Mr. Smith, however, avail himself. His theory is certainly not really weakened by this refusal to invoke the aid of unavailing expedients. But it stands out more barely in its essential inefficiency through their absence; and its ineffectiveness is perceived with more startling distinctness. Its main difficulty is, however, no other than that on which all other autosoteric theories are wrecked,—and that is just its autosoteric character. If man can save himself or must save himself, he does not need a Saviour. And if nevertheless it is urged that he does need the work of Christ to induce him or to enable him to save himself, new difficulties at once emerge.

For example, what are we to say of those who lived before Christ, on whom, therefore, no influences from the Cross could play? Mr. Smith declares boldly that Christ "came that He might become eternally qualified to be the Saviour, not of Jews only, but of the whole world—of all generations of men, past, present, and to come" (p. 173). But we can only reply, Such an effect, on his theory, were impossible. Does he not in the very assertion declare that Christ came in order to *qualify* Himself to become a Saviour—and that His saving power *arises* from effects "produced in His own being and character by His experiences in the midst of sinful men"? And does he not over and over again tell us that the saving effects of Christ's work depend on influences which were incapable of working except after the saving work was accomplished (cf. p. 267: "is now able"), and which play not on God but on men? Now, if Christ came as the God-provided substitute for sinners and expiated the guilt of our sins on the tree, why, of course,

God could act upon this great satisfaction in prospect as well as in retrospect: for God's promissory note is as good as the money down. But if He came to *qualify* himself to communicate to men a spiritual power attained by Himself only in the course of His earthly work—why, of course, this communication cannot be made until He is qualified to make it and it can be made only to those who are exposed to those influences which spring from it. The universal loss of the entire human race before Christ is the inevitable result of finding the saving fact in an action of man's own will under influences streaming from the Cross.

We do not put this consideration forward, of course, as the matter of main importance: but only as an incidental result which may bid us pause and think. The matter of main importance is, naturally, that no man at all can ever be saved by such an Atonement,—because man is *ex hypothesi* incapable in his sin-bred inability of responding, in a saving act of faith and repentance, to any inducements brought to bear on him from the Cross. He needs not merely inducements to action, but recreating grace, and an Atonement which purchases for him the recreating Spirit as well as the proffer of mercy. It is here that the true opposition between the two views lies. It is the old opposition between "grace" and "free will". "I am at present reading our Erasmus", wrote Luther six months before he inaugurated the Reformation movement by nailing his theses on the door of the Schloss-Kirche at Wittenberg: "I am at present reading our Erasmus, but my heart recoils more and more from him. . . . The human is to him of more importance than the divine. . . . Those who ascribe something to man's freedom of will regard these things differently from those who know only God's free grace." Here we have the real hinge of the Reformation announced to us; and the core of the Gospel. There is an impassable gulf fixed between those who hang the efficacy of Christ's work upon the "free" action of man's will, and those who ascribe all to God's free grace. They are of different religions.

We have noted an occasional misprint in Mr. Smith's volume,—for example, p. 173, line 4, "alienable" for "inalienable". We may be permitted to suppose, therefore, that the *monstra* "true and proper incarnate man", "sinless incarnate humanity", "Sinless Incarnate Man", "sinless incarnate humanity", occurring on pp. 151-2, are to be attributed to the printer.

Princeton.

B. B. WARFIELD.

FREEDOM IN THE CHURCH. Or the Doctrine of Christ, as the Lord hath Commanded, and as this Church hath received the same according to the Commandments of God. By ALEXANDER V. G. ALLEN, Professor in the Episcopal Theological School in Cambridge; D. D. Kenyon, Harvard, and Yale; Author of "Continuity of Christian Thought"; "Christian Institutions"; "Life of Jonathan Edwards"; "Life of Phillips Brooks", etc. New York: The Macmillan Company; London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd. 1907. Crown 8vo.; pp. xiv, 223.

* Mr. Augustine Birrell has somewhere, perhaps somewhat wickedly, remarked of the Church of England that it is "based upon a view of history peculiarly her own". He had in mind, no doubt, that peculiar interpretation of history which is inculcated by her dominant High-Church teachers. But this has no advantage in point of peculiarity over that view of history which their Broad-Church brethren would fain substitute in its stead. Readers of Broad-Church historians cannot afford to permit themselves to fall off into a comfortable doze even when stretches of history especially familiar to them are under discussion: there is no way of forecasting what a page may bring forth. We shall not soon forget the benumbing wonder with which we read a quarter of a century ago the astonishing historical deductions and the weird estimates of historical values of Professor Allen's *Continuity of Christian Thought*. Something of the same feeling steals over us as we turn the pages of this latest product of his fertile, and certainly always learned, pen. Its object is to vindicate for the clergy (and for the laity, too) of the Protestant Episcopal Church in the United States of America a large liberty of belief, especially with respect to the articles of the so-called Apostles' Creed, and more especially still with respect to that particular article which recites that our Lord was "born of the Virgin Mary". Its method is historical, advancing considerations which seem designed to show that the Church of England, and by inference her daughter, the Protestant Episcopal Church in the United States of America, has never bound herself to a system of truth, but in all her deliverances in which she may at first sight seem to do so, is really asserting her freedom from systems of truth. To this are added further considerations which seem designed to show that such a document as the so-called Apostles' Creed cannot serve as an authoritative statement of doctrine, because its clauses when historically studied will be seen to have meant at various times such a variety of things that they can to-day mean little or nothing. The upshot is, if we understand Dr. Allen aright, that in his view the clergyman of the Protestant Episcopal Church, beyond the doctrine of the Trinity (no doubt variously understood), is committed to little or nothing but to the serious study of Scripture, under the leading of the best light available, with what results he may be led to thereby. With this view of the matter in his mind, he is no doubt right in asserting that "the Anglican Church" is "the most comprehensive Church in Christendom", in which "sound learning" (as determined by every man according to a standard of learning of his own) takes the place of "sound doctrine" (according to some external standard) as its "justification and defence". In the course of the presentation and development of his thesis, Dr. Allen brings out of his treasury many good things, old and new. He performs an important service, for example, in demonstrating afresh

* It is perhaps right to say that this notice was written and out of the writer's hands before Dr. Allen's death. It has been allowed to stand untouched, as originally written.

that the Reformed Church of England took her stand, like her sister Reformed Churches, firmly and exclusively on the impregnable rock of Holy Scripture. He seeks, it is true, to rob this fact of half its significance by contending that "the Anglican Church, while giving supreme importance to Scripture, nowhere lays down any rule for the interpretation of Scripture or any theory of inspiration" (p. 13); that "it has made no effort to guard the Bible by theory, definition, or dogma", and does not even assert its "infallibility" (p. 28). These things, however, are not formally adverted to in the formularies of the Church of England only because they are presupposed, which is a much more fundamental and emphatic way of making assertions regarding them. The Church of England was not engaged in establishing the authority of the Scriptures or in rooting that authority in a Divine inspiration which rendered them *simpliciter* infallible: these things were not in dispute, and, being universally allowed, were taken for granted and everywhere assumed. What it was engaged in asserting was that these divinely inspired and therefore infallible Scriptures, "of whose authority was never any doubt in the Church" (Art. VI), are the sole and exclusive authority, outside the teachings of which (all of which are "the commandments of God") no "commandments of men" are to be imposed on the consciences of men as articles of faith or as necessary to salvation. Nothing could be more fatuous than in these circumstances to contend that the immediate inspiration and absolute infallibility of Scripture, on which, as every allusion to it shows, the framers of these formularies based their demand that it and it alone should be of authority in the Christian Church, are left open questions. Apart, however, from this grave misrepresentation of the positive doctrine of Holy Scripture as held and embodied in their formularies by the English Reformers, Dr. Allen is quite right in his representation of the position they gave the Scriptures in the Church, and he has performed a service in calling sharp attention to it at the present juncture.

Dr. Allen is also quite right in pointing out that this restriction of authority over the consciences of men in Christ's Church to Scripture alone, is the charter of the Christian man's freedom. When the English Reformers in their formularies denied infallibility to the Church, whether ancient or modern, assembled in General Council or speaking through whatever organ (p. 10), and forbade the teaching for doctrine, necessary to salvation, of anything which cannot be "concluded and proved" out of the words of Scripture, or the ordaining for rites and ceremonies of anything "contrary to God's word written", their professed object was to liberate men from bondage to human as distinguished from Divine commandments. Of course, therefore, there was included in this the liberation of men's consciences from the proscriptions of man-made creeds, as such. Dr. Allen speaks with absolute truth when he declares: "They were under no delusions regarding the value of the Creed", meaning the so-called Apostles' Creed, "when compared with the Scriptures. Their emphasis was withdrawn from

creeds and placed on Scripture, to which the candidate for the ministry of this Church was called to give his entire and unreserved allegiance" (p. 81). Again: "To get back to the will of Christ and to the commandments of God was the deliberate intention. . . . It was not the letter and the text of creeds, but Scripture as the Word of God, to which the Church gave the highest place. And the doctrine which the Church received was received from Scripture, not from tradition; *as Christ had commanded*, and not as men had taught" (p. 163). Yet again: "Nowhere in the formularies of the Anglican Church is it creeds on which the stress is laid, but rather the Scriptures, as the word of God, containing all things necessary to salvation" (p. 20). These things are wholly true and admirably said. And the conclusion which is drawn is eminently sound: "It is a relief, then, and it brings freedom, to turn to Scripture as authority, and not to the tradition of the Church as an infallible guide, in matters of faith. For nowhere have we been taught in Scripture, or in our formularies, that the Christian Church is such a guide. On the contrary, it is declared in the Articles that the churches of Jerusalem, Antioch, and Alexandria have erred, and that the Church of Rome hath also erred, even in things pertaining to the faith. If they have erred, and in the happier ages of the Catholic Church, what guarantee have we that the Anglican Church may not err? Certainly the Church of England does not claim for herself an immunity which she refuses to the ancient churches of Christendom. Nowhere in her formularies does she show any solicitude for her own infallibility. Nor does she show solicitude for the creeds. Her sole solicitude is for the maintenance of the Word of God, uncorrupted by men's traditions or made of no effect by the commandments of men" (pp. 199-200).

This doctrine of authority in religion, which Dr. Allen vindicates afresh for the Church of England, it will be perceived, is just the common Reformed doctrine. It has two sides to it. If on the one hand it emancipates the Christian man from all man-made authorities, on the other hand it raises the Scriptures to the pinnacle of authority, on the express ground that the things they teach are not the commandments of men, but the commandments of God. Dr. Allen is so preoccupied with the liberating effect of the doctrine that he allows to drift out of sight, or rather pushes violently to one side, the stringency of the authority it vindicates for the teachings of Scripture. And so he misleads himself into speaking of the Church of England as an "undogmatic" church, which puts the Scriptures into the hands of her children and trusts to their instincts of "sound learning", imposing on them no interpretations of Scripture and asking of them no "swearing in the words of others". Nothing could be less true to the facts. No church of the Reformation manifested less of such trust in her children than the Church of England. That is what her Book of Homilies and Book of Common Prayer and Acts of Uniformity mean. As a matter of course she had, like the other churches of the Reformation, her special Articles of Religion which, she asserted, embodied the teaching of

Scripture; and she imposed them on her clergy. And if Tracts No. 90 and rumors of their current designation as "the Forty Stripes save One" teach us anything, these Articles of Religion have not always proved an easy yoke or light burden to her clergy. Dr. Allen himself tells us, and tells us truly, that when the clergy of the Church of England vow at their ordination to "give their faithful diligence so to minister the Doctrine and the Sacraments and the Discipline of Christ as the Lord hath commanded *and as this Church hath received the same*, according to the commandments of God", they solemnly bind themselves just to the doctrine set forth in the Thirty-Nine Articles. "To minister the doctrine *as this Church hath received the same*", says he, "does not mean as it hath received it from tradition, thus identifying the Reformed Church with the Church of the past; but the doctrine as set forth in the Articles of Religion, whose object at every turn is to protest against the errors involved in the commandments of men, which Rome had added to the Christian faith" (p. 83). The Thirty-Nine Articles, then, are "the doctrine" of the Church of England, and in these Thirty-Nine Articles the Three Creeds are incorporated. It is meaningless, therefore, to say that "from the Reformation down to our own day the oath of subscription in the Church of England has been taken to the Thirty-Nine Articles, and not to the creeds as such" (p. 88). To subscribe—or, as the phrase now goes, "to assent to"—the Thirty-Nine Articles is to subscribe (or "assent to") the Three Creeds, for the Thirty-Nine Articles declare that these Three Creeds "ought thoroughly to be received and believed: for they may be proved by most certain warrants of Holy Scripture". This is not an invitation to "test" the Creeds by Scripture and a license to disbelieve them when they do not seem to us to abide the test; it is the announcement that they stand the test of Scripture and are therefore to be "thoroughly" believed by all the clergy of the Church of England. The tenor of the subscription (or "assent") is not to the effect that the subscriber will believe all he finds taught by what he finally determines may be fairly recognized as Scripture; but that he believes all that the Canonical Scriptures recognized by the Church teach, that he finds that they teach what is set forth in the Thirty-Nine Articles, and that he accepts as true, because truly Scriptural, what is recited in the Three Creeds. A freedom of belief which passes beyond the limits of this declaration is in the Anglican Church a freedom exercised in defiance of the most solemn engagements by which a human being may bind himself. Whatever, then, may be the authority of the Creeds as such, or particularly of the Apostles' Creed, the clergyman of the Anglican Church is bound to believe that all that is asserted in them is true, because he commits himself, by his subscription (or "assent") to the Thirty-Nine Articles, to the Scripturalness of all their assertions. What they say the Bible says: and what the Bible says is simply true.

It may be quite possible, of course, still to contend that the clauses of the so-called Apostles' Creed are little fitted to serve as authoritative definitions of faith,—that they are beset with ambiguities and

lie open to multiform interpretations. It may even be possible to enter a broader plea still, and to suggest that religion ought not in any case to be hampered with vexing questions of truth and error: that "the primary religious question is, not whether a certain doctrine is true, for we may have no canons of determining truth; but what does it mean—a question we can always answer" (p. 195). In these suggestions, however, the discussion of the historical question of the extent of freedom allowed in the Anglican Church seems to be passing into a discussion of the broader and merely academical question of the extent of freedom which ought to or must be allowed in any church. Meanwhile, it remains certain that, in point of fact, it is required of every clergyman of the Anglican Church to receive and believe everything set down in the Three Creeds without exception. Dr. Allen endeavors, to be sure, to convey the impression that in declaring that the Three Creeds "ought thoroughly to be received and believed", because "they may be proved by most certain warrants of Holy Scripture" (Art. VIII), the Anglican Church means to commend nothing more than the doctrine of the Trinity to the faith of her children. We cannot, however, think him successful in this attempt. It is based on the circumstance that in the Church Catechism, after the catechumen has been made to declare that he is bound to believe "*all* the Articles of the Christian Faith", and has then repeated these Articles as they are enumerated in the Apostles' Creed, he is further asked, "What dost thou *chiefly* learn in these Articles of thy Belief?" and is made to answer: "First, I learn to believe in God the Father, who has made me, and all the world. Secondly, in God the Son, who has redeemed me, and all mankind. Thirdly, in God the Holy Ghost, who sanctifieth me, and all the people of God." See, cries Dr. Allen, "here is a distinction between the articles of the Creed: some are primary and essential, others are subordinate in importance" (p. 43). He even permits himself to say: "The inference seems just and inevitable that if any one learns this much from the Creed, he has gained what the Church holds to be essential; the other details of the Creed are left to his individual judgment, guided by Scripture, to determine" (p. 68). How it can be "just and inevitable", however, to infer from the circumstance that some items of belief are held to be more important than others, that therefore all others are to be understood to be wholly unimportant, and are not intended to be inculcated at all, but "left to individual judgment"—although they are actually inculcated and declared to be taught in Holy Scripture—passes the comprehension of ordinary mortals.

Among these declarations of the Creed which the Church of England is thus held not to inculcate but to leave "to the individual judgment" of her children "guided by Scripture" (as reconstructed and reinterpreted by themselves) "to determine", Dr. Allen is particularly concerned with that which sets forth the Virgin-birth of our Lord. He labors strenuously to make out that this fact (for he allows it to be a fact, pp. vii, 180-181) not only is a matter of entire indifference to the Christian faith, but cannot be said to be inculcated by the Church of

England among the Articles of her belief, to which she requires her clergy to assent. To that end he discusses at large the origin of the clause "born of the Virgin Mary" which appears in the Creed, seeks to trace the various senses which have been attributed to it in the course of Christian history, and warns men off from attaching any significance to the term "Virgin" in it lest they should become involved at once in crass errors as to the mode of the Incarnation and gross superstitions with respect to Mary the ever-virgin Mother of God. Like Dr. McGiffert, he supposes that the insertion of the clause was originally anti-Docetic and was designed to assert the real humanity of the Lord: and this he rightly supposes a matter of much greater importance than the mere fact that our Lord came into the world by a Virgin-birth. He paints in black colors—but none too black—the dreadful misuse which has been made of the Virginity of Mary in its exploitation in the interests of Mariolatry—and remarks with high justice as well as excellent point that it is surely wrong to "attribute to our Lord's Mother" (which he himself nevertheless spells with a capital initial) "the inheritance of sanctity and purity which marked His human nature, instead of to the grace of God, or the action upon Him of the Holy Spirit" (pp. 169-170). The gravity and length with which these things are discussed may almost betray the unwary reader into the impression that they have something to do with the matter in hand. They have not. No matter with what primary purpose the clause was inserted into the Creed, as it has finally become established in the Church, as that Creed is declared by the Church of England to be "thoroughly" to be believed because it is entirely Scriptural, it involves an assertion of the Virgin birth. No matter how grossly it may have been misused by this or that past age or present party, it asserts nothing, over and above the true humanity of our Lord, but His Virgin-birth. And as it cannot be doubted that the Virgin-birth is asserted in this clause, so it cannot be represented as of little importance that it should be asserted by the Church of to-day. It is idle to speak of the widespread tendency now showing itself to minimize its importance or to deny its reality, as due to reaction from the gross perversions of it which have been from time to time made. Dr. Allen knows perfectly well it is due just to chariness with respect to the supernatural. And that being so, so little is it a matter of little importance to a Christian man's faith whether he believes in the Virgin-birth or not, that his whole faith is bound up with that of which it is the symbol and sign. If the Lord be not a supernatural being, whose account cannot be found in natural causes, then the whole of historical Christianity is an imagination and a dream.

Serious as in these circumstances the minimizing of the importance of the Virgin-birth is, however, it is less serious than the note that is struck when Dr. Allen seems to suggest the divorce of religion from questions of verity, and even of morality. Fortunately there are no explicit assertions here; and the ominous suggestions which seem to meet us once and again may be merely incidental enunciations of half-truths which after all mean little or nothing. They may be all the more

misleading, however, on that very account. For instance, what are we to think when we read (p. v.), that "religion constitutes a department of life by itself, independent of science, or ethics, or philosophy"? If nothing more is meant than that ethics and religion are not the same thing any more than philosophy and religion are the same thing, this is a mere truism. What bids us pause is that the sentence seems to be introduced in order to support the declaration that "honesty in the recitation of the Creed is by no means the only question", and that the issues of religion are too "complicated" to be unraveled on the basis of "ethical theorizing". Theology may be a department of thought distinct from philosophy and ethics: but can we say that "religion" is a department of life independent of truth and morality? Of course, there is a sense in which a man may be intensely religious and yet deeply in error or even imperfectly moral. As the intelligence may be awake while the conscience is asleep, so "the religious nature" may function while the moral sense is inert: to be devout and to be righteous are distinguishable, and in this world of imperfection, perhaps not inseparable things. But why should we lose ourselves in such abstract generalities in the face of the specific problems which are before us? The real question is not whether it is possible for a man to be lopsided, but whether a lopsided man is admirable, or such a lopsided man as is here supposed is tolerable. If an unethical religion is possible, it certainly is not a religion to be embraced, trusted, elevated to or retained in the post of director and guide of life. By becoming religious we do not pass beyond the control of the ten commandments, or lapse into the philosophy of the devout negro thief who declared he "wasn't gwine let no chicken stan' twix him and his Saviour". If honesty and religion are not the same thing, this is not because honesty is too much to ask of a religious man, but because honesty is too little to make a man religious.

We have been pestered for a generation with the monstrosity of an "undogmatic religion". Are we to be pestered now with an "unethical religion"? The advance may be perfectly logical, but the progress is to the *reductio ad absurdum*. What Christ offers the world is neither an unethical nor yet an undogmatic religion; but a religion in which truth forms the foundation stone, holiness the superstructure, and devotion the capstone—in which, in a word, truth is in order to holiness and holiness the indispensable condition of seeing the Lord. In this religion it is the truth that sets us free from sin and freedom from sin that pleases God. When we say "freedom", however, we have pronounced another word, with which Dr. Allen imposes on himself. Freedom, he says, was "the one predominant motive of the Reformation". By no means. No Reformer dreamed of emancipating man from the absolute control of the Word of God, whether the inner word which spoke in his conscience, or the external word which was recorded in inspired Scriptures. The predominate motive of that branch of the Reformation of which the Church of England was one of the products, was the recovery for God and the rendering to God of

His due. It was the vision of the Lord God Almighty, Holy and True, which was its strength, and its note was passionate service of Him. Dr. Allen therefore but bears fresh witness to the truly Reformed character of the Church of England when he tells us that the chief evil it bent itself to overcome was "the worship of man, which had been substituted for the worship of God" (p. 163). For this was the fundamental characteristic of the Reformed movement to which its assertion of freedom—freedom from all man-made commandments—was ancillary. Let Dr. Allen be true, thus far at least, to his own principle: the Reformation was a religious, not an ethical movement, and its nerve lay therefore not in the assertion of Freedom, which is an ethical conception, but in its self-subjection to God, which is the core of all religion.

Dr. Allen supports the general contentions which we have ventured to traverse by the adduction of a multitude of historical details. A number of these require some correction. We shall not, however, enter into these minor matters here. We shall content ourselves with remarking upon just one, which has some bearing upon the general matters to which we have adverted. He opens his discussion by attempting to withdraw the Church of England from the fellowship of the Calvinistic churches, of which in its official creed, nevertheless, it remains to this day, one. It separates itself from them, he asserts, by rejecting "the dogmatic limitation" which they make in the reach of the redemption of Christ, making on its part in opposition to this, the emphatic assertion, which "went to the root of Augustinianism and of the Calvinism then rising into power, that humanity had been potentially redeemed in Christ." The Church Catechism, he tells us, makes the catechumen declare: "I learn to believe in God the Son, who hath redeemed me and *all mankind*." And in the Prayer of General Thanksgiving the congregation declares, "We thank Thee for the *redemption of the world*, by our Lord Jesus Christ". If Mr. Allen had understood Augustinianism better he would have been spared the artificial contrast which he here seeks to raise between it and the doctrine of the Church of England. The sentences quoted any Calvinist would heartily repeat. The best proof of it is that, possibly both of them, and certainly one of them, were the actual composition of Calvinists. If Dr. Allen had borne in mind that the Prayer of General Thanksgiving was written by Edmund Reynolds, an honored member of the Westminster Assembly (of the Calvinism of which he has no doubt), he would probably have corrected this paragraph. Nobody will accuse the Church of England or its daughter Church in America of being to-day Calvinistic in the sentiments of its clergy. No one will accuse the Book of Common Prayer of being altogether what it should be on Reformed principles. But the doctrinal formulas of the Church of England are a different matter. And despite the "benign" interpretation they have now received for some centuries, and despite the lamentable facility with which they lend themselves to "benign" interpretation, it remains true that the Thirty-Nine Articles to which every minister of the Church of England still

"assents" and which are still set forth by the American Protestant Episcopal Church "as established" by it, are a soundly Reformed formulary. The trouble with the Anglican Church of to-day is not that it has no authoritative creed, but that it no longer believes the creed to which its clergy give their "assent" at their ordination. And the trouble with the "freedom" which exists "in that church"—and which is claimed apparently for an ever wider and wider area of belief—is that it is exercised in defiance of the engagements which are entered into by its clergy as a condition of enjoying its countenance. We may scornfully declare that the obligations of the clergy are not to be interpreted as if they were "a business contract with a corporation." They certainly should not be esteemed less binding than such a business contract.

Princeton.

B. B. WARFIELD.

ENTWÜRFE ZU KATECHESSEN über Luthers kleinen Katechismus, von GEO. MEZGER, Professor am Concordia-Seminar zu St. Louis. Zweite durchgesehene Auflage, 1907. Pp. 301.

The practical purpose of this book must guide us in judging it. Lutheran pastors, teachers and parents are those for whose use it was written, and indeed those only of the Missouri Synod. So we are not surprised to find it narrow both in scope and method. The aim announced by Professor Mezger in his preface is to supply the growing demand for a guide in the use of the new synodal catechism (*Kurse Auslegung des kl. Katech. D. Martin Luthers, 1896*). "These 'outlines for catechizing' shall not in the first instance analyze and expound our Synodal Catechism,—that would scarcely serve the purpose,—but rather handle Luther's Little Catechism with our Exposition constantly in view". As a matter of fact he handles the exposition and the catechism together, with the man Luther "constantly in view" as final oracle. This is an exposition of an exposition very largely, and one is compelled to ask himself whether that Synodal Catechism can be itself a very well constructed tool, when it needs this bulky guide.

The scheme of the book necessitates a good deal of repetition, which spoils it for consecutive reading. It is cast in a colloquial form, almost as if intended to be read to the children, lesson by lesson. The way in which truths are presented, and are built upon the foundation of those already learned, is pedagogically admirable. Yet why, with so much fulness, have not the pupils' experiences, the events of common life and the truths of nature been more largely drawn upon to illumine and enliven the teachings? Surely it would have made the book more useful to the average teacher. As they stand these sketches form a good-sized compend of Lutheran theology, couched in simple terms, yet furnishing strong meat and dry eating for boys and girls of Confirmation age. As an instance of how the author's zeal for scientific method sometimes makes him blind to the nature and needs of youth we cite the opening pages devoted to the question: "What is a catechism?" Thus attention is distracted from the truth to the vehicle.

Naturally the divisions of Luther's Catechism are kept throughout,—decatalogue, creed, Lord's prayer, sacraments, confession and the office of the keys. The utterances on things peculiarly Lutheran receive peculiar emphasis, and sometimes in a polemic way that seems to us out of place in the instruction of children. All churches which teach the sacredness of our Sunday as a day set apart unto God are designated as false. In explaining the fourth commandment Luther is followed in making "the word" the sole concern. Luther's rule makes the ten commandments binding on us so far as they are in harmony with the law of nature, and even on this ground we Presbyterians will claim authority for Christian Sabbath-keeping. Yet in this connection Mezger gives us a fine practical exposition of the duties of Bible study, family religion and church attendance. The phrase, "false churches and sects" is applied again to all who do not hold the Lutheran theory of consubstantiation in the Lord's Supper. After this it is not surprising to find on p. 179 an attempt to prove that while there are true Christians in other churches they are in constant danger, and that only the Evangelical Lutheran body is the true visible church. Some of the other points where the coloring of the 17th century Lutheran dogmatics is very strong are: the communication of attributes between the two natures of Christ, and the habitual concealment of the Divine attributes during His humiliation, after the theory of Chemnitz; the making of Christ's descent into hell a part of His exaltation; the justifying of infant baptism by claiming the function of faith for infants. In this latter connection there is a curious misuse of the word *Völker*, nations, to make it mean all people, both young and old.

In two directions at least, important truths receive less emphasis than they deserve. The resurrection of Christ, with its place in the work of salvation, is disposed of in less than three pages without any special effort to arouse faith in the Christ living to-day and offering us the fellowship of His life. In discussing the petition; "Thy kingdom come," reference is made to the work of missions and the duty to carry the Gospel to the heathen, but only as the concern of preachers, or of the church at large. There is an entire failure to teach that this is the duty of every Christian, that each of us is saved to serve Christ in evangelizing and uplifting his fellowmen. Surely any course of Christian instruction that fails here has failed to teach the whole Word, and has failed to touch the thing that is best in the spirit of our age.

Missouri Lutheranism is avowedly Predestinarian, and attempts to find predestination in the Formula of Concord. In the book before us there are expressions which involve that doctrine, but also many which are inconsistent with a thoroughgoing Predestinarianism, as for instance this on universal redemption, p. 184: God "has already declared the whole world righteous through the raising of Jesus from the dead. This great treasure of forgiveness is offered for all men". On the other hand the teaching of the plenary inspiration and supreme value of Scripture is all that Reformed Christians could desire. And we are pleased to see that these new Lutheran works have borrowed some of the good things

of our Reformed catechisms; for example, the three offices of Christ, the "required and forbidden" treatment of the commandments, the coupling together of God's glory and our own good, the emphasis on pure doctrine as essential to right living. Finally, while Luther will scarcely allow the law any other use than as a mirror of sin, Mezger says little of this, perhaps too little, and makes much of the *usus didacticus*.

The reviewer wishes to express his indebtedness to these Outlines, and his belief that many a pastor in any church would find them helpful for the simple presentation and correlation of Christian truth.

Wilmington, Delaware.

E. B. WELSH.

PRACTICAL THEOLOGY.

THE PASTORAL TEACHING OF ST. PAUL. By W. EDWARD CHADWICK, D.D., Vicar of St. Giles', Northampton. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. Imported by Charles Scribner's Sons. 8vo. Cloth. Pp. 394.

The method adopted by the author is as admirable as the results are stimulating and helpful. By a careful study of the life of St. Paul as a Christian minister, those principles are deduced which should control all pastoral service. In selecting the material all mention of the Pastoral Epistles is purposely avoided, not only because their treatment would demand the space of a separate volume, but also because the process pursued is that of revealing St. Paul as an example of a true pastor, rather than as an instructor of pastors. In the very salutations of the Epistles, Paul reveals both his conception of his office and of those to whom he ministers, by the terms employed. Equally significant are the familiar terms found elsewhere in his writings, "apostle", "minister", "herald", "prophet", "preacher", "teacher", "ambassador", "steward", "soldier", "husbandman", "master-builder"; to the minister of the present day these words are shown to have a definite message. After treating Paul's address to the Ephesian elders, the writer dwells upon "love of souls" as the condition and motive for pastoral work. He suggests the wealth of instruction contained in the prayers of St. Paul; and emphasizes, in an admirable chapter on "preaching", the teaching function of the minister. The discussion closes with an application to modern conditions of Paul's references to "prophecy" and to "wisdom". The entire volume is evidently written not in the spirit of a mere theorist, but of a busy pastor who aims to encourage his brethren in the ministry to apply in their daily tasks the principles exhibited by St. Paul.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

THE BIBLE AS ENGLISH LITERATURE. By J. H. GARDINER. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. Octavo. Cloth. Pp. 402.

It may not be unfair to suggest that a more appropriate title for this

volume might have been "The *Polychrome Bible* as English Literature"; for the writer unhesitatingly accepts the alleged discoveries of certain destructive critics; and then proceeds to discuss, in the light of a "reconstructed Hebrew History", certain books which, from his description, are difficult to recognize as portions of Sacred Scripture. The result is a striking demonstration of the viciousness of that method of study which approaches the Bible with certain preconceived theories, particularly with those of which the "Polychrome Bible" appeared to be the "*reductio ad absurdum*." The writer is absolutely blinded to the literary structure and unity of the various books, and consequently to their real beauty and true significance, even as masterpieces of literature. He does, however, discover certain felicities of style, the broadness and stateliness of the narrative, the melody and naturalness of the poetry, the seriousness and spiritual elevation of the prophecy. Mention is also made of the shrewd insight and intuitive soundness of the "wisdom books", and the "mystical" reasoning of Paul. Probably the more valuable portion of the discussion is found in the closing chapters, where the history of the different versions is outlined, and where a true emphasis is laid upon the place of prominence and power held by the English Bible among the great monuments of English literature.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

EXPOSITIONS OF HOLY SCRIPTURES. By ALEXANDER MACLAREN, D. D., Litt.D. A. C. Armstrong & Son, New York City. Second Series. Cloth, 6 vols., \$7.50. Vol. I., Exodus, Leviticus and Numbers; 376 pages. Vol. II, Deuteronomy, Joshua, Judges, Ruth and I Samuel; 405 pages. Vol. III, 2 Samuel, 1 Kings, 2 Kings to chapter vii.; 399 pages. Vol. IV. St. Mark, chapters i-viii; 339 pages. Vol. V. St. Mark, chapters ix-xvi; 322 pages. Vol. VI, Acts, chapter i-xii; 398 pages.

Third Series. 6 vols. Cloth. Price \$7.50. Vol. I, The Gospel of St. John, (chaps. i-viii) pp. 382. Vol. II, The Gospel of St. John (chaps. ix-xiv) pp. 402. Vol. III, The Gospel of St. John (chaps. xv-xxi), pp. 401. Vol. IV, The Acts of the Apostles (chaps. xiii-end), pp. 385. Vol. V., The Books of Chronicles, Ezra, Nehemiah, pp. 398. Vol. VI, The Books of Esther, Job, Proverbs, and Ecclesiastes, pp. 409.

It is a great privilege to express the same cordial commendation of these twelve volumes, as was given to the first series of expositions which came to us from this "Prince of Expositors". As will be remembered, these volumes are collections of expository sermons, arranged in the biblical order of their texts. In the case of the Old Testament, the passages selected are often isolated, and no complete view of a book is afforded; but in the treatment of the New Testament, so few passages are omitted as to give almost a continuous commentary. This is particularly noticeable in the admirable volumes on John and The Acts. As the books are not sold, excepting in sets of six volumes, the

arrangement is most wise, by which, in each series, certain volumes on the Old Testament are united with certain volumes on the New. These sermons are of an excellence which is surprisingly uniform. They are models of clearness, conciseness, force and beauty. Their deep spiritual insight, luminous suggestions, evangelical fervor, and practical applications make them of great value to all readers, and of special service to ministers and other Bible teachers.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

THE CREED OF JESUS. By HENRY SLOANE COFFIN. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1907. 12mo. Pp. 280. \$1.00 net.

There is an originality about these sermons which is refreshing. Many old truths are made to appear new in them. Not that the truths themselves are changed in essence, but the angle of observation is so altered from that which is usual as to make the truths so treated take on new aspects. This method of exposition may be made most helpful. The selection of an unfamiliar text to impress a familiar truth is often fully justified, homiletically and practically. This collection of sermons well illustrates the excellencies of this method. But it also suggests in more than one instance its dangers. It would appear to us that in his search for new angles from which to view old truths the author has sometimes taken his stand at a place in the Scriptures from which the truth to be observed cannot be seen, and at other times has used the text chosen as a point of departure rather than a point of observation. In a word these are, in the main, topical and not textual sermons. The topics chosen are often treated in a fascinating manner, but it is sometimes a portion of Scripture other than that which is placed at the head of the sermon that justifies the use of the topic.

Princeton

LEWIS SEYMOUR MUDGE.

GIVING A MAN ANOTHER CHANCE. By WILTON MERLE-SMITH. New York: 1908. Fleming H. Revell Company. Pp. 222. \$1.00 net.

Those who have heard Dr. Merle-Smith preach will recognize in this collection of his sermons those qualities which have made his ministrations so acceptable in his own pulpit, that of the Central Presbyterian Church of New York City, at Northfield and among the young men and women of many of our institutions of higher learning. The first sermon, that entitled "Giving a Man Another Chance", strikes the key-note of the collection. It is optimism in its highest and best sense, which pervades these pages. Not that man-made optimism which materialistic evolution evolves, but that divinely authorized optimism which the gospel message proclaims. That optimism which says to men, through Jesus Christ, you may redeem a misspent past, you may exercise a

beneficent influence, you may perform most noble service, you may triumph over appalling obstacles, you may give to the world a splendid example of what faith in Christ and hope through Christ and love for Christ will do for even the greatest of sinners. These are the great thoughts which permeate these sermons, and which they drive home with power. Therefore, they are in the best sense helpful sermons. And no greater praise than this can be bestowed.

Princeton

LEWIS SEYMOUR MUDGE.

MORNINGS IN THE COLLEGE CHAPEL. Second Series. By FRANCIS GREENWOOD PEABODY. Boston and New York: Houghton, Mifflin & Co. 1907. Pp. 233. \$1.25 net.

After twenty years' service as College Pastor at Harvard University, Professor Peabody has retired and committed the duties of that office to other hands. This little volume is in the nature of a valedictory, and is made up, most appropriately, of selected addresses delivered from time to time in the College Chapel. These addresses reveal, in part, the secret of Professor Peabody's marked success as a preacher to and pastor of young men. They make religion a manly thing. They emphasize its virility. They evidence its value as a factor in true success. They exalt Jesus Christ as the manliest of men, and urge growth into His likeness and conformity to His ideals. Therefore, although prepared for young men, they are suited to the needs of all men, and will be found helpful by all who desire ever and anon to read short, simple, strengthening sermons.

Princeton.

LEWIS SEYMOUR MUDGE.

MODERN POETS AND CHRISTIAN TEACHING. New York: Eaton & Mains; Cincinnati: Jennings & Graham. 6 vols. 12mo., as follows: TENNYSON. By WILLIAM EMORY SMYSER. Pp. 207.—ROBERT BROWNING. By FRANK C. LOCKWOOD. Pp. 146.—MATTHEW ARNOLD. By JAMES MAIN DIXON. Pp. 165.—LOWELL. By WILLIAM A. QUAYLE. Pp. 155.—SIDNEY LANIER. By HENRY NELSON SNYDER. Pp. 132.—RICHARD WATSON GILDER: EDWIN MARKHAM: EDWARD ROWLAND SILL. By DAVID G. DOWNEY. Pp. 183.

In this series of volumes the Methodist Book Concern gives us interesting studies of several of the English and American poets of the generation just past (only two of those treated are still living), with some special stress—more or less—laid on the bearing of their ideas on Christian life and teaching. Each author deals with his special subject in his own way, and there is naturally some inequality in the treatment. But all are useful and instructive books. The several sketches

are accompanied with portraits. The material included in some of the volumes (not all) is made more accessible by good indices.

Princeton.

B. B. WARFIELD.

THE ANALYZED BIBLE. Introduction to the Old and New Testaments. Vol. I, Genesis to Esther. Vol. II, Job to Malachi. Vol. III, Matthew to Revelation. By the Reverend G. CAMPBELL MORGAN, D.D. New York: Fleming H. Revell Company. 12mo. Cloth. Pp. 220, 285, 340. Price, each, \$1.00 net.

When this proposed series of analytical Bible studies is complete, it will comprise, in all, some thirty volumes. These three introductory volumes, however, form in themselves a complete unit, and contain a general "telescopic view of the Scriptures." Each separate book is treated in broad outline, and its scope and structure clearly set forth. The analyses are preceded by charts which vividly portray the contents and divisions of the books. While the treatment is necessarily brief, the method is admirable, and the results will prove illuminating and stimulating to all classes of Bible readers.

Princeton.

CHAS. R. ERDMAN.

HYMNS AND POETRY OF THE EASTERN CHURCH. By BERNHARD PICK. New York: Eaton & Mains. 12mo. Cloth. Pp. 175. Price \$1.00 net.

This little volume "fills a gap in the literature of hymnology." It reminds us of the distant sources of some of our most cherished hymns, and presents to us other sacred poems of rare beauty. Among the authors specially treated are Clement of Alexandria, Gregory of Nazianzen, Synesius, Ephraem the Syrian, Anatolius, John of Damascus, Cosmos of Jerusalem, Theodore of Studium, and Methodius.

Princeton.

CHAS. R. ERDMAN.

GOD AND MUSIC. By JOHN HARRINGTON EDWARDS. The Baker and Taylor Company, New York. 1907. Revised edition. 12mo. Pp. 318.

The theme of this graceful volume is not new, but it is handled with rare freshness and power. The book turns on the question: Does God reveal Himself in ways recognizable by human minds and hearts; and, especially has music evidential value? In dealing with this proposition, Mr. Edwards takes a wide range and hardly holds himself within the limits of his theme. There are fifteen chapters, each a separate essay, all admirable but not all germane. The most interesting and suggestive

are Chapters II and XIII-XV. In these the author discusses, more or less luminously, the nature of music and its relation as an art to religious experience, the future life and the Being of God. The discussion of "Musico-Therapy" is ingenious and so far convincing that the reader must admit that music has somehow a healing efficacy in certain neurotic types of disease. The interesting chapter, that vindicates the author's position that "the history of religion and the history of music are inseparable" is quite enough in itself to justify the sending forth of the book. The fact is established that the noblest music in theme and motif is always essentially religious, and the masters in composition and expression have been men of deepest religious instinct and sensibility. For example, Mozart longed "that he might breathe his last on Good Friday, in hopes of meeting his good God, his sweet Lord and Savior on the day of His resurrection."

The writer has given us a valuable book. He shows a genius for his subject and a mastery of its principles. The array of quotations and illustrations grows almost tedious at times, but is sufficiently relevant and comprehensive to make the book a scholarly authority. The style is lucid, fervent, and the purpose deeply devout. "That the Supreme Being is perfect in goodness, truth and beauty, and that He has formed man to perceive and richly enjoy the divine self-revelation in either form"—this sums up the motive.

Interest is added to the volume, in that it is dedicated to "Henry van Dyke, D.D., LL.D., a master workman in many fields, and in all for the Master."

Princeton.

SYLVESTER W. BEACH.

SERMONS WHICH HAVE WON SOULS. By Rev. Louis Albert Banks, D. D. New York. Funk and Wagnalls Company. 12 mo. Cloth. Pp. 486. Price, \$1.40.

The popular sermons of Dr. Banks are not usually classed as models of homiletic art, nor are they criticised for theological profundity, nor too great exegetical exactness; but they do exhibit a remarkable fertility and resourcefulness in illustration, they pulsate with real life, and best of all seem to be used in the salvation of souls. This volume opens with a chapter on "The Pastor as a Personal Soul-Winner," and contains some twenty-eight sermons which fairly represent Dr. Bank's sermonic method and style.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

THE CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY OF LIFE. By the Reverend SAMUEL PENNIMAN LEEDS. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin & Co. 1908. Cloth. 16mo., pp. 302. Price \$1.25 net.

Dr. Leeds attained the unique distinction of serving forty years as pastor of a college church; and these sermons are selected from the

large number delivered to the students of Dartmouth College. They are direct and practical in their aim, and treat mainly of moral and ethical themes. They are, however, not a mere miscellany, but have been chosen and arranged so as to form or suggest a Christian philosophy of life.

Princeton.

CHAS. R. ERDMAN.

A NEW APPRAISAL OF CHRISTIAN SCIENCE. By the Reverend JOSEPH DUNN BURRELL, D.D., Pastor of Classon Avenue Presbyterian Church, Brooklyn. New York City: Funk & Wagnalls Co. 16mo. Cloth. Pp. 64. Price 50 cents net.

This admirable little volume contains a dispassionate, calm, clear, review and exposure of the pretensions, contradictions, fallacies, perils and puerilities of this popular and pernicious delusion.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

PRESBYTERIAN BROTHERHOOD. Report of the First Convention held at Indianapolis, November Thirteen to Fifteenth, Nineteen-six. Philadelphia, The Presbyterian Board of Publication. 1907. Pp. 287. Price, 25 cents.

PRESBYTERIAN BROTHERHOOD. Report of the Second Convention held at Cincinnati, November Twelfth to Fourteenth, Nineteen-seven. Philadelphia. The Presbyterian Board of Publication. 1908. Pp. 371. Price 35 cents.

Next best to have been at these conventions is to read the verbal reports of the addresses made there and printed in these little volumes. The keynote of the first is perhaps to be found in the words of Mr. Charles H. Holt; "this conventions may mark a turning point, to which many generations shall look back with gratitude, as the beginning of a mighty movement of the whole church up to the ideal and standard of her Master." Throughout all the addresses there runs the same prophetic optimistic note. At the beginning of the volume there is a succinct statement of the steps that led to the formation of the Presbyterian Brotherhood, and some valuable information concerning the different kinds of men's societies within the church, the work they are attempting to do and the causes of success or failure. An appendix gives among other things a sample constitution for the convenience of those contemplating the formation of such a society, and an analysis of the attending members showing the very large preponderance of laymen.

The same joyous optimism characterizes the report of the second convention. It is what the Annual Report of the Council given at the back of the volume says it should be "a center of enthusiasm and a

clearing house of practical experience and suggestion." To single out any one speaker would be invidious, but the writer was particularly interested by the practical suggestions made in and called forth by the Rev. Dr. Biggers address, and the discussion on the Practical Ministers of the Brotherhood where some idea of the accomplished results may be found. Any one interested in the spirit and motive power back of the many men's organization in the Presbyterian Church cannot do better than read these little volumes carefully, for if we are not mistaken they give a true picture of the remarkable movement now going on within the Church. The report of the second Convention contains the constitution of the Brotherhood. At the end of the volume an analysis of the attendance is given showing that over sixty occupations were represented, and only about one fifth of the total were ministers.

Princeton.

KERR D. MACMILLAN.

INDIVIDUAL EVANGELISM. By the Rev. CHARLES FISK BEACH, M.A. Philadelphia: Allen, Lane & Scott, Publishers. 12mo., cloth, pp. 239. Price \$1.00 net.

The real purpose and message of this stimulating little volume is suggested by the full title, which reads as follows: "Individual Evangelism. Christian Witnessing and Work; The Call of Christ to the Laity." While the same note is sounded in such books as *Individual Work for Individuals*, the writer is probably justified in his statement that "this is the first attempt, at least in this country, to compass, in a brief space, the entire subject of lay evangelism". The last term is not employed here to define the work accomplished by men specially ordained or licensed as "local" or "temporary" "evangelists", but of the activity of all Christians, men and women, who are unordained, save by the appointment of the Holy Spirit, but who are endeavoring to bring others to a definite acceptance of Christ as Lord and Master. The author shows that this definite work is incumbent upon every follower of Christ. It consists not merely in the witness of a consistent life, but in private conversations, in special correspondence, in public speaking when opportunity offers or can be found. After clearly defining the work, the writer sets forth its methods, its requirements, its incentives and its rewards. The discussion is scriptural, and it is timely. As the writer contends, "If the world is to be brought under the influence of the Gospel at any period of the near future, to a great extent the work must be done by the laity". This book should be placed in the hands of parents, of Sabbath-school teachers, of church officers, and its message should be emphasized in all our pulpits.

Princeton.

CHAS. R. ERDMAN.

THE MASTER OF THE HEART. By ROBERT E. SPEER. New York: Fleming H. Revell Company. 12mo., cloth, pp. 241. Price \$1.00 net.

The strong, sane, masterful spirit which characterizes all the work of

Mr. Speer breathes through every sentence of these stirring addresses. They were prepared originally to be delivered at the summer conferences of young men and women at Northfield, but in their present form are certain to be of helpfulness to much larger circles. As the title may suggest, the earnest purpose of each address is to secure a more perfect submission of the heart and life to Christ as Master and Lord. While various lines of thought are followed, and a number of themes proposed, the unity of aim has given to these separate addresses a certain vital connection by which they are logically grouped in one volume, and arranged in a more or less definite sequence. The first discussion is of the lordship of Christ as suggested by the various words for "Master" used by the Evangelists. The second treats of the right attitude toward Christ under the title of "The Believing Heart". The contrasting "doubt" is next considered; and the "The Heart's Repose" to the call: "follow me." Other closely related addresses are entitled "The Unity of Hearts in Christ", "The Master, the Maker of Strong Hearts", "The Burning Heart", "The Master, the Satisfaction of the Heart". The chapters on "The Inner Circle", "Looking Away to Jesus", and "The Uniqueness of Our Lord and Master Jesus Christ", are likewise characterized by a note of reality and earnestness which compels attention. The reading of the book cannot fail to secure the hope of the author that it may be used "in some life, to make a larger place for our Lord and Master, Jesus Christ".

Princeton,

CHAS. R. ERDMAN.

GENERAL LITERATURE.

DOCUMENTE FRÜHEN DEUTSCHEN LEBENS, ERSTE REIHE. DAS DEUTSCHE LIED, GEISTLICH UND WELTLICH, BIS ZUM 18TEN JAHRHUNDERT. Katalog III. Von MARTIN BRESLAUER in Berlin. Unter den Linden 16. 1908. Preis 8 Mark. Pp. i-xi, 277-582.

The firm of Martin Breslauer in Berlin has sent to the REVIEW this catalogue of works which it has for sale, and has asked that it be noted in our pages. This we can do quite gladly, for although a catalogue the volume before us is so far different from the ordinary dealers' catalogues, that it may be said to be a contribution to the literature on early German songs and music. The collection of the late Karl Biltz, whose portrait is the frontispiece, and a brief sketch of whose life is given in the preface, forms the nucleus of the works here offered for sale. The catalogue contains a list of 556 works, which are arranged in three divisions. The first of these, containing 75 numbers, comprises works of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, dealing with the question which agitated Europe so greatly at the time of the Reformation, viz.: the sing-

ing of songs, hymns and Psalms. The introduction of singing into the churches, and the nature of the songs that might be sung. The second division, containing 396 numbers, is devoted to songs and hymns, whether published separately as tracts, as was frequently done in the sixteenth century, or in collections. Of these a considerable number are secular, but the great majority spiritual. Among the latter are to be found the hymnbooks not only of the Lutheran church, but also of the Bohemian Brethren, the Anabaptists, the Mennonites, and other sects; and, of course, several early editions of the Psalms in metre. The third division is devoted to the Murner-Stiefel controversy, and to works in poetry have been added some in prose on the same subject.

It is at once evident what a rare and valuable collection is here offered for sale; and its value is enhanced by the fact that Herr Biltz was fond of handsome and well preserved books. To each title Herr Breslauer has added a short scholarly note on the character of the book, its position in history, and very frequently an illuminating quotation from the book itself. The catalogue is still further enriched by frequent woodcuts, being title-pages, illustrations, and tunes from the advertised works. At the end of the volume is appended an index to the first lines of the songs, of which there are about four hundred; another to the tunes, of which there are over one hundred and twenty; and another of names and subjects. A fourth appendix gives a bibliography of the works used in the preparation of the catalogues.

Princeton.

KERR D. MACMILLAN.

MYTHS OF THE RED CHILDREN RETOLD. By GILBERT L. WILSON, A.M.
Illustrated by Frederick N. Wilson. 8vo.; pp. viii, 154. Ginn & Company: Boston; New York; Chicago; London.

The title of this beautiful little book indicates sufficiently its theme, but gives no idea of its excellence. We do not see how either writer or illustrator could have done his work better. The myths themselves are singularly interesting, and they are told in language of rare simplicity and grace. The narrator seems so to have caught the spirit of each myth that his style accords with it. An admirable feature of the illustrations is that in every case they throw light on some custom of the Indians. Directions are also given in a "Children's Supplement" for making many of the implements of the Red Men; and judicious "Explanatory Notes" further illuminate the stories. We know not which to congratulate the more, the children who are to enjoy this booklet or those who have prepared it; and with regard to the latter, we are at a loss whether they should be commended the more for this uniquely excellent children's book or for the historical and literary gem, which, after all, it is.

Princeton.

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

PERIODICAL LITERATURE.

AMERICAN JOURNAL OF THEOLOGY. Chicago. October. Does the Fourth Gospel Depend upon Pagan Traditions? Professor Lic. Carl Clemen, Ph.D. Can Christianity Ally Itself with Monistic Ethics? Professor Frank Thilly, Ph.D. The Relation between the Resurrection of Jesus and the Belief in Immortality. Professor W. W. Fenn, D.D.; President W. Douglas Mackenzie, D.D. Were the Spiritual Franciscan Montanists Heretics? David Saville Mussey, Ph.D. The Christian Experience of the Trinity. Rev. G. A. Barrow, Ph.D.

BIBLIOTHECA SACRA. Oberlin. October. The Alleged Callapse of New England Theology. The Editor. The Plagues of Egypt. (II) Edward M. Merrins. The Real Date of the Gospels. Parke P. Flournoy. A Remarkable Claim on Behalf of the Radical Criticism. William M. McPheeters. Circumcision among the Samaritans. Jacob, son of Aaron. Essays in Pentateuchal Criticism. (II) Harold M. Wiener.

CHURCH QUARTERLY REVIEW. London. October. The Lambeth Conference. Eucharistic Doctrine and the Canon of the Roman Mass. Rev. Darwell Stone. The Increase of the Episcopate in its Latest Developments. The Higher Education of Women. Miss Wordsworth. The Doctrine of Divine Immanence in New Testament Theology. The Archbishopric of Cyprus. Irregular Marriages and the Earliest Discipline of the Church. C. H. Turner.

EXPOSITOR. London. December. Relation of the Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs to the Books of the New Testament. Rev. Alfred Plummer, D.D. Man's Forgiveness of his Neighbor. Rev. Professor R. H. Charles, D.D. Land of Edom. Rev. Professor G. A. Smith, D.D. Dr. G. A. Smith on Jerusalem. Rev. Professor D. S. Margoliuth, Litt.D. Professor Mayor and the Helvidian Hypothesis. "X." Functions of the Forerunner and the Storming of the Kingdom. Rev. Professor H. A. A. Kennedy, D.D. *Analecta*, 2. A Laodicean Bishop. 3. The Time of the Transfiguration. Professor Sir W. M. Ramsay, D.D.

HIBBERT JOURNAL. Boston and London. October. A Chinese Statesman's View of Religion. Charles Johnson. Moslem Tradition of Jesus's Second Visit on Earth. Captain F. W. von Herbert. A Great Social Experiment. Rev. Charles Plater, S.J. Hegel and His Method. Professor William James. F. C. S. Schiller. Neglected Argument for the Reality of God. C. S. Pierce. Determinism and Morals. Hon. Bertrand Russell. Pain. Miss Caroline Stephens. The "Jerahmeel Theory." Rev. T. K. Cheyne, D.Litt. How May Christianity be Defended To-day? Professor A. C. McGiffert.

Bookless Religions. James Moffatt, D.D. Evangelical Bargaining. John Page Hopps.

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS. Boston. October. *Morals of an Immoralist*—Friedrich Nietzsche. Alfred W. Benn. Savonarola. Thomas Davidson. *Modern Conception of Justice*. Miss F. Melian Stawell. *Dramatic and Ethical Interpretations of Experience*. Professor J. B. Baillie. *Ethics and Law*. Professor Charles W. Super. *New Type of Naturalism*—Montgomery. William Mackintire Salter.

IRISH THEOLOGICAL QUARTERLY. Dublin and New York. October. *Pan-Anglicism*. Rev. W. MacDonald, D.D. *Temple of Onias at Leontopolis*. Rev. Hugh Pope, O.P. *St. Anselm's Definition of Original Sin*. Rev. P. J. Toner, D.D. *History of the Vatican Council (Granderath)*. Rev. J. MacCaffrey, D.Ph. *Historical Character of the Fourth Gospel*. Rev. J. MacRory, D.D. *Clandestinity and Mixed Marriages in Ireland*. Rev. J. M. Harty, D.D.

JOURNAL OF THEOLOGICAL STUDIES. London. October. Dr. Hort on the Apocalypse. Very Rev. J. Armitage Robinson, D.D. *Historical Introduction to the Textual Criticism of New Testament*. I. Growth of the Idea of a Canon of the New Testament. C. H. Turner. *Documents*. Origen on I Corinthians. IV. Rev. Claude Jenkins: A Bohairic Fragment of the 'Martyrdom of St. Luke.' S. Gaselee. *The Leonian Sacramentary; an Analytical Study*. II. Martin Rule.

LONDON QUARTERLY REVIEW. London. October. *God and Man in Human History*. W. T. Davison, D.D. *Letters of Martin Luther*. Principal H. B. Workman, D.Lit. *Christ in Us and for Us*. A. E. Garvie, D.D. *Spirit of Edward Greig*. Frederick Lawrence. *Faith and History*. Dugald MacFadyen, M.A. *Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs*. W. F. Slater, M.A. *Christian Platonism and Modern Theology*. Wilbert F. Howard, B.D. *Edmondo de Amicis*. Anne E. Keeling. *Does Spiritual Insight Keep Pace with Material Knowledge?* E. J. Brailsford.

LUTHERAN CHURCH REVIEW. Philadelphia. October. J. Sebastian Bach on Church Music. Professor A. Spaeth, D.D. *Milton on Music*. Professor Sigmund Spaeth, D.D. *Instrumental Music in the Church*. F. F. Buermeyer, D.D. *Secular Influences on Church Music*. William Benbow. *New History of Christianity*. C. M. Jacobs. *High Tide of Physical Conscience*. Dr. Luther Gulick. *Council of Constance and the Burning of Hus*. E. F. Keever.

LUTHERAN QUARTERLY. Gettysburg. October. *Christ and Socrates*. M. Coover, D.D. *Has Darwinism Played Out?* Rev. A. Spieckermann. *Duty of the Church College to the Public Schools*. Professor H. W. Focht, A.M. *Proof of the Absolute Religion*. Translated by F. V. N. Painter, D.D. *Luther and the Decalogue*. Rev. Wm. Weber, Ph.D. *Modern Theological Thought in Germany*. Professor George H. Schodde, Ph.D. *Infant Salvation*. Samuel Schwarm, D.D. *Superior Advantages of Catechisation*. Rev. M. M. Allbeck. *Place of the Altar in Lutheran Worship, and its Position*

in the Church Building. Pastor Kossink. Church Union in Germany. Professor Albert Hauck, D.D.

METHODIST REVIEW. New York. November-December. Cradle of the Human Race. William F. Warren, D.D. Life and Light of Men. Albert J. Lyman, D.D. Dr. Otto Pfeleiderer. President Samuel Plantz, D.D. Scientific View of God. Rev. Ralph T. Flewelling, Ph.D. Supremacy of Spiritual Aspiration. Rev. S. R. Reno. New Psychology and Personality. Professor E. C. Wilm, Ph.D.

METHODIST REVIEW QUARTERLY. Nashville. October. Gospel or Gospels. Thomas Carter. Methodist Church and Slavery. Bishop Soule. Duties of the Christian Citizen. G. W. Dyer. Neglected Element in Christian Work. W. D. Weatherford. James Martineau. The Unitarian Mystic. Emma G. Wilbur. Japan Methodism: an Interior View. H. M. Hamill.

PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW. Lancaster and London. November. On the meaning of Truth. Professor Charles M. Bakewell. Nature and Criterion of Truth. Professor J. E. Creighton. Self-Realization and the Criterion of Goodness. Professor Henry W. Wright. The Hegelian Conception of Absolute Knowledge. Dr. G. W. Cunningham.

REFORMED CHURCH REVIEW. Lancaster. October. Education and Pessimism. Rev. J. Spangler Kieffer, D.D. Christianity and the Family. J. Max Hark, D.D. Early Catechisms of the Reformed Church in the United States. Professor William J. Hinke, Ph.D. Heidelberg Catechism for Catechization. Rev. Henry H. Ranck. Contemporary Sociology. Professor A. V. Heister. What and How to Preach. Rev. Charles E. Creitz.

REVIEW AND EXPOSITOR. Louisville. October. Pragmatism, Humanism and Personalism—The New Philosophic Movement. President E. Y. Mullins, D.D. Virgin Birth of Our Lord. Rev. Henry M. King, D.D. Paul's Use of the Term "Man". Rev. O. P. Eaches, D. D. Three Prophetic Days. Rev. O. L. Hailey, D.D. Did Our Lord Use the Lord's Prayer? Rev. J. Hunt Cooke, D.D.

THEOLOGICAL QUARTERLY. St. Louis. October. Analogy of Faith and Rom. 12:6. Balaam. Proof Texts of the Catechism with a Practical Commentary.

UNION SEMINARY MAGAZINE. Richmond. October-November. Ministry of Reconciliation; or Bringing Lost Men to God. Theron H. Rice. Address at the Opening of the Ninety-Seventh Session. T. C. Johnson. Presbyterianism and the Love of Truth. P. D. Stephenson. The New Theology. Harris E. Kirk. Eternity, the Proper Standard of Measurement. J. Gray McAllister. Importance of the Church's Recognizing Her Dependence upon God for Her Ministers. W. M. McPheeters. Moral Dignity of Baptism. S. D. Hall.

THE UNITED BRETHREN REVIEW. Dayton. September-October. Pastor as a Personal Soul-Winner. Rev. Louis Albert Banks, D.D. Marching Orders of the Church—An Interpretation. Rev. R. J. Head. Epistle to the Galatians. Rev. W. D. Good. The Social Will. Ex-President Charles W. Super, D.D. Self-Consciousness of Christ.

Rev. J. H. Snyder, D.D. Ministry of Healing. Rev. E. J. Arthur. Church and Labor. Rev. A. W. Lewis, D. D. Ministry of To-day. Rev. George A. Gordon, D.D.

REVUE DE THEOLOGIE ET DES QUESTIONS RELIGIEUSES. Montauban. Septembre. Comment le problème de l'Eglise se pose-t-il pour nous à l'heure présente? Jean Friedel. Observation Psychologique: une erreur d'interprétation. L. Kreyts. La Philosophie religieuse de Renouvier. J.-E. Neel. Les attributs de Dieu. André Arnal. L'Eglise chrétienne au temps d'Ignace d'Antioche. Ch. Bruston.

REVUE D'HISTOIRE ECCLESISTIQUE. Lourain. Octobre. Les mss. du dialogue avec Thyphon. G. Archambault. La christologie de Timothée Aelure, archevêque monophysite d'Alexandrie, d'après les sources syriaques inédites. J. Lebon. La question franciscaine. Le manuscrit II. 2326 de la Bibliothèque royale de Belgique (suite, à suivre). A. Fierens. Un traité inconnu sur le Grand Schisme dans la Bibliothèque des ducs de Bourgogne. A. Bayot. Négociations politico-religieuses entre l'Angleterre et les Pays-Bas catholiques (1598-1625). Intervention des souverains anglais en faveur du protestantisme aux Pays-Bas (suite et fin). L. Willaert, S.J.

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VOLUME VII

APRIL, 1909

NUMBER 2

The Princeton Theological Review

CONTENTS

The Reformation and Natural Law	177
A. LANG	
Calvin's Doctrine of the Knowledge of God	219
B. B. WARFIELD	
Reviews of Recent Literature	326

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LIST OF BOOKS REVIEWED

Auchincloss, <i>Bible Chronology from Abraham to the Christian Era</i>	336
Auchincloss, <i>To Canaan in One Year</i>	336
Auchincloss, <i>How to Read Josephus</i>	336
Auchincloss, <i>Christian Era</i>	336
Clark, <i>The Christian Method of Ethics</i>	362
Cremer, <i>Rechtfertigung und Wiedergeburt</i>	358
Currie, <i>The Letters of Martin Luther</i>	352
Fitchett, <i>The Beliefs of Unbelief</i>	335
Gilbert, <i>Interpretation of the Bible</i>	348
Hastings, <i>Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics</i>	326
Horton, <i>My Belief</i>	334
Hulley, <i>Studies in the Book of Psalms</i>	340
Jevons, <i>An Introduction to the Study of Comparative Religion</i>	333
Kent, <i>The Historical Bible</i>	340
Mullins, <i>The Axioms of Religion</i>	366
Nicol, <i>The Four Gospels in the Earliest Church History</i>	351
Richardson, <i>An Alphabetical Subject Index and Index Encyclopaedia to Periodical Articles on Religion, 1890-1899</i>	368
Richter, <i>Die Epistel Pauli an die Römer</i>	351
Schlatter, <i>Der Zweifel an der Messianität Jesu</i>	343
Smith, <i>Jerusalem, the Topography, Economics and History from the Earliest Time to A. D. 70</i>	339
Strong, <i>Outlines of Systematic Theology</i>	361
Wiener, <i>Notes on Hebrew Religion</i>	343
Wolf, <i>Ursprung und Verwendung des religiösen Erfahrungsbe- griffes in der Theologie des 19 Jahrhunderts</i>	361

THE PRINCETON THEOLOGICAL REVIEW

VOLUME VII

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NUMBER 2

THE REFORMATION AND NATURAL LAW.*

The world of to-day is filled with the conflict about the modern understanding of the Gospel. The decision in this conflict cannot be reached merely through Biblical studies and the investigation of primitive Christianity; there is need also of a thorough acquaintance with the development of the evangelical Church and of the evangelical spirit, as well as with their influence upon the formation of the modern world. In this respect, however, evangelical theology must be pronounced positively backward. The Protestant scholar, who is at home in Babylonia and Assyria, in primitive Christianity, and in the first three centuries, is in Germany no less than in England and America often without a moderately adequate survey of the general development of his own Church. How fragmentary is the exposition in the general Church histories, how narrow and one-sided in the histories of doctrine. How many fields have still received very little cultivation, for example, non-German Protestantism, the great movement of the "Enlightenment" and of Rationalism, Christian life, Protestantism and culture, and the like. In view of this defect, Ernst Tröltsch deserves gratitude on account of the very fact that he has even undertaken such a work as the comparatively full presentation of "Protestant Christianity and the Modern Church", which he

* Translated by J. Gresham Machen, B.D. The article will appear in German in the *Beiträge zur Förderung christlicher Theologie*, edited by Schlatter and Lütgert.

offers in the *Kultur der Gegenwart*.¹ His merit becomes greater on account of the fertility of his thought, and especially on account of the real breadth of vision, that has led him not to confine himself one-sidedly to German evangelical Christianity, but rather to attempt also an appreciation especially of Calvin and Calvinism, as well as of the smaller religious parties. Against such merits, it is true, must be set the entirely mistaken fundamental thesis of Tröltzsch that Luther and the entire Reformation belong to the Middle Ages. This assertion is rightly contradicted by men of the most various opinions—I name only Böhmer, Loofs, Kattenbusch, Hunzinger.²

Little, however, has yet been accomplished towards the refutation of that proposition, which can be regarded only as a catchword, similar to the various clever half-truths that appear in Tröltzsch's style. Students of recent history have long been agreed that the close of the seventeenth century, the conclusion of the religious wars, marks the beginning of a new epoch in Church history, the character of which, as Loofs³ judiciously puts it, "stands in no less sharp contrast with the previous period of the Reformation and Counter-Reformation, than that former period with the Middle Ages, and the Middle Ages with the period of the ancient Church". The peculiarity of the new period is, expressed in one word, what is called, sometimes with pride, sometimes with contempt, "modernism", or "the modern spirit". But if the division is a real one, there arises the question, embarrassing to every evangelical Christian, How is the modern spirit, which, since the seventeenth century, in spite of the check that it received in the nineteenth, has been unfolding itself

¹ Teil I, Abt. iv, 1. Hälfte, 1906, pp. 253-458; *Protestantisches Christentum und Kirche in der Neuzeit*.

² Böhmer, *Luther im Lichte der neueren Forschung*, Leipzig, 1906; Loofs, "Luthers Stellung zum Mittelalter und der Neuzeit", *Deutsch-evangelische Blätter*, 1907, Augustheft; Kattenbusch in *Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche*, 1907, Heft 1, and *Theologische Rundschau*, 1907, Heft 2; Hunzinger, *Der Glaube Luthers und das religionsgeschichtliche Christentum*, Leipzig, 1907.

³ *Grundlinien der Kirchengeschichte*, p. 203.

with ever-increasing vigor, related to the Gospel of the Reformation? How could the age of the Reformation with its conflicts of faith be followed so suddenly by an age whose views about historical criticism and natural science, about politics and social life, are in part directly opposed to the Reformation conception of the world? What forces of the Gospel had a part in the development of the new way of thinking? What other, unevangelical, tendencies intruded themselves, and therefore, because they arose, for example, in Catholicism (and hence in false belief), or in an unbelieving and therefore pernicious development of civilization, must be combatted and eliminated? Or perhaps the Gospel of the Reformation is no longer judge over modern progress? Perhaps it is rather the latter that shall decide how much of the former is still tenable and fit for use?

To these questions, which, although they concern the systematic theologian as much as the historian, are primarily historical questions, I desire to make a slight contribution by examining the relation between the Reformation and Natural Law. For there can be no doubt that "natural law"—primarily a school of jurisprudence, usually regarded as beginning with Hugo Grotius and not till the nineteenth century replaced by the historical school—was one of the principal historical factors in the formation of the modern spirit, a factor whose after-effects are still perceptible in the most diverse spheres. For not only have the laws of the evangelical Church itself been influenced thereby, both in the collegial law of the eighteenth century and also, though not so strongly, in the modern presbyterial-synodical constitutions; but especially all the political reversals up to the French Revolution are most intimately connected with the natural-law theories. Rousseau's *Contrat social* is the last great manifest of natural law. This itself is sufficient to show that natural law was more than a mere political and legal system; it became also the starting-point for "natural theology", the broad religious basis of the religion of the "Enlightenment".

How could this natural law spring up on the ground of the Reformation, take such deep root and put forth such wide-spreading branches? Of course, it is far from my intention to include in the investigation the whole complicated phenomenon of natural law,⁴ especially on its juristic and purely political side. My endeavor is only to study the beginnings of natural law on Protestant ground (which in many ways were interwoven with theological points of view), and even in this, I am not attempting anything like completeness, but desire merely, by means of certain chief representatives, to show from the origin of the natural law of the "Enlightenment", how far that movement was influenced whether positively or negatively by the ideas and motives of the Reformation.

I

First of all, there can be no doubt that natural law received at one point in the Reformation theology itself, if not a formal treatment, at least an organic insertion into the general body of its dogmatico-ethical system, namely, in Melancthon. So early as in the first edition of his *Loci*,⁵ that echo of the Gospel of Luther, he mentions the most

⁴ How extraordinarily numerous the forms are in which the theories of natural law have developed may be seen from the work of the acute professor of law at Bonn, Karl Bergbohm, *Jurisprudenz und Rechtsphilosophie*, Vol. i, *Das Naturrecht der Gegenwart*, Leipzig, 1892. Bergbohm has undertaken to study the complicated appearances, forms and operations of natural law in past and present, and with the searching broom of criticism to sweep them away from the science of jurisprudence. An example of the most extreme inconstancy in the use of the term, natural law, is afforded by the book of the philosopher, A. Trendelenburg, *Naturrecht auf dem Grunde der Ethik*, Leipzig, 1868, a work which examines by a purely philosophical method the nature of law, that is, the ethical foundation of legal enactment, both according to the principle of law and according to the legal relations derived therefrom. In spite of the fluctuating element in the conception of natural law, it remains, nevertheless, for the historian, a definite historical quantity, and of course this alone is in view in the following discussion.

⁵ *Melanthonis Opera*, in *Corpus Reformatorum*, xxi, cc. 116ff.

usual forms (*communissimas formas*) of the *lex naturae* or of the *ius naturale*, as the theologians and jurists were accustomed to set them forth. These he finds in three principal divisions of natural law—concerning the worship of God, concerning the formation of the state and the inviolability of the individual persons guaranteed in the state, and concerning property—and to these he appends a brief notice about the *ius gentium* with its regulations concerning marriage, business, trade and the like. Biblical attestation of the *lex naturae* with its innate moral principles is according to Melanchthon contained in the apostolic dictum, Rom. ii. 15. Nevertheless, he is unwilling at first to concede to natural law any influence upon his system, for, now that human reason has been darkened by the Fall, though the moral faculty of man survives, yet it would be a great mistake to suppose that the material content of the innate moral law can be disengaged from the corruptions that have intruded themselves.⁶ So in 1521; but the disposition of the Reformer becomes much more favorable in the editions of the *Loci* subsequent to 1535, after he had turned aside towards synergism. While he recognizes no relation between the *naturalis notitia* and the Gospel, both on account of the character of the Gospel as *mysterium* and on account of the grace that is contained in it, he now sets up the equation: *legem divinam notitias esse nobiscum nascentes sicut aliarum artium principia et demonstrationes*.⁷ *Una est lex et natura nota omnibus gentibus et aetatibus*.⁸ It is true that emphasis is still placed upon the fact that natural law, especially with regard to the first table, is much obscured, and above all lacks the power for the execution of its commands; yet there is no principial but merely an accidental opposition between the revealed and the natural law. The Decalogue has rather merely the function of elucidating

⁶ *Ibid.*, xxi, c. 117: *insita nobis a deo regula iudicandi de moribus*. A little before: *est in universum fallax humani captus iudicium propter cognatam caecitatem, ita ut etiamsi sint in animos nostros insculptae quaedam formae morum, tamen eae deprehendi vix possint*.

⁷ *Ibid.*, xiii, c. 7. ⁸ *Ibid.*, xxi, c. 417.

and expounding the law of nature. Accordingly, a number of natural-law principles are again discussed; for example, in the regulations of the Mosaic law about the forbidden degrees in marriage, an element is discovered which, since it belongs to natural law, is therefore binding upon the whole of humanity. In proof is cited the assertion of Scripture that the Canaanites (though they were not subject to the revealed law) were exterminated on account of their incestuous disregard of the marriage laws⁹—an argument which appears afterwards in Hugo Grotius in almost the same form.

With the disquisitions in the *Loci* agrees the frequent mention of natural law in other writings of the Reformer. To select merely one class of instances, I may refer especially to the frequent *Declamationes de dignitate legum*.¹⁰ God, so we hear in these passages, has infused a ray of His eternal wisdom and justice into the nature of men, and however weak that nature has become, God has left even to fallen men so much comprehension of His law that that law rules their outward behavior, indeed in a certain sense their will.¹¹ This law of nature is best expressed in the Decalogue.¹² Yet all other laws of the nations have issued from these *initia et principia* given by nature, and in spite of their diversity are, in accordance with the character of each nation, good and justifiable, in so far as they *ad illum radium lucis divinae transfusum in mentes hominum congruant, qui vocatur ius naturae, ex quo vult Deus exstrui leges*.¹³ Among all the legal systems that have been formed upon the basis of this law of nature, the Roman law deserves the palm; *nusquam extat perfectior et illustrior imago iustitiae quam in his [Romanis] legibus*.¹⁴ Such expressions, it is

⁹ *Ibid.*, xxi, c. 391.

¹⁰ Additional passages in Tröltsch, *Vernunft und Offenbarung*, pp. 167ff.

¹¹ *Op. Mel.*, xi, c. 909; compare also xi, cc. 360, 639, 919; xii, c. 20.

¹² *Ibid.*, xi, c. 912; xii, cc. 21, 149.

¹³ *Ibid.*, xi, c. 922; cf. xi, cc. 361, 631, 912, 921.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, xi, cc. 221, 361ff., 915; xii, c. 22.

true, contain nothing about a primitive contract or the like, yet evidently something more is intended than the mere natural faculty for law-making; for natural law is called in to decide the most important legal questions—not merely, for example, in an academic discussion as to whether or no the assassination of Cæsar was justifiable,¹⁵ but also in the extremely important question of practical politics: *an liceat vi resistere Caesari vim iniustam inferenti*. With regard to this question Melanchthon's finding on the basis of natural law in 1530 still runs: *etiam sententiae iniustae iudicio sit obediendum*.¹⁶ Later, on the other hand, in 1537, he expresses quite the opposite opinion: *Evangelium non tollit magistratum et ius naturae*; hence *licita defensio contra inferentem iniustum bellum*.¹⁷

An example of the variableness of natural-law conceptions! The estimate placed upon the law of nature receives further light, however, when it is observed that Melanchthon regards the natural moral law in general as the most valuable product of human reason, indeed as the highest achievement of philosophical thought. Nevertheless, in the equation between divine and natural law the point was given, where, in the orthodox system which was being formed, secular science, philosophy, law and the like could come into organic connection with the purely theological principles derived from the Gospel. Accordingly, Lutheran orthodoxy gives to the dogmatics and ethics that are derived from Revelation a substructure of natural sciences and arts, which, it is true, as a lower, secular sphere must allow its truth-content to be controlled and corrected by the higher, spiritual sphere. In this connection, even before Grotius, there appeared in Lutheran territory expositions of natural law by Oldendorp, Hemming, Winkler, which derived their nourishment substantially from the material afforded by Melanchthon's ideas.¹⁸

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, x, cc. 699f. The reasons for and against are opposed to each other without a final decision; the former are taken from natural law.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, ii, cc. 20-22. ¹⁷ *Ibid.*, iii, c. 631.

¹⁸ Cf. Kaltenborn, *Die Vorläufer des Hugo Grotius auf dem Gebiete*

Tröltsch, who in his treatise, *Vernunft und Offenbarung bei Joh. Gerhard und Melanchthon*, first made these relations clear, is unwilling, it is true, to recognize in the whole phenomenon a creative act of genius on the part of Melanchthon, yet he regards it as a necessary "compromise between the autonomous reason that was so to speak incarnate in the productions of antiquity on the one side, and the religious spirit of humanity on the other". It was a compromise such as within our circle of culture "cannot be avoided by any theology", and one cannot refuse a certain admiration to the grandeur of the plain and straightforward sequence of thought.¹⁹ We neither desire nor are we able to dispute this estimate here, but it should at least be said even at this point that the adjustment thus secured between secular and theological science remained entirely unfruitful for the future. When Lutheran orthodoxy fell to pieces, the new scientific impulses, in quite a special manner those for natural law, came from the West, from the science that had been developed in the Calvinistic camp. A Pufendorf and a Thomasius, as is well known, did not start from Melanchthon or the orthodoxy, but from Grotius and his spiritual kinsmen.

But if the natural-law theories could appeal to Melanchthon as their patron, is the same true for the other Reformers as well? For Luther, this is affirmed by the Paris theologian Eugène Ehrhardt, who has published a special investigation under the title, "*La notion du droit naturel chez Luther.*"²⁰ It is a fact that Luther often speaks of natural law or the law of nature,²¹ and Ehrhardt, investigating, though not with absolute completeness, the use of the conception in the writings of the Reformer, believes he has

des jus naturae et gentium, 1848; Tröltsch, *Vernunft und Offenbarung*, 1891, p. 169.

¹⁹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 173, 137.

²⁰ In the *Études de Théologie et d'Histoire publiées par MM. les Professeurs de la faculté de Théol. prot. de Paris en hommage à la faculté de Théologie de Montauban à l'occasion du tricentenaire de sa fondation*, Paris, 1901, pp. 285-320.

²¹ "von dem Naturrecht oder dem natürlichen Gesetz."

discovered that the conception in Luther also has had its roots in fundamental principles of his theology.²² This judgment becomes already precarious, however, when it is observed that the notion of natural law, which, it is true, is at all times variable, threatens in the Reformer to lose itself almost altogether in the most diverse interpretations. At one time, he thinks of it as like a law of reason which "issuing from free reason overleaps all books".²³ At another time it is like "natural equity".²⁴ At another time it is identified out and out with the law of Christian love,²⁵ when it is said of the law of nature: "which also the Lord declares in Luke vi. 31 and Mat. vii. 12: 'whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, do ye even so to them'".²⁶ At another time, however, it is again only the law "which also heathen, Turks and Jews must keep", "kept among all heathen in common", which, although it forbids resistance to lawful authority, still is far from making a man a Christian.²⁷ In expressing himself about its relation to positive law, Luther now places it in the closest relation to Roman law,²⁸ now regards it as the source of all written law;²⁹ at another time he distinguishes the natural law as the general moral demands of conscience from Moses' law as the Jew's *Sachsenspiegel*, and yet says just afterwards that the natural laws are nowhere drawn up in such a fine and orderly manner as in Moses.³⁰ It is of course easy, in connection with Rom. i. 19ff. and ii. 15, to discover a ruling idea in these more or less divergent utterances, but if this

²² *Op. cit.*, p. 317.

²³ *Von weltlicher Obrigkeit*, Erlangen edition, 22, p. 105.

²⁴ *Ermahnung zum Frieden auf die 12 Artikel der Bauern*, Erlangen edition, 24², p. 290.

²⁵ *Grosser Sermon vom Wucher*, Weimar edition, 6, pp. 52, 60; *Von Kaufhandlung und Wucher*, Erlangen edition, 22, p. 202; *Von weltlicher Obrigkeit*, Erlangen edition, 22, p. 104.

²⁶ *Grosser Sermon vom Wucher*, Weimar edition, 6, p. 49.

²⁷ *Ermahnung zum Frieden*, Erlangen edition, 24², pp. 279, 282.

²⁸ *Tischreden*, herausg. von Förstemann und Bindseil, 3, 320; 4, 486; *Warnung an seine lieben Deutschen*, Erlangen edition, 25², p. 15.

²⁹ *Auslegung des 101 Psalms*, Erlangen edition, 39, p. 284.

³⁰ *Wider die himmlischen Propheten*, Erlangen edition, 29, pp. 156f.

idea had, as Ehrhardt supposes, exerted a pervasive and fundamental influence over Luther's ethical, social and political views, Luther would probably have taken occasion to express himself more fully and definitely about the meaning and character of natural law.

Luther's conception of the state, its duties and its relation to the Kingdom of God, is plainly two-fold. On the one side, as is well known, he freed the natural arrangements of life in family and state from the ban of ecclesiastical asceticism; the "civil law and sword" is a divine institution that has its office from God.³¹ The state's historical and positive laws have their authority according to the will of God, and no natural law may nullify them.³² By virtue of the universal priesthood, the civil authority has the right of reformation. It has the right to abolish all abuses that have established themselves in the "Christian body",³³ that is, in state and Church, in case the ecclesiastical authority does not itself make the first move. In correspondence with this positive estimate of the functions of the state, the direction of Church affairs under the new conditions came later, in the evangelical territories, with at least the permission of the Reformer, into the hands of the princes and magistrates.

But alongside of the positive view of the state, stands a more negative one,³⁴ and to this indeed Luther has given more frequent expression in his writings. He starts here from a strict separation of the Kingdom of God and the kingdom of the world. There are "two divisions of Adam's children, of which one is in the Kingdom of God under Christ, the other, in the kingdom of the world under the magistrate".³⁵ The latter is by nature evil through and

³¹ Erlangen edition, 22, pp. 63, 76, etc.; *Gal. Kommentar*, ii, 41.

³² So R. Seeberg in his lecture, "Luthers Stellung zu den sittlichen und sozialen Nöten seiner Zeit," in *Neue kirchliche Zeitschrift*, 1901, p. 839.

³³ Erlangen edition, 21, p. 285.

³⁴ Erich Brandenburg in his lecture, "Martin Luther's Anschauung vom Staate und der Gesellschaft", *Schriften des Vereins für Reformationsgeschichte*, H. 70, has placed this negative manner of regarding the state too one-sidedly in the foreground.

³⁵ *Von weltlicher Obrigkeit*, Erlangen edition, 22, p. 82.

through. "We are serving here in an inn, where the devil is master, and the world mistress, and all kinds of evil desires are the household; and these all together—master, mistress, and household—are the Gospel's enemies and adversaries. If a man steals thy gold, defames thy honor, remember, in this house, that is the way things go."³⁶ The civil authority has the commission to check evil in some measure, lest things devour one another.³⁷ Therefore it is necessary for the bad and the weak; but the Christians, the living members of the body of Christ, have no need of it at bottom. The Gospel "places the outward life altogether in suffering, injustice, a cross, patience and contempt of temporal goods and temporal life"; but where there is "nothing but enduring, no punishment, no law, no sword is needed".³⁸ "The kingdom of the world is a kingdom of wrath and sternness", "a true forerunner of hell and of eternal death", hence also its "instrument" is a naked sword.³⁹

When such a negative view is held of legal institutions, the Scripture cannot of course be the source of their authority. A theologian must teach simply belief in the Lord Christ, and not meddle with secular affairs.⁴⁰ "God has subjected and entrusted the civil government to the reason, because that government has to control not the soul's salvation nor eternal goods, but only bodily and temporal possessions."⁴¹ Now Ehrhardt calls up that passage from the treatise, *Von weltlicher Obrigkeit*,⁴² in which natural law is identified with the reason, inasmuch as the reason is the "law-fountain"⁴³ of all written law. From this Ehrhardt draws the conclusion that Luther saw in natural law or the law of reason the particular source of all legal institutions.⁴⁴

³⁶ *Auslegung des Johannes-Evangeliums*, Erlangen edition, 50, pp. 349f.

³⁷ Erlangen edition, 22, p. 68; 50, p. 317.

³⁸ Erlangen edition, 24², p. 291; 22, p. 66.

³⁹ *Ein Sendbrief vom Büchlein wider die Bauern*, Erlangen edition, 2², p. 318.

⁴⁰ *Antwort von der Gegenwehr*, Erlangen edition, 64, p. 265.

⁴¹ *Auslegung des 101. Psalms*, Erlangen edition, 39, p. 330.

⁴² Erlangen edition, 22, pp. 104f.

⁴³ "Rechtsbrunnen." ⁴⁴ Ehrhardt, *op. cit.*, pp. 298f.

Luther had to fight against a double opposition, Ehrhardt continues—against the Catholic theocracy, and against the theocracy of the letter of Scripture, which the fanatics sought to establish. On both sides, he defended the independence of the state—both over against ecclesiastical tutelage, and also in recognition of the fact that state and Gospel belonged to entirely separate spheres of life. But this independence of the state and of society he secured by representing the foundation of their legal order to be natural law, which, in accordance with its origin in the primitive revelation, he could in a certain sense designate also as divine law. So the idea of natural law, Ehrhardt concludes, becomes a necessary middle term in the sequence of Luther's thought.⁴⁵

Nevertheless, Ehrhardt is himself obliged to admit that in his practical instructions for dealing with individual legal and social questions, the Reformer often did not at all abide by his notion of natural law as Ehrhardt has conceived it; not in the attitude of the state with respect to the persecution of heretics, not with regard to property, marriage, interest and usury—that is, not in any of the individual questions that Ehrhardt discusses. Ehrhardt concludes that Luther indeed desired to make of his natural law a principle of social reform, but as soon as he tried to bring this conception into practical use, he had to borrow now from the Old and New Testaments, now from Roman law, from national traditions, indeed even from canon law.⁴⁶ It is possible to go still further and to maintain that, aside from isolated utterances, Luther's method of reasoning in the practical concerns of national and social life is based throughout upon the ethical principles of Christianity and the Bible. He desires to deal with the twelve articles of the peasants, in accordance with their proposal, on the basis of "clear, open, undeniable sayings of Scripture",⁴⁷ and so in all the disputed questions before him he treats the Christian-ethical principles derived from God's word as the decisive norm. His

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 290-296, 316ff. ⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 318.

⁴⁷ *Ermahnung zum Frieden*, Erlangen edition, 24², p. 272.

only quarrel with the fanatics is that they apply the letter of Scripture to the affairs of the state and of society as a rigid law, without regard for historical development, without recognition of the distinction between the Gospel and legal institutions. Natural law is for him, it is true, a familiar and recognized conception; but everywhere he permits it to play merely a secondary, incidental part. The best proof of this is afforded by the treatise, *Von weltlicher Obrigkeit*, in which Luther delivers himself at great length about the divine right of the civil authority, the limits of its power, the duties of a prince, with interpretation of the Bible texts in point; but takes notice of natural law only at the very end and in an extremely cursory manner.⁴⁸

The above-mentioned antinomy in the thought of Luther about the state is to be judged similarly to the well-known antinomy in his view of the relation between law and Gospel. The *lex moralis* as a wage-agreement between God and man is, according to Luther, abolished for the regenerated man; indeed it is regarded by him as the pernicious, death-dealing, sin-increasing power. On the other hand, as moral obligation it is retained even by Luther, although his expressions are not always perfectly consistent. Indeed faith, Luther says, should procure for the law its true fulfilment.⁴⁹ To the former manner of regarding the law is closely related the negative view of the state and of legal institutions as a piece of this world, to which the Christian must with suffering accommodate himself. But accordingly this view is supplemented by the valuation of the state and of social relations as divine institutions; where, however, this positive valuation makes itself felt, there also the life of the state is subjected to judgment according to Christian-ethical standards, which are derived not from natural law but from the Scriptures. In this sense, Luther at any rate always taught the so-called *usus civilis* or *politicus* of the revealed

⁴⁸ Erlangen edition, 22, pp. 59-105; with regard to the natural law, only pp. 104f.

⁴⁹ Compare the convincing exposition in Loofs' *Dogmengeschichte*, 4. Aufl., pp. 770ff.

law,⁵⁰ upon which, as well as upon the New Testament passages about its own divine establishment,⁵¹ the civil power supports its authority for the punishment of evil-doers.⁵²

It is true, after all has been said, that the relation between ethics and law, Scripture truth and state institutions, was, in spite of many valuable beginnings, never brought by Luther to a perfectly clear definition; but this lack of clearness should not be exploited for the benefit of natural-law theories. Luther's merit is that he assigned to the state and to law an independent, well-grounded special province. But when it comes to developing that special province, Luther simply uses the ethical principles of the Christian revelation; or else he refers, as, for example, in a fine passage of his *Auslegung des 101. Psalms*,⁵³ to "God's wonder-workers",⁵⁴ whom He raises up now and then and whose mind and heart He endows with the power of separating the "healthy law" from the "diseased law", who either "change the law or so master it, that the whole land thrives and blooms". Luther intimates here that the secular law, so far as it proves itself useful and excellent, is given to the peoples by wise rulers, "heroes of law", who create it by their genius, their endowment from above; accordingly, he would have provided the historical school of jurisprudence of the nineteenth century, long before its appearance, with a convincing justification.

Even less than Luther does Calvin show himself a friend of natural law. He holds too strongly the fundamental Reformation conviction of the universal sinful corruption of the natural man. True, he admits in his *Commentary on Romans*⁵⁵ that there is *naturalis quaedam legis intelligentia, quae hoc bonum atque expetibile dictet, illud autem detestandum*, that *quasdam iustitiae ac rectitudinis conceptiones*,

⁵⁰ Compare with regard to this Loofs, *op. cit.*, p. 775.

⁵¹ Rom. xiii; I Pet. ii.

⁵² So, for example, *Wider die himmlischen Propheten*, Erlangen edition, 29, p. 140.

⁵³ Erlangen edition, 39, p. 285. ⁵⁴ "Wunderleute Gottes."

⁵⁵ On Rom. ii. 15.

quas Graeci προλήψεις vocant, hominum animis esse naturaliter ingenas. These "seeds of righteousness" consist in the fact that all peoples have a religion, punish adultery, theft, murder, also lay stress upon fidelity and trust in trade and intercourse.⁵⁶ Likewise Calvin speaks in the introductory chapters of the *Institutio* of the natural knowledge of God implanted in the human spirit, but at the same time he pronounces this knowledge completely corrupted and stifled. *Hinc rursus facile elicitur quantum ab hac confusa Dei notitia differat, quae solis fidelium pectoribus instillatur pietas, ex qua demum religio nascitur.*⁵⁷ The natural knowledge of God serves him only as a dark background to set off in all the clearer light the knowledge which faith derives from the revelation of God in Scripture. Therefore Calvin attributes also to the *lex naturae* as moral standard, in spite of that passage in the *Commentary on Romans*, only a subordinate value. Of the three passages where the *Institutio* mentions the *lex naturae*, it is said of it in the first two merely that it affords only a very faint foretaste of what is really well-pleasing to God,⁵⁸ and serves only the purpose of preventing man from pleading before the judgment-seat of God the excuse of ignorance.⁵⁹ More important is the third place where it is mentioned, in the last chapter of the *Institutio*. Here the question under discussion is, Where does a Christian state secure the ethico-religious standard for its legislation? Even Calvin rejects here the unqualified subordination of the state's law to the law of Moses.⁶⁰ He distinguishes in the revealed law between the ethical principles, which are summed up in the commandment of love to God

⁵⁶ *Opera Calvini in Corpus Reformationum*, Vol. xlix, cc. 37f.

⁵⁷ *Institutio*, I, iv, 4.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, II, viii, 1: *Homo per legem naturalem vix tenuiter degustat quis Deo acceptus sit cultus; certe, a recta eius ratione longissimo intervallo distat.*

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, II, ii, 22: *Finis legis naturalis est, ut reddatur homo inexcusabilis.*

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, IV, xx, 14: *Sunt qui recte compositam esse rempublicam negent, quae neglectis Mose politicis, communibus gentium legibus regitur. Quae sententia . . . falsa ac stolidi est.*

and one's neighbor, and which for all peoples and all ages represent the eternal rule of righteousness, and the judicial, purely political regulations in the law of Moses (*iudiciorum forma, iudiciariae constitutiones*), which have merely the temporary importance for Israel of confirming love, the eternal law of God, as the foundation of legal enactments and procedure in the Jewish people. From the second element of the revealed law, Calvin says the other peoples are free, but not from the former. For although laws may be very differently constituted in detail (*legis constitutio*) according to different conditions and circumstances, yet in their ethical tendency they must all exhibit a natural equity (*naturalis aequitas*), as it is demanded by the conscience of man. But since the revealed divine moral law is nothing else than *naturalis legis testimonium*, the best expression of that natural *aequitas*, it contains standard, goal, and limits for the legislation of the peoples and nations.⁶¹ So the nations may indeed make their laws, Calvin says, without reference to Moses, as they think advantageous; only these laws must conform to the eternal fundamental law of love in God's commandment, so that though the form varies, the tendency shall remain the same.⁶²

In this sequence of thought the incidental mention of natural law serves merely the purpose of strengthening the Calvinistic principle, that for the state and for law as well as for other things, despite all accidental differences, still the eternal norm is to found in the rightly understood revelation of the divine will in Scripture. This is in harmony also with the method of the Geneva thinker; natural law plays no part in his judgment of legal and social conditions. It is true that in the collection of his *Consilia*⁶³ we meet at

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, IV, xx, 16: *Dei lex, quam moralem vocamus . . . sola ipsa legum omnium et scopus et regula et terminus sit oportet.*

⁶² *Ibid.*, IV, xx, 15: *Libertas certe singulis gentibus relicta est condendi quas sibi conducere providerint, leges: quae tamen ad perpetuam illam caritatis regulam [divinorum praeceptorum] exigantur, ut forma quidem varient, rationem habeant eandem.*

⁶³ *Opera*, xa.

one point a remark about the *équité naturelle*, at another point, one about the *ius naturale*, which are identified both times with the rule of Christ, "Whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, do ye even so to them".⁶⁴ Indeed, in a difficulty, in order to strengthen his view that marriage with a brother's widow is opposed to the Mosaic law and therefore forbidden for Christians too, Calvin has recourse also to the *commune ius gentium* (whereby, however, he means nothing more than the *naturae honestas*), which declares that even *ipse naturae sensus* rejects such marriages as *foeditas*.⁶⁵ Similarly he places the law of Moses and the *commune ius gentium* side by side in still another difficulty about the marriage laws.⁶⁶ Further utterances of that kind, however, have not come to my notice in my search in the writings of Calvin for the point now under discussion. Everywhere else—in the treatment of usury,⁶⁷ of the right of the civil authority,⁶⁸ or of the duty of obedience even to tyrannical rulers,⁶⁹ and the like—natural law is passed over without a word. Most convincing, however, is the above-mentioned closing chapter of the *Institutio*. Here the Reformer, in his discussion about the civil authority and the constitution of the state, about legislation and the position of the subjects, offers in his way a "Politics". But in so doing, he never deserts the method that he employs throughout the whole of the *Institutio*—a method which is based upon Scripture and the *analogia fidei*, or in this case also upon the revealed moral law confirmed by the *naturalis aequitas*. This method he does not sacrifice at a single point for the benefit of a general ethical ratiocination, certainly not for natural-law theories of any description.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, xa, cc. 248, 264, in both cases in a discussion of the question of taking interest, which Calvin, in distinction from Luther, within the limits of that same natural equity or of Christian brotherly love, pronounces entirely permissible.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, xa, cc. 236f. ⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, xa, c. 242.

⁶⁷ In the *Sermon on Deut.* xxiii, 18-20, *Opera*, xxviii, cc. 115-124.

⁶⁸ *Sermon on Tit.* ii. 15-iii. 2, *Opera*, liv, cc. 554-559.

⁶⁹ *Commentary on I Pet.*, *Opera*, lv, cc. 244f.

We may conclude as follows. All the Reformers recognized of course a natural moral faculty on the ground of Rom. ii. 15. But there are also indications that even they, at that early time, held as a matter of learned tradition some kind of conception of a specific natural law. But in distinction from Melanchthon, Luther attributed to it only a subordinate importance, Calvin almost no importance at all. Finally, the views about the relation of politics, law and equity to the word of God and to Christian ethics were as yet little elucidated, though Calvin was the most positive in hoping to find the foundations for an evangelical Christian conception of the state in the ethical principles of the Bible—which principles, however, are not to be identified off-hand with the Mosaic law.

II

Under such circumstances, how did it happen that it was precisely decided Calvinists who, first among the men of evangelical faith, and so early as the sixteenth century, not merely developed natural law theoretically, but at the same time, as political publicists, made it a weapon in the conflicts of the time? Before we seek the explanation, however, we must briefly recall the fact itself. It is a question here primarily of the so-called "Monarchomachist" writers and jurists—not all of the Reformed faith, but some also Jesuit-Catholic (of the latter we shall speak further on)—who in the religious wars of the sixteenth century drew from the principle of the sovereignty of the people the revolutionary conclusion of a right of active resistance towards contract-breaking rulers. Among the Calvinists, besides the Reformer John Knox⁷⁰ should be mentioned particularly the Scotchman George Buchanan, the Frenchmen Hubert Languet (author, under the pseudonym Junius Brutus, of *Vindiciae contra tyrannos*), François Hotman (Francogallia),

⁷⁰ Cf. *Works*, iv, pp. 496f., 539f. The position of John Knox with regard to the question of natural law would require further investigation. Cf. Charles Martin, "De la genèse des doctrines politiques de J. K." in the *Bull. de la soc. de l'hist. du prot. franc.*, 1907, pp. 193ff.

and Lambert Daneau, and the German Johannes Althusius. The last-named—born in 1557 in the territory of Wittgenstein, from 1586 to 1604 teacher of law in the Reformed University at Herborn, from 1604 till he died syndic of the city of Emden—gave to the tendencies of the Monarchomachi, in his *Politics*, appearing in 1603, the methodically scholastic, and at the same time completest and most thorough-going expression. Otto Gierke, in his book, *Joh. Althusius und die Entwicklung der naturrechtlichen Staatstheorien* (Breslau, 1880), has the merit both of rescuing the teachings of Althusius himself from the dust of oblivion and of assigning them their place in the general historical development of law from the Middle Ages to the close of the eighteenth century. The significance of the questions there under discussion becomes sufficiently evident from the single remark of Gierke⁷¹ to the effect that a remarkable agreement just in a number of fundamental and distinctive ideas renders it probable that the *Politics* of Althusius was read and made use of by Rousseau for his *Contrat social*.

The following is a very rough sketch of the doctrine of the Monarchomachi concerning the state. We shall disregard their more or less serious differences from each other, and depend substantially upon the best-defined and most completely developed doctrines of Althusius. In the hands of the Monarchomachi the state loses more and more of its theocratic character. True, government is regarded as having its power from God; but it has it indirectly, not directly. Between it and God there stands a legal transaction of natural law. For natural law postulates an original natural condition when there was no state, when men lived in complete freedom and equality, indeed with community of goods. The state did not take its rise until a double contract had been freely concluded—the social contract and the governmental contract. By the social contract—the model of Rousseau's *Contrat social*—the community of men becomes for the first time a legal body; as such it then, by the second

⁷¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 9.

contract, delegates the government to the rulers. The terms of the governmental contract could, it is true, be interpreted in two ways. It might be said, in the first place, as was done for example by Bodinus, the famous French absolutistic teacher of law, of the end of the sixteenth century, that by this contract the sovereignty was once for all fully and unconditionally transferred to the ruler. On the other hand, the original right of the people might be granted a permanent precedence over against the holder of the state power. In adopting the latter interpretation the Monarchomachi are a unit. For them the ruler is merely the highest officer of the people, holding his office by contract. His right to exert the power of the state is independent, it is true, but at the same time conditional and revocable. He has only a *munus sub conditione et stipulatione*; he is merely *mandatarius*.⁷² Althusius supported the limitation of the power of the ruler in his logical radicalism with the proposition that the sovereignty, the majesty, is by its definition an indivisible unity, which can belong only to one of the two powers, the people or the ruler. But since the prerogatives of sovereignty are as necessary to the nature and existence of the social organism, *populus universus in corpus unum symbioticum ex pluribus minoribus consociationibus consociatus*, as life is an inalienable possession of every man,⁷³ therefore in the governmental contract those prerogatives must have remained in possession of the people. But beside them there can be no full, unlimited monarchical sovereignty, but in the last analysis only a chief business-manager. To this is added still a further deduction, which again appears in an especially incisive form in Althusius. As in the governmental contract, so also before that in the social contract, the individual surrendered only so many rights as were necessary for the accomplishment of the governmental ends. Therefore there remain to the individual under every form of government certain inalienable rights of man, which from the time of the Monarchomachi on

⁷² Gierke, *op. cit.*, pp. 144f. ⁷³ *Ibid.*, pp. 19, 29.

played an ever more important part in various schools of natural law, until in the French Revolution they became, as everyone knows, the battle-cry that moved the peoples. But in order to make the rights of the people effective, there was recognized, even at the beginning and by the Monarchomachi themselves, the need of representatives, estates, or, as Althusius calls them after an expression used incidentally by Calvin,⁷⁴ ephors, who represent the people, assist the ruler especially in legislation, and restrain him when he exceeds his authority, if necessary by force.

One needs only to recall these propositions in order to become conscious of their revolutionary character, but at the same time of the fruitful element in them that could enable them gradually to produce the modern constitutional forms of the state. But the motive which forced the Monarchomachi to these theories is quite plain. Their teaching is confined throughout to the political or legal sphere. Their postulation of the rights of man, their reduction of all social and national life to the individuals as the constitutive factors, involves no contradiction of dogma or revelation. But forced as they were into the fearful battle with the Counter-Reformation, the Reformed Monarchomachi sought merely an adequate justification of the right of resistance against the tyrannical government. Over against a state-power which without hesitation exhausted all means to suppress the Gospel, they too had recourse to the last resort, to civil war. But could that be justified? Now it is true that Calvin in a brief remark at the very end of his *Institutio*⁷⁵ had expressed himself to the effect that where there are popular magistrates, estates, who like the ephors in Sparta, or the tribunes of the people in Rome, are intended to champion the rights of the people, these lower officials are justified in offering resistance to the tyranny of the supreme head of the state. But this remark, however gladly it was exploited, seemed far from being sufficient; for Calvin had placed at the head of his "Politics" as highest prin-

⁷⁴ *Institutio*, IV, xx, 31. ⁷⁵ IV, xx, 31.

ciple the duty of passive obedience, and had with all energy declared this principle to be the clear intention of Scripture. Therefore, the ground remained uncertain. Although a way could be found to transcend the mere passive resistance, simply by the abundant use of the Old Testament, yet that was continually hindered by the great authority of the Biblical scholar of Geneva. Therefore, in order to arrive at a plain and firm position, recourse was taken to natural law. Here was found what was needed; only on this foundation could the Old Testament examples of resistance against tyrannical power develop their full strength; it was deemed certain that in connection with the natural-law doctrine of the sovereignty of the people the law of the Decalogue was at the same time finding its first perfect application to politics.

Yet almost at the same time at which the Monarchomachi, in order to attain a firm legal foundation for resistance against the anti-Reformation governments, sanctioned natural law, natural law forced itself forward also out of inter-confessional conflicts into Reformed Protestantism—I mean, through the book of the Anglican divine, Richard Hooker, *Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity Eight Books*.⁷⁶ This work appeared in a number of parts consecutively—the first four books in 1594, the very copious fifth book in 1597, the last three books not till many years after the early death of the author (1600), under the restoration of Charles II. The genuineness of the last three books has been questioned, but without sufficient reason, since the same style and the same peculiar type of thinking prevail throughout. Hooker's work has been subjected to a sympathetic estimation by Leopold von Ranke in an essay entitled, *Zur Geschichte der politischen Theorien*,⁷⁷ principally from the point of view that it was written in defence of the ecclesiastical supremacy of the English king over against Rome. But this judgment gives an entirely incorrect picture of the origin and

⁷⁶ In *The Works of Rich. Hooker*, 2 vols., Oxford, 1841.

⁷⁷ *Sämmtliche Werke*, Vol. 24, pp. 238ff.

purpose of the *Ecclesiastical Laws*. The book did not grow out of the conflict with Rome, but out of the spiritual unrest into which the Anglican world under Elizabeth was thrown by the rising Puritanism. Hooker, a man of the second generation (born 1553), the pupil of Bishop Jewel of Salisbury, who was the first defender of the Anglican form of the Church as a happy mean between Catholicism and (Reformed) Protestantism, set himself the task, as he repeatedly reminds us and as the whole content of his book undeniably testifies, of justifying Anglicanism against the criticism of the Puritans and Presbyterians. In this defense it was a question chiefly of the Anglican ceremonies and the Anglican constitution. Accordingly, Hooker deals with the former in books iv and v, and with the latter in books vi-viii (concerning the presbyterial-episcopal constitution and the question of the supremacy); the discussions of the separate points are preceded by a philosophical substructure in the first three books: concerning the nature of laws, the authority of Scripture, and the idea of the Church.

The chief lever of the Puritan criticism was the radical Reformed doctrine of Scripture to the effect that absolutely everything must be based upon God's word, that the Scripture alone must decide about doctrine and life, about Church and state. Hooker seeks to oppose these claims first of all by limiting the authority of Scripture. It is true, he approves the rejection of tradition, and also approves the doctrine of the sufficiency of Scripture;⁷⁸ but he holds that human aids, the studies of learned men, also councils, are indispensable for the purpose of determining what Scripture teaches.⁷⁹ The Scripture is indeed the foundation of all things, but the authority of man is the key that unlocks its meaning. Nor did the opposing party, Hooker claims, have any better right to say that their teaching was the pure truth of God; they too depended in their interpretation of Scripture upon human opinion. Further, Hooker calls attention to the differing character of the contents of Scrip-

⁷⁸ *Works*, 1841, i, p. 210. ⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, i, pp. 260ff.

ture. Of course, everything that is necessary to salvation is revealed in it, but it does not by any means afford a clear precept of the divine will for every trifle of daily life.⁸⁰ Indeed, Hooker even ventures the assertion that there are matters which in themselves are indifferent from the ethico-religious point of view.⁸¹ At any rate, not everything in Scripture is eternally obligatory; a great deal in the Bible depends upon the temporary circumstances and was prescribed for those circumstances alone. The Gospel is eternal, but not the rites and ceremonies.⁸²

However reasonable many of these propositions may appear to us, Hooker was nevertheless fully conscious that, despite all such means, he could scarcely make it credible, under the dogmatic view of Scripture that then prevailed, that the Anglican ceremonies and a form of government with leanings towards Catholicism could stand before the forum of the Bible as well as could the claims of the Presbyterians. Therefore, he too had recourse to an additional aid, namely, to the law of reason and nature. Even in matters of revelation, we cannot do without the reason; only rational reflection can make us certain what God's word is. The *testimonium spiritus sancti internum* is not sufficient to insure the authority of the Word; for the operations of the Spirit are by their nature obscure and must be tested by the reason before their genuineness can be settled. For a legislation such as is demanded by the situation of the English people, the mere precepts of the Bible are insufficient; we obtain something useful only from Scripture and reason together.⁸³ Man has within himself a law of reason, which in every individual case points out what is good, and that, too, with compelling force, so that it must be done.⁸⁴ This law of reason corresponds to the operations of nature, it is the law of nature.⁸⁵ In it the moral faculty of man finds expression, and it is therefore universally valid; to it the positive laws, which owe their origin to definite legislative

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, i, pp. 270ff.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, i, p. 238.

⁸² *Ibid.*, i, pp. 217f.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, i, pp. 308-314.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, i, p. 178.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, i, p. 178.

acts, whether of a human state or of God, stand related as regulations that cannot be obligatory for ever.⁸⁶ Among the latter Hooker includes certain "supernatural duties".⁸⁷ The law of nature as the natural light of reason does not, it is true, embrace all necessary laws; above all, it cannot be kept without the continual help and coöperation of God;⁸⁸ but still it can be recognized without the assistance of Revelation. Standing upon this theologico-philosophical foundation, Hooker accordingly derives the origin of states purely by natural law from a primitive social contract, from which, it is true, he does not clearly distinguish the governmental contract.⁸⁹ With regard to the terms of the latter, however, he maintains, like the Monarchomachi, that the individual did not completely surrender his native right of self-government and that the legislative power still remains in substance in the hands of the community. A king who does not base his laws upon the general consent is a tyrant; the people, moreover, declares its consent through its representatives, the parliaments.⁹⁰ But since in Hooker's opinion the Church is included among the political associations to which laws are given in this way,⁹¹ he finally ventures the conclusion: king and parliament have the full right to issue such legal regulations for the Anglican Church as seem to them suitable, and if these regulations turn out to be different from those of other churches and peoples, this is to be explained by the requirements of the time and of the nation.

So Hooker found in natural law the most valuable ally for the defense of Anglicanism against the assaults of the Puritans. On the other hand, the consequences of this point of view could not fail to appear. True, the Anglican is willing to subtract nothing from the absolute necessity of the supernatural-mystical way of redemption through the Son of God, and maintains further that the knowledge of this way is to be obtained only in a supernatural manner.⁹² But if reason and nature alone make it possible to distin-

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, i, p. 189.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, i, p. 217.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, i, pp. 178-181.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, i, pp. 186ff.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, i, pp. 191ff.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, i, p. 194.

⁹² *Ibid.*, i, pp. 215f.

guish between the eternally valid elements in Revelation and the perishable admixtures that were added to it in correspondence to temporary needs, it can readily be seen how precarious the position has thereby become. This uncertain attitude even diminished Hooker's Protestant firmness against Rome; the Papal Church also is for him a church of Christ, although with many errors, which we pray God to take from her.⁹⁸ So there we have in Hooker, leaving out of account his opposition to monarchical absolutism, all the elements which later, in the English Revolution, brought Anglicanism to disaster,—the tendency towards Catholicism, the beginnings of the latitudinarianism of a Laud and of other high-church representatives of the system of the Stuarts. But we must not forget that all this grew not without an inward necessity out of the conflict with Puritanism; for the latter was unable in its rigid Biblicism to adapt itself to the needs of the ever more consciously active religious spirit of the English people. The uncompromising *jus divinum* called the *jus naturae* with a certain necessity into the arena.

The English latitudinarianism had on the Continent its more original and more vigorous parallel in Arminianism. But if in England latitudinarianism and natural-law ideas form a union, so, as everyone knows, the Remonstrant Hugo Grotius becomes the scientific founder of the modern school of natural law. Nothing more natural than this coincidence! Arminianism was dogmatic criticism, criticism of the one central dogma of Calvinism; and that not on the ground of a strong new religious motive, but on the ground of the humanistic-scientific subjectivity of highly refined culture. This criticism could not stop with one dogma; it had to tone down the entire orthodox-Reformed view of life. To that end, Grotius could scarcely have chosen anything apparently less dangerous and at the same time in its almost unlimited possibilities more effective than his natural law. And yet, however disintegrating the effect of Grotius' *Three*

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, i, p. 283.

Books concerning the Law of War and Peace upon the early Reformed view of the world and of life, it cannot be emphasized strongly enough that he too followed not only a noble purpose, but also an actual compulsion of circumstances. When in 1625 he published his work in Paris, Germany was bleeding in the Thirty Years' War, the Netherlands also had no certain peace with Spain, and in general frightful wars, both civil and foreign, had torn almost all countries of Europe for fifty years. At that time, in the midst of conflicts, this man raised his voice for law; his expressed purpose was to guide the fighters towards humanity by teaching them that even in war there are legal conditions which must be respected, and that war exists merely to prepare for peace. This purpose, however, appeared impossible of attainment merely by an appeal to the *ius divinum*, the divine commands of justice and peacefulness. For the wars of that time were waged just on account of Revelation and the differing interpretations of it; this method of urging peace would have meant simply becoming a partisan to the conflict. Only what belonged to all of humanity in common, only what existed before all parties and was recognized by all, in a word, only natural law seemed adapted to the need. Accordingly Grotius proposed for his book the second task of bringing the principles of natural law, in clear distinction from positive law, into scientific form.⁹⁴ The title of his book, it is true, called to mind primarily only the *ius gentium*, which had formerly been regarded rather as an appendix to natural law proper.⁹⁵ But by skilful arrangement, in accordance with which the first book is devoted to the legal admissibility of war, the second to its causes, and the third to the manner of conducting it and to the conclusion of peace, Grotius was able to weave into his exposition almost the entire private and internal law of the state.

The influence of the work is thus explained. For two

⁹⁴ *De iure belli et pacis*, Prolegomena, § 30.

⁹⁵ Cf. Bergbohm, *op. cit.*, p. 156; Gierke, *op. cit.*, p. 235.

hundred years after the appearance of the *De iure belli et pacis* of Grotius, almost the whole of jurisprudence was controlled by the natural-law theories. And yet the mighty influence of the book is, on the other hand, a riddle, for even to the eye of a juristic layman the scientific weaknesses of this classical work of jurisprudence become immediately apparent. In it the theological element is still predominant to an astonishing degree; the boundaries between law and ethics are scarcely determined at all. But especially, what a variable thing it is after all, this natural law! First of all, the doctrine of popular sovereignty and in general the revolutionary tendencies of the natural law of the Monarchomachi are considerably weakened, not without arbitrariness and contradiction. The people, so Grotius maintains, can in the governmental contract very well have surrendered the government to its ruler definitely and finally, just as every man can enter the state of private slavery.⁹⁶ Still more does a king who has conquered a people through force hold the right of government as his unconditional and even alienable property.⁹⁷ Against a state-power that comes into conflict with natural or divine law, nothing more than passive resistance is in any case justifiable;⁹⁸ even the *inferiores magistratus*, the ephors of Althusius, have no higher competence.⁹⁹ Here, however, Grotius immediately makes an exception; if the tyranny of the ruler endangers the existence of the state, which was established through the primitive contract, then forcible resistance is permitted as a right of necessity.¹⁰⁰ Especially full of contradiction is the relation of Grotius' natural law to the divine commands. On the one side, he emphasizes the fact that natural law itself, though proceeding from the inward principles of man, is from God;¹⁰¹ indeed, he even ventures the assertion, "Natural law is so unchangeable that even God cannot change it".¹⁰² In another passage, however, he seems to suggest that, as

⁹⁶ *Op. cit.*, Lib. I, cap. iii, dist. 8. I use the *Editio nova* of 1632.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, I, iii, 12. ⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, I, iv, 2. ⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, I, iv, 6. ¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, I, iv, 7.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, Prolegomena, § 12. ¹⁰² *Ibid.*, I, i, 10.

applied to certain materials, natural law has relaxed its strictness and adapted itself to the customs of the time.¹⁰³ Or take another example. Grotius declares as a matter of principle that "God has made the principles [of natural law] clearer through express laws";¹⁰⁴ so the revealed law would be the interpretation of the law of nature. But then again the divine law as something positive and arbitrary stands in contrast with the natural law;¹⁰⁵ indeed, it is repeatedly asserted that natural law and the Gospel (he means the ethical regulations of the Gospel) are by no means identical: it is possible for a thing to be strictly forbidden in the Gospel which is permitted by natural law—for example, polygamy.¹⁰⁶ Something similar is true of slavery, which the natural law of Grotius permits without scruple.¹⁰⁷

These examples are sufficient to illustrate the attenuation of the moral judgment, which, already bound up with the casuistic method of Grotius, becomes glaring through the contrast between natural law and Revelation. Already there is beginning to appear that way of thinking to which reason and nature are everything, Scripture truth nothing but an unimportant historical expression of them. Yet, however much fault may be found with the undertaking of the learned Remonstrant, that undertaking is primarily to be understood as arising from the necessity of constructing for the religious parties that were lacerating one another some sort of common basis of law and of peace.

After the book of Grotius, natural law began its triumphant course; it penetrated into almost all Protestant movements. A Hobbes employed it in order to deduce with still greater incisiveness than Bodin the absolute right of absolutism; the Independents, Roger Williams and the poet Milton, by means of it supported their demands for civil and religious liberty. We have no further interest in following up all the various forms assumed by the natural-law theory; only one classical representative of that theory, the philo-

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, II, i, 13. ¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, Prolegomena, § 13. ¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, I, i, 13.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, I, ii, 6; compare also II, i, 10. ¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, II, v, 27.

sopher John Locke, may finally be mentioned in passing. First, however, we may offer some general remarks in explanation of his doctrine, with regard to which the recent book of a French writer, Bastide, affords valuable information.¹⁰⁸ In spite of Williams, Milton and other Independents, the great English Revolution stands by no means under the standard of natural law. On the contrary, Weingarten (however antiquated his book on the English churches of the revolution¹⁰⁹ may be in other respects) is correct in his fundamental thesis, when he sees in the Revolution the last mighty attempt to establish the theocratic principle, and at the same time the crisis of the theocracy. The Puritan army of the saints fought against the absolutistic, catholicizing and latitudinarian tendencies for divine truth and divine regulation of the Church and state, under the conviction that it was thereby guaranteeing to the conscience the free worship of God. But when the victory had been won, it became evident in the so-called Barebones Parliament of 1653 that the enthusiasts, in spite of all their faith in the Bible, lacked clear and positive ends and were incapable of establishing the new order of things. Hence, after Cromwell too had passed away without having established a permanent reorganization, the restoration of the Stuarts became a necessity. All the achievements of the great conflict would have been lost if the follies of Charles II and James II, and the threatening phantom of the reintroduction of Catholicism, had not for a moment extinguished the internal disputes between Whigs and Tories, and made possible the glorious Revolution of 1688 with the accession of William of Orange. Now, through the Bill of Rights, the aristocratic-constitutional form of government in England was definitely established, and at the same time the religious conditions most happily settled in such a way, that, while Anglicanism continued to be the state Church, the dissenting religious parties

¹⁰⁸ Ch. Bastide, *J. Locke, ses théories politiques et leur influence en Angleterre*, Paris, 1906.

¹⁰⁹ *Die Revolutionskirchen Englands*, Leipzig, 1868.

were granted a tolerance that was at first limited but later became increasingly extensive.

For the reorganization of England, however, natural law offered the more or less clearly recognized theoretical basis. Natural law appeared as though of its own accord, where the saints of the Barebones Parliament had waited in vain for illumination through the Spirit and through Revelation. The Bill of Rights was in fact such a governmental contract between ruler and subjects as natural law referred to primitive times, and John Locke, the son of a Puritan father as well as the adherent and friend of the latitudinarian, not to say skeptical elder Shaftesbury, justified the Revolution of 1688 with opinions which, although by no means already the common property of the English people, were destined in many respects to become such. Of Locke's writings, there come in question in the first place *The Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina*, and then the *Letter concerning Toleration* and *Two Treatises of Government*, which appeared in 1689 but were in part composed earlier.¹¹⁰ Like all adherents of natural law, Locke here derives the origin of the state from the social and the governmental contracts. But in so doing he emphasizes, like the Monarchomachi before him, the innate rights of man, "liberty and property"; the primitive men in forming a union surrendered only so much of their rights as is necessary for the protection of life and property. The state is in essence only a legally constituted organization, whose compulsion does not extend further than is required by the above-mentioned tasks, or, as Locke also expresses it, by the common good. Within the state, Locke regards the churches as purely corporations, similar to the guilds or to the learned societies; to them, even including Catholics and Socinians or other free-religious societies, is due complete liberty to constitute their worship, form of government and dogmas as they think best. Only the atheists, whose unbelief endangers the trustworthiness of oaths, as well as all religious movements, which, by tran-

¹¹⁰ Bastide, *op. cit.*, pp. 42ff., 108.

scending the spiritual sphere, threaten the stability and peace of the state, must be suppressed by force. And the trouble-makers, Locke thinks, are only the fanatically intolerant, domineering preachers and priests. Thus entered into the modern liberalism at its beginning the hatred of priests and theologians that is still in part characteristic of it.

But, in general, Locke's adjustment between state and Church certainly cannot give complete satisfaction; the purpose of the state as it is restricted by Locke is too narrow and is contradicted by all history. But still less can the churches attain a full development on the basis of the mere right of association—perhaps the Independents might do so, but certainly not the Calvinists and least of all the Catholics. In Locke's notion of the Church, too little place is given to the institutional element, to the recognition that the Church is primarily a public institution with divine authority and a divine function. A closer examination reveals the deeper cause of these defects in Locke's philosophico-religious position. As is well known, he is a moderate deist; that is, there are for him two sources for the apprehension of truth, the reason and Revelation. By examining both (in the *Essay concerning Human Understanding* and *The Reasonableness of Christianity*), he thinks he has discovered that many things in life prevent us from attaining certitude; we must therefore often be satisfied with mere probability.¹¹¹ Our highest duty is therefore humility and love. In this way the demand for tolerance is based upon human weakness. Therein, however, is revealed the Achilles heel of the entire system. The doctrine of universal reason, into which in the age of Deism and of the "Enlightenment" the natural-law theories developed more and more, did not fill its adherents with absolute, impregnable certainty; therefore that doctrine necessarily dissipated and destroyed more than it built up. Even in a Locke, a keen eye can detect the seeds of those destructive tendencies which later in France and the French Revolution exhibited their fearful explosive power. But

¹¹¹ Cf. Bastide, *op. cit.*, pp. 252f.

that ought never to cause us to forget that the natural-law theories were for the England of the seventeenth century again to a certain extent a necessity. As circumstances stood, those theories alone were able to conserve the tolerance which was the result of the great Revolution; they have therefore contributed their full share towards the happy reorganization of the civil and ecclesiastical constitution of England.

III

We pause here. We have seen how natural law, despite the rather unfavorable attitude of Calvin, pours itself like an irresistible stream into Reformed Protestantism, attains a decisive importance in its vital problems, becomes fundamental in the political constitutions produced by it, and in general enters as one of the most important factors into the spirit of the "Enlightenment" and of the entire modern period. We are now, I think, in a position to form a final judgment concerning natural law in its relation to the Reformation.

The first thing that I have to notice is that natural law is for the Reformation a part of tradition, more particularly an inheritance from the Catholicism of the Middle Ages. The former fact can be at once surmised, so soon as one observes how much as a matter of course, indeed how naïvely, Luther refers to natural law, and lets it appear in varying colors, without, however, conceding to it any fundamental importance. When Melanchthon assumed an attitude so much more favorable, and permitted the circle of ideas that is connected with natural law and the law of nature to become influential for his entire system, it is certain that his classical leanings contributed largely to that end; but they were not the only motive and not even the proximate occasion. It would be highly incorrect, we believe, to suppose that the ideas of natural law are a humanistic inheritance from the ancient world, which was half received by Melanchthon and then gradually emancipated

itself. It is true, the original source of natural law lies, as we all know, in antiquity. Socrates, Plato and Aristotle already cherished the notion of a natural law in distinction from the arbitrary laws of men. The form of these views which was most influential for the future was contained in the Stoic doctrine of the world-reason and the pantheizing law of nature: after Cicero, under Platonic influence, had so modified this doctrine that the natural laws inherent in human nature received at the same time a theonomic, divinely obligating character.¹¹² But aside from the fact that such teachings never remained uncontradicted in antiquity, Melanchthon himself at his first mention of the natural laws in the *Loci* of 1521¹¹³ takes his start from the *Theologi* and *Iurisconsulti*, that is, from the schoolmen and jurists of his time, and introduces only by comparison with these the utterances of Plato and Cicero. However, no matter how Melanchthon's position be conceived, it is impossible that a theory of ancient philosophy should merely on Melanchthon's authority, while the other Reformers were at least indifferent, have revived just after the Reformation with such vigor and exerted such an enduring influence, if it had been dormant during the entire Middle Ages.

Just the opposite is in reality the case. From the height of the Middle Ages, natural law was a recognized, though, it is true, also an extremely multiform doctrine of ecclesiastical and civil law, as well as of scholastic theology. So early as the *Decretum Gratiani*, we read: *Ius naturale est commune omnium nationum, eo quod ubique instinctu naturae, non constitutione aliqua habetur, ut viri et feminae conjunctio, liberorum successio et educatio, communis omnium possessio et omnium una libertas, acquisitio eorum, quae coelo, terra marique capiuntur*.¹¹⁴ Natural law is in

¹¹² Bergbohm, *op. cit.*, pp. 151ff.; Tröltzsch, *Vernunft und Offenbarung*, p. 165.

¹¹³ *Op. Mel.*, xxi, c. 116.

¹¹⁴ Dist. I, c. vii; cf. dist. I, c. i; dist. IX, c. xi; dist. V and VI. Bergbohm, *op. cit.*, pp. 157ff.; Gierke, *Das deutsche Genossenschaftsrecht*, iii: *Die Staats- und Korporationslehre des Altertums und des Mittelalters*, Berlin, 1881, pp. 610ff.

the *Decretum* at one time identified with the revealed law (*quod in lege et evangelio continetur*), more particularly, with the saying of Christ, "Whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, do ye even so to them"; at another time it is assigned an independent place between the divine and the human law. With increased weight, though also in equally uncertain terms,¹¹⁵ natural-law theories are set forth by Thomas Aquinas. In that part of his *Summa Theologiae* which is devoted to the law, he treats successively the *lex aeterna*, *lex naturalis* and *lex humana*.¹¹⁶ The law of nature is *participatio legis aeternae in rationali creatura*,¹¹⁷ hence it is contained *primo in lege aeterna, secundario in naturali iudicatorio rationis humanae*.¹¹⁸ So it oscillates between God's command and the law of reason. From the Gospel or the *lex nova*, the *lex indita naturalis* differs again through its lack of the *donum superadditum gratiae*.¹¹⁹ Nevertheless, it is the foundation of all human laws, so that if a law differs from the law of nature, it is no longer law but corruption of the law.¹²⁰

Accordingly, Thomas in the treatise, *De regimine principum* refers also the origin of the state to the *ius naturale*. A certain independence is thereby conceded to the state, in that it is regarded no longer as a product of sin (which was still the view of Bonaventura), but as the product of a reasonable impulse in human nature; but at the same time in that way it is delivered over to the control of Church and Papacy as constituting the higher sphere of grace and faith. But under the influence of Thomas, the theories of natural law become more and more the common property of mediæval thought. So early as the year 1300, they were seized upon by the popular political writers, both parties using them as a weapon in the great conflict between Church and state—a fact for which Richard Scholz, in his instructive investigations concerning *Die Publizistik zur Zeit Philipps*

¹¹⁵ Cf. Bergbohm, *op. cit.*, p. 260, Anm. 37.

¹¹⁶ *Summa Theologiae*, Prima secundae, qu. 90, 91, 93, 94, 95ff.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*, qu. 91, art. 2.

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*, qu. 71, art. 6.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*, qu. 106, art. 1.

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*, qu. 95, art. 2.

des Schönen, has produced ample proofs.¹²¹ But, in general, a glance into Gierke's *Althusius* or into the third volume of his *Deutsches Genossenschaftsrecht* is sufficient to show how in the second half of the Middle Ages almost all schools of jurisprudence were permeated by these views. All the individual doctrines that have their roots in natural law—the doctrines of the primitive contract and of the sovereignty of the people, and the principle of representation—existed long before the Reformation in more or less thoroughly-developed forms. The strict curialistic school, as well as the teachings of Marsilius of Padua, which contended for popular freedom and the national state; the adherents of the conciliar idea, as well as pre-Reformers like Wiclif; above all, finally, the humanistic school of jurisprudence, which flourished in Italy and then, in the century of the Reformation, in France, and which was cultivated by teachers and friends of Calvin like Alciati and François de Connan—all these had accustomed themselves to erect their conception of the state upon a natural-law foundation.

But such a unanimity of the jurists, theologians and humanists is by no means accidental, for it is a well-known fact that the entire mediæval Catholic system of faith and life is characterized by the separation between the natural and the supernatural—the two spheres are built up one on top of the other like two stories of a house. The natural is the lower sphere of the secular, the transitory; it too proceeds from the Creator's hand and is therefore not altogether sinful, but it must be held in check by a higher power. The supernatural, on the other hand, is the eternal, holy, divine, it is that which rules the lower sphere and thereby gives it an organic part in the Kingdom of God. For an example we do not need to go further than the doctrine of the primitive state of man. The *dona naturae* are supplemented by the *dona supernaturalia*. Similarly, the natural light of reason, with its natural knowledge of God, is the

¹²¹ *Kirchenrechtliche Abhandlungen von Stutz*, 6-8 Heft, Stuttgart, 1903, pp. 68ff., 101, 113f., 134f., 142ff., 222f., 311, 323ff., 362, 370.

lower sphere in comparison with the supernatural revelation. Saving faith in the latter can be attained only through the sacramental-magic inpouring of the *illuminatio spiritus*. In the same way, over against the *lex naturae*, which is merely explained and elucidated by the *lex Mosis*, stands the *lex Christi* or the *lex gratiae*; in connection with justification, over against the *praeformatio ad gratiam* afforded by work-righteousness, the *infusio gratiae*; in ethics, over against the *praecepta* destined for all, the *consilia* of monasticism. The relation of Church and state is exactly similar. The Church is the divine establishment, the institute of salvation clothed with supernatural authority. The state is a mere product of man's natural social requirement, it proceeded from a primitive contract by virtue of natural law. It must therefore necessarily subordinate itself to the Church if the ends of the one *civitas Dei* are to be attained. Indeed, the Church, being the guardian and interpreter of the natural as well as of the divine law, can depose those rulers who in her opinion are infringing the primitive contract, and can summon the subjects to revolution. Such was the practice of the Curia, at least when the political situation promised success in making good the claim; such was the more or less decided teaching of the theorists.

Natural law with all its political consequences must accordingly, so far as one may speak here at all of religious and ecclesiastical determination, be regarded, despite its beginnings in antiquity, as a thoroughly Catholic product. The proof of this view is made still stronger by the fact that simultaneously with the Reformed Monarchomachi, Catholic Monarchomachi appeared, among whom the Jesuits like the Spaniard Juan Mariana¹²² did not shrink even from directly instigating the assassination of tyrants. But since, on the other hand, the theories of natural law must be regarded as a central doctrine of the "Enlightenment", which has exerted an extensive influence upon the entire spirit of modern times in the political, ethico-religious and intel-

¹²² Cf. his book, *De rege et regis institutione*, Tolet., 1599.

lectual spheres, a prospect is opened up which is diametrically opposed to the historical construction of Tröltzsch. Not the Reformation, which in its chief representatives met natural law, if not with out-and-out rejection, at least with cool indifference, is mediæval and Catholic; rather has modern liberalism been influenced in its development by a group of ideas which was an integral part of the mediæval-Catholic view of the world. At the same time we see by this example how little value is to be attributed to such general schemes and catch-words as the one proposed by Tröltzsch; for the most part they merely help partisans to establish one-sided judgments.

Yet if natural law has its roots in mediæval Catholicism, that only brings us to the chief question, How could doctrines that were Catholic in spirit be appropriated in Reformation territory at such an early time and with so little hesitation? This might be understood in the case of Hooker, for his opposition to Puritanism brought him still nearer to Rome than the genius of his Church would in itself suggest, so that he cites Thomas Aquinas quite expressly as a witness for his theory.¹²³ But how is it to be comprehended in the other Protestants, particularly the most anti-Catholic of all, the decided Calvinists? For Melanchthon, no doubt academic tradition and the demands of education exercised the determining influence. He saw how the doctrines of natural law were set forth in all schools, even by those who were neutral in the conflict between the confessions, namely, by the humanists; he found those doctrines taught in the works of ancient writers, like Cicero whom he prized so highly; he heard also how Luther spoke of natural law without opposing it, and even on occasion made use of it in his way—all this no doubt combined to remove Melanchthon's objections, which later on, after he had become a synergist, did not weigh very heavily with him anyhow. The men of the Reformed faith may well have been influenced by certain

¹²³ *Works*, i, p. 315. Here he calls Thomas "the greatest amongst the school divines", and cites *Sum. Theol.* i, 2, qu. 91, art. 3.

other things. Perhaps even the variability of the ideas in question, and their remoteness from the central truths of religion which made them appear almost like a mere scientific hypothesis, may have helped to commend them. Furthermore, the theories of natural law could be regarded as a principle of individualism, which would naturally be congenial to the Calvinists. But this was for them certainly not the principal reason, for their individualism had such firm root in their particular type of religion, that it needed no further support. The point of view which was finally decisive for the men of the Reformed confession was rather, we believe, the one which was indicated in our investigation, when we spoke of the inward necessity, the compulsion of circumstances, under which the entrance of natural law in all four of the phases discussed in our second section took place. This inward necessity can be made clear by some such general survey as the following.

The Reformation at its very beginning found itself in the presence of problems and exigencies of indefinite range, first of all, conflicts of purely religious and theological character—doctrinal, liturgical, and constitutional conflicts. What an amount of spiritual strength was consumed even by these conflicts! How much there was which went wrong! What unrest, what losses these conflicts produced! And yet the problems which then appeared could be settled by reference to the fundamental religious principle of Protestantism, and on the whole were in fact settled in a truly Protestant way. Much more difficult and dangerous, however, was a second adjustment, which lay more on the periphery of religious truth and yet was no less necessary—namely the adjustment to the general ethical, political and social problems, to science and art. This adjustment, I say, was unavoidable, for if Protestantism, over against the mediæval-Catholic world, involves a new world-view, then there must necessarily be a Protestant science of politics, a Protestant philosophy and science, a Protestant art. This conclusion cannot be avoided through the assertion that the Reformation achieved just

the liberation of the secular activities of the spirit from the control of the mediæval church and their restoration to their own immanent principles; for then that freedom would still have to be grounded more in detail, the boundary-lines would have to be drawn to show where the ethico-religious claims of the Gospel end and the rights of the free spiritual principle begin.

For such an adjustment, however, in the very nature of things, time is required; it cannot be accomplished by one man or by one generation. It was, indeed, a thankworthy undertaking, when Calvin in his *Institutio* did not entirely ignore politics, but the results were of such a kind that they did not give satisfaction even negatively, on the question of the obedience of subjects and the right of resistance, much less positively. But now the tasks and problems of culture came upon the young evangelical Church in a storm. Not so much upon the Lutherans. In their small states, where there was little cultural movement, they were able to settle down and persevere for two centuries on the basis of the theocratic idea as purified by the Reformation, and in analogy to the traditional forms of Church and state, as though all those questions of adjustment were really already settled by Melanchthon's organization of the universities and of the sciences. The Reformed, on the contrary, were obliged to fight the hardest battles for existence; then, after the final victory, they had new states to found both at home and in the wilderness; above all, they had to settle the question of tolerance between the different parties that had arisen in their own camp. But the tasks were met by the will to accomplish them. Calvin had inspired in his disciples that energy of piety, which abhors all half-way measures, which boldly endeavors to make all the affairs of life subject to Christ, the Head and Lord. In this congregation of the elect, the individualism of the Reformation reached its climax, and despite all subjection under God's command, there was developed a thirst for liberty, which tolerated nothing that came in its way except after free and earnest investi-

gation. The chief merit of Calvinism is that it brought men's powers into the liveliest activity, undertook the most diversified tasks with vigorous confidence, and so with impatient energy carried humanity forward on its way. But the impulse to freedom can work itself out to the good of humanity only when it remains conscious of its limitations. But what was needed to keep it within bounds, the firm principles about the relation of the Reformation to the forces of culture—to the state, science and art—was lacking, and how could it be attained all at once in the midst of all the unrest of the time? Regarded in this way, we believe, the appearance of natural law becomes comprehensible. A doctrine of the state constructed on evangelical principles was not in existence. But such a doctrine was imperatively demanded by the need of the time. Men needed to have clearness about the relation of the ruler to the subjects, about the problem of Church and state, about the relation between different churches in the same country. No wonder that in the lack of a conception of the state revised in the light of fundamental evangelical ideas, men had recourse to the political theory taught in the traditional jurisprudence, without heeding the fact that that theory had an origin foreign to the Reformation and involved tendencies and consequences which would lead away from the Reformation. These tendencies, of course, became apparent later in slowly-developing after-effects, and then, especially after the spiritual enervation sustained in the protracted religious wars, they could not fail gradually to dissipate and destroy the Reformation's basis of faith.

Unless all indications are deceptive, the progress of events was similar in the case of other cultural questions. The desire for knowledge, the desire for activity, which was experienced by the individual after he had been liberated through the Reformation, plunged itself into all problems of the spiritual life of man, became absorbed in the traditional manner of their treatment, and was all too quickly satisfied with solutions which were not in agreement with

the fundamental ethico-religious factors of the practical religious life of the Reformation. The reaction did not remain absent. The evangelical life of faith became shallower, instead of deepening itself and developing in all directions. Here, however, the opposition between the modern spirit and the Reformation would seem to receive an explanation which grows out of an organic understanding of the historical development. It is not true that the Gospel of the Reformation has been outstripped; but spiritual culture in general has infinitely advanced, while its permeation with ethico-religious principles in the spirit of the Reformation has not kept pace. If it is true that the religious spirit of the Reformation in passing through Deism, the "Enlightenment" and Rationalism, was moving on a downward path, the reason for its deterioration was that the adjustment between the Reformation and culture was neither brought to a satisfactory conclusion nor even earnestly enough attempted. Nevertheless, we hope that such an adjustment may yet be accomplished; the better it succeeds, so much the more completely will the difficulties of our present religious situation disappear.

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CALVIN'S DOCTRINE OF THE KNOWLEDGE OF GOD.

The first chapters of Calvin's *Institutes* are taken up with a comprehensive exposition of the sources and guarantee of the knowledge of God and divine things (Book I, chs. i-ix). A systematic treatise on the knowledge of God must needs begin with such an exposition; and we require no account of the circumstance that Calvin's treatise begins with it, beyond the systematic character of his mind and the clearness and comprehensiveness of his view. This exposition therefore makes its appearance in the earliest edition of the *Institutes* which attempted "to give a summary of religion in all its parts", redacted in orderly sequence; that is to say, which was intended as a text-book in theology. This was the second edition, published in 1539, which was considered by Calvin to be the first which at all corresponded to its title. In this edition this exposition already stands practically complete. Large insertions were made into it subsequently, by which it was greatly enriched as a detailed exposition and validation of the sources of our knowledge of God; but no modifications were made in its fundamental teaching by these additions, and the ground plan of the exposition as laid down in 1539 was retained unaltered throughout the subsequent development of the treatise.

We may observe in the controversies in which Calvin had been engaged between 1536 and 1539 a certain preparation for writing this comprehensive and admirably balanced statement, with its equal repudiation of Romish and Anabaptist error and its high note of assurance in the face of the scepticism of the average man of the world. We may trace in it the fruits of his eager and exhaustive studies prosecuted in the interval, as pastor, professor and Protest-

ant statesman; and especially of his own ripening thought as he worked more and more into detail his systematic view of the body of truth. But we can attribute to nothing but his theological genius the feat by which he set a compressed apologetical treatise in the forefront of his little book—for the *Institutes* were still in 1539 a little book, although already expanded to more than double the size of their original form (edition of 1536). Thus he not only for the first time supplied the constructive basis for the Reformation movement, but even for the first time in the history of Christian theology drew in outline the plan of a complete structure of Christian Apologetics. For this is the significance in the history of thought of Calvin's exposition of the sources and guarantee of the knowledge of God, which forms the opening topic of his *Institutes*. "Thus", says Julius Köstlin, after cursorily surveying the course of the exposition, "there already rises with him an edifice of Christian Apologetics, in its outlines complete (*fertig*). With it, he stands, already in 1539, unique (*einzig*) among the Reformers, and among Christian theologians in general up to his day. Only as isolated building-stones can appear in comparison with this, even what Melancthon, for example, offered in the last elaboration of the *Loci* with reference to the proofs for the existence of God."¹ In point of fact, in Augustine alone among his predecessors, do we find anything like the same grasp of the elements of the problem as Calvin here exhibits; and nowhere among his predecessors do we find these elements brought together in a constructive statement of anything like the completeness and systematic balance which he gave to it.

At once on its publication, however, Calvin's apologetical construction became the property of universal Christian thought, and it has entered so vitally into Protestant, and

¹Article on *Calvins Institutio, nach Form und Inhalt, in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung*, printed in the *Theologische Studien und Kritiken* for 1868, p. 39. Köstlin's whole account of the origin of these sections in the edition of 1539 is worth reading (pp. 38-39).

especially Reformed, thinking as to appear now-a-days very much a matter of course. It is difficult for us to appreciate its novelty in him or to realize that it is not as native to every Christian mind as it now seems to us the inevitable adjustment of the elements of the problems raised by the Christian revelation. Familiar as it seems, therefore, it is important that we should apprehend it, at least in its outlines, as it lies in its primary statement in Calvin's pages. So only can we appreciate Calvin's genius or estimate what we owe to him. A very brief abstract will probably suffice, however, to bring before us in the first instance the elements of Calvin's thought. These include the postulation of an innate knowledge of God in man, quickened and developed by a very rich manifestation of God in nature and providence, which, however, fails of its proper effect because of man's corruption in sin; so that an objective revelation of God, embodied in the Scriptures, was rendered necessary, and, as well, a subjective operation of the Spirit of God on the heart enabling sinful man to receive this revelation,—by which conjoint divine action, objective and subjective, a true knowledge of God is communicated to the human soul.

Drawn out a little more into detail, this teaching is as follows. The knowledge of God is given in the very same act by which we know self. For when we know self, we must know it as it is: and that means we must know it as dependent, derived, imperfect and responsible being. To know self implies, therefore, the co-knowledge with self of that on which it is dependent, from which it derives, by the standard of which its imperfection is revealed, to which it is responsible. Of course, such a knowledge of self postulates a knowledge of God, in contrast with whom alone do we ever truly know self: but this only the more emphasises the fact that we know God in knowing self, and the relative priority of our knowledge of two objects of knowledge which we are conscious only of knowing together may for the moment be left undetermined. Meanwhile, it is clear

that man has an instinctive and ineradicable knowledge of God, which, moreover, must produce appropriate reactions in his thought, feeling and will, whence arises what we call religion. But these reactions are conditioned by the state of the soul which reacts. Although, then, man cannot avoid possessing a knowledge of God, and this innate knowledge of God is quickened and developed by the richest manifestations of God in nature and providence, which no man can escape either perceiving or so far apprehending, yet the actual knowledge of God which is framed in the human soul is affected by the subjective condition of the soul. The soul, being corrupted by sin, is dulled in its instinctive apprehension of God; and God's manifestation in nature and history is deflected in it. Accordingly the testimony of nature to God is insufficient that sinful man should know Him aright, and God has therefore supernaturally revealed Himself to His people and deposited this revelation of Himself in written Scriptures. In these Scriptures alone, therefore, do we possess an adequate revelation of God; and this revelation is attested as such by irresistible external evidence and attests itself as such by such marks of inherent divinity that no normal mind can resist them. But the sin-darkened minds to which it appeals are not normal minds, but disordered with the awful disease of sin. What is to give subjective effect in a sin-blinded mind to even a direct revelation from God? The revelation of God is its own credential. It needs no other light to be thrown upon it but that which emanates from itself: and no other light can produce the effect which its own splendor as a revelation of God should effect. But all fails when the receptivity is destroyed by sin. For sinners, therefore, there is requisite a repairing operation upon their souls before the light of the Word itself can accredit itself to them as light. This repairing operation on the souls of sinful men by which they are enabled to perceive light is called the testimony of the Holy Ghost: which is therefore just the subjective action of the Spirit of God on the heart, by virtue of which

it is opened for the perception and reception of the objective revelation of God. The testimony of the Spirit cannot, then, take the place of the objective revelation of the Word: it is no revelation in this strict sense. It presupposes the objective revelation and only prepares the heart to respond to and embrace it. But the objective revelation can take no effect on the unprepared heart. What the operation of the Spirit on the heart does, then, is to implant, or rather to restore, a spiritual sense in the soul by which God is recognized in His Word. When this spiritual sense has been produced the necessity of external proofs that the Scriptures are the Word of God is superseded: the Word of God is as immediately perceived as such as light is perceived as light, sweetness as sweetness,—as immediately and as inamissibly. The Christian's knowledge of God, therefore, rests no doubt on an instinctive perception of God native to man as man, developed in the light of a patefaction of God which pervades all nature and history; but particularly on an objective revelation of God deposited in Scriptures which bear in themselves their own evidence of their divine origin, to which every spiritual man responds with the same strength of conviction with which he recognizes light as light. This is the basis which Calvin in his *Institutes* places beneath his systematic exposition of the knowledge of God.

The elements of Calvin's thought here, it will readily be seen, reduce themselves to a few great fundamental principles. These embrace particularly the following doctrines: the doctrine of the innate knowledge of God; the doctrine of the general revelation of God in nature and history; the doctrine of the special revelation of God and its embodiment in Scriptures; the doctrine of the noëtic effects of sin; the doctrine of the testimony of the Holy Spirit. That we may do justice to his thought we must look in some detail at his treatment of each of these doctrines and of the subordinate topics which are necessarily connected with them.

I. NATURAL REVELATION.

That the knowledge of God is innate (I. iii. 3), naturally engraved on the hearts of men (I. v. 4), and so a part of their very constitution as men (I. iii. 1), that it is a matter of instinct (I. iii. 1, I. iv. 2), and every man is self-taught it from his birth (I. iii. 3), Calvin is thoroughly assured. He lays it down as incontrovertible fact that "the human mind, by natural instinct itself, possesses some sense of a deity" (I. iii. 1, *ad init. et ad fin.*; 3,—*sensus divinitatis* or *deitatis*),² and defends the corollaries which flow from this fact, that the knowledge of God is universal and indelible. All men know there is a God, who has made them, and to whom they are responsible. No savage is sunk so low as to have lost this sense of deity, which is wrought into his very constitution: and the degradation of men's worship is a proof of its ineradicableness—since even such dehumanization as this worship manifests has not obliterated it (I. iii. 1). It is the precondition of all religion, without which no religion would ever have arisen; and it forms the silent assumption of all attempts to expound the origin of religion in fraud or political artifice, as it does also of all corruptions of religion, which find their nerve in men's incurable religious propensities (I. iii. 1). The very atheists testify to its persistence in their ill-concealed dread of the deity they profess to despise (I. iv. 2); and the wicked, strive they

² *Instit.* I. iii. 1: *Quemdam inesse humanae menti, et quidem naturali instinctu, divinitatis sensum, extra controversiam ponimus; iii. 3 ad init.*: "This indeed with all rightly judging men will always be assured, that there is engraved on the minds of men *divinitatis sensum, qui deleri numquam potest*"; iii. 3, *med.*: *vigere tamen ac subinde emergere quem maxime extinctum cuperent, deitatis sensum*; iv. 4 *ad fin.*: *naturaliter insculptum esse deitatis sensum humanis cordibus*; iv. 4. *fin.*: *manet tamen semen illud quod revelli a radice nullo modo potest, aliquam esse divinitatem*. The phraseology by which Calvin designates this "natural instinct" (*naturalis instinctus*; III. 1. *ad init.*) varies from *sensus divinitatis* or *sensus deitatis* to such synonyms as: *numinis intelligentia, dei notio, dei notitia*. It is the basis on the one hand of whatever *cognitio dei* man attains to and on the other of whatever *religio* he reaches; whence it is called the *semen religionis*.

never so hard to banish from their consciousness the sense of an accusing deity, are not permitted by nature to forget it (I. iii. 3). Thus the cases alike of the savages, the atheists and the wicked are made contributory to the establishment of the fact, and the discussion concludes with the declaration that it is by this innate knowledge of God that men are discriminated from the brutes, so that for men to lose it would be to fall away from the very law of their creation (I. iii. 3, *ad fin.*).³

If the knowledge of God enters thus into the very idea of humanity and constitutes a law of its being, it follows that it is given in the same act of knowledge by which we know ourselves. This position is developed at length in the opening chapter. The discussion begins with a remark which reminds us of Augustine's familiar contention that the proper concern of mankind is the knowledge of God and the soul; to which it is added at once that these two knowledges are so interrelated that it is impossible to assign the priority to either. The knowledge of self involves the knowledge of God and also profits by the knowledge of God: the better we know ourselves the better we shall know God, but also, we shall never know ourselves as we really are save in contrast with God, by whom is supplied the only standard for the formation of an accurate judgment upon ourselves (I. i. 2). In his analysis of the mode of the

³That the knowledge of God is innate was the common property of the Reformed teachers. Peter Martyr, *Loci Communes*, 1576, *praef.*, declares that *Dei cognitio omnium animis naturaliter innata[est]*. It was thrown into great prominence in the Socinian debate, as the Socinians contended that the human mind is natively a *tabula rasa* and all knowledge is acquired. But in defending the innate knowledge of God, the Reformed doctors were very careful that it should not be exaggerated. Thus Leonh. Riissen, *F. Turretini Compendium . . . auctum et illustratum* (1695), I. 5, remarks: "Some recent writers explain the natural sense of deity (*numinis*) as an *idea of God impressed on our minds*. If this idea is understood as an innate *faculty* for knowing God after some fashion, it should not be denied; but if it expresses an *actual and adequate representation of God from our birth*, it is to be entirely rejected." (Heppe, *Die Dogmatik der evangelisch-reformirten Kirche*. p. 4.)

implication of the knowledge of God in the knowledge of self, Calvin lays the stress upon our nature as dependent, derived, imperfect and responsible beings, which if known at all must be known as such, and to be known as such must be known as over against that Being on whom we are dependent, to whom we owe our being, over against whom our imperfection is manifest, and to whom we are responsible (I. i. 1). As we are not self-existent, we must recognize ourselves as "living and moving" in Another. We recognize ourselves as products, and in knowing the product know the cause; thus our very endowments, seeing that they distil to us by drops from heaven, form so many streams up which our minds must needs travel to their Fountain-head. The perception of our imperfections is at the same time the perception of His perfection; so that our very poverty displays to us His infinite fulness. Our sense of dissatisfaction with ourselves, directs our eyes to Him whose righteous judgment we can but anticipate; and when in the presence of His majesty we realize our meanness and in the presence of His righteousness we realize our sin, our perception of God passes into consternation as we recognize in Him our just Judge.

The emphasis which Calvin places in this analysis upon the sense of sin and the part it plays in our knowledge of God, at once attracts attention. It is perhaps above everything the "miserable ruin" in which we find ourselves, which compels us, according to him, to raise our eyes towards heaven, spurred on not merely by a sense of lack but by a sense of dread: it is only, he declares, when we have begun to be displeased with ourselves that we energetically turn our thoughts Godward. This is already an indication of the engrossment of Calvin in this treatise with practical rather than merely theoretical problems. He is less concerned to show how man as man attains to a knowledge of God, than how man as he actually exists upon the earth attains to it. In the very act of declaring that this knowledge is instinctive and belongs to the very constitution

of man as such, therefore, he so orders the exposition of the mode of its actual rise in the mind as to throw the emphasis on a quality which does not belong to man as such, but only to man as actually existing in the world,—in that “miserable ruin into which we have been plunged by the defection of the first man” (I. i. 1). Man as unfallen, by the very necessity of his nature would have known God, the sphere of his being, the author of his existence, the standard of his excellences; but for man as fallen, Calvin seems to say, the strongest force compelling him to look upwards to the God above him, streams from his sense of sin, filling him with a fearful looking forward to judgment.

It is quite obvious that such a knowledge of God as Calvin here postulates as the unavoidable and ineradicable possession of man, is far from a mere empty conviction that such a being as God exists. The knowledge of God which is given in our knowledge of self is not a bare perception, it is a conception: it has content. “The knowledge of ourselves, therefore,” says Calvin (I. i. 1, *ad fin.*), “is not only an incitement to seek after God, but becomes a considerable assistance towards finding God.” The knowledge of God with which we are natively endowed is therefore more than a bare conviction that God is: it involves, more or less explicated, some understanding of what God is. Such a knowledge of God can never be otiose and inert; but must produce an effect in human souls, in the way of thinking, feeling, willing. In other words, our native endowment is not merely a *sensus deitatis*, but also a *semen religionis* (I. iii. 1, 2; iv. 1, 4; v. 1). For what we call religion is just the reaction of the human soul to what it perceives God to be. Calvin is, therefore, just as insistent that religion is universal as that the knowledge of God is universal. “The seeds of religion”, he insists, “are sown in every heart” (I. iv. 1; v. 1); men are propense to religion (I. iii. 2, *med.*); and always and everywhere frame to themselves a religion, consonant with their conceptions of God.

Calvin's ideas of the origin and nature of religion are set

forth, if succinctly, yet with eminent clearness, in his second chapter. Wherever any knowledge of God exists, he tells us, there religion exists. He is not speaking here of a competent knowledge of God such as redeemed sinners have in Christ. But much less is he speaking of that mere notion that there is such a Being as God which is sometimes called a knowledge of God. It may be possible to speculate on "the essence" of God without being moved by it. But certainly it is impossible to form any vital conception of God without some movement of intellect, feeling and will towards Him; and any real knowledge of God is inseparable from movements of piety towards Him. Piety means reverence and love to God; and the knowledge of God tends therefore to produce in us, first, sentiments of fear and reverence; and, secondly, an attitude of receptivity and praise to Him as the fountain of all blessing. If man were not a sinner, indeed, such would be the result: men, knowing God, would turn to Him in confidence and commit themselves without reserve to His care,—not so much fearing His judgments, as making them in sympathetic loyalty their own (I. ii. 2). And herein we see what pure and genuine religion is: "it consists in faith, united with a serious fear of God, comprehending a voluntary reverence, and producing legitimate worship agreeable to the injunctions of the law" (I. ii. 2, *ad fin.*).⁴

The definition of religion to which Calvin thus attains is exceedingly interesting, and that not merely because of its vital relation to the fundamental thought of these opening chapters, but also because of its careful adjustment to the state of the controversy in which he was engaged as a leader of the Reformation. In the first of these aspects, as we have already pointed out, religion is with him the vital effect of the knowledge of God in the human soul; so that inevitably religions will differ as the conceptions of God

⁴ En quid sit pura germanaque religio, nempe *fides*, cum serio *Dei timore* conjuncta; ut timor et *voluntariam reverentiam* in se contineat, et secum trahat *legitimum cultum*, qualis in Lege praescribitur.

determining our thought and feeling and directing our life differ. In the estate of purity, the knowledge of God produces reverence and trust: and the religion of sinless man will therefore exhibit no other traits but trust and love. In sinful man, the same knowledge of God must produce, rather, a reaction of fear and hate—until the grace of God intervenes with a message of mercy. Sinful man cannot be trusted, therefore, to form his own religion for himself, but must in all his religious functioning place himself unreservedly under the direction of God in his gracious revelation. In its second aspect, then, we perceive Calvin carefully framing his definition so as to exclude all "will-worship" and to prepare the way for the condemnation of the "formal worship" and "ostentation in ceremonies" which had become prevalent in the old Church. The position he takes up here is essentially that which has come down to us under the name of "the Puritan principle". Religion consists, of course, not in the externalities of worship, but in faith, united with a serious fear of God, and a willing reverence. But its external expression in worship is not therefore unimportant, but is to be strictly confined to what is prescribed by God: to "legitimate worship, agreeable to the injunctions of the law" (I. ii. 2, *fin.*). This declaration is returned to and expounded in a striking section of the fourth chapter (I. iv. 3; *cf.* I. v. 13), where Calvin insists that "the divine will is the perpetual rule to which true religion is to be conformed", and asserts of newly-invented modes of worshipping God, that they are tantamount to idolatry. God cannot be pleased by showing contempt for what He commands and substituting other things which He condemns: and none would dare to trifle in such a manner with Him unless they had already transformed Him in their minds into another and different Being: and in that case it is of little importance whether you worship one god or many.⁵

⁵ The significance and relations of "the Puritan principle" of absolute dependence on the Word of God as the source of knowledge of His

From this digression for the sake of asserting the "Puritan", that is, the "Reformed", principle with reference to acceptable worship, it is already apparent that Calvin did not suppose that men have been left to the *notitia Dei insita* for the framing of their religion, although he is insistent that therefrom proceeds a propensity to religion which already secures that all men shall have a religion (I. ii. 2). On the contrary, he teaches that to the ineradicable revelation of Himself which He has imprinted on human nature, God has added an equally clear and abundant revelation of Himself externally to us. As we cannot know ourselves without knowing God, so neither can we look abroad on nature or contemplate the course of events without seeing Him in His works and deeds (I. v). Calvin is exceedingly emphatic as to the clearness, universality and convincingness of this natural revelation of God. The whole world is but a theatre for the display of the divine glory (I. v. 5); God manifests Himself in every part of it, and, turn our eyes whichever way we will, we cannot avoid seeing Him; for there is no atom of the world in which some sparks of His glory do not shine (I. v. 1). So pervasive is God in nature, indeed, that it may even be said by a pious mind that nature is God (I. v. 5),—though the expression is too readily misapprehended in a Pantheistic (I. v. 5) or Materialistic (I. v. 4) sense to justify its use. Accordingly, no man can escape this manifestation of God; we cannot open our eyes without seeing it, and the language in which it is delivered to us penetrates through even the densest stupidity and ignorance (I. v. 1). To every individual on earth, there-
will, and exclusive limitation to its prescriptions of doctrine, life, and even form of Church government and worship, are suggested by Dorner, *Hist. of Protest. Theol.*, I. 390, who criticizes it sharply from his "freer" Lutheran standpoint. But even Luther knew how, on occasion, to invoke "the Puritan principle". Writing to Bartime von Sternberg, Sept. 1, 1523, he says: "For a Christian must do nothing that God has not commanded, and there is no command as to such masses and vigils, but it is solely their own invention, which brings in money, without helping either living or dead" (*The Letters of Martin Luther, Selected and Translated* by Margaret A. Currie, p. 115).

fore, with the exclusion of none (I. v. 7), God abundantly manifests Himself (I. v. 2). Each of the works of God invites the whole human race to the knowledge of Him; while their contemplation in the mass offers an even more prevalent exhibition of Him (I. v. 10). And so clear are His footsteps in His providence, that even what are commonly called accidents are only so many proofs of His activity (I. v. 8).

In developing this statement of the external natural revelation of God, Calvin presents first His patefaction in creation (I. v. 1-6), and then His patefaction in providence (I. v. 7-9), and under each head lays the primary stress on the manifestations of the divine wisdom and power (I. v. 2-5, wisdom; 6, power; 8, wisdom and power). But the other attributes which enter into His glory are not neglected. Thus, under the former caption, he points out that the perception of the divine power in creation "leads us to the consideration of His eternity; because He from whom all things derive their origin must necessarily be eternal and self-existent", while we must postulate goodness and mercy as the motives of His creation and providence (I. v. 6). Under the second caption, he is particularly copious in drawing out the manifestations of the divine benignity and beneficence—of His clemency—though he does not scruple also to point to the signs of His severity (I. v. 7, *cf.* 10). From the particular contemplation of the divine clemency and severity in their peculiar distribution here, indeed, he pauses to draw an argument for a future life when apparent irregularities will be adjusted (I. v. 10).

The vigor and enthusiasm with which Calvin prosecutes his exposition of the patefaction of God in nature and history is worth emphasising further. He even turns aside (I. v. 9) to express his special confidence in it, in contrast to *a priori* reasoning, as the "right way and the best method of seeking God". A speculative inquiry into the essence of God, he suggests, merely fatigues the mind and flutters in the brain. If we would know God vitally, in our hearts, let

us rather contemplate Him in His works. These, we shall find, as the Psalmist points out, declare His greatness and conduce to His praise. Once more, we may observe here the concreteness of Calvin's mind and method, and are reminded of the practical end he keeps continually in view.⁶ So far is he from losing himself in merely speculative elaborations or prosecuting his inquiries under the spur of "presumptuous curiosity", that the practical religious motive is always present, dominating his thought. His special interest in the theistic argument is, accordingly, due less to the consideration that it rounds out his systematic view of truth than to the fact that it helps us to the vital knowledge of God. And therefore he is no more anxious to set it forth in its full force than he is to point out the limitations which affect its practical value.⁷ In and of itself, indeed, it has

⁶ Cf. P. J. Muller, *De Godsleer van Zwingli en Calvijn* (1883), p. 8: "If Zwingli follows more the *a priori*, Calvin follows the *a posteriori* method"; and E. Rabaud, *Hist. de la doctrine de l'inspiration*, etc. (1883), p. 58: "his lucid and, above everything, practical genius."

⁷ It is this distribution of Calvin's interest which leads to the impression that he lays little stress on "the theistic proofs". On the contrary, he asserts their validity most strenuously: only he does not believe that any proofs can work true faith apart from "the testimony of the Spirit", and he is more interested in their value for developing the knowledge of God than for merely establishing His existence. Hence P. J. Muller is wrong when he denies the one to affirm the other, as, *e. g.*, in his *De Godsleer van Zwingli en Calvijn* (1883), p. 11: "Neither by Zwingli nor by Calvin are proofs offered for the existence of God, although some passages in their writings seem to contain suggestions of them. The proposition, 'God exists', needed no proof either for themselves, or for their coreligionists, or even against Rome. The so-called cosmological argument has no doubt been found by some in Zwingli (Zeller, *Das theolog. Syst. Zwinglis* extracted from the *Theol. Jahrb. Tübingen*, 1853, p. 33), and the physico-theological in Calvin (Lipsius, *Lehre der ev.-prot. Dogmatik*, ed. 2, 1879, p. 213); but it would not be difficult to show that we have to do in neither case with a philosophical deduction, but only with a means for attaining the complete knowledge of God." Though Calvin (also Zwingli) makes use of the theistic proofs to develop the knowledge of God, it does not follow that he (or Zwingli) did not value them as proofs of the existence of God. And we do not think Muller is successful (pp. 12 sq.) in explaining away the implication of the latter in Zwingli's use of these theistic arguments, or in Calvin's (p. 16). Schweitzer, *Glaubenslehre der ev.-ref. Kirche*

no limitations: Calvin is fully assured of its validity and analyses its data with entire confidence: to him nothing is more certain than that in the mirror of His works God gives us clear manifestations both of Himself and of His everlasting dominion (I. v. 11). But Calvin cannot content himself with an intellectualistic contemplation of the objective validity of the theistic argument. So dominated is he by practical interests that he actually attaches to the chapter in which he argues this objective validity a series of sections in which he equally strongly argues the subjective inability of man to receive its testimony. Objectively valid as the theistic proofs are, they are ineffective to produce a just knowledge of God in the sinful heart. The insertion of these sections here is the more striking that they almost seem unnecessary in view of the clear exposition of the noëtic effects of sin which had been made in the preceding chapter (ch. iv),—although, of course, there the immediate reference was to the *notitia Dei insita*, while here it is to the *notitia Dei acquisita*.

Thus, however, our attention is drawn very pointedly to Calvin's doctrine of the disabilities with reference to the knowledge of God which are induced in the human mind by sin. He has, as has just been noted, adverted formally to them twice in these opening chapters of his treatise,—on the earlier occasion (ch. iv) with especial reference to the revelation of God made in the constitution of human nature, and on the later occasion (ch. v, §§ 11-15) with especial reference to the revelation of God made in His works and deeds. Were man in his normal state, he could not under this double revelation, internal and external, fail to know God as God would wish to be known. If he actually comes short of an adequate knowledge of God, therefore, this

(1844), I. 250, finds in Calvin's citation of Cicero's declaration that there is no nation so barbarous, no tribe so degraded, that it is not persuaded that a God exists, an appeal to the so-called *historical* argument for the divine existence (*cf.* the use of it by Zwingli, *Opera*, III. 156): but Calvin's real attitude to the theistic argument is rather to be sought in the implications of the notably eloquent ch. 5.

cannot be attributed to any shortcomings in the revelation of God. Calvin is perfectly clear as to the objective adequacy of the general revelation of God. Men, however, do come short of an adequate knowledge of God; and that not merely some men, but all men: the failure of the general revelation of God to produce in men an adequate knowledge of Him is as universal as is the revelation itself. The explanation is to be found in the corruption of men's hearts by sin, by which not merely are they rendered incapable of reading off the revelation of God which is displayed in His works and deeds, but their very instinctive knowledge of God, embedded in their constitution as men, is dulled and almost obliterated. The energy with which Calvin asserts this is almost startling, and matches in its emphasis that which he had placed on the reality and objective validity of the revelation of God. Though the seeds of religion are sown by God in every heart, yet not one man in a hundred has preserved even these seeds sound, and in no one at all have they grown to their legitimate harvest. All have degenerated from the true knowledge of God, and genuine piety has perished from the earth (I. iv. 1). The light which God has kindled in the breasts of men has been smothered and all but extinguished by their iniquity (I. iv. 4). The manifestation which God has given of Himself in the structure and organization of the world is lost on our stupidity (I. v. 11). The rays of God's glory are diffused all around us, but do not illuminate the darkness of our mind (I. v. 14). So that in point of fact, "men who are taught only by nature, have no certain, sound or distinct knowledge, but are confined to confused principles; they worship accordingly an unknown God" (I. v. 12, *fin.*): "no man can have the least knowledge of true and sound doctrine without having been a disciple of the Scriptures" (I. vi. 2 *fin.*): "the human mind is through its imbecility unable to attain any knowledge of God without the assistance of the Sacred Word" (I. vi. 4, *fin.*).

Calvin therefore teaches with great emphasis the bank-

ruptcy of the natural knowledge of God. We must keep fully in mind, however, that this is not due in his view to any inadequacy or ineffectiveness of natural revelation, considered objectively.⁸ He continues to insist that the seeds of religion are sown in every heart (I. v. 1 *ad init.*); that through all man's corruption the instincts of nature still suggest the memory of God to his mind (I. v. 2); that it is impossible to eradicate that sense of the deity which is naturally engraved on all hearts (I. v. 4, *fin*); that the structure and organization of the world, and the things that daily happen out of the ordinary course of nature, that is under the providential government of God, bear a witness to God which the dumbest ear cannot fail to hear (I. v. 1, 3, 7, esp. II. vi. 1); and that the light that shines from creation, while it may be smothered, cannot be so extinguished but that some rays of it find their way into the most darkened soul (I. vi. 14). God has therefore never left Himself without a witness; but, "with various and most abundant benignity sweetly allures men to a knowledge of Him, though they persist in following their own ways, their pernicious and fatal errors" (I. vi. 14). The sole cause of the failure of the natural revelation is to be found, therefore, in the corruption of the human heart. Two results flow from this fact. First, it is not a question of the extinction of the knowledge of God, but of the corruption of the knowledge of God. And secondly, men are without excuse for their corruption of the knowledge of God. On both points Calvin is insistent.

He does not teach that all religion has perished out of the earth, but only that no "genuine piety" remains (I. iv. 1 *init*): he does not teach that men retain no knowledge of God, but no "certain, sound or distinct knowledge" (I. v. 12, *fin*). The seed of religion remains their inalienable possession, "but it is so corrupted as to

⁸ P. J. Muller, *De Godsleer van Zwingli en Calvijn* (1883), pp. 18 sq., does not seem to bear this in mind, although he had clearly stated it in his *De Godsleer van Calvijn* (1881), pp. 13-25.

produce only the worst fruits" (I. v. 4, *fin*). Here we see Calvin's judgment on natural religion. Its reality he is quick to assert: but equally quickly its inadequacy—and that because not merely of a negative incompleteness but also of a positive corruption. Men have corrupted the knowledge of God; and perhaps Calvin might even subscribe the declaration of a modern writer that men's religions are their worst crimes.⁹ Certainly Calvin paints in dark colors, the processes by which men form for themselves conceptions of God under the light of nature, or rather, in the darkness of their minds, from which the light of nature is as far as lies in their power excluded. "Their conceptions of God are formed, not according to the representations He gives of Himself, but by the invention of their own presumptuous imaginations" (I. iv. 1, *med.*). They set Him far off from themselves and make Him a mere idler in heaven (I. iv. 2); they invent all sorts of vague and confused notions concerning Him, until they involve themselves in such a vast accumulation of errors as almost to extinguish the light that is within them (I. iv. 4); they confuse Him with His works, until even a Plato loses himself in the round globe (I. v. 11); they even endeavor to deny His very existence (I. v. 12), and substitute demons in His place (I. v. 13). Certainly it is not surprising, then, that the Holy Spirit, speaking in Scripture, "condemns as false and lying whatever was formerly worshipped as divine among the Gentiles", nay, "rejects as false every form of worship which is of human contrivance", and "leaves no Deity but in Mount Zion" (I. v. 13). The religions of men differ, doubtless, among themselves: some are more, some less evil; but all are evil and the evil of none is trivial.

⁹ Cf. F. C. Baur, *Die christliche Lehre von der Dreieinigkeit*, etc., III. (1843), p. 41: "From this point of view"—he is expounding Calvin's doctrine—"the several manifestations in the history of religions are conceived not as stages in the gradually advancing evolution of the religious consciousness, but as inexcusable, sinful aberrations, as wilful perversions and defacements of the inborn idea of God."

Are men to be excused for this, their corruption of the knowledge of God? Are we to listen with sympathy to the plea that light has been lacking? It is not a case of insufficient light, but of an evil heart. Excuses are vain, for this heart-darkness is criminal. If we speak of ignorance here, we must remember it is a guilty ignorance; an ignorance which rests on pride and vanity and contumacy (I. iv. 1), an ignorance which our own consciences will not excuse (I. v. 15). What! shall we plead that we lack ears to hear what even mute creatures proclaim? that we have no eyes to see what it needs no eyes to see? that we are mentally too weak to learn what mindless creatures teach? (I. v. 15). We are ignorant of what all things conspire to inform us of, only because we sinfully corrupt their message: their insufficiency has its roots in us, not in them; wherefore we are without excuse (I. iv. 1: v. 14-15). Our "folly is inexcusable, seeing that it originates not only in a vain curiosity, but in false confidence, and an immoderate desire to exceed the limits of human knowledge" (I. iv. 1 *fin*). "Whatever deficiency of natural ability prevents us from attaining the pure and clear knowledge of God, yet, since that deficiency arises from our own fault, we are left without any excuse" (I. v. 15).

The natural revelation of God failing thus to produce its legitimate effects of a sound knowledge of God, because of the corruption of men's hearts, we are thrown back for any adequate knowledge of God upon supernatural activities of God communicating His truth to men. It is accordingly in an assertion and validation of these supernatural revelatory operations of God that Calvin's discussion reaches its true center. To this extent his whole discussion of natural revelation—in its inception in the implantation in man of a *sensus deitatis*, in its culmination in the patefaction of God in His works and deeds, and in its failure through the sin-bred blindness of humanity—may be said to be merely introductory to and intended to prepare the way for his discussion of the supernatural operations of God by which

He meets this otherwise hopeless condition of humanity sunk in its corrupt notions of God. These operations obviously must meet a twofold need. A clearer and fuller revelation of God must be brought to men than that which is afforded by nature. And the darkened minds of men must be illuminated for its reception. In other words, what is needed, is a special supernatural revelation on the one hand, and a special supernatural illumination on the other. It is to the validation of this twofold supernatural operation of God in communicating the knowledge of Himself that Calvin accordingly next addresses himself (chs. vi-ix).

One or two peculiarities of his treatment of them attract our notice at the outset, and seem to invite attention, before we enter into a detailed exposition of the doctrine he presents. It is noticeable that Calvin does not pretend that this supernatural provision of knowledge of God to meet men's sin-born ignorance is as universal in its reach as the natural revelation which it supplements and, so far as efficiency is concerned, supersedes. On the contrary, he draws it expressly into a narrower circle. That general revelation "presented itself to all eyes" and "is more than sufficient to deprive the ingratitude of men of every excuse, since", in it, "God, in order to involve all mankind in the same guilt, sets an exhibition of His majesty, delineated in the creatures, before them all without exception" (I. vi. 1, *init.*). But His supernatural revelation He grants only "to those whom He intends to unite in a more close and familiar connection with Himself" (*ibid.*); "to those to whom He has determined to make His instructions effectual" (I. vi. 3); in a word, to "the elect" (I. vi. 1; vii. 5 near end). In dealing with the supernatural revelation of God, therefore, Calvin is conscious of dealing with a special operation of the divine grace by means of which God is communicating to those He is choosing to be His people the saving knowledge of Himself. It is observable also that, in speaking of this supernatural revelation, he identifies it from the outset distinctly with the Scriptures (ch. vi). This is in accord-

ance with the practical end and engrossment which, as we have already had occasion to note, dominate his whole discussion. He was not unaware that the special revelation of God antedates the Scriptures: on occasion he speaks discriminatingly enough of this revelation in itself and the Scriptures in which it is embodied. But his mind is less on the abstract truth than on the concrete conditions which surrounded him in his work. Whatever may have been true ages gone, to-day the special revelation of God coalesces with the Scriptures, and he does not occupy himself formally with it except as it presents itself to the men of his own time. The task which he undertakes, therefore, is distinctly to show that men have in the Scriptures a special revelation of God supplementing and so far superseding the general revelation of God in nature; and that God so operates with this His special revelation of Himself as to overcome the sin-bred disabilities of man.

In this state of the case we may perhaps be justified in leaving at this point the logical development of his construction and expounding Calvin's teaching more formally under the heads of his doctrine of Holy Scripture and his doctrine of the Testimony of the Holy Spirit.

II. HOLY SCRIPTURE.

First, then, what was Calvin's doctrine of Holy Scripture?

Under the designation of "Scripture" or "the Scriptures" Calvin understood that body of writings which have been transmitted to us as the divinely given rule of faith and life. In this body of writings, that is to say, in "the Canon

¹⁰ Cf. J. Cramer, *Nieuwe Bijdragen op het gebied van Godgeleerdheid en Wijsbegeerte*, III (1881), p. 202: "By the Scripture or the Scriptures he [Calvin] understood the books of the Old and New Testaments which have been transmitted to us by the Church as canonical, as the rule of faith and life. The Apocrypha of the O. T. as they were determined by the Council of Trent, he excludes. They are to him indeed *libri ecclesiastici*, in many respects good and useful to be read; but they are not *libri canonici* 'ad fidem dogmatum faciendam' (*Acta Synodi Tridentinae, cum antidoto*, 1547)." In a later article, *De Roomsche Katholieke en de Oud-protestantsche Schriftbeschouwing*, 1883, p. 36,

of Scripture", he included all the books of the Old Covenant which were recognized by the Jewish Church as of divine gift, and as such handed down to the Christian Church; and all the books of the New Covenant which have been given the Church by the Apostles as its authoritative law-code. Calvin's attitude towards the canon was thus somewhat more conservative than, say, Luther's. He knew of no such distinction as that between Canonical and Deutero-Canonical Books, whether in the Old or the New Testament. The so-called "Apocryphal Books" of the Old Testament, included within the canon by the decrees of Trent, he rejected out of hand: the so-called "Antilegomena" of the New Testament he accepted without exception.¹⁰

The representations which are sometimes made, to the effect that he felt doubts of the canonicity of some of the canonical books or even was convinced of their uncanonicity,¹¹ rest on a fundamental misconception of his attitude,

Cramer declares that by the Scriptures, Calvin means "nothing else than the canon, established by the Synods of Hippo and Carthage, and transmitted by the Catholic Church, with the exception of the so-called Apocrypha of the O. T.", etc. Cf. Leipoldt: *Geschichte d. N. T. Kanons*, II, 1908, p. 140: "We obtain the impression that it is only for form's sake that Calvin undertakes to test whether the disputed books are canonical or not. In reality it is already a settled matter with him that they are. Calvin feels himself therefore in the matter of the N. T. canon bound to the mediæval tradition." Cf. also Otto Ritschl, *Dogmengeschichte des Protestantismus*, I, 1908, p. 70, to the same effect.

¹⁰Cf., e. g., J. Pannier *Le témoignage du Saint-Esprit* (1893), pp. 112 sq.: "One fact strikes us at first sight: not only did Calvin not comment on the Apocryphal books, for which he wrote a very short preface, which was ever more and more abridged in the successive editions, but he did not comment on all the Canonical books. And if lack of time may explain the passing over of some of the less important historical books of the Old Testament, it was undoubtedly for a graver reason that he left to one side the three books attributed to Solomon, notably the Song of Songs. 'In the New Testament there is ordinarily mentioned only the Apocalypse, neglected by Calvin undoubtedly for critical or theological motives analogous to those which determined the most of his contemporaries, but it is necessary to note that the two lesser epistles of John are also lacking, and that in speaking of the large epistle Calvin always expresses himself as if it were the only existing one' (Reuss, *Revue de Théologie de Strasbourg*, VI (1853), p. 229). In

and are wrecked on his express assertions. No doubt he has not left us commentaries on all the Biblical Books, and no doubt his omission to write or lecture on certain books is not to be explained merely by lack of time, but involves an act of selection on his part, which was not unaffected by his estimate of the relative importance of the several books or by his own spiritual sympathies.¹² He has also occasionally

effect, at the very time when he was defending particularly the authority of the Scriptures against the Council of Trent, when he was dedicating to Edward VI, the King of England, his Commentaries on the 'Epistles which are accustomed to be called Canonical' (1551), he included in the Canon only the First Epistle of Peter, the First Epistle of John, James and, at the very end, the Second Epistle of Peter and Jude."—Reuss, however, in his *History of the Canon of the Holy Scriptures in the Christian Church* (1862, E. T. 1884), greatly modifies the opinion here quoted from him: "Some have believed it possible to affirm that Calvin rejected the Apocalypse because it was the only book of the N. T., except the two short Epistles of John, on which he wrote no commentary. But that conclusion is too hasty. In the *Institutes*, the Apocalypse is sometimes quoted like the other Apostolic writings, and even under John's name. If there was no commentary, it was simply that the illustrious exegete, wiser in this respect than several of his contemporaries and many of his successors, understood that his vocation called him elsewhere" (p. 318). He adds, indeed, of 2 and 3 John: "It might be said with more probability that Calvin did not acknowledge the canonicity of these two writings. He never quotes them, and he quotes the First Epistle of John in a way to exclude them: *Joannes in sua canonica*, *Instit.* iii. 2. 24; 3. 23 (*Opp.* ii. 415-453)." But this opinion requires revision, just as that on the Apocalypse did, as we shall see below. Cf. further, in the meantime, Reuss: *Hist. of the Sacred Scriptures of the N. T.*, ii. 347, and S. Berger, *La Bible au Seizième Siècle* (1879), p. 120, who expresses himself most positively: "Calvin expresses no judgment on the lesser Epistles of St. John. But we remark that he never cites them and that he mentions the First in these terms: 'As John says in his canonical.' This word excludes, in the thought of the author, the two other Epistles attributed to this Apostle."

¹² This may have been the case with the Apocalypse, which not only Reuss, as we have seen, but Scaliger thought him wise not to have entered upon; and which he is—perhaps credibly—reported to have said in conversation he did not understand (cf. Leipoldt's *Geschichte des N. T. Kanons*, II, p. 48, note). But how impossible it is to imagine that this implies any doubt of the canonicity or authority of the book will be quickly evident to anyone who will note his frequent citation of it in the same fashion with other Scripture and alongside of other

employed a current expression, such as, for example, "the Canonical Epistle of John",¹³ when speaking of 1 John, which, if strictly interpreted, might be thought to imply denial of the genuineness of certain books of the canon,—

Scripture (*e. g.*, *Opp.* I. 736 = II. 500; I. 983 = II. 957; I. 1033 = II. 1063; I. 1148 = II. 521; II. 88, 357, 859. V. 191, 195, 1199, 532. VI. 176. VII. 29, 118, 333. XXXI. 650), sometimes mentioning it by name (VII. 467; I. 733 = II. 497), sometimes by the name of John (I. 715 = II. 492, VIII. 338 [along with 1 John]), sometimes by the name of both 'John' and 'the Apocalypse' (I. 506 = II. 125, VII. 116, XXX. 651, XLVIII. 122, XXIV. 43), and always with reverence and confidence as a Scriptural book. He even expressly cites it under the name of Scripture and explicitly as the dictation of the Spirit: VII. 539, "Fear not, says the Scripture (Eccles. xviii. 22). . . . Again (Rev. xxii. 11) . . . and (John xv. 2)"; I. 624: "Elsewhere also the Spirit testifies . . . " (along with Daniel and Paul). *Cf.* also such passages as II. 734, "Nor does the Apocalypse which they quote afford them any support . . . "; XLVIII. 238: "I should like to ask the Papists if they think John was so stupid that . . . etc. (Rev. xxii. 8)"; also VI. 369; V. 198.

¹³ We use the simple expression "the Epistle of John"; the apparently, but only apparently, stronger and more exclusive, "the Canonical Epistle of John", which Calvin employs, although it would be misleading in our associations, is its exact synonym. Those somewhat numerous writers who have quoted the form "the Canonical Epistle of John" as if its use implied the denial of the *canonicity* of the other epistles of John forget that this was the ordinary designation in the West of the Catholic Epistles—"the Seven Canonical Epistles"—and that they are all currently cited by this title by Western writers. The matter has been set right by A. Lang: *Die Bekehrung Johanns Calvins* (II. 1. of Bonwetch and Seeberg's *Studien zur Geschichte der Theologie und der Kirche* (1897), pp. 26-29). On the title "Canonical Epistles" for the Catholic Epistles, see Lücke, *SK.* 1836, iii. 643-659; Bleek, *Introd. to the N. T.*, § 202 at end; Hilgenfeld, *Einleitung in d. N. T.*, p. 153; Westcott, *Epp. of St. John*, p. xxix; Salmond, *Hastings BD.* I., p. 360. In 1151, Calvin published his *Commentarii in Epistolas Canonicas*—that is on the Catholic Epistles; also his *Commentaire sur l'Épître Canonique de St. Jean*, i. *e.*, on "the Epistle of John"; also his *Commentaire sur l'Épître Canonique de S. Jude*. Calvin does not seem ever to have happened to quote from 2 and 3 John. The reference given in the Index printed in *Opp.* xxii, viz., 3 Jno. 9, *Opp.* 10, part 2, p. 81, occurs in a letter, not by Calvin but by Christof Libertetus to Farel. *Cf.* J. Leipoldt, *Geschichte des N. T. Kanons* (2nd Part, Leipzig, 1908), p. 148, note 1: "The smaller Johannine Epistles Calvin seems never to have cited. He cites 1 John in *Inst.* III. ii. 21 by the formula: *dicat Johannes in sua canonica*. Nevertheless it is very questionable whether inferences can be drawn from this formula as to Calvin's attitude to 2 and 3 Jno." He adds a reference to Lang as above.

such as 2 and 3 John,—and not merely the momentary or habitual neglect of them; just as the common use of the term “the Apostle” of Paul might be said, if similarly strictly pressed, to imply that there was no other Apostle but he. It is also true that he expresses himself with moderation when adducing the evidence for the canonicity of this book or that, and in his modes of statement quite clearly betrays his recognition that the evidence is more copious or more weighty in some cases than in others. But he represents the evidence as sufficient in all cases and declares with confidence his conclusion in favor of the canonicity of the whole body of books which make up our Bible, and in all his writings and controversies acts firmly on this presupposition. How, for example, is it possible to contend that some grave reason connected with doubts on his part of their canonical authority underlies the failure of Calvin to comment on “the three books attributed to Solomon, particularly the Song of Songs”,¹⁴ in the face of the judgment of the ministers of Geneva with regard to Castellion, which is thus reported by Calvin himself over his signature.¹⁵ “We unanimously judged him one who might be appointed to the functions of the pastor, except for a single obstacle which opposed it. When we asked him, according to custom, whether he was in accord with us on all points of doctrine, he replied that there were two on which he could not share our views: one of them . . . being our inscribing the Song of Solomon in the number of sacred books. . . . We conjured him first of all, not to permit himself the levity of treating as of no account the constant witness of the universal Church; we reminded him that there is no book the authenticity of which is doubtful, about which some discussion has not been raised; that even those to which we now attach an undisputed authen-

¹⁴ Pannier, as cited, p. 113.

¹⁵ *Opera*, xi. 674-676: cf. Buisson, *Castellion* (1892), I. 198-199. Buisson discusses the whole incident and quotes from the minutes of the Council before which Castellion brought the matter: the point of dispute is there briefly expressed thus: “Moss” Calvin recognizes as holy, and the said Bastian repudiates” the book in question.

ticity were not admitted from the beginning without controversy; that precisely this one is one which has never been openly repudiated. We also exhorted him against trusting unreasonably in his own judgment, especially where nothing was toward which all the world had not been aware of before he was born. . . . All these arguments having no effect on him, we thought it necessary to consider among ourselves what we ought to do. Our unanimous opinion was that it would be dangerous and would set a bad precedent to admit him to the ministry in these circumstances. . . . We should thus condemn ourselves for the future to raise no objection to another, should one present himself and wish similarly to repudiate Ecclesiastes or Proverbs or any other book of the Bible, without being dragged into a debate as to what is and what is not worthy of the Holy Spirit."¹⁶ Not merely the firmness with which Calvin held to the canonicity of all the books of our Bible, but the importance he attached to the acceptance of the canonical Scriptures in their integrity, is made perfectly clear by such an incident; and indeed so also are the grounds on which he accepted these books as canonical.

¹⁶ Calvin employs all these "three books attributed to Solomon" freely as Scripture and deals with them precisely as he does with other Scriptures. As was to be expected, he cites Proverbs most frequently, Canticles least: but he cites them all as Solomon's and as authoritative Scripture. "'I have washed my feet' says the believing soul in Solomon . . ." is the way he cites Canticles (*Opp.* i. 778, ii. 589, *cf.* vii. 760). "They make a buckler of a sentence of Solomon's, which is as contrary to them as is no other that is in the Scriptures" (vii. 130) is the way he cites Ecclesiastes. He indeed expressly contrasts Ecclesiastes as genuine Scripture with the Apocryphal books: "As the soul has an origin apart, it has also another preëminence, and this is what Solomon means when he says that at death the body returns to the earth from which it was taken and the soul returns to God who gave it (Eccl. xii. 7). For this reason it is said in the Book of Wisdom (ii. 23) that man is immortal, seeing that he was created in the image of God. This is not an authentic book of Holy Scripture, but it is not improper to avail ourselves of its testimony as of an ancient teacher (*Docteur ancien*)—although the single reason ought to be enough for us that the image of God, as it has been placed in man, can reside only in an immortal soul, etc." (vii. 112, 1544).

These grounds, to speak briefly, were historico-critical. Calvin, we must bear in mind, was a Humanist before he was a Reformer,¹⁷ and was familiar with the whole process of determining the authenticity of ancient documents. If then he received the Scriptures from the hands of the Church, not indulging himself in the levity of treating the constant witness of the universal Church as of no account, he was nevertheless not disposed to take "tradition" uncritically at its face value. His acceptance of the canon of the Church was therefore not a blind but a critically mediated acceptance. Therefore he discarded the Apocrypha: and if he accepted the Antilegomena it was because they commended themselves to his historico-critical judgment as holding of right a place in the canon. The organon of his critical investigation of the canon was in effect twofold. He inquired into the history of the books in question. He inquired into their internal characteristics. Have they come down to us from the Apostolic Church, commanding either unbrokenly or on the whole the suffrages of those best informed or best qualified to judge of their canonical claims? Are they in themselves conformable to the claims made for them of apostolic, which is as much as to say, divine origin? It was by the application of this twofold test that he excluded the Apocrypha of the Old Testament from the canon. They had in all ages been discriminated from the canonical books, and differ from them as the writing of an individual differs from an instrument which has passed under the eye of a notary and been sealed to be received of all.¹⁸ Some fathers, it is true, deemed them

¹⁷ Cf. A. Bossert, *Calvin* (1906), p. 6: "Humanist himself as well as profound theologian . . ." Charles Borgeaud, *Histoire de l'Université de Genève* (1900), p. 21: "Before he was a theologian, Calvin was a Humanist . . ."

¹⁸ Cf. the *Preface* he prefixed to the Apocryphal Books (for the history of which, see *Opera*, ix. 827, note): "These books which are called Apocryphal have in all ages been discriminated from those which are without difficulty shown to be of the Sacred Scriptures. For the ancients, wishing to anticipate the danger that any profane books should be mixed with those which certainly proceeded from the Holy Spirit,

canonical; even Augustine was of that way of thinking, although he had to allow that opinions differed widely upon the matter. Others, however, could admit them to no higher rank than that of "ecclesiastical books", which might be useful to read but could not supply a foundation for doctrine; among such were Jerome and Rufinus.¹⁹ And, when we observe their contents, no sane mind will fail to pass judgment against them.²⁰ Rome may, indeed, find her interest in defending them, for she may discover support in them for some of her false teachings. But this very fact is their condemnation. "I beg you to observe", he says of the closing words of 2 Maccabees, where the writer sets his hope in his own works: "I beg you to observe how far this con-

made a roll of these latter which they called 'Canon'; meaning by this word that all that was comprehended under it was the assured rule to which we should attach ourselves. Upon the others they imposed the name of Apocrypha; denoting that they were to be held as private writings and not authenticated, like public documents. Accordingly the difference between the former and latter is the same as that between an instrument, passed before a notary, and sealed to be received by all, and the writing of some particular man. It is true they are not to be despised, seeing that they contain good and useful doctrine. Nevertheless it is only right that what we have been given by the Holy Spirit should have preëminence above all that has come from men." Cf., in his earliest Christian treatise, the *Psychopannychia* of 1534-1542 (*Opp.* v. 182), where, after quoting Ecclus. xvii. 1 and Wisd. ii. 23 as "two sacred writers", he adds: "I would not urge the authority of these writers strongly on our adversaries, did they not oppose them to us. They may be allowed, however, some weight, if not as canonical, yet certainly as ancient, as pious, and as received by the suffrages of many. But let us omit them and let us retain . . ." etc. In the *Psychopannychia* his dealing with Baruch on the other hand is more wavering. On one occasion (p. 205) it is quoted with the formula, "sic enim loquitur propheta", and on another (p. 229), "in prophetia Baruch" corrected in 1542. In the *Institutes* of 1536 he quotes it as Scripture: "alter vero propheta scribit" (*Opp.* i. 82),—referring back to Daniel. This is already corrected in 1539 (i. 906; cf. ii. 632). In 1534-1536, then, he considered Baruch canonical: afterwards not so. His dealing with it in v. 271 (1537), vi. 560 (1545), vi. 638 (1546) is *ad hominem*.

¹⁹ *Acta Synodi Tridentinae, cum Antidoto* (1547).

²⁰ *Vera ecclesiae reformandae ratio*, p. 613: quae divinitus non esse prodita, sani omnes, saltem ubi moniti fuerint judicabunt.

fession falls away from the majesty of the Holy Spirit"²¹—that is to say, from the constant teaching of Holy Scripture.

And it was by the application of the same two-fold test that he accredited the Antilegomena of the New Testament as integral parts of the canon. In the Preface which he has prefixed to 2 Peter, for example, he notes that Eusebius speaks of some who rejected it. "If it is a question", he adds, "of yielding to the simple authority of men, since Eusebius does not name those who brought the matter into doubt, no necessity seems to be laid on us to credit these unknown people. And, moreover, he adds that afterwards it was generally received without contradiction. . . . It is a matter agreed upon by all, of common accord, that there is nothing in this Epistle unworthy of Saint Peter, but that, on the contrary, from one end of it to the other, there are apparent the force, vehemence and grace of the Spirit with which the Apostles were endowed. . . . Since, then, in all parts of the Epistle the majesty of the Spirit of Christ is clearly manifest, I cannot reject it entirely, although I do not recognize in it the true and natural phrase of Saint Peter."²² To meet the difficulty arising from the difference of the style from that of 1 Peter, he therefore supposed that the Epistle is indeed certainly Peter's, since otherwise it would be a forgery, a thing inconceivable in a book of its high character,²³ but was dictated in his old age to some one of his disciples, to whom it owes its peculiarities of diction. Here we have an argument conducted on the two grounds of the external witness of the Church and the internal testimony of the contents of the book: and these are the two grounds on which he everywhere depends. Of

²¹ *Acta Synodi Tridentinae, cum antidoto*: Quantum, obsecro, a Spiritus Sancti majestati aliena est haec confessio!

²² This is translated from the French version, ed. Meyrueis, IV. 743. The Latin is the same, though somewhat more concise: nihil Petro indignum, ut vim spiritus apostolici et gratiam ubique appareat: eam prorsus repudiare mihi religio.

²³ Haec fictio indigna esset nimistro Christi, obtendere alienam personam.

the Epistle of Jude he says:²⁴ "Because the reading of it is very useful, and it contains nothing that is not in accord with the purity of the Apostolic doctrine; because also it has long been held to be authentic by all the best men, for my part, I willingly place it in the number of the other epistles." In other cases the external evidence of the Church is not explicitly mentioned and the stress of the argument is laid on the Apostolic character of the writing as witnessed by its contents. He receives Hebrews among the Apostolic Epistles without difficulty, because nowhere else is the sacrifice of Christ more clearly or simply declared and other evangelical doctrines taught: surely it must have been due to the wiles of Satan that the Western Church so long doubted its canonicity.²⁵ James seems to him to contain nothing unworthy of an Apostle of Christ, but to be on the contrary full of good teaching, valuable for all departments of Christian living.²⁶ For the application of this argument he of course takes his start from the Homologoumena, which gave him the norm of Apostolic teaching which he used for testing the other books. It must not be supposed that he received even these books, however, without critico-historical inquiry: but only that the uniform witness of the Church to their authority weighed with him above all grounds of doubt. It was, in a word, on the ground of a purely scientific investigation that Calvin accredited to himself the canon. It had come down to him through the ages, accredited as such by the constant testimony of its proper witnesses: and it accredited itself to critical scrutiny by its contents.²⁷

²⁴ Ed. Meyrueis, IV. 780.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, IV. 362.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, IV. 694. Latin: mihi ad epistolam hanc recipiendam satis est, quod nihil continet Christi apostolo indignum.

²⁷ Cf. J. Cramer, as cited, p. 126: "It was thus, in the first place, as the result of scientific investigations that Calvin fixed the limits of the canon . . . not *a priori*, but *a posteriori*, that he came to the recognition of the canonicity of the Biblical books." But especially see the excellently conceived passage on p. 155, to the following effect: "What great importance Calvin attaches to the question whether a Biblical

The same scientific spirit attended Calvin in his dealing with the text of Scripture. As a Humanist he was familiar with the processes employed in settling the texts of classical authors; and naturally he used the same methods in his determination of the text of the Biblical books. His practice here is marked by a combination of freedom and sobriety; and his decisions, though often wrong, as they could not but be in the state of the knowledge of the transmission of the New Testament text at the time, always man-
book is apostolic! If it is not apostolic, he does not recognize it as canonical. To determine its apostolicity, he appeals not merely to the ecclesiastical tradition of its origin, but also and principally to its contents. This is what he does in the case of all the antilegomena. The touchstone for this is found in the homologoumena. That he undertakes no investigation of the apostolic origin of these latter is a matter of course. This, for him and for all his contemporaries, stood irreversibly settled. The touchstone employed by Calvin is a scientific one. The testimonium Spiritus Sancti no doubt made its influence felt. But without the help of the scientific investigation, this internal testimony would not have the power to elevate the book into a canonical book. That Calvin was treading here in the footprints of the ancient Church will be understood. The complaint sometimes brought against the Christians of the earliest centuries is unfounded, that they held all writings canonical in which they found their own dogmatics. No doubt they attached in their criticism great weight to this. But not less to the question whether the origin of the books was traceable back to the apostolical age, and their contents accorded with apostolic doctrine, as it might be learned from the indubitably apostolic writings. So far as science had been developed in their day, they employed it in the formation of the canon . . . " In a later article Cramer says: "In the determination of the compass of Scripture, Calvin, like Luther, took his start from the writings which more than the others communicated the knowledge of Christ in His kingdom and had been recognized always by the Church as genuine and trustworthy. Even if the results of his criticism were more in harmony than was the case with those of the German reformer with the ecclesiastical tradition, he yet walked in the self-same critical pathway. He took over the canon of the Church just as little as its version and its exegesis without scrutiny" (*De Roomsche-Katholieke en de Oud-protestantsche Schrift-beschouwing*, 1883, pp. 31-32). Cramer considers this critical procedure on Calvin's part inconsistent with his doctrine of the testimony of the Spirit, but (p. 38) he recognizes that we cannot speak of it as the nodding of Homer: "It is not here and there, but throughout; not in his exegetical writings alone, but in his dogmatic ones, too, that he walks in this critical path. We never find the faintest trace of hesitation."

ifest good sense, balance and trained judgment. In his remarks on the pericope of the adulteress (Jno. vii. 53-viii. 11), we meet the same circle of ideas with which we are familiar from his remarks on the Antilegomena: "because it has always been received by the Latin Churches and is found in many of the Greek copies and old writers, and contains nothing which would be unworthy of an apostolical spirit, there is no reason why we should refuse to take our profit from it."²⁸ He accepts the three-witness passage of 1 Jno. v. 7. "Since the Greek codices do not agree with themselves", he says, "I scarcely dare reach a conclusion. Yet, as the context flows most smoothly if this clause is added, and I see that it stands in the best codices and those of the most approved credit, I also willingly adopt it." When puzzled by difficulties, he, quite like the Humanist dealing with a classical text, feels free to suggest that there may be a "mendum in voce". This he does, for example, in Mat. xxiii. 35, where he adduces this possibility among others; and still more instructively in Mat. xxvii. 9, where he just as simply assumes "Jeremiah" to be a corrupt reading²⁹ as his own editors assume that the "Apius" which occurs in the French version of the *Institutes* in connection with Josephus is due to a slip of his translators, not of his own—remarking: "It is evident that it cannot be Calvin who translated this passage."³⁰ His assurance that it cannot be the Biblical writer who stumbles leads him similarly to attribute what seems to him a manifest error to the copyists. It is only, however, in such passages as these that he engages formally in textual emendation. Ordinarily he simply follows the current text, although he is, of course, not without an intelligent ground for his confidence in it.³¹ As we cursorily read his com-

²⁸ Comment on John viii. 1 (Meyrueis' ed. of the Commentaries, II. 169).

²⁹ Quomodo Jeremiae nomen obrepserit, me nescire fateor, nec anxie laboro; certe Jeremiae nomen errore positum esse pro Zacharia res ipsa ostendit; quia nihil tale apud Jeremiam legitur.

³⁰ *Opera*. III. 100, note 3.

³¹ Cf. J. Cramer, as cited, pp. 116-117: "Calvin does not largely busy

mentaries we feel ourselves in the hands of one who is sanely and sagely scrutinizing the text with which he is dealing from the point of view of a scholar accustomed to deal with ancient texts, whose confidence in its general integrity represents the well-grounded conclusion of a trained judgment. His occasional remarks on the text, and his rare suggestion of a corruption, are indicia of the alertness of his general scrutiny of the text and serve to assure us that his acceptance of it as a whole as sound is not merely inert acquiescence in tradition, but represents the calm judgment of an instructed intelligence.

INSPIRATION OF SCRIPTURE.

Now, these sixty-six books of canonical Scriptures handed down to us, in the singular providence of God,⁸² in a sound text which meets the test of critical scrutiny, Calvin held to be the very Word of God. This assertion he intended in its simplest and most literal sense. He was far from overlooking the fact that the Scriptures were written by human hands: he expressly declares that, though we have received them from God's own mouth, we have nevertheless received them "through the ministry of men".⁸³ But he was equally far from conceiving that the relation of their human authors to their divine author resembled in any degree that of free intermediaries, who, after receiving the divine word, could do with it what they listed.⁸⁴ On the

himself with textual criticism. He follows the text which was generally received in his day. It deserves notice only that he exercises a free and independent judgment and recognizes the rights of science." Cramer adduces his treatment of 1 Jno. v. 7 and proceeds: "He comes forward on scientific grounds against the Vulgate. The decree of Trent that this version must be followed as 'authentic', he finds silly; and reverence for it as if it had fallen down from heaven, ludicrous. 'How can anyone dispute the right to appeal to the original text? And what a bad version this is! There are scarcely three verses in any page well rendered' (*Acta Synod. Trident.*, etc., pp. 414-416)."

⁸² *Institutes*, I. vii. 10. Cf. I. vi. 203.

⁸³ I. vii. 5 *init*: "We have received it from God's own mouth by the ministry of men."

⁸⁴ It is quite common to represent Calvin as without a theory, at

contrary, he thought of them rather as notaries (IV. vii. 9), who set down in authentic registers (I. vi. 3) what was dictated to them (*Augumentum in Ev. Joh.*).³⁵ They wrote, therefore, merely as the organs of the Holy Ghost, and did not speak *ex suo sensu*, not *humano impulsu*, not *sponte sua*, not *arbitrio suo*, but set out only *quae coelitus mandata fuerant*.³⁶ The diversity of the human authors thus disappears for Calvin before the unity of the Spirit, the sole

least an expressed theory, of the relation of the divine and human authors of Scripture. Thus J. Cramer, as cited, p. 103, says: "How we are to understand the relation of the divine and human activities through which the Scriptures were produced is not exactly defined by Calvin. A precise theory of inspiration such as we meet with in the later dogmatists is not found in him." Cramer is only sure that Calvin did not hold to the theory which later Protestants upheld: "It is true that Calvin gave the impulse (from which the later dogmatic view of Scripture grew up), more than any other of the Reformers. But we must not forget that here we can speak of nothing more than the impulse. We nowhere find in Calvin such a magical conception of the Bible as we find in the later dogmatists. It is true he used the term 'dictare' and other expressions which he employs under the influence of the terminology of his day, but on the other hand . . . in how many respects does he recognize the *human* factor in the Scriptures!" (p. 142). Similarly Pannier, as cited, p. 200: "In any case Calvin has not written a single word which can be appealed to in favor of *literal* inspiration. What is divine for him, if there is anything specifically divine beyond the contents, the brightness of which is reflected upon the container, is the *sense* of each book, or at most of each phrase,—never the employment of each word. Calvin would have deplored the petty dogmatics of the *Consensus Helveticus*, which declares the vowel points of the Hebrew text inspired, and the exaggerations of the theopneusty of the nineteenth century." Yet nothing is more certain than that Calvin held both to "verbal inspiration" and to "the inerrancy of Scripture", however he may have conceived the action of God which secured these things.

³⁵ Cf. Otto Ritschl, *Dogmengeschichte des Protestantismus*, 1908, I., p. 63: "If we may still entertain doubts whether Bullinger really defended the stricter doctrine of inspiration, it certainly is found in Calvin after 1543. He may have merely taken over from Butzer the expression *Spiritus Sancti amanuenses*; but it is peculiar to him that he conceives both the books of the Old Testament inclusively as contained in the historical enumerations, and those of the New Testament, as arising out of a verbal dictation of the Holy Spirit."

³⁶ These phrases are brought together by J. Cramer (as cited, pp. 102-3) from the Comments on 2 Tim. iii. 16 and 2 Pet. i. 20.

responsible author of Scripture, which is to him therefore not the *verba Dei*, but emphatically the *verbum Dei*.³⁷ It is a *Deo* (*Inst.* I. vii. 5); it has "come down to us from the very mouth of God" (I. vii. 5);³⁸ it has "come down from heaven as if the living words of God themselves were heard in it" (I. vii. 1);³⁹ and "we owe it therefore the same reverence which we owe to God Himself, since it has proceeded from Him alone, and there is nothing human mixed with it" (*Com.* on 2 Tim. iii. 16).⁴⁰ According to this declaration the Scriptures are altogether divine, and in them, as he puts it energetically in another place, "it is God who speaks with us and not mortal men" (*Com.* on 2 Pet. i. 20).⁴¹ Accordingly, he cites Scripture everywhere not as the word of man but as the pure word of God. His "holy word" is "the scepter of God", every statement in which is "a heavenly oracle" which "cannot fail" (*Dedicatory Epistle* to the *Institutes*): in it God "opens His own sacred mouth" to add His direct word to the "voice" of His mute creatures (I. vi. 1). To say "Scripture says" and to say "the Holy Ghost says" is all one. We contradict the Holy Spirit, says Calvin—meaning the Scriptures—when we deny to Christ the name of Jehovah or anything which belongs to the majesty of Jehovah (I. xiii. 23). "The Holy Spirit pronounces", says he, . . . "Paul declares . . . the Scriptures condemns . . . wherefore it is not surprising if the Holy Spirit reject"—all in one running context, meaning ever the same thing (I. v. 13): just as in another context he uses interchangeably the "commandments of

³⁷ Cf. Pannier, as cited, p. 203: "The Word of God is for him one, *verbum Dei*, and not *verba Dei*. The diversity of authors disappears before the unity of the Spirit."

³⁸ Ab ipsissimo Dei ore ad nos fluxuissi.

³⁹ E coelo fluxuissi, acsi vivae ipsae Dei voces illic exaudirentur.

⁴⁰ Hoc prius est membrum, eandem scripturae reverentiam deberi quam Deo deferimus, quia ad eo solo manavit, nec quicquam humani habet admixtum.

⁴¹ Justa reverentia inde nascitur, quam statuimus, Deum nobiscum loqui, non homines mortales.

Christ" and the "authority of Scripture" of the same thing. (*Dedicatory letter.*)

It may be that Calvin has nowhere given us a detailed discussion of the mode of the divine operation in giving the Scriptures. He is sure that they owe their origin to the divine gift (I. vi. 1, 2, 3) and that God has so given them that they are emphatically His word, as truly as if we were listening to His living voice speaking from heaven (I. vii. 1): and, as we have seen, he is somewhat addicted to the use of language which, strictly taken, would imply that the mode of their gift was "dictation". The Scriptures are 'public records' (I. vi. 2), their human authors have acted as 'notaries' (IV. viii. 9), who have set down nothing of their own, but only what has been dictated to them, so that there appears no admixture of what is human in their product (on 2 Tim. iii. 16).⁴² It is not unfair to urge, how-

⁴²The account of Calvin's doctrine of inspiration given by E. Rabaud, *Histoire de la doctrine de l'inspiration . . . dans les pays de langue française* (1883), pp. 52 sq., is worth comparing. Calvin's thought on this subject, he tells us, was more precise and compact than that of the other Reformers, although even his conception of inspiration was far from possessing perfectly firm contours or supplying the elements of a really systematic view (52). He was the first, nevertheless, to give the subject of Sacred Scripture a fundamental, theoretic treatment, led thereto not by the pressure of controversy, but by the logic of his systematic thought: for his doctrine of inspiration (not yet distinguished from revelation) is one of the essential bases, if not the very point of departure of his dogmatics (55). To him "the Bible is manifestly the word of God, in which he reveals himself to men", and as such "proceeds from God". "But" (pp. 56 sq.) "the action of God does not, in Calvin's view, transform the sacred authors into machines. Jewish verbalism, Scriptural materialism, may be present in germ in the ideas of the *Institutes*—and the cold intellects of certain doctors of the Protestant scholasticism of the next century developed them—but they are very remote from the thought of the Reformer. Chosen and ordained by God, the Biblical writers were subject to a higher impulse; they received a divine illumination which increased the energy of their natural faculties; they understood the Revelation better and transmitted it more faithfully. It was scarcely requisite for this, however, that they should be passive instruments, simple secretaries, pens moved by the Holy Spirit. Appointed but intelligent organs of the divine thought, far from being subject to a dictation, in complete obedience to the immediate will of God, they acted under the impulsion of a personal

ever, that this language is figurative; and that what Calvin has in mind is not to insist that the mode of inspiration was dictation, but that the result of inspiration is as if it were by dictation, viz., the production of a pure word of God free from all human admixtures. The term "dictation" was no doubt in current use at the time to express rather the effects than the mode of inspiration.⁴⁸ This being allowed,

faith which God communicated to them. 'Now, whether God was manifested to men by visions or oracles, what is called celestial witnesses, or ordained men as His ministers who taught their successors by tradition, it is in every case certain that He impressed on their hearts such a certitude of the doctrine, that they were persuaded and convinced that what had been revealed and preached to them proceeded from the true God: for He always ratified His word so as to secure for it a credit above all human opinion. Finally, that the truth might uninterruptedly remain continually in vigor from age to age, and be known in the world, He willed that the revelations which He had committed to the hands of the Fathers as a deposit, should be put on record: and it was with this design that He had the Law published, to which he afterwards added the Prophets as its expositors' (*Institutes*, I. vi. 2). These few lines resume in summary form the very substance of Calvin's doctrine of inspiration. We may conclude from it that he did not give himself to the elaboration of this dogma, with the tenacity and logical rigor which his clear and above all practical genius employed in the study and systematization of other points of the new doctrine. We shall seek in vain a precise declaration on the mode of revelation, on the extent and intensity of inspiration, on the relation of the book and the doctrine. None of these questions, as we have already had occasion to remark, had as yet been raised: the doctors gave themselves to what was urgent and did not undertake to prove or discuss what was not yet either under discussion or attacked. The principle which was laid down sufficed them. God had spoken—this was the faith which every consciousness of the time received without repugnance, and against which no mind raised an objection. To search out how He did it was wholly useless: to undertake to prove it, no less so" (p. 58). There is evident in this passage a desire to minimize Calvin's view of the divinity of Scripture; the use of the passage from I. vi. 2 as the basis of an exposition of his doctrine of inspiration is indicative of this—whereas it obviously is a very admirable account of how God has made known His will to men and preserved the knowledge of it through time. The double currents of desire to be true to Calvin's own exposition of his doctrine and yet to withhold his *imprimatur* from what the author believes to be an overstrained doctrine, produces some strange confusion in his further exposition.

⁴⁸Cf. J. Cramer, as cited, p. 114: "How Calvin conceives of this

it is all the more unfair to urge that, Calvin's language being in this sense figurative, he is not to be understood as teaching that the effect of inspiration was the production of a pure word of God, free from all admixture of human error. This, on the contrary, is precisely what Calvin does teach, and that with the greatest strenuousness. He everywhere asserts that the effects of inspiration are such that God alone is the responsible author of the inspired product, that we owe the same reverence to it as to Him Himself, and should esteem the words as purely His as if we heard them proclaimed with His living voice from heaven; and that there is nothing human mixed with them. And he everywhere deals with them on that assumption. It is true that men have sought to discover in Calvin, particularly in his *Harmony of the Gospels*, acknowledgments of the presence of human errors in the fabric of Scripture.⁴⁴ But

dictare by the Holy Ghost it is difficult to say. He borrowed it from the current ecclesiastical usage, which employed it of the *auctor primarius* of Scripture, as indeed also of tradition. Thus the Council of Trent uses the expression *dictante Spiritu Sancto* of the unwritten tradition inspired by the Holy Spirit." Otto Ritschl, *Dogmengeschichte des Protestantismus*, I, 1908, p. 59, argues for taking the term strictly in Calvin. It is employed, it is true, in contemporary usage in the figurative sense, of the deliverances of the natural conscience, for example; and some Reformed writers use it of the internal testimony of the Spirit. Calvin also himself speaks as if he employed it of Scripture only figuratively,—e. g., *Corpus Ref.* xxix, p. 632: *verba quodammodo dictante Christi Spiritu*. Nevertheless, on the whole Ritschl thinks he meant it in the literal sense.

⁴⁴ Cf., e. g., J. Cramer, as cited, pp. 114-116, whose instances are followed in the remarks which succeed. Cf. also p. 125. How widespread this effort to discover in Calvin some acknowledgment of errors in Scripture has become may be seen by consulting the citations made by Dunlop Moore, *The Presbyterian and Reformed Review*, 1893, p. 60: he cites Cramer, van Oosterzee, Farrar. Cf. even A. H. Strong, *Syst. Theol.*, ed. 1907, vol. I, p. 217, whose list of "theological writers who admit the errancy of Scripture writers as to some matters unessential to their moral and spiritual teaching" requires drastic revision. *Leipziger* (Geschichte d. N. T. Kanons, II, p. 169) says: "Fundamentally Calvin holds fast to the old doctrine of verbal inspiration. His sound historical sense leads him, here and there, it is true, to break through the bonds of this doctrine. In his harmony of the Gospels (*Commentarii*

these attempts rest on very crass misapprehensions of Calvin's efforts precisely to show that there are no such errors in the fabric of Scripture. When he explains, for example, that the purpose "of the Evangelists"—or "of the Holy Spirit", for he significantly uses these designations as synonyms—was not to write a chronologically exact record, but to present the general essence of things, this is not to allow that the Scriptures err humanly in their record of the sequences of time, but to assert that they intend to give no sequences of time and therefore cannot err in this regard. When again he suggests that an "error" has found its way into the text of Mat. xxvii. 9 or possibly into Mat. xxiii. 35, he is not speaking of the original, but of the transmitted text;⁴⁵ and it would be hard if he were not permitted to make such excursions into the region of textual criticism without laying himself open to the charge of denying his most assured conviction that nothing human is mixed with Scripture. In point of fact, Calvin not only asserts the freedom of Scripture as given by God from all error, but never in his detailed dealing with Scripture allows that such errors exist in it.^{45a}

in harmoniam ex Mat. et Lk. compositam, 1555), *e. g.*, Calvin shows that the letters are not sacred to him; he moves much more freely here than Martin Chemnitz. But in other cases again Calvin draws strict consequences from the doctrine of verbal inspiration. He ascribes, *e. g.*, to all four Gospels precisely similar authority, although he (with Luther and Zwingli) considers John's gospel the most beautiful of them all."

⁴⁵ This is solidly shown, *e. g.*, by Dunlop Moore, as cited, pp. 61-62: also for Acts vii. 16.

^{45a} Despite his tendency to lower Calvin's doctrine of inspiration with respect to its effects, J. Cramer in the following passage (as cited, pp. 120-121) gives in general a very fair statement of it: "We have seen that Calvin, although he has not given us a completed theory of inspiration, yet firmly believed in the inspiration of the entirety of Scripture. It is true we do not find in him the crass expressions of the later Reformed, as well as Lutheran, theologians. But the foundation on which they subsequently built—though somewhat onesidedly—is here. We cannot infer much from such expressions as 'from God', 'came from God', 'flowed from God'. Just as in Zwingli, these expressions were sometimes in Calvin synonyms of 'true'. Thus, at Titus ii. 12, he says

If we ask for the ground on which he asserts this high doctrine of inspiration, we do not see that any other reply can be given than that it was on the ground of the teaching of Scripture itself. The Scriptures were understood by Calvin to claim to be in this high sense the word of God; and a critical scrutiny of their contents brought to him nothing which seemed to him to negative this claim. There were other grounds on which he might and did base a firm confidence in the divine origin of the Scriptures and the trustworthiness of their teaching as a revelation from God. But there were no other grounds on which he could or did rest his conviction that these Scriptures are so from God that there is nothing human mixed with them, and their every affirmation is to be received with the deference which is due to the living voice of God speaking from heaven. On

he cannot understand why so many are unwilling to draw upon profane writers,—‘for, since all truth is from God (*a Deo*), if anything has been said well and truly by profane men, it ought not to be rejected, for it has come from God (*a Deo est profectum*)’. More significant are such expressions as, ‘nothing human is mixed with Scripture’, ‘we owe to them the same reverence as to God’, God ‘is the author of Scripture’ and as such has ‘dictated’ (*dictavit*) all that the Apostles and Prophets have written, so that we must not depart from the word of God in even the smallest particular’, etc. All this applies not only to the Scriptures as a whole, not merely to their fundamental ideas and chief contents, but to all the sixty-six books severally. In contradistinction from the Apocrypha, they have been given by the Holy Spirit (*Préface mise en tête des livres apocryphes de l’Ancien Test.: Corp. Ref. ix. 827*). The book of Acts ‘beyond question is the product of the Holy Spirit Himself’, Mark ‘wrote nothing but what the Holy Spirit gave him to write’, etc. To think here merely of a providential direction by God, in the sense that God took care that His people should lack nothing of a Scriptural record of His revelation—is impossible. For, however often Calvin may have directed attention to such a ‘singularis providentiae cura’ (*Inst.*, V. vi. 2, *cf.* I. viii. 10; *Argument in Joh.*) with respect to Scripture, he yet saw something over and above this in the production of the sacred books. He looked upon them as the writings of God Himself, who, through an extraordinary operation of His Spirit, guarded His amanuenses from all error as well when they transmitted histories as when they propounded the doctrine of Christ. Thus to him Scripture (naturally in its original text) was a complete work of God, to which nothing could be added and from which nothing could be taken away.”

these other grounds Calvin was led to trust the teaching of the Scriptures as a divine revelation: and he therefore naturally trusted their teaching as to their own nature and inspiration.

Such, then, are the Scriptures as conceived by Calvin: sixty-six sacred books, "dictated" by God to His "notaries" that they might, in this "public record", stand as a perpetual special revelation of Himself to His people, to supplement or to supersede in their case the general revelation which he gives of Himself in His works and deeds, but which is rendered ineffective by the sin-bred disabilities of the human soul. For this, according to Calvin, is the account to give of the origin of Scripture, and this the account to give of the function it serves in the world. It was because man in His sinful imbecility was unable to profit by the general revelation which God has spread before all eyes, so that they are all without excuse (I. vi. 1), that God in His goodness gave to "those whom He intended to unite in a more close and familiar connection with Himself", a special revelation in open speech (I. vi. 1). And it was because of the mutability of the human mind, prone to errors of all kinds, corrupting the truth, that He committed this His special revelation to writing, that it might never be inaccessible to "those to whom He determined to make His instructions effectual" (I. vi. 3). In Calvin's view, therefore, the Scriptures are a documentation of God's special revelation of Himself unto salvation (I. v. 1, *ad init.*); but a documentation cared for by God Himself, so that they are, in fine, themselves the special revelation of God unto salvation in documentary form (I. vi. 2, 3). The necessity for the revelation documented in them arises from the blindness of men in their sin: the necessity for the documentation of this revelation arises from the instability of men, even when taught of God. We must conceive of special revelation, and of the Scriptures as just its documentation, therefore, as not precisely a cure, but rather an assistance to man dulled in his sight so as not to be able to perceive God in His

general revelation. "For", says Calvin, "as persons who are old, or whose eyes have somehow become dim, if you show them the most beautiful book, though they perceive that something is written there, can scarcely read two words together, yet by the aid of spectacles will begin to read distinctly,—so the Scripture . . . " etc. (I. vi. 1). The function of Scripture thus, as special revelation documented, is to serve as spiritual spectacles to enable those of dulled spiritual sight to see God.

Of course, the Scriptures do more than this. They not only reveal the God of Nature more brightly to the sin-darkened eye; they reveal also the God of Grace, who may not be found in nature. Calvin does not overlook this wider revelation embodied in them: he particularly adverts to it (I. vi. 1). But he turns from it for the moment as less directly germane to his present object, which is to show that without the "spectacles" of Scripture, sinful man would not be able to attain to a sound knowledge of even God the Creator. It is on this, therefore, that he now insists. It was only because God revealed Himself in this special, supernatural way to them, that our first fathers—"Adam, Noah, Abraham and the rest of the patriarchs"—were able to retain him in their knowledge (I. vi. 1). It was only through this special revelation, whether renewed to them by God, or handed down in tradition, "by the ministry of men", that their posterity continued in the knowledge of God (I. vi. 2). "At length, that the truth might remain in the world in a continual course of instruction to all ages, God determined that the same oracles which He deposited with the patriarchs, should be committed to public records"—first the Law, then the Prophets, and then the books of the New Covenant (I. vi. 2, 3). It is now, therefore, only through these Scriptures that man can attain to a true knowledge of God. The revelation of God in His works is not useless: it makes all men without excuse; it provides an additional though lower and less certain revelation of God to His people—to a consideration of which all should

seriously apply themselves, though they should principally attend to the Word (I. vi. 2). But experience shows that without the Word the sinful human mind is too weak to reach a sound knowledge of God, and therefore without it men wander in vanity and error. Calvin seems to speak sometimes almost as if the Scriptures, that is special revelation, wholly superseded general revelation (I. v. 12 *ad fin.*; vi. 2 *ad fin.*; 4 *ad fin.*). More closely scrutinized it becomes evident, however, that he means only that in the absence of Scripture, that is of special revelation, the general revelation of God is ineffective to preserve any sound knowledge of Him in the world: but in the presence of Scripture, general revelation is not set aside, but rather brought back to its proper validity. The real relation between general and special revelation, as the matter lay in Calvin's mind, thus proves to be, not that the one supersedes the other, but that special revelation supplements general revelation indeed, but in the first instance rather repeats and by repeating vivifies and vitalizes general revelation, and flows confluent in with it to the one end of both, the knowledge of God (I. vi. 2). What special revelation is, therefore,—and the Scriptures as its documentation—is very precisely represented by the figure of the spectacles. It is aid to the dulled vision of sinful man, to enable it to see God.

The question forcibly presents itself, however, whether "spectacles" will serve the purpose here. Has not Calvin painted the sin-bred blindness of men too blackly to encourage us to think it can be corrected by such an aid to any remainders of natural vision which may be accredited to them? The answer must be in the affirmative. But this only opens the way to point out that Calvin does not present special revelation, or the Scriptures as special revelation documented, as the entire cure, but places by the side of it the *Testimonium Spiritus Sancti*. Special revelation, or Scripture as its documented form, provides in point of fact, in the view of Calvin, only the objective side of the cure he finds has been provided by God. The subjective side

is provided by the *Testimonium Spiritus Sancti*. The spectacles are provided by the Scriptures: the eyes are opened that they may see even through these spectacles, only by the witness of the Spirit in the heart. We perceive, then, that in Calvin's view the figure of the spectacles is a perfectly just one. He means to intimate that special revelation alone will not produce a knowledge of God in the human soul: that something more than external aid is needed before it can see: and to leave the way open to proceed to point out what further is required that sinful man may see God. Sinful man, we say again: for the whole crux lies there. Had there been no sin, there would have been no need of even special revelation. In the light of the splendid revelation of Himself which God has displayed in the theatre of nature, man with his native endowment of instinctive knowledge of God would have bloomed out into a full and sound knowledge of Him. But with sinful man, the matter is wholly different. He needs more light and he needs something more than light—he needs the power of sight.⁴⁶ That we may apprehend Calvin's thought, therefore, we must turn to the consideration of his doctrine of the Testimony of the Spirit.

III. THE TESTIMONY OF THE SPIRIT.

What is Calvin's doctrine of the Testimony of the Spirit?

The particular question which Calvin addresses himself

⁴⁶ In I. vi. 14 Calvin says that the Apostle in Heb. xi. 3, 'By faith we understand that the worlds were framed by the Word of God' wishes to intimate that "the invisible divinity *was represented* indeed by such displays of His power, but that we have no eyes *to perceive it* unless they are illuminated through faith by the inner revelation of God" (*Invisibilem divinitatem representari quidem talibus spectaculis, sed ad eam perspicendam non esse nobis oculos, nisi interiore Dei revelatione per fidem illuminatur*). Here he distinguishes between the external, objective representation, and the internal, subjective preparation to perceive this representation. God is objectively revealed in His works: man in his sins is blind to this revelation: the interior operation of God is an opening of man's eyes: man then sees. The operation of God is therefore a palingenesis. This passage is already in ed. 1539 (I. 291); the last clause (*nisi . . .*) is not, however, reproduced in the French versions of either 1541 or 1560 (III. 60).

to when he turns to the consideration of what he calls the testimony of the Spirit concerns the accrediting of Scripture, not the assimilation of its revelatory contents. The reader cannot fail to experience some disappointment at this. The whole development of the discussion hitherto undoubtedly fosters the expectation, not, indeed, of an exclusive treatment of the assimilation of special revelation by sinful man—for both problems are raised by it and the two problems are at bottom one and their solution one—but certainly of some formal treatment of it, and indeed of such a treatment of the double problem that the stress should be laid on this. Calvin, however, is preoccupied with the problem of the accrediting of Scripture. This is due in part, doubtless, to its logical priority: as he himself remarks, we cannot “be established in the belief of the doctrine, till we are indubitably persuaded that God is its Author” (I. vii. 4 *init.*). But it was rendered almost inevitable by the state of the controversy with Rome, who intrenched herself in the position that the Protestant appeal to Scripture as over against the Church was inoperative, seeing that it is only by the Church that the Scriptures can be established in authority: for who but the Church can assure us that these Scriptures are from God, or indeed what books enter into the fabric of Scripture, or whether they have come down to us uncorrupted? As a practical man writing to practical men for a practical purpose, Calvin could not fail, perhaps, to give his primary attention to the aspect of the problem he had raised which was most immediately pressing. But this scarcely prepares us for the almost total neglect of its other aspect, with the effect that the construction of his general doctrine is left with a certain appearance of incompleteness. Not really incomplete; for the solution of the one problem is, as we have already suggested, the solution of the other also; and even the cursory reader—or perhaps we may say especially the cursory reader—may well be trusted to feel this as he is led on through the discussion, particularly as there are not lacking repeated suggestions of

it, and the discussion closes with a direct reference to it and a formal postponement of the particular discussion of the other aspect of the double problem to a later portion of the treatise. "I pass over many things for the present", says Calvin, "because this subject will present itself for discussion in another place. Only, let it be known here that that alone is true faith which the Spirit of God seals in our hearts. And with this one reason every reader of docility and modesty will be satisfied" (I. vii. 5, near the end). That is as much as to say, This whole subject is only one application of the general doctrine of faith; and as the general doctrine of faith is fully discussed at another place in this treatise, we may content ourselves here with the somewhat incomplete remarks we have made upon this special application of that doctrine; we only need to remind the reader that there is no true faith except that which is begotten in the soul by the Holy Spirit.

We can scarcely wonder that Calvin contents himself with this simple reference of the topic now engaging his attention, as a specific case, to the generic doctrine of faith, when we pause to realize how nearly this simple reference of it, as a species to its genus, comes to a sufficient exposition of it. We shall stop now to signalize only two points which are involved in this reference, the noting of which will greatly facilitate our apprehension of Calvin's precise meaning in his doctrine of the testimony of the Spirit to the divinity of Scripture. This doctrine is no isolated doctrine with Calvin, standing out of relation with the other doctrines of his system: it is but one application of his general doctrine of faith; or to be more specific, one application of his general doctrine of the function of the Holy Spirit in the production of faith. Given Calvin's general doctrine of the work of the Holy Spirit in applying salvation, and his specific doctrine of the *testimonium Spiritus Sancti* in the attestation of Scripture, and in the applying of its doctrine as well, was inevitable. It is but one application of the general doctrine that there is no true faith except that which

the Spirit of God seals in our hearts. For Calvin in this doctrine—and this is the second point we wish to signalize—has in mind specifically “true faith”. He is not asking here how the Scriptures may be proved to be from God. If that had been the question he was asking, he would not have hesitated to say that the testimony of the Church is conclusive of the fact. He does say so. “The universal judgment of the Church” (I. vii. 3, *fin.*) he represents as a very useful argument, “the consent of the Church” (I. viii. 12, *init.*) as a very important consideration, in establishing the divine origin of the Scriptures: although, of course, he does not conceive the Church as lending her authority to Scripture “when she receives and seals it with her suffrage”, but rather as performing a duty of piety to herself in recognizing what is true apart from her authentication, and treating it with due veneration (I. vii. 2, *ad fin.*). For what is more her duty than “obediently to embrace what is from God as the sheep hear the voice of the shepherd”?⁴⁷ Were it a matter of proving the Scriptures to be the Word of God, Calvin would, again, have been at no loss for rational arguments which he was ready to pronounce irresistible. He does adduce such arguments and he does pronounce them irresistible. He devotes a whole chapter to the adduction of these arguments (ch. viii),—such arguments as these: the dignity of the subject-matter of Scripture—the heavenliness of its doctrine and the consent of all its parts— (§ 1), the majesty of its style (§ 2), the antiquity of its teaching (§ 3), the sincerity of its narrative (§ 4), its miraculous accompaniment, circumstantially confirmed (§§ 5, 6), its predictive contents authenticated by fulfilment

⁴⁷ In his response to the Augsburg Interim (*Vera Ecclesiae reformatione ratio*, 1548) he allows it to be the *proprium ecclesiae officium* to *scripturas veras a suppositis discernere*; but only that *obedienter amplectitur, quicquid Dei est*, as the sheep hear the voice of the shepherd. It is nevertheless *sacrilega impietas ecclesiae iudicio submittere sacrasancta Dei oracula*. See J. Cramer, as cited, p. 104, note 3. Cramer remarks in expounding Calvin's view: “By the approbation she gives to them”—the books of Scripture—“the Church does not make them authentic, but only yields her homage to the truth of God.”

(§§ 7, 8), its continuous use through so many ages (§§ 9-12), its sealing by martyr blood (§ 13): and these arguments he is so far from considering weak and inconclusive (I. viii. 13 *med.*) that he represents them rather as capable of completely vindicating the Scriptures against all the subtleties of their calumniators (*ibid.*). Nay, he declares that the proofs of the divine origin of the Scriptures are so cogent, as "certainly to evince, if there is a God in heaven, that He is the author of the Law, and the Prophecies, and the Gospel" (I. vii. 4, near the beginning); as to extort with certainty from all who are not wholly lost to shame, the confession of the divine gift of the Scriptures (*ibid.*).⁴⁸ "Though I am far from possessing any peculiar dexterity" in argument "or eloquence", he says, "yet were I to contend with the most subtle despisers of God, who are ambitious to display their wit and their skill in weakening the authority of Scripture, I trust I should be able without difficulty to silence their obstreperous clamor" (*ibid.*). But objective proofs—whether the conclusive testimony of witnesses, or the overwhelming evidence of rational considerations,—be they never so cogent,⁴⁹ he does not consider of themselves capable of producing "true faith". And it is "true faith",

⁴⁸ It would require that we should be wholly hardened (*nisi ad perditam impudentiam obduruerint*) that we should not perceive that the doctrine of Scripture is heavenly, that we should not have the confession wrung from us that there are manifest signs in Scripture that it is God who speaks in and through it (*extorquebitur illis haec confessio, manifesta signa loquentis Dei conspici in Scriptura ex quibus pateat coelestem esse ejus doctrinam*)—I. vii. 4.

⁴⁹ The exact relations of the "proofs" to the divinity of Scripture, which Calvin teaches, was sufficiently clear to be caught by his successors. It is admirably stated in the Westminster Confession of Faith, I. v. And we may add that the same conception is stated also very precisely by Quenstedt: "These motives, as well internal as external, by which we are led to the knowledge of the authority of Scripture, make the theopneusty of Sacred Scripture probable, and produce a certitude which is not merely conjectural but moral: they do not make the divinity of Scripture infallible and altogether indubitable." That is to say, they are not of the nature of *demonstration*, but nevertheless give moral certitude: the testimony of the Spirit is equivalent to demonstration,—as is the deliverance of any simply acting sense.

we repeat, that Calvin has in mind in his doctrine of the *testimonium Spiritus Sancti*. If it seemed to him a small matter that man should know that God is if he did not know what God is, it equally seemed to him a small matter that man should know what God is, in the paradigms of the intellect, if he did not really know this God in the intimacy of communion which that phrase imports. And equally it seemed to him utterly unimportant that a man should be convinced by stress of rational evidence that the Scriptures are the Word of God, unless he practically embraced these Scriptures as the Word of God and stayed his soul upon them. The knowledge of God which Calvin has in mind in this whole discussion is, thus, a vital and vitalizing knowledge of God, and the attestation of Scripture which he is seeking is not an attestation merely to the intelligence of men, compelling from them perhaps a reluctant judgment of the intellect alone (since those convinced against their will, as the proverb has it, are very apt to remain of the same opinion still), but such an attestation as takes hold of the whole man in the roots of his activities and controls all the movements of his soul.

This is so important a consideration for the exact apprehension of Calvin's doctrine that it may become us to pause and assure ourselves of the simple matter of fact from the language which Calvin employs of it in the course of the discussion. We shall recall that from the introduction of the topic of special revelation he has in mind and keeps before his readers' mind its destination for the people of God alone. The provisions for producing a knowledge of God, consequent on the inefficiency of natural revelation, Calvin is careful to explain, are not for all men, but for "the elect" (I. vi. 1), or, as they are more fully described, "those whom God intends to unite in a more close and familiar connection with Himself" (*ibid.*), "those to whom He determines to make His instructions effectual" (I. vi. 3). From the first provisions of His supernatural dealings, therefore, He "intends to make His instructions effectual".

More pointedly still he speaks of the *testimonium Spiritus Sancti* as an act in which "God deigns to confer a singular power on His elect, whom He distinguishes from the rest of mankind" (I. vii. 5).⁵⁰ This singular power, now, is nothing else but "saving faith", and Calvin speaks of it in all the synonymy of "saving faith". He calls it "true faith" (I. vi. 5), "sound faith" (I. vii. 4), "firm faith" (I. viii. 13), "the faith of the pious" (I. vii. 3), "the certainty of the pious" (I. vii. 3), "that assurance which is essential to true piety" (I. vii. 4), "saving knowledge" (I. viii. 13), "a solid assurance of eternal life" (I. vii. 1). It is the thing which is naturally described by this synonymy which Calvin declares is not produced in the soul except by the testimony of the Holy Spirit. This obviously is nothing more than to declare that that faith which lays hold of Christ unto eternal life is the product of the Holy Spirit in the heart, and that it is one of the exercises of this faith to lay hold of the revelation of this Christ in the Scriptures with assured confidence, so that it is only he who is led by the Spirit who embraces these Scriptures with "sound faith", that is, "with that assurance which is essential to true piety" (I. vii. 4). What Calvin has in mind, in a word, is simply an extended comment on Paul's words: "the natural man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God . . . but he that is spiritual judgeth all things" (1 Cor. ii. 14, 15).⁵¹

⁵⁰ Cf. Pannier, as cited, pp. 257-8: "We see that this understanding of the Scriptures, this capacity to receive the testimony of the Spirit, is not, according to Calvin, possible for all; and that, less and less . . . He continually emphasises more and more the incapacity of man to persuade another of it, without the aid of God; but he emphasises still more progressively the impossibility of obtaining this aid if God does not accord it first. 1550 (I. viii, at end): 'Those who wish to prove to unbelievers by arguments that the Scriptures are from God are inconsiderate; for this is known *only to faith*.' 1559 (I. vii. *in fine*): The mysteries of God are not understood, *except by those to whom it is given* . . . It is quite certain that the witness of the Spirit does not make itself felt except to believers, and is not *in itself* an apologetic means with respect to unbelievers . . . The *natural* man receiveth not spiritual things."

⁵¹ Cf. Pannier, as cited, pp. 195-6: "First let us recall this,—for

Calvin does not leave us, however, to gather from general remarks referring it to its class or to infer from its general effects, what he means by the testimony of the Spirit of God to the divinity of Scripture, but describes for us its nature and indicates the mode of its operation and specific effects with great exactitude.⁵² He tells us that it is a

Calvin this testimony of the Holy Spirit is only one act of the great drama which is enacted in the entire soul of the religious man, and in which the Holy Spirit holds always the principal rôle. While the later dogmatists make the Holy Spirit, so to speak, function mechanically, at a given moment, in the pen of the prophets or in the brain of the readers, Calvin sees the Holy Spirit constantly active in the man whom He wishes to sanctify, and the fact that He leads him to recognize the divinity and the canonicity of the sacred books is only one manifestation,—a very important one, no doubt, but only a particular one,—of His general work." It is only, of course, the Lutheran and Rationalizing dogmatists who, constructively, subject the action of the Spirit to the direction of man—whether by making it rest on the application of the "means of grace" or on the action of the human will. Calvin and his followers—the Reformed—make the act of man depend on the free and sovereign action of the Spirit.

⁵² J. Cramer, as cited, pp. 122-3, somewhat understates this, but in the main catches Calvin's meaning: "Calvin does not, it is true, tell us in so many words precisely what this *testimonium sp. s.* is, but it is easy to gather it from the whole discussion. He is thinking of the Holy Spirit, who, as the Spirit of our adoption as children, leads us to say Amen to the Word which the Father speaks in the Holy Scriptures to His children. He even says expressly in *Inst.* I. vii. 4: 'As if the Spirit was not called "seal" and "earnest" just because He confers faith on the pious.' But more plainly still, and indeed so that no doubt can remain, we find it in Beza, the most beloved and talented pupil of Calvin, who assuredly also in his conception of Scripture was the most thoroughly imbued with the spirit of his teacher. In his reply to Castellion, Beza says: 'The testimony of the Spirit of adoption does not lie properly in this, that we believe to be true what the Scriptures testify (for this is known also to the devils and to many of the lost), but rather in this,—that each applies to himself the promise of salvation in Christ of which Paul speaks in Rom. viii. 15, 16.' Accordingly a few lines further down he speaks of a 'testimony of adoption and free justification in Christ'. In the essence of the matter Calvin will have meant just this by his testimony of the Holy Spirit." . . . Beza's words are in his *Ad defensiones et reprehensiones Seb. Castellionis* (*Th. Bezae Vezelii Opera*, i, Geneva, 1582, p. 503): *Testimonium Spiritus adoptionis non in eo proprie positum est ut credamus verum esse quod Scriptura testatur (nam hoc ipsum quoque sciunt diaboli et reprobi multi), sed in eo potius ut quisque sibi salutis in Christo*

"secret" (I. vii. 4), "internal" (I. vii. 13), "inward" (I. vii. 5) action of the Holy Spirit on the soul, by which the soul is "illuminated" (I. vii. 3, 4, 5), so as to perceive their true quality in the Scriptures as a divine book. We may call this "an inward teaching" of the Spirit which produces "entire acquiescence in the Scriptures", so that they are self-authenticating to the mind and heart (I. vii. 5); or we may call it a "secret testimony of the Spirit", by which our minds and hearts are convinced with a firmness superior to all reason that the Scriptures are from God (I. vii. 4). In both instances we are using figurative language. Precisely what is produced by the hidden internal operation of the Spirit on the soul is a new spiritual sense (*sensus*, I. vii. 5, near end), by which the divinity of Scripture is perceived as by an intuitive perception. "For the Scripture exhibits as clear evidence of its truth, as white and black things do of their color, and sweet and bitter things of their taste" (I. vii. 2, end): and we need only a sense to discern its divine quality to be convinced of it with the same immediacy and finality as we are convinced by their mere perception of light or darkness, of whiteness or blackness, of sweetness

promissionem applicet, de qua re agit Paulus, Rom. viii. 15, 16." . . . That it was generally understood in the first age that this was the precise nature of the witness of the Spirit is shown by its definition in this sense not only by the Reformed, but by the Lutherans. For example, Hollaz defines thus: "The testimony of the Holy Spirit is the supernatural act (*actus supernaturalis*) of the Holy Spirit by means of the Word of God attentively read or heard (His own divine power having been communicated to the Scriptures) by which the heart of man is moved, opened, illuminated, turned to the obedience of faith, so that the illuminated man out of these internal spiritual movements truly perceives the Word which is propounded to him to have proceeded from God, and gives it therefore his unwavering assent." The Lutheranism of this definition resides in the clauses: "By means of the Word of God" . . . "His own divine power having been communicated to the Scriptures" . . . which make the action of the Holy Spirit to be from out of the Word, in which He dwells *intrinsicus*. But the nature of the testimony of the Spirit is purely conceived as an act of the Holy Spirit by which the heart of man is renewed to spiritual perception, in the employment of which he perceives the divine quality of Scripture.

or bitterness (*ibid.*). No conclusions based on "reasoning" or "proofs" or founded on human judgment can compare in clearness or force with such a conviction, which is instinctive and immediate, and finds its ultimate ground and sanction in the Holy Spirit who has wrought in the heart this spiritual sense which so functions in recognizing the divine quality of Scripture. Illuminated by the Spirit of God, we believe, therefore, not on the ground of our own judgment, or on the ground of the judgment of others, but with a certainty above all human judgment, by a spiritual intuition.⁵³ With the utmost explicitness Calvin so describes this instinctive conviction in a passage of great vigor: "It is, therefore", says he, "such a persuasion as requires no reasons; such a knowledge as is supported by the highest reason and in which the mind rests with greater security and constancy than in any reasons; in fine, such a sense as cannot be produced but by a revelation from heaven" (I. vii. 5).⁵⁴ Here we are told that it is a *persuasio*, or rather a *notitia*, or rather a *sensus*. It is a persuasion which does not require reasons,—that is to say, it is a state of conviction not induced by arguments, but by direct perception: it is, that is to say, a knowledge, a direct perception in accord with the highest reason, in which the mind rests, with an assurance not attainable by reasoning; or to be more explicit still, it is a sense which comes only from divine gift. As we have implanted in us by nature a sense which distinguishes between light and darkness, a sense which distinguishes between sweet and bitter, and the verdict of these senses is immediate and final; so we have planted in us by the creative action of the Holy Spirit a sense for the divine, and its verdict, too, is immediate and

⁵³ *Supra humanum iudicium, certo certius constituimus (non secus ac si ipsius Dei numen illic intueremur) hominum ministerio, ab ipsissimo Dei ore ad nos fluxisse (I. vii. 5).*

⁵⁴ *Talis ergo est persuasio quae rationes non requirat; talis notitia, cui optima ratio constet: nempe in qua securius constantiusque mens quiescit quam in ullis rationibus; talis denique sensus, qui nisi ex coelesti revelatione nasci nequeat (I. vii. 5).*

final: the spiritual man discerneth all things. Such, in briefest outline, is Calvin's famous doctrine of the testimony of the Spirit.

MODE OF THIS TESTIMONY.

Certain further elucidations of its real meaning and bearing appear, however, to be necessary, to guard against misapprehension of it. When we speak of an internal testimony of the Holy Spirit, it is evident that we must conceive it as presenting itself in one of three ways. It may be conceived as of the nature of an immediate revelation to each man to whom it is given. It may be conceived as of the nature of a blind conviction produced in the minds of its recipients. It may be conceived as of the nature of a grounded conviction, formed in their minds by the Spirit, by an act which rather terminates immediately on the faculties, enabling and effectively persuading them to reach a conviction on grounds presented to them, than produces the conviction itself, apart from or without grounds. In which of these ways did Calvin conceive the testimony of the Spirit as presenting itself? As revelation, or as ungrounded faith, or as grounded faith?

Certainly not the first. The testimony of the Spirit was not to Calvin of the nature of a propositional "revelation" to its recipients. Of this he speaks perfectly explicitly, and indeed in his polemic against Anabaptist mysticism insistently. He does indeed connect the term "revelation" with the testimony of the Spirit, declaring it, for example, such a sense (*sensus*) as can be produced by nothing short of "a revelation from heaven" (I. vii. 5, near end). But his purpose in the employment of this language is not to describe it according to its nature, but to claim for it with emphasis a heavenly source: he means merely to assert that it is not earth-born, but God-wrought, while at the same time he intimates that in its nature it is not a propositional revelation, but an instinctive "sense". That he did not conceive of it as a propositional revelation is made perfectly

clear by his explicit assertions at the opening of the discussion (I. vii. 1, *init.*), that we "are not favored with daily oracles from heaven", and that the Scriptures constitute the sole body of extant revelations from God. It is not to supersede nor yet to supplement these recorded revelations that the testimony of the Spirit is given us, he insists, but to confirm them (I. ix. 3): or, as he puts it in his polemic against the Anabaptists, "The office of the Spirit which is promised us is not to feign new and unheard of revelations, or to coin a new system of doctrine, which would seduce us from the received doctrine of the Gospel, but to seal to our minds the same doctrine which the Gospel delivers" (I. ix. 1 *init.*).

In this polemic against the Anabaptists (ch. ix) he gives us an especially well-balanced account of the relations which in his view obtain between the revelation of God and the witness of the Spirit. If he holds that the revelation of God is ineffective without the testimony of the Spirit, he holds equally that the testimony of the Spirit is inconceivable without the revelation of God embodied in the Word. He even declares that the Spirit is no more the agent by which the Word is impressed on the heart than the Word is the means by which the illumination of the Spirit takes effect. "If apart from the Spirit of God we are utterly destitute of the light of truth", he says (I. ix. 3, *ad fin.*), "equally the Word is the instrument by which the Lord dispenses to believers the illumination of the Spirit." So far as the knowledge of the truth is concerned, we are as helpless, then, without the Word as we are without the Spirit, for the whole function of the Spirit with respect to the truth is, not to reveal to us the truth anew, much less to reveal to us new truth, but efficaciously to confirm the Word, revealed in the Scriptures, to us, and efficaciously to impress it on our hearts (I. ix. 3). This Calvin makes superabundantly plain by an illustration and a didactic statement of great clearness. The illustration (I. ix. 3) is drawn from our Lord's dealings with His two disciples with whom after

His rising He walked to Emmaus. "He opened their understandings", Calvin explains, "not that rejecting the Scriptures they might be wise of themselves, but that they might understand the Scriptures." Such also, he says, is the testimony of the Spirit to-day: for what is it—and this is the didactic statement to which we have referred—but an enabling of us by the light of the Spirit to behold the divine countenance in the Scriptures that so our minds may be filled with a solid reverence for the Word (I. ix. 3)? Here we have the nature of the testimony of the Spirit, and its manner of working and its effects, announced to us in a single clause. It is an illumination of our minds, by which we are enabled to see God in the Scriptures, so that we may reverence them as from Him.

Other effect that this Calvin explicitly denies to the testimony of the Spirit and defends his denial from the charge of inconsistency with the stress he has previously laid upon the necessity of this testimony (I. ix. 3). It is not to deny the necessity of this work of the Spirit, he argues, to confine it to the express confirmation of the Word and of the revelation contained therein. Nor is it derogatory to the Spirit to confine His operations now to the confirmation of the revealed Word. While on the other hand to attribute to Him repeated or new revelations to each of the children of God, as the mystics do, is derogatory to the Word, which is His inspired product. To lay claim to the possession of such a Spirit as this, he declares, is to lay claim to the possession of a different Spirit from that which dwelt in Christ and the Apostles—for their Spirit honored the Word—and a different spirit from that which was promised by Christ to His disciples—for this Spirit was "not to speak of Himself". It is to lay claim to a Spirit for whose divine mission and character, moreover, we lack all criterion—for how can we know that the Spirit that speaks in us is from God, save as He honors the Word of God (I. ix. 1 and 2)? From all which it is perfectly plain not only that Calvin did not conceive the testimony

of the Spirit as taking effect in the form of propositional revelations, but that he did conceive it as an operation of God the Holy Spirit in the heart of man which is so connected with the revelation of God in His Word, that it manifests itself only in conjunction with that revelation.

Calvin's formula here is, The Word and Spirit.⁵⁵ Only in the conjunction of the two can an effective revelation be made to the sin-darkened mind of man.⁵⁶ The Word supplies the objective factor; the Spirit the subjective factor: and only in the union of the objective and subjective factors is the result accomplished. The whole objective revelation of God lies, thus, in the Word. But the whole subjective capacitating for the reception of this revelation lies in the will of the Spirit. Either, by itself, is wholly ineffective to the result aimed at—the production of knowledge in the human mind. But when they unite, knowledge is not only rendered possible to man: it is rendered certain. And therefore it is that Calvin represents the provision for the knowledge of God both in the objective revelation in the Word and in the subjective testimony of the Spirit as destined by God not for men at large, but specifically for His

⁵⁵ Köstlin, as cited, p. 412-13, esp. 413, note a, adverts to this with a reference to Dorner, *Gesch. d. protest. Theologie*, 379, who makes it characteristic of Calvin in distinction from Zwingli to draw the outer and inner Word more closely together. The justice of Dorner's view, which would seem to assign to Calvin in his doctrine of the Word as a means of grace a position somewhere between Zwingli and Luther, may well be doubted. According to Dorner, Calvin "modified the looser connection between the outward and inward Word held by Zwingli and connected the two sides more closely together." "In reference, therefore, to the principle of the Reformation", he continues, "with its two sides, Calvin is still more than Zwingli, of one mind and spirit with the Lutheran Reformation" (E. T., I, p. 387). Again (I, 390): "The double form of the *Verbum Dei externum* and *internum*, held by Zwingli, gives place indeed in Calvin to a more inward connecting of the two sides; the Scriptures are according to him not merely the sign of an absent thing, but have in themselves divine matter and breath, which makes itself actively felt." We do not find that Calvin and Zwingli differ in this matter appreciably.

⁵⁶ Cf. his response to Sadolet (1539), *Op.* V. 393: *tuo igitur experimento disce non minus importunum esse spiritum jactare sine verbo, quam futurum sit, sine verbum ipsum obtendere.*

people, His elect, those "to whom He determined to make His instructions effectual" (I. vi. 3). The Calvinism of Calvin's doctrine of religious knowledge comes to clear manifestation here; and that not merely because of its implication of the doctrine of election, but also because of its implication of Calvin's specific doctrine of the means of grace. Already in his doctrine of religious knowledge, we find Calvin teaching that God is known not by those who choose to know Him, but by those by whom He chooses to be known: and this simply because the knowledge of God is God-given, and is therefore given to whom He will. Men do not wring the knowledge of God from a Deity reluctant to be known: God imparts the knowledge of Himself to men reluctant to know Him: and therefore none know Him save those to whom He efficaciously imparts, by His Word and Spirit, the knowledge of Himself. "By His Word and Spirit",—therein is expressed already the fundamental formula of the Calvinistic doctrine of the "means of grace". In that doctrine the Spirit is not, with the Lutherans, conceived as in the Word, conveyed and applied wherever the Word goes: nor is the Word, with the mystics, conceived as in the Spirit always essentially present wherever He is present in His power as a Spirit of revelation and truth. The two are severally contemplated, as separable factors, in the one work of God in producing the knowledge of Himself which is eternal life in the souls of His people; separable factors which must both, however, be present if this knowledge of God is to be produced. For it is the function of the Word to set before the soul the object to be believed; and it is the function of the Spirit to quicken in the soul belief in this object: and neither performs the work of the other or its own work apart from the other.

It still remains, however, to inquire precisely how Calvin conceived the Spirit to operate in bringing the soul to a hearty faith in the Word as a revelation from God. Are we to understand him as teaching that the Holy Spirit by His almighty power creates, in the souls of those whom God

has set upon to bring to a knowledge of Him, an entirely ungrounded faith in the divinity of the Scriptures and the truth of their contents, so that the soul embraces them and their contents with firm confidence as a revelation from God wholly apart from and in the absence of all *indicia* of their divinity or of the truth of their contents? So it has come to be very widely believed; and indeed it may even be said that it has become the prevalent representation that Calvin taught that believers have within themselves a witness of the Spirit by which they are assured of the divinity of Scripture and the truth of its contents quite apart from all other evidence. The very term, "the testimony of the Spirit", is adduced in support of this representation, as setting a divine witness to the divinity of Scripture over against other sources of evidence, and of course superseding them: and appeal is made along with this to Calvin's strong assertions of the uselessness and even folly of plying men with "the proofs" of the divine origin of Scripture, seeing that, it is said, in the absence of the testimony of the Spirit such "proofs" must needs be ineffective, and in the presence of that effective testimony they cannot but be adjudged unnecessary. What can he mean, then, it is asked, but that the testimony of the Holy Spirit is sufficient to assure us of the divinity of Scripture apart from all *indicia*, and does its work entirely independently of them?

The sufficient answer to this question is that he can mean—and in point of fact does mean—that the *indicia* are wholly insufficient to assure us of the divinity of Scripture apart from the testimony of the Spirit; and effect no result independently of it. This is quite a different proposition and gives rise to quite a different series of corollaries. Calvin's dealing with the *indicia* of the divinity of Scripture has already attracted our attention in one of its aspects, and it is quite worthy of renewed scrutiny. We have seen that he devotes a whole chapter to their exposition (ch. viii) and strongly asserts their objective conclusiveness to the fact of the divine origin of Scripture (I. vii. 4). Nor does he

doubt their usefulness whether to the believer or the unbeliever. The fulness and force of his exposition of them is the index to his sense of their value to the believer: for he adduces them distinctly as confirmations of believers in their faith in the Scriptures (I. viii. 1, 13), and betrays in every line of their treatment the high significance he attaches to them as such. And he explicitly declares that they not only maintain in the minds of the pious the native dignity and authority of Scripture, but completely vindicate it against all the subtleties of calumniators (I. viii. 13). No man of sound mind can fail to confess on their basis that it is God who speaks in Scripture and its doctrine is divine (I. vii. 4). It is a complete misapprehension of Calvin's meaning, then, when it is suggested that he represents the *indicia* of the divinity of Scripture as inconclusive or even as ineffective.⁵⁷ Their conclusiveness could not be

⁵⁷ There is a certain misapprehension involved, also, in speaking of Calvin *subordinating* the *indicia* to the witness of the Spirit, as if he conceived them on the same plane, but occupying relatively lower and higher positions on this plane. The witness of the Spirit and the *indicia* move in different orbits. We find K  stlin, as cited, 413, accordingly speaking not quite to the point, when he says: "He subordinated to the power of this one, immediate, divine testimony, all those several criteria by the pious and thoughtful consideration of which our faith in the Scriptures and their contents may and should be further mediated. Even miracles, as Niedner has rightly remarked (*Philosophie- und Theologieggeschichte*, 341, note 2), take among the evidences for the divinity of the Biblical revelation, 'nothing more than a co  rdinate' place: we add in passing that Calvin introduces them here only in the edition of 1550, and then enlarges the section which treats of them in the edition of 1559. He does not, however, put a low estimate on such criteria; he would trust himself—as he says in an addition made in the edition of 1559 (xxx. 59)—to silence with them even stiff-necked opponents; but this certainty which faith should have, can never be attained, says he, by disputation, but can be wrought only by the testimony of the Spirit." The question between the testimony of the Spirit and the *indicia* is not a question of which gives the strongest evidence; it is a question of what each is fitted to do. The *indicia* are supreme in their sphere: they and they alone give objective evidence. But objective evidence is inoperative when the subjective condition is such that it cannot penetrate and affect the mind. All objective evidence is in this sense subordinate to the subjective change wrought by the Spirit: but considered as objective evidence it is supreme in its own

asserted with more energy than he asserts it: nor indeed could their effectiveness—their effectiveness in extorting from the unbeliever the confession of the divinity of Scripture and in rendering him without excuse in refusing the homage of his mind and heart to it—in a word, will he, will he, convincing his intellect of its divinity; their effectiveness also in confirming the believer in his faith and maintaining his confidence intact. This prevalent misapprehension of Calvin's meaning is due to neglect to observe the precise thing for which he affirms the *indicia* to be ineffective and the precise reason he assigns for this ineffectiveness. There is only one thing which he says they cannot do: that is to produce "sound faith" (I. vii. 4), "firm faith" (I. viii. 13),—that assurance which is essential to "true piety" (I. vii. 4). And their failure to produce "sound faith" is due solely to the subjective condition of man, which is such that a creative operation of the Holy Spirit on the soul is requisite before he can exercise "sound faith" (I. vi.

sphere. The term "subordinate" is accordingly misleading here. For the rest, it is true that Calvin places the miracles by which the giving of Scripture was accompanied rather among the objective evidences of their divinity than at their apex: but this is due not to an underestimation of the value of miracles as evidence, but to the very high estimate he placed on the internal criteria of divinity, by which the Scriptures evidence themselves to be divine. And above all we must not be misled into supposing that he places miracles below the testimony of the Spirit in importance. Such a comparison is outside his argument: miracles are part of the objective evidence of the deity of Scripture; the testimony of the Spirit is the subjective preparation of the heart to receive the objective evidence in a sympathetic embrace. He would have said, of course,—he does say,—that no miracle, and no body of miracles, could or can produce "true faith": the internal creative operation of the Spirit is necessary for that. And in that sense the evidence of miracles is subordinated to the testimony of the Spirit. But this is not because of any depreciation of the evidential value of miracles; but because of the full appreciation of the deadness of the human soul in sin. The evidential value of miracles, and their place in the objective evidences of the divine origin of the Scriptures, are wholly unaffected by the doctrine of the testimony of the Spirit; and the strongest assertions of their valuelessness in the production of faith, apart from the testimony of the Spirit, do not in the least affect the estimate we put on them, as objective evidences.

4; viii. 1, 13). It is the attempt to produce this "sound faith" in the heart of man, not renewed for believing by the creative operation of the Holy Spirit, which Calvin pronounces preposterous and foolish. "It is acting a preposterous part", he says, "to endeavor to produce *sound faith* in the Scriptures by disputations": objections may be silenced by such disputations, "but this will not fix in men's hearts *that assurance which is essential to true piety*"; for religion is not a matter of mere opinion, but a fundamental change of attitude towards God (I. vii. 4). It betrays, therefore, great folly to wish to demonstrate to infidels that the Scriptures are the Word of God, he repeats in another place, obviously with no other meaning, "since this cannot be known without faith", that is, as the context shows, without the internal working of the Spirit of God (I. viii. 13, end).

That Calvin should thus teach that the *indicia* are incapable of producing "firm faith" in the human heart, disabled by sin, is a matter of course: and therefore it is a matter of course that he should teach that the *indicia* are ineffective for the production of "sound faith" apart from the internal operation of the Spirit correcting the sin-bred disabilities of man, that is to say, apart from the testimony of the Spirit. But what about the *indicia* in conjunction with the testimony of the Spirit? It would seem to be evident that, on Calvin's ground, they would have their full part to play here, and that we must say that, when the soul is renewed by the Holy Spirit to a sense for the divinity of Scripture, it is through the *indicia* of that divinity that it is brought into its proper confidence in the divinity of Scripture. In treating of the *indicia*, Calvin does not, however, declare this in so many words. He sometimes even appears to speak of them rather as if they lay side by side with the testimony of the Spirit than acted along with it as co-factors in the production of the supreme effect. He speaks of their ineffectiveness in producing sound faith in the unbeliever: and of their value as corroboratives to the believer: and his language would

sometimes seem to suggest that therefore it were just as well not to employ them until after faith had formed itself under the testimony of the Spirit (I. viii. 1, 13). Of their part in forming faith under the operation of the testimony of the Spirit he does not appear explicitly to speak.⁵⁸

Nevertheless, there are not lacking convincing hints that

⁵⁸ Cf. Köstlin, as cited, pp. 413-14: "We find in Calvin the aforementioned several criteria set alongside of this witness of the Spirit, and indeed especially those which are internal to the Scriptures themselves, such as their elevation above all merely human products, which cannot fail to impress every reader, etc. It would certainly be desirable to trace an inner connection between this impression made by the character, by the style of speech, by the contents of Scripture, and that supreme immediate testimony of the Spirit for it. Assuredly God Himself, the Author of Scripture, works upon us also in such impressions, which we analyse in our reflecting human consideration, and in our debates strive to set before opponents; and we feel, on the other side, a need to analyse, as far as is possible for us, even the supreme witness of the Spirit, in spite of its immediacy, and to relate it with our other experiences and observations with respect to Scripture, so as to become conscious of the course by which God passes from one to the other. Calvin, however, does not enter into this; he sets the two side by side and over against one another: 'Although (Scripture) conciliates reverence to itself by its own supreme majesty, it does not seriously affect us, until it is sealed to our hearts by the Spirit' (xxix. 295; xxx. 60; ed. 3. I. 7. 5): he does not show the inner relation of one to the other. He does not do this even in the edition of 1559, where he with great eloquence speaks more fully of the power with which the Word of the New Testament witnesses manifests its divine majesty. The witness of the Spirit comes forward with Calvin thus somewhat abruptly. By means of it the Spirit works true faith, which the Scripture, even through its internal criteria, cannot establish in divine certainty; and indeed He does not work it in the case of all those—and has no intention of working it in the case of all those—to whom the Scripture is conveyed with its criteria, but, as the section on Predestination further shows, only in the case of those who have been elected thereto from all eternity. Here we are already passing over into the relation of the Calvinistic conception of the Formal Principle or the Authority of Scripture, to its conception of the means of grace. In this matter the Lutheran doctrine stands in conflict with it. But with reference to what we have been discussing, we do not find that the Lutheran dogmaticians, when they come to occupy themselves more particularly with the *testimonium Spiritus Sancti* to the Scriptures, dealt more vitally with its relation to the operation of these criteria on the human spirit. No doubt, in Luther's own conception this was more the case: but he gave no scientific elaboration of it."

there was lying in his mind all the time the implicit understanding that it is through these *indicia* of the divinity of Scripture that the soul, under the operation of the testimony of the Spirit, reaches its sound faith in Scripture, and that he has been withheld from more explicitly stating this only by the warmth of his zeal for the necessity of the testimony of the Spirit which has led him to a constant contrasting of this divine with those human "testimonies". Thus we find him repeatedly affirming that these *indicia* will produce no fruit *until* they be confirmed by the internal testimony of the Spirit (I. vii. 4, 5; viii. 1, 13): "Our reverence may be conciliated by the internal majesty of Scripture, but it never seriously affects us, *till* it is confirmed by the Spirit in our hearts" (I. vii. 5). "*Without this certainty*, in vain will the authority of Scripture be either defended by arguments or established by the consent of the Church, or of any other supports: since without the foundation be laid, it remains in perpetual suspense" (I. viii. 1). The *indicia* "*are alone* not sufficient to produce firm faith in the Scriptures, *till* the heavenly Father, discovering His own power therein, places its authority above all controversy" (I. viii. 13). It is, however, in his general teaching as to the formation of sound faith in the divinity of Scripture that we find the surest indication that he thought of the *indicia* as co-working with the testimony of the Spirit to this result. This is already given, indeed, in his strenuous insistence that the work of the Spirit is not of the nature of a revelation, but of a confirmation of the revelation deposited in the Scriptures, especially when this is taken in connection with his teaching that Scripture is self-authenticating. What the Spirit of God imparts to us, he says, is a *sense* of divinity: such a sense discovers divinity only where divinity is and only by a perception of it,—a perception which of course rests on its proper *indicia*. It is because Scripture "exhibits the plainest evidence that it is God who speaks in it" that the newly awakened *sense* of divinity quickened in the soul, recognizes it as divine (I. vii. 4). The senses do not dis-

tinguish light from darkness, white from black, sweet from bitter,—to use Calvin's own illustration (I. vii. 2),—save by the mediation of those *indicia* of light and darkness, whiteness and blackness, sweetness and bitterness, by which these qualities manifest themselves to the natural senses: and by parity of reasoning we must accredit Calvin as thinking of the newly implanted spiritual sense discerning the divinity of Scripture only through the mediation of the *indicia* of divinity manifested in Scripture. To taste and see that the Scriptures are divine is to recognize a divinity actually present in Scripture; and of course recognition implies perception of *indicia*, not attribution of a divinity not recognized as inherent. Meanwhile it must be admitted that Calvin has not at this point developed this side of his subject with the fulness which might be wished, but has left it to the general implications of the argument.

OBJECT TESTIFIED TO.

Closely connected with the question of the mode in which Calvin conceived the testimony of the Spirit to be delivered, is the further question of the matters for which he conceived that testimony to be available. On the face of it it would seem that he conceived it directly available solely for the divinity of the Scriptures and therefore for the revelatory character of their contents. So he seems to imply throughout the discussion, and, indeed, to assert repeatedly. Nevertheless, there is a widespread impression abroad that he appealed to it to determine the canon of Scripture too,⁵⁹

⁵⁹ Cf. Köstlin, as cited, p. 417: "The certainty that the Scriptures really possess such authority, rests for us not on the authority of the Church, but just on this testimony of the Spirit. Calvin's reference here is even to the several books of Scripture: he is aware that the opponents ask how, without a decree of the Church, we are to be convinced what book should be received with reverence, what should be excluded from the canon; he himself adduces in opposition to this, even here, nothing else except the *testimonium Spiritus*: the entirety of Scripture seems to him to be equally, so to say, *en bloc*, divinely legitimated by this." So also Pannier, as cited, p. 252: "The question of canonicity never presented itself to the thought of Calvin, except in the second

and indeed also to establish the integrity of its text. This impression is generally, though not always, connected with the view that Calvin conceived the mode of delivery of the testimony of the Spirit to be the creation in the soul of a blind faith, unmotivated by reasons and without rooting in grounds; and it has been much exploited of late years in the interests of a so-called "free" attitude towards Scripture, which announces itself as following Calvin when it refuses to acknowledge as authoritative Scripture any portion of or element in the traditionally transmitted Scriptures which does not spontaneously commend itself to the immediate

place as a corollary of the problem of the divinity (I. vii. 1). If the Holy Spirit attests to us that a given book is divine, He in that very act attests that it forms a part of the rule of faith, that it is canonical. Nowhere has Calvin permitted, as his successors have done, a primary place to be taken by a theological doctrine which became less capable of resisting the assaults of adversaries when isolated from the practical question. Perhaps, moreover, he did not render as exact an account as we are able to render after the lapse of two centuries, of the wholly new situation in which the Reformation found itself with respect to the canon, or of the new way in which he personally resolved the question." Accordingly, at an earlier point Pannier says: "It is true that the faculty of recognizing the Word of God under the human forms included for Calvin, and especially according to the Confession of Faith of 1559, the faculty of determining the canonicity of the books. This is a consequence secondary but natural, and so long as they maintained the principle, the Reformed doctors placed themselves in a false position when they showed themselves disposed to abandon the consequences to the criticisms of their opponents" (p. 164). Cf. J. Cramer, *Nieuwe Bijdragen*, III. 140: "But you must not think of an *immediate* witness of the Spirit to the particular parts of the Holy Scriptures. The old theologians did not think of that. They conceived the matter thus: The *testimonium Spiritus Sancti* gives witness *directly* to the religious-moral contents of Scripture only. Since, however, the religious-moral contents must necessarily have a particular form, and the dogmatic content is closely bound up with the historical, neither the chronological nor the topographical element can be separated out, etc. . . . therefore the *testimonium Spiritus Sancti* gives to the total content of Scripture witness that it is from God." This, after all, then, is not to appeal to the *testimonium Spiritus Sancti*, directly to authenticate the canon; but to construct a canon on the basis of a testimony of the Spirit given solely to the divinity of Scripture, the movement of thought being this: All Scripture given by inspiration of God is profitable; this Scripture is given by inspiration of God; accordingly this Scripture belongs to the category of profitable Scripture, that is to the canon.

religious judgment as divine. Undoubtedly this is to reverse the attitude of Calvin towards the traditionally transmitted Scriptures, and it is difficult to believe that two such diametrically contradictory attitudes towards the Scriptures can be outgrowths of the same principal root. In point of fact, moreover, as we have already seen, not only does Calvin not conceive the mode of the delivery of the testimony of the Spirit to be by the creation of a blind and unmotivated faith, but, to come at once to the matter more particularly in hand, he does not depend on the testimony of the Spirit for the determination of canonicity or for the establishment of the integrity of the text of Scripture. So far from discarding the *via rationalis* here, he determines the limits of the canon and establishes the integrity of the transmission of Scripture distinctly on scientific, that is to say, historico-critical grounds. In no case of his frequent discussion of such subjects does he appeal to the testimony of the Spirit and set aside the employment of rational and historical argumentation as invalid or inconclusive; always, on the contrary, he adduces the evidence of valid tradition and apostolicity of contents as conclusive of the fact. It is hard to believe that such a consequent mind could have lived unconsciously in such an inconsistent attitude towards a question so vital to him and his cause.⁶⁰

⁶⁰ Reuss, in the 16th chapter of his *History of the Canon of the Holy Scriptures* (E. T. 1884), expounds Calvin, with his usual learning and persuasiveness, as basing the determination of the canon solely on the testimony of the Spirit. But the exposition falls into two confusions: a confusion of the authority of Scripture with its canonicity, and a confusion of the divine with the apostolic origin of Scripture. Of course, Calvin repelled the Romish conception that the authority of Scripture rests on its authentication by the Church and its tradition (p. 294), but that did not deter him from seeking by a historical investigation to discover what especial books had been committed by the apostles to the Church as authoritative. Of course, he founded the sure conviction of the divine origin of the Scriptures on the witness of the Spirit of God by and with them in the heart, but that did not prevent his appealing to history to determine what these Scriptures which were so witnessed were in their compass. Accordingly even Reuss has to admit that it is exceedingly difficult to carry through his

So far as support for the impression that Calvin looked to the testimony of the Spirit to determine for him the canon of Scripture and to assure him of its integrity is derived from his writings, it rests on a manifest misapprehension of a single passage in the *Institutes*, and what seems to be a misassignment to him of a passage in the old French Confession of Faith.

The passage in the *Institutes* is a portion of the paragraphs which are devoted to repelling the Romish contention that "the Scriptures have only so much weight as is conceded to them by the suffrages of the Church; as though the eternal and inviolable truth of God depended on the arbitrary will of men" (I. vii. 1). "For thus", Calvin says—and this is the passage which is appealed to—"For thus, dealing with the Holy Spirit as a mere laughing stock (*ludibrium*), they ask, Who shall give us confidence that these [Scriptures] have come from God,—who assure us that they have reached our time safe and intact,—who persuade us that one book should be received reverently, another expunged from the number (*numero*)—if the Church should not prescribe a certain rule for all these things? It depends, therefore, they say, on the Church, both what reverence is due to Scripture, and what books should be inscribed (*censendi sint*) in its catalogue (*in ejus catalogo*)" (I. vii. 1). This passage certainly shows that the Romish controversialists in endeavoring to prove that the authority of Scripture is dependent on the Church's suffrage, argued that it is only by the Church that we can be assured even of

theory of Calvin's theoretical procedure consistently with Calvin's observed practice. In point of fact, the Reformers, and Calvin among them, did not separate the Apocrypha from the O. T. on the sole basis of the testimony of the Spirit: they appealed to the evidence of the Jewish Church (p. 312). Nor did they determine the question of the New Testament antilegomena on this principle: this, too, was with them "a simple question of historical criticism" (p. 316)—although Reuss here (p. 318) confuses Calvin's appeal to the internal evidence of apostolicity with appeal to "religious intuition". In a word, Reuss' exposition of Calvin's procedure in determining the canon rests on a fundamental misconception of that procedure.

the contents of Scripture and of its integrity,—that its very canon and text rest on the Church's determination. But how can it be inferred that Calvin's response to this argument would take the form: No, of these things we can be assured by the immediate testimony of the Spirit? In point of fact, he says nothing of the kind, and the inference does not lie in the argument. What he says is that the Romish method of arguing is as absurd as it is blasphemous, a mere cavil (I. vii. 2), as well as derogatory to the Holy Spirit. The Holy Spirit, he says, assures us that in the Scriptures God speaks to us. To bid us pause on the ground that it is only the Church who can assure us that this or that book belongs to the body of the Scriptures, that the text has been preserved to us intact and the like, is to interpose frivolous objections, and can have no other end than to glorify the Church at the expense of souls. Accordingly, he remarks that these objectors are without concern what logical difficulties they may cast themselves into: they wish only to prevent men taking their comfort out of the direct assurance by the Spirit of the divinity of the Scriptures. He repudiates, in a word, the entire Romish argument: but we can scarcely infer from this, that his response to it would be that the immediate witness of the Spirit provides us with direct answers to their carping questions. It is at least equally likely from the mere fact that he speaks of these objections as cavils (I. vii. 2) and girds at the logic of the Romish controversialists as absurd, that his response would be that the testimony of the Spirit for which he was contending had no direct concernment with questions of canon and text.

The passage in the Confession of La Rochelle, on the other hand, does certainly attribute the discrimination of the canonical books in some sense—in what sense may admit of debate—to the testimony of the Spirit. In the third article of this Confession there is given a list of the canonical books.⁶¹ The fourth article, then, runs as follows:

⁶¹ "All this Holy Scripture is comprised in the canonical books of the

"We recognize these books to be canonical and the very certain rule of our faith, not so much by the common accord and consent of the Church, as by the inward witness and persuasion of the Holy Spirit, who makes us distinguish them from the other ecclesiastical books, upon which, though they may be useful, no article of faith can be founded." This article, however, was not the composition of Calvin, but was among those added by the Synod of Paris to the draft submitted by Calvin.⁶² Calvin's own article "On the Books of Holy Scripture", which was expanded by the Synod into several, reads only: "This doctrine does not derive its authority from men, nor from angels, but from God alone; we believe, too (seeing that it is a thing surpassing all human sense to discern that it is God who speaks), that He Himself gives the certitude of it to His elect, and seals it in their hearts by His Spirit."⁶³ In this fine statement we find the very essence of the teaching of the *Institutes* on this subject; the ideas and even the phraseology of which are reproduced.

We may learn, therefore, at most, from the Confession of La Rochelle, not that Calvin, but that some of his immediate followers attributed in some sense the discrimination of the canonical books to the witness of the Spirit. Other evidences of this fact are not lacking. The Belgian Confession, for example, much like that of La Rochelle, declares of the Scriptural books, just enumerated (Art. 5): "We receive all these books alone, as holy and canonical, for the regulation, foundation and establishment of our faith, and we fully believe all that they contain, not so much because the Church receives and approves them, but principally because the Spirit gives witness to them in our hearts that they are from God, and also because they are approved

Old and New Testaments, the number (*le nombre*) of which is as follows" . . . the list ensuing.

⁶² *Opp.* ix. *prolg.*, pp. lvii-lx: cf. Dieterlen, *Le Synode général de Paris* (1873), pp. 77, 89; Pannier, as cited, p. 127; and for a brief précis, Müller, *Bekennnisschriften der reform. Kirche* (1903), p. xxxiii.

⁶³ *Opp.* ix. 741.

by themselves; for the very blind can perceive that the things come to pass which they predict." Perhaps, however, we may find a more instructive instance still in the words of one of the Protestant disputants in a conference held at Paris in 1566 between two Protestant ministers and two doctors of the Sorbonne.⁶⁴ To the inquiry, How do you know that some books are canonical and others apocryphal, the Protestant disputant (M. Lespine) answers: "By the Spirit of God which is a Spirit of discrimination, by whom all those to whom He is communicated are illuminated, so as to be made capable of judging and discerning spiritual things and of recognizing (*cognoistre*) and apprehending the truth (when it is proposed to them), by the witness and assurance which He gives to them in their hearts. And as we discriminate light and darkness by the faculty of sight which is in the eye; so, we can easily separate and recognize (*reconoistre*) truth from falsehood, and from all things in general which can be false, absurd, doubtful or indifferent, when we are invested with the Spirit of God and guided by the light which He lights in our hearts." M. Lespine had evidently read his Calvin; though there is a certain lack of crisp exactness in his language which may raise doubt whether he has necessarily reproduced him with precision. Clearly his idea is that the Spirit of God in His creative operation on the hearts of Christ's people has implanted in them—or quickened in them—a spiritual sense, which recognizes the stamp of divinity upon the Books which God has given to the Church, and so separates them out from all others and thus constitutes the canon. This is to attribute the discrimination of the canonical books to the witness of the Spirit not directly but indirectly, namely, through the intermediation of the determination of the books which are of divine origin, which,

⁶⁴ *Actes de la dispute et conference tenue à Paris és mois de juillet et aoust 1566* (Strasbourg, 1566), printed in the *Biblioth. de la Soc. de l'Hist. du Prot. franc.* We draw from the account of it in Pannier, as cited, pp. 141 sq.

then, being gathered together, constitute the canon, or divinely given rule of our faith and life. This conception of the movement of the mind in this matter became very common, and was given very clear expression, for example, by Jurieu,⁶⁵ in a context which bears as evident marks of reminiscences of Calvin as do M. Lespine's remarks. "That grace which produces faith in a soul", says he, "does not begin by persuading it that a given book is canonical. This persuasion comes only afterwards and as a consequence. It gives to the consciousness a taste for the truth: it applies this truth to the mind and heart; it proceeds from this subsequently that the believer believes that a given book is canonical, because the truths which 'find' him are found in it. In a word, we do not believe that which is contained in a book to be divine because this book is canonical. But we believe that a given book is canonical because we have perceived that what it contains is divine. And we have perceived this as we perceive the light when we look on the fire, sweetness and bitterness when we eat." Whether we are to attribute this movement of thought, however, to Calvin, is another question.⁶⁶ There is no hint of it in his writings.

It is not even obvious that this precise movement of thought is the conception which lay in the mind of the authors of the additional articles in the Confession of La

⁶⁵ *Le vray systeme de l'Eglise et la véritable analyse de la foy*, III. ii. 450. (Pannier, p. 168).

⁶⁶ As we have seen, it is attributed to Calvin by both Pannier and Cramer. Pannier (203) remarks that "if Calvin was not able to appreciate in all its purity" the new situation with regard to the canon into which the Reformation brought men, "it was even less incumbent on him to render account of the personal attitude which he himself took up with reference to it". "It is his successors only who, in adopting his conclusions (except that they apply them more or less), have asked themselves how they reached them, and have reconstructed the reasoning which no doubt Calvin himself had unconsciously followed." Is not this a confession that after all the view in question was not Calvin's own view? At least not consciously to himself? But Pannier would say, no doubt, either this was Calvin's view or he appealed to the testimony of the Spirit *directly* to authenticate the canon.

Rochelle and of the similar statement in the Belgian Confession. The interpretation of these articles is particularly interesting, as they both undoubtedly came under the eye of Calvin and their doctrine was never disavowed by him. It is not, however, altogether easy, because of a certain ambiguity in the use of the term "canonical". It is on account of the ambiguity which attends the use of this term that in speaking of their teaching we have guardedly said that they appear to suspend the canonicity of the Scriptural books in some sense directly on the testimony of the Spirit. This ambiguity may be brought sharply before us by placing in juxtaposition two sentences from Quenstedt in which the term "canonical" is employed, obviously, in two differing senses. "We deny", says he, "that the catalogue of canonical books is an article of faith, superadded to the others [articles of faith] contained in Scripture. Many have faith and may attain salvation who do not hold the number of canonical books. If the word 'canon' be understood of the *number* of the books, we concede that such a catalogue is not contained in Scripture." "These are two different questions", says he again, "whether the Gospel of Matthew is canonical, and whether it was written by Matthew. The former belongs to saving faith; the latter to historical knowledge. For if the Gospel which has come down to us under the name of Matthew had been written by Philip or Bartholomew, it would make no difference to saving faith." In the former extract the question of canonicity is removed from the category of articles of faith; in the latter it is made an integral element of saving faith. The contradiction is glaring—unless there be an undistributed middle. And this is what there really is. In the former passage, where Quenstedt is engaged in repelling the contention that there are articles of faith that must be accepted by all, which are not contained in Scripture—in defending, in a word, the Protestant doctrine of the sufficiency or perfection of Scripture—he uses the terms 'canon', 'canonical' in the purely technical sense of the extent of Scripture. In the latter

passage, where he is insisting that the authority of Scripture as the Word of God hangs on its divine, not on its human, author, he uses the term 'canonical' in the sense of "divinely given". The term "canonical" was current, then, in the two senses of 'belonging to the list of authoritative Scriptures', 'entering into the body of the Scriptures', and 'God-given', 'divine'. In which of these two senses is it used in the Gallican and Belgian Confessions? If in the former, then these Confessions teach that the testimony of the Spirit is available directly for the determination of the canon: if in the latter, then they teach no such thing, but only that it is on the testimony of the Spirit that we are assured of the divine origin and character of these books.

That the Gallican Confession employs the term in the latter of these senses, seems at least possible when once attention is called to it, although regard for the last clause of the statement: "who makes us distinguish them from the other ecclesiastical books", etc., prevents the representation of this interpretation as certain. Its declaration, succeeding the catalogue of the books given in the third section, is obviously intended to affirm something that is true of them already as a definite body of books before the mind. "We recognize *these* books", it says, "to be canonical and the very certain rule of our faith". That is to say, to this body of books we ascribe the quality of canonicity and recognize their regulative character. What would seem, then, to be in question is a quality belonging to a list of books already determined and in the mind of the framer of the statement as a whole. The same may be said of the Belgian Confession. It, too, has already given a list of the canonical books, and now proceeds to affirm something that is true of "all of these books and them only". The thing affirmed is that they are "holy and canonical", where the collocation suggests that "canonical" expresses a quality which ranges with "holy". We cannot help suspecting, then, that these early confessions use the term "canonical" not quantitatively but qualitatively, not extensively but intensively; and in that

sense it is the equivalent of "divine".⁶⁷ Even the inference back from them to Calvin that he may have supposed that the testimony of the Spirit is available to determine the canon becomes therefore doubtful: and no other reason exists why we should attribute this view to him. We cannot affirm that the movement of his thought was never from the divinity of Scripture, assured to us by the testimony of the Spirit, to the determination of the limits of the canon: but

"The following is the account of the treatment of the question of the canon in these creeds, given by J. Cramer (*De Roomsche-Katholieke en de Oud-protestantsche Schrifbeschouwing*, 1883, pp. 48 sq.): "And on what now, does that authority rest? This question, too, is amply discussed in the Reformed Confessions, and that, as concerns the principal matter, wholly in the spirit of Calvin. Only, more value is ascribed to the testimony of the Church. No doubt the authority of the Scriptures is not made to rest on it; but it is permitted an important voice in the question of the canon. When it is said that 'all that is said in the Holy Scriptures' is to be believed *not so much* because the Church receives them and holds them as canonical, but especially because the Holy Spirit bears witness to them in our heart that they are from God', a certain weight is attributed to the judgment of the church. This appears particularly from the way in which the canonical books are spoken of in distinction from the Apocryphal books. In enumerating the Bible books, the Belgian Confession prefixes the words: 'Against which nothing can be said' (art. IV). By this apparently is meant, that against the canonicity of these books, from a historical standpoint, with the eye on the witness of the Church, nothing can be alleged (a thing not to be said of the Apocrypha). In the same spirit the Anglican Articles, when speaking of the books of the O. and N. Testaments, says that 'Of their authority there has never been any doubt in the Church'. I will not raise the question here how that can be affirmed with the eye on the Antilegomena. It shows, however, certainly that much importance is attached to the ecclesiastical tradition. The fundamental ground, however, why the Scriptures of the O. and N. Testaments are to be held to be the Word of God is sought in the Scriptures themselves, and, assuredly, in the testimony which the Holy Spirit bears to their divinity in the hearts of believers. Like Calvin, the Confessions suppose that thus they have given an immovable foundation to the divine authority of the Scriptures, and have taken an impregnable position over against Rome, which appealed to the witness of the Catholic Church." . . . Calvin, however, allowed as much to the testimony of the Church—external evidence—as is here allowed, and the very adduction of its testimony shows that sole dependence was not placed on the testimony of the Spirit for the canonicity of a book: what it is appealed to for is the divinity of the canonical books.

we have no reason to ascribe this movement of thought to him except that it was adopted by some of his successors.

On the other hand, Calvin constantly speaks as if the only thing which the testimony of the Spirit assures us of in the case of the Scriptures is the divinity of their origin and contents: and he always treats Scripture when so speaking of it as a definite entity, held before his mind as a whole.⁶⁸

⁶⁸ So even Köstlin perceives, as cited, p. 417: "The entirety of Scripture appeared to him divinely legitimated by the *testimonium Spiritus*, altogether, so to say, *en bloc*. . . . The declarations of Calvin as to the Word spoken by the prophets and apostles, which they rightly asserted to be God's Word, pass without hesitation over into declarations as to the Holy Scriptures, as such, and that in their entirety; with the proposition 'the Law and the Prophets and the Gospel have emanated from God' is interchanged the proposition 'the Scripture is from God',—and the witness of the Spirit assures us of it." So also Pannier (II. 203): "Everything goes back to his considering things not in detail but *en bloc*. The word of God is for him one, *verbum Dei*, not *verba Dei*. The diversity of the authors disappears before the unity of the Spirit. The same reasoning applies to each single book as to the whole collection. All the verses hold together; and if one introduces us to the knowledge of salvation we may conclude that the book is canonical. Given the collection, it is enough in practice, since all the parts are of a sort, to establish the value of one of them to guarantee the value of all the others. It is certain that the critical theologian and the simple believer even yet proceed somewhat differently in this matter; the simplest and surest method is that of the humble saint, and Calvin was very right not to range himself among the theologians at this point. 'The just shall live by faith.' This affirmation seemed to him a revealed truth: he concluded from it that the whole epistle to the Romans is inspired; some remarks of this kind in other passages of the Epistles, of the Gospels, and the canonicity of the New Testament is established. The same for the Old Testament. The Second Epistle of Peter and the Song of Songs. The human testimonies, internal and external criteria, useful for confirming the other parts of a book of which a passage has been recognized as inspired, are insufficient to expel from the canon a book which the witness of the Spirit has not recognized as opposed to the doctrine of salvation." We quote the whole passage to give Pannier's whole thought: but what we adduce it for is at present merely to signalize the admission it contains that Calvin dealt with the Scriptures in the matter of the testimony of the Spirit, so to speak, "in the lump"—as a whole. Pannier cites apparently as similar to Calvin's view, Gaussen, *Canon*, ii. 10: "This testimony, which every Christian has recognized when he has read his Bible with vital efficacy, may be recognized by him only in a single page; but this page

In these circumstances his own practice in dealing with the question of canonicity and text, makes it sufficiently clear that he held their settlement to depend on scientific investigation, and appealed to the testimony of the Spirit only to accredit the divine origin of the concrete volume thus put into his hands. The movement of his thought was therefore along this course: first, the ascertainment, on scientific grounds, of the body of books handed down from the Apostles as the rule of faith and practice; secondly, the vindication, on the same class of grounds, of the integrity of their transmission; thirdly, the accrediting of them as divine on the testimony of the Spirit. It is not involved in this that he is to be considered to have supposed that a man must be a scholar before he can be a Christian. He supposed we become Christians not by scholarship but by the testimony of the Spirit in the heart, and he had no inclination to demand scholarship as the basis of our Christianity. It is only involved in the position we ascribe to him that he must be credited with recognizing that questions of scholarship are for scholars and questions of religion only for Christians as such. He would have said—he does say—that he in whose heart the Spirit bears His testimony will recognize the Scriptures whenever presented to his contemplation as divine, will depend on them with sound trust and will embrace with true faith all that they propound to him.

is enough to spread over the book which contains it an incomparable brightness." That is, Calvin, like the simple believer, has a definite book—the Bible—in his hands and treats it as all of a piece—of course, in Calvin's case, not without reasonable grounds for treating it as all of a piece: in other words, the canon was already determined for him before he appealed to the testimony of the Spirit to attest its divinity. Cf. Cramer, p. 140, as quoted above. Cramer is quite right *so far*, therefore, when he says (p. 156): "Although we determine securely by means of the historical-critical method what must be carried back to the apostolical age and what accords with the apostolical doctrine, we have not yet proved the divine authority of these writings. This hangs on this,—whether the Holy Spirit gives us His witness to them. On this witness alone rests our assurance of faith, not on the force of a historical-critical demonstration." This, so far as appears, was Calvin's method.

He would doubtless have said that this act of faith logically implicates the determination of the 'canon'. But he would also have said—he does in effect say—that this determination of the canon is a separable act and is to be prosecuted on its own appropriate grounds of scientific evidence. It involves indeed a fundamental misapprehension of Calvin's whole attitude to attribute to him the view that the testimony of the Spirit determines immediately such scientific questions as those of the canon and text of Scripture. The testimony of the Spirit was to him emphatically an operation of the Spirit of God on the heart, which produced distinctively a spiritual effect: it was directed to making men Christians,⁶⁹ not to making them theologians. The testimony of the Spirit was, in effect, in his view, just what we in modern times have learned to call "regeneration" considered in its noëtic effects. That "regeneration" has noëtic effects he is explicit and iterative in affirming: but that these noëtic effects of "regeneration" could supersede the necessity of scientific investigation in questions which rest for their determination on matters of fact,—Calvin would be the last to imagine. He who recognized that the conviction of the divinity of Scripture wrought by the testimony of the Spirit rests as its ground on the *indicia* of the divinity of Scripture spiritually discerned in their true weight, could not imagine that the determination of the canon of Scripture or the establishment of its text could be wholly separated from their proper basis in evidence and grounded solely in a blind testimony of the Spirit alone: which indeed in that case would be fundamentally indistinguishable from that "revelation" which he rebuked the Anabaptists for claiming to be the recipients of.

⁶⁹ Calvin would certainly have subscribed to these words of Pannier, as cited, p. 164: The most of the Catholics "have always strangely misapprehended the illumination which, according to the Reformed, the least of believers is capable of receiving and of applying to the reading of the Bible. It is a question, not as they suppose, of becoming theologians, but of becoming believers, of having not the plentitude of knowledge, but the certitude of faith".

THE TESTIMONY AND THE RELIGIOUS LIFE.

When we clearly apprehend the essence of Calvin's doctrine of the testimony of the Spirit to the divinity of Scripture to be the noëtic effects of "regeneration" we shall know what estimate to place upon the criticism which is sometimes passed upon him that he has insufficiently correlated his doctrine of the testimony of the Spirit with the inner⁷⁰

⁷⁰ Cf. Köstlin, as cited, p. 415.—After raising the question of the relation of the witness of the Spirit to the inner experience of the Christian, and the relative priority of the two,—and remarking that in case the vital process is conceived as preceding the witness of the Spirit to the divinity of the Scriptures, it will be hard not to allow to the Christianized heart the right and duty of criticism of the Scriptures (where the fault in reasoning lies in the term *process*), Köstlin continues: "We touch here on the relation between the formal and material sides of the fundamental evangelical principle. And we think at once of the relation in which they stood to one another in Luther's representation, by which his well-known critical attitude, with respect, say, to the Epistle of James, was rendered possible. Calvin, too, now has no wish to speak of a witness of the Spirit merely with reference to the Scriptures, and is far from desiring to isolate that witness of the Spirit for the Scriptures. He comes back to it subsequently, when speaking of faith in the saving content of the Gospel, declaring that the Spirit seals the contents of the Word in our hearts (1539, xxix. 456 sq., 468 sq.; further in 1559, III. 2). He also inserted in the section on the Holy Scriptures and the witness of the Spirit to them, in 1550, an additional special sentence, in which he expressly refers to his intention to speak further on such a witness of the Spirit in a later portion of the treatise, and declares of faith in general, that there belongs to it a sealing of the divine Spirit (XXIX. 296 [1559, I. vii. 5 near end]). In any event he must have recurred to such a Spiritual testimony for the assurance of individual Christians of their personal election. But in the first instance—and this again is precisely what is characteristic for Calvin—he nevertheless treats of the doctrine of the divine origin and the divine authority of the Scriptures, and of the witness of the Spirit for them, wholly apart. The presentation proceeds with him in such a manner, that the Spirit first of all fully produces faith in this character of the Scriptures, and only then the Bible-believing Christian has to receive from the Scriptures its contents, in all its several parts, as divinely true,—though, no doubt, this reception and this faith in the several elements of the truth are by no means matters of human thought, but are rather to be performed under the progressive illumination and the progressive sealing of these contents in the heart by the Holy Spirit. Even though he, meanwhile, calls that the 'truth' of the Scriptures, which we come to feel in the power of the Spirit, he means

religious life of the Christian, has given too separate a place to the Spirit's witness to Scripture, and thus has overestimated the formal principle of Protestantism in comparison with the material principle,⁷¹ with the effect of giving a hard, dry and legalistic aspect to Christianity as expounded by him. With Luther, it is said, everything is made of Justification and the liberty of the Christian man fills the horizon of thought; and this is because his mind is set on the "faith" out of which all good things flow and by which everything—Scripture itself—is dominated. With Calvin,

by this in the section before us, an absolute truth-character, which must from the start be attributed to the Scriptures as a whole, and will be experienced in and with the divinity of the Scriptures in general. So the matter already stands in the edition of 1539. . . . (XXIX. 292 sq.)." Accordingly Calvin teaches that the Scriptures in all their parts are of indefectible authority, and should be met in all their prescriptions with unlimited obedience (p. 418), because it is just God who speaks in them. Then: "With Dorner (*Geschichte der protest.-Theologie*, 380)—and even more decisively than he does it—we must remark on all this: 'The formal side of the protestant principle remains with Calvin with an over-emphasis, in comparison with the material, and with this is connected that he sees in the Holy Scriptures above all else the revelation of the will of God which he has dictated to man through the sacred writers.' And this tendency came ever more strongly forward with him in the successive revisions of the *Institutes*. His conception of the formal principle thus left no room for such a criticism as Luther employed on the several parts of the canon." Later Lutheranism, however, Köstlin concludes by saying, adopted Calvin's point of view here and even exaggerated it.

⁷¹ "The formal side of the Protestant principle retains with Calvin the ascendancy over the material; and with this is connected the fact that he sees in the Holy Scriptures chiefly the revelation of the will of God, which he has prescribed to men through the sacred writers."—Dorner, *Hist. of Protest. Theology*, I. 390. Cf. p. 397: "The formal principle is according to him the norm and source of dogma, whilst he does not treat faith, in the same way as Luther, as a source of knowledge for the dogmatical structure, that is to say, as the mediative principle of knowledge." Hence Dorner complains (p. 390) of the more restricted freedom which Calvin left "for the free productions of the faith of the Church in legislation and dogma", and instances his treatment of "the Apostolic Church as normative for all times, even for questions of Church constitution", and the little room he left for destructive Biblical criticism. Cf. what is said above of Calvin's adoption of "the Puritan principle" (p. 229).

on the other hand, with his primary emphasis on the authority of Scripture, accredited to us by a distinct act of the Holy Spirit, the watchword becomes obedience; and the horizon of thought is filled with a sense of obligation and legalistic anxiety as to conduct.

How Calvin could have failed to correlate sufficiently closely the testimony of the Spirit with the inner Christian life, or could have emphasized the formal principle of Protestantism at the expense of the material, when he conceived of the witness of the Spirit as just one of the effects of "regeneration", it is difficult to see. So to conceive the testimony of the Spirit is on the contrary to make the formal principle of Protestantism just an outgrowth of the material. It is only because our spirits have been renewed by the Holy Spirit that we see with convincing clearness the *indicia* of God in Scripture, that is, have the Scriptures sealed to us by the Spirit as divine. It is quite possible that Calvin may have particularly emphasized the obligations which grow out of our renewal by the Holy Spirit and the implantation in us of the Spirit of Adoption whereby we become the sons of God—obligations to comport ourselves as the sons of God and to govern ourselves by the law of God's house as given us in His Word; while Luther may have emphasized more the liberty of the Christian man who is emancipated from the law as a condition of salvation and is ushered into the freedom of life which belongs to the children of God. And it is quite possible that in this difference we may find a fundamental distinction between the two types of Protestantism—Lutheran and Reformed—by virtue of which the Reformed have always been characterized by a strong ethical tendency—in thought and in practice. But it is misleading to represent this as due to an insufficient correlation on Calvin's part of the testimony of the Spirit to the divinity of Scripture with the inner Christian life. It would be more exact to say that Calvin in this correlation thinks especially of what in our modern nomenclature we call "regeneration", while the mind of his Lutheran critics is

set more upon justification and that "faith" which is connected with justification. With Calvin, at all events, the recognition of the Scriptures as divine and the hearty adoption of them as the divine rule of our faith and life is just one of the effects of the gracious operation of the Spirit of God on the heart, renewing it into spiritual life, or, what comes to the same thing, one of the gracious activities into which the newly implanted spiritual life effloresces.

Whether we should say also that it was with him the first effect of the creative operation of the Spirit on the heart, the first act of the newly renewed soul, requires some discrimination. If we mean logically first, there is a sense in which we should probably answer this question also in the affirmative. Calvin would doubtless have said that it is in the Scriptures that Christ is proposed to our faith, or, to put it more broadly, that Christ is the very substance of the special revelation documented in the Scriptures, and that the laying hold of Christ by faith presupposes therefore confidence in the revelation the substance of which He is,—which is as much as to say the embracing of the Scriptures in firm faith as a revelation from God. If the Word is the vehicle through which the knowledge of Christ is brought to the soul, it follows of itself that it is only when our minds are filled with a solid reverence for the Word, when by the light of the Spirit we are enabled and prevalently led to see Christ therein, that we can embrace Christ with a sound faith: so that it may truly be said that no man can have the least true and sound knowledge of Christ without learning from Scripture (*cf.* I. ix. 3; I. vi. 2). In this sense Calvin would certainly have said that our faith in Christ presupposes faith in the Scriptures, rather than that we believe in the Scriptures for Christ's sake. But if our minds are set on chronological sequences, the response to the question which is raised is more doubtful. Faith in the revelation the substance of which is Christ and faith in Christ the substance of this revelation are logical implicates which involve one another: and we should probably be nearest to

Calvin's thought if, without raising questions of chronological succession, we should recognize them as arising together in the soul. The real difference between Calvin's and the ordinary Lutheran conception at this point lies in the greater profundity of Calvin's insight and the greater exactness of his analysis. The Lutheran is prone to begin with faith, which is naturally conceived at its apex, as faith in Jesus Christ our Redeemer; and to make everything else flow from this faith as its ultimate root. For what comes before faith, out of which faith itself flows, he has little impulse accurately to inquire. Calvin penetrates behind faith to the creative action of the Holy Spirit on the heart and the new creature which results therefrom, whose act faith is; and is therefore compelled by an impulse derived from the matter itself to consider the relations in which the several activities of this new creature stand to one another and to analyse the faith itself which holds the primacy among them (for trust is the essence of religion, ch. ii), into its several movements. The effect of this is that "efficacious grace"—what we call in modern speech "regeneration"—takes the place of fundamental principle in Calvin's soteriology and he becomes pre-eminently the theologian of the Holy Spirit. In point of fact it is from him accordingly that the effective study of the work of the Holy Spirit takes its rise, and it is only in the channels cut by him and at the hands of thinkers taught by him that the theology of the Holy Spirit has been richly developed.⁷²

⁷² Cf. the Introduction to the English Translation of Kuyper's *The Work of the Holy Spirit*. Cf. what Pannier, pp. 102-4, says of Calvin's general doctrine of the work of the Spirit and the relation borne to it by his particular doctrine of the testimony of the Spirit to Scripture. "If we pass beyond the two particular chapters whose contents we have been analysing and seek in the *Institutes* from 1536 to 1560 for other passages relating to the Holy Spirit, we shall see Calvin insisting ever more and more and on all occasions,—as in the *Commentaries*,—upon these diverse manifestations of the Holy Spirit, and presenting them all more or less as *testimonies*. He constantly recurs to the natural incapacity of man and the necessity of divine illumination in his mind, and especially in his heart, for the act of faith. It is from this point of view that he brings together the ideas of the Spirit and the Word of God

It is his profound sense of the supernatural origin of all that is good in the manifestations of human life which constitutes the characteristic mark of Calvin's thinking: and it is this which lies at the bottom of and determines his doctrine of the witness of the Holy Spirit. He did not doubt that the act of faith by which the child of God embraces the Scriptures as a revelation of God is his own act and the expression of his innermost consciousness. But neither did he doubt that this consciousness is itself the expression of a creative act of the Spirit of God. And it was on this account that he represented to himself the act of faith performed as resting ultimately on "the testimony

in the definition of faith: 'It is a firm and certain knowledge of the good will of God towards us: which, being grounded in the free promise given in Jesus Christ, is revealed to our heart by the Holy Spirit.' He introduces the same ideas in his introductory remarks on the Apostles' Creed, and they lie at the basis of the explication he gives of the Third Article in all its forms, . . . *e. g.*, in the ed. of 1560: 'In sum, He is set before us as the sole fountain from which all the celestial riches flow down to us. . . . For it is by His inspiration that we are regenerated into celestial life, so as no longer to govern or guide ourselves, but to be ruled by His movement and operation; so that if there is any good in us, it is only the fruit of His grace. . . . But since faith is His prime master-piece, the most of what we read in the Scriptures of His virtue and operation relates itself to this faith, by which He brings us to the brightness of the Gospel, in a manner which justifies calling Him the King by whom the treasures of the kingdom of heaven are offered to us, and His illumination may be called the longing of our souls.' From these quotations it is made plain that the witness of the Holy Spirit which at the opening of the *Institutes* in 1539 appeared as the *means of knowledge*, was thenceforward nevertheless considered, in the progress of the work, as the *means of grace*, and that taking his start from this point of view, Calvin discovered ever more widely extending horizons, so as at the end to speak particularly of the Holy Spirit in at least four different connections, but always—even in the first—in direct and constant relation to faith, with respect to its origin, and with respect to its consequences; and by no means almost exclusively with respect to assurance of the authority of the Scriptures." The progress which Pannier supposes he traces in Calvin's doctrine of the work of the Spirit seems illusory: the general doctrine of the work of the Spirit is already pretty fully outlined in 1536. But the relating of the testimony of the Spirit to Scripture to Calvin's general doctrine of faith as the product of the Spirit is exact and important for the understanding of his teaching. From beginning to end, Calvin

of the Spirit". Its supernatural origin was to him the most certain thing about it. That language very much resembling his own might be employed in a naturalistic sense was, no doubt, made startlingly plain in his own day by the teaching of Castellion. Out of his pantheising rationalism Castellion found it possible to speak almost in Calvin's words. "It is evident", says he, "that the intention and secret counsels of God, hidden in the Scriptures, are revealed only to believers, the humble, the pious, who fear God and have the Spirit of God." If the wicked have sometimes spoken like prophets, they have nevertheless not really understood what they said, but are like magpies in a cage going through the forms of speech without inner apprehension of its meaning.⁷³ But Castellion meant by this nothing more than that sympathy is requisite to understanding. Since his day multitudes more have employed Calvin's language to express little more than this; and have even represented Calvin's own meaning as nothing more than that the human consciousness acquires by association with God in Christ the power of discriminating the truth of God from falsehood. Nothing could more fundamentally subvert Calvin's whole teaching. The very nerve of his thought is, that the confidence of the Christian in the divine origin and authority

conceived the confidence of the Christian in Scripture, wrought by the Holy Spirit, as one of the exercises of saving faith. Calvin is ever insistent that all that is good in man comes from the Spirit—whether in the sphere of thought, feeling or act. "It is a notion of the natural man", he says on John xvi. 17 (1553: ix. 47. 33), "to despise all that the Sacred Scriptures say of the Holy Spirit, depending rather on his own reason, and to reject the celestial illumination. . . . For ourselves, feeling our penury, we know that all we have of sound knowledge comes from no other fountain. Nevertheless the words of the Lord Jesus show clearly that nothing can be known of what concerns the Holy Spirit by human sense, but He is known only by the experience of faith". "No one", says he again (*Institutes* of 1543, I. 330), "should hesitate to confess that he attains the knowledge of the mysteries of God only so far as he has been illuminated by God's grace. He that attributes more knowledge to himself is only the more blind that he does not recognize his blindness."

⁷³ *Opp. Calvini*, xiv. 727-737 (Pannier, as cited, p. 120).

of Scripture and the revelatory nature of its contents is of distinctively supernatural origin, is God-wrought. The testimony of the Spirit may be delivered through the forms of our consciousness, but it remains distinctively the testimony of God the Holy Spirit and is not to be confused with the testimony of our consciousness.^{73a} Resting on the language of Rom. viii. 16, from which the term 'testimony of the Spirit' was derived, he conceived it as a co-witness along with the witness of our spirit indeed, but on that very account distinguishable from the witness of our spirit. This particular point is nowhere discussed by him at large, but Calvin's general sense is perfectly plain. That there is a double testimony he is entirely sure—the testimony of our own spirit and that of the Holy Spirit: that these are though distinguishable yet inseparable, he is equally clear: his conception is therefore that this double testimony runs confluent together into one. This is only as much as to say afresh that the testimony of the Holy Spirit is not delivered to us in a propositional revelation, nor by the creating in us of a blind conviction, but along the lines of our own consciousness. In its essence, the act of the Spirit in delivering His testimony, terminates on our nature, or faculties, quickening them so that we feel, judge and act differently from what we otherwise should.

^{73a} The classical instance of this confusion is supplied by the teaching of Claude Pajon (1626-1685), who, in accordance with his general doctrine that "without any other grace than that of the Word, God changes the whole man, from his intellect to his passions", explained the "testimony of the Spirit" as nothing else than the effect of the *indicia* of divinity in Scripture on the mind. The effect of these "marks" is a divine effect, because it is wrought in prearranged circumstances prepared for this effect: *facit per alium facit per se*. The conception is essentially deistic. It is no small testimony to the cardinal place which the doctrine of "the testimony of the Spirit" held in the Reformed system of the seventeenth century that Pajon still taught it: and it is no small testimony to its current conception as just "regeneration" that Pajon too identified it with regeneration, explained, of course, in accordance with his fundamental principle that all that God works He works through means. See on the whole matter Jurieu, *Traité de la Nature et de la Grace*, 1688, pp. 25, 26, who quotes alike from Pajon and his followers.

In this sense, the testimony of the Spirit coalesces with our consciousness. We cannot separate it out as a factor in our conclusions, judgments, feelings, actions, consciously experienced as coming from without. But we function differently from before: we recognize God where before we did not perceive Him; we trust and love Him where before we feared and hated Him; we firmly embrace Him in His Word where before we turned indifferently away. This change needs accounting for. We account for it by the action of the Holy Spirit on our hearts: and we call this His "testimony". But we cannot separate His action from our recognition of God, our turning in trust and love to Him and the like. For this is the very form in which the testimony of the Spirit takes effect, into which it flows, by which it is recognized. We are profoundly conscious that of ourselves we never would have seen thus, and that our seeing thus can never find its account in anything in us by nature. We are sure, therefore, that there has come upon us a revolutionary influence from without: and we are sure that this is the act of God. Calvin would certainly have cried as one of his most eloquent disciples cries to-day: "The Holy Spirit is God, and not we ourselves. What we are speaking of is a Spirit which illuminates our spirit, which purifies our spirit, which strives against our spirit, which triumphs over our spirit. And you say this Spirit is nothing but our spirit? By no means. The Holy Spirit, the Spirit of God,—this is God coming into us, not coming from us."⁷⁴ It is with equal energy that Calvin declares the supernaturalness of the testimony of the Spirit and repels every attempt to confound it with the human consciousness through which it works. To him this testimony is just God Himself in His intimate working in the human heart, opening it to the light of the truth, that by this illumination it may see things as they really are and so recognize God in the Scriptures with the same directness and surety as men

⁷⁴ Doumergue, *Le Problème Protestant* (1892), p. 46 (Pannier, as cited, p. 192).

recognize sweetness in what is sweet and brightness in what is bright. Here indeed lies the very hinge of his doctrine.⁷⁵

It has seemed desirable to enter into some detail with respect to Calvin's doctrine of the testimony of the Spirit, not only because of its intrinsic interest, but also because of its importance for understanding Calvin's doctrine of the knowledge of God and indeed his whole system of truth, and for a proper estimate of his place in the history of

⁷⁵ Pannier, as cited, pp. 188 sq., is quite right in insisting on this. After quoting D. H. Meyer (*De la place et rôle de l'Apologétique dans la théologie protestante* in the *Revue de théologie et des quest. relig.*, Jan., 1893, p. 1) to the effect that "the witness of the Holy Spirit in the heart of Christians is not a subjective phenomenon: it is an objective thing and comes from God",—he continues: "Now this objective character of the witness of the Holy Spirit is precisely what appears to make it 'incomprehensible' to our modern theologians (so A. E. Martin, *La Polemique de R. Simon et J. Le Clerc*, 1880, p. 29: 'This intervention of the Holy Spirit distinct from the individual consciousness appears to us incomprehensible'). We are not speaking of those who venture to pretend that Calvin identifies the witness of the Holy Spirit with 'the intimate feeling' of each Christian. When one takes his place by the side of Castellion he may lawfully say, For me as for him 'the inspiration of the Holy Ghost confounds itself with consciousness; these revelations made to the humble are nothing more than the intuitions of a moral and religious sense fortified by meditation' (Buisson, *Castellion*, I. 304, cf. 201: 'Castellion placed above the tradition of the universal Church his own sense, his own reason, or rather, let us say it all at once, for it is the foundation of the debate, his consciousness'). But when one invokes the real fathers of the real Reformation, ah, please do not take for their's the very opinions they combat. To make of the testimony of the Holy Spirit the equivalent of the testimony of the human spirit, of the individual consciousness, is to deny the real existence and the distinct rôle of the Holy Spirit, is to show that we have nothing in common with the faith expounded by Calvin so clearly, and defended through a century against the attacks of the Catholics as one of the essential bases of the Reformed theology and piety." Again, Pannier is quite right in his declaration (p. 214): "What we deny is that our reason—moral consciousness, religious consciousness, the term is of no importance—can, of itself, *make us see* the divinity of the Scriptures. It is this which *sees* it; but it is the Holy Spirit which *makes us see it*. He is not the inner eye for seeing the truth which is outside of us, but the supernatural hand which comes to open the eye of our consciousness—an eye which is, no doubt, divine in the sense that it too was created by God, but which has been blinded by the consequences of sin."

thought. His doctrine of the testimony of the Spirit is the keystone of his doctrine of the knowledge of God. Men endowed by nature with an ineradicable *sensus deitatis*, which is quickened into action and informed by a rich revelation of God spread upon His works and embodied in His deeds, are yet held back from attaining a sound knowledge of God by the corruption of their hearts, which dulls their instinctive sense of God and blinds them to His revelation in works and deeds. That His people may know Him, therefore, God lovingly intervenes by an objective revelation of Himself in His Word, and a subjective correction of their sin-bred dullness of apprehension of Him through the operation of His Spirit in their hearts, which Calvin calls the Testimony of the Holy Spirit. Obviously it is only through this testimony of the Holy Spirit that the revelation of God, whether in works or Word, is given efficacy: it is God, then, who, through His Spirit, reveals Himself to His people, and they know Him only as taught by Himself. But also on this very account the knowledge they have of Him is trustworthy in its character and complete for its purpose: being God-given, it is safeguarded to us by the dreadful sanction of deity itself. This being made clear, Calvin has laid a foundation for the theological structure—the scientific statement and elaboration of the knowledge of God—than which nothing could be conceived more firm. There remained nothing more for him to do before proceeding at once to draw out the elements of the knowledge of God as they lie in the revelation so assured to us, except to elucidate the *indicia* by which the Christian under the influence of the testimony of the Spirit is strengthened in his confidence that the Scriptures are the very Word of God, and to repudiate the tendency to neglect these Scriptures so authenticated to us in favor of fancied continuous revelations of the Spirit. The former he does in a chapter (ch. viii) of considerable length and great eloquence, which constitutes one of the fullest and most powerful expositions of the evidence for the divine origin of the Scriptures

which have come down to us from the Reformation age. The latter he does in a briefer chapter (ch. ix), of crisp polemic quality, the upshot of which is to leave it strongly impressed on the reader's mind that the whole knowledge of God available to us, as the whole knowledge of God needful for us, lies objectively displayed in the pages of Scripture, which, therefore, becomes the sole source of a sound exposition of the knowledge of God.

This strong statement is not intended, however, to imply that the Spirit-led man can learn nothing from the more general revelation of God in His works and deeds. Calvin is so far from denying the possibility of a "Natural Theology", in this sense of the word, that he devotes a whole chapter (ch. v) to vindicating the rich revelation of God made in His works and deeds: though, of course, he does deny that any theology worthy of the name can be derived from this natural revelation by the "natural man", that is, by the man the eyes of whose mind and heart are not opened by the Spirit of God,—who is not under the influence of the testimony of the Spirit; and in this sense he denies the possibility of a "Natural Theology". What the strong statement in question is intended to convey is that there is nothing to be derived from natural revelation which is not also to be found in Scripture, whether as necessary presupposition, involved implication or clear statement; and that beside that documented in Scripture there is no supernatural revelation accessible to men. The work of the Spirit of God is not to supplement the revelation made in Scripture, far less to supersede it, but distinctively to authenticate it. It remains true, then, that the whole matter of a sound theology lies objectively revealed to us in the pages of Scripture: and this is the main result to which his whole discussion tends. But side by side with it requires to be placed as a result of his discussion secondary only to this, this further conclusion, directly given in his doctrine of the testimony of the Spirit,—that only a Christian man can profitably theologize. It is in the union of these two great principles that we find

Calvin's view of the bases of a true theology. This he conceives as the product of the systematic investigation and logical elaboration of the contents of Scripture by a mind quickened to the apprehension of these contents through the inward operations of the Spirit of God. It is on this basis and in this spirit that Calvin undertakes his task as a theologian; and what he professes to give us in his *Institutes* is thus, to put it simply, just a Christian man's reading of the Scriptures of God.

The Protestantism of this conception of the task of the theologian is apparent on the face of it. It is probably, however, still worth while to point out that its Protestantism does not lie solely or chiefly in the postulate that the Scriptures are the sole authoritative source of the knowledge of God,—“formal principle” of the Reformation though that postulate be, and true, therefore, as Chillingworth's famous declaration that “the Bible and the Bible only is the religion of Protestants” would be, if only Chillingworth had kept it to this sense. It lies more fundamentally still in the postulate that these Scriptures are accredited to us as the revelation of God solely by the testimony of the Holy Spirit,—that without this testimony they lie before us inert and without effect on our hearts and minds, while with it they become not merely the power of God unto salvation, but also the vitalizing source of all our knowledge of God. There is embodied in this the true Protestant principle, superior to both the so-called formal and the so-called material principles—both of which are in point of fact but corollaries of it. For it takes the soul completely and forcibly out of the hands of the Church and from under its domination, and casts it wholly upon the grace of God. In its formulation Calvin gave to Protestantism for the first time, accordingly, logical stability and an inward sense of security. Men were no more puzzled by the polemics of Rome when they were asked, You rest on Scripture alone, you say: but on what does your Scripture rest? Calvin's development of the doctrine of the testimony of the Spirit

provided them with their sufficient answer: "On the testimony of the Spirit of God in the heart." Here we see the historical importance of Calvin's formulation of this doctrine. And here we see the explanation of the two great facts which reveal its historical importance, the facts, to wit, that Calvin had no predecessors in the formulation of the doctrine, and that at once upon his formulation of it it became the common doctrine of universal Protestantism.

IV. HISTORICAL RELATIONS.

The search for anticipations of the doctrine of the testimony of the Spirit among the Fathers and Scholastics⁷⁶ reveals only such sporadic assertions of the dependence of man on the inward teaching of the Holy Spirit for the knowledge or the saving knowledge of God as could not fail in the speech of a series of Christian men who had read their Bibles. A sentence of this kind from Justin Martyr,⁷⁷ another from Chrysostom,⁷⁸ two or three from Hilary of Poitiers,⁷⁹ almost exhaust what the first age yields. It is

⁷⁶ See especially P. Du Moulin, *Le Juge des Controverses*, 1636, pp. 294 sq., and cf. Pannier, as cited, pp. 64-68.

⁷⁷ Dialogue with Trypho 7 (*Opp.* ed. Otto, I. 32): οὐ γὰρ συνοπτὰ οὐδὲ συνοητὰ πᾶσιν ἐστίν, εἰ μὴ τῷ θεῷ δῶ συνίέναι, καὶ ὁ Χριστὸς αὐτοῦ: "these things cannot be perceived or understood by all, but only by the man to whom God and His Christ have given it to understand them."

⁷⁸ In Genes. V. homil. xxi (Migne, liii. 175): Διάτοι τοῦτο προσήκει ἡμᾶς ὑπὸ τῆς ἀνωθεν χάριτος ὁδηγομένους, καὶ τὴν παρὰ τοῦ ἁγίου Πνεύματος ἐλλογίαν δεξαμένους οὕτως ἐπιέναι τὰ θεῖα λόγια. "For we must be led by the grace from above, and must receive the illumination of the Holy Spirit, to approach the divine oracles; for it is not human wisdom but the revelation of the Holy Spirit that is needed for understanding the Holy Scriptures." It will be perceived that it is more distinctly the understanding of the Scriptures than the reception of them as from God which is in question with both Justin and Chrysostom.

⁷⁹ *De Trinitate*, ii. 34: Animus humanus, nisi per fidem donum Spiritus hauserit, habebit quidem naturam Deum intelligendi, sed lumen scientiae non habebit; iii. 24: non enim concipiunt imperfecta perfectum, neque quod ex alio subsistit, absolute vel auctoris sui potest intelligentiam obtinere, vel propriam; v. 21: neque enim nobis ea natura est, ut se in coelestem cognitionem suis viribus efferat. A Deo discendum est quid de Deo intelligendum sit; quia non nisi se auctore cognoscitur. . . . Loquendum ergo non aliter de Deo est, quam ut ipse ad intelligentiam

different with Augustine. With his profound sense of dependence on God and his vital conviction of the necessity of grace for all that is good in man, in the whole circle of his activities, he could not fail to work out a general doctrine of the knowledge of God in all essentials the same as Calvin's. In point of fact, as we have already pointed out, he did so. There remain, however, some very interesting and some very significant differences between the two.⁸⁰ It is interesting to note, for instance, that where Calvin speaks of an innate *sensus deitatis* in man, as lying at the root of all his knowledge of God, Augustine, with a more profound ontology of this knowledge, as at least made explicit in the statement, speaks of a continuous reflection of a knowledge of Himself by God in the human mind.⁸¹ There is here, however, probably only a difference in fulness of statement, or at most only of emphasized aspect. On the other hand, it is highly significant that, instead of Calvin's doctrine of the testimony of the Spirit, Augustine, in conformity with the stress he laid upon the "Church" and the "means of grace" in the conference of grace, speaks of the knowledge of God as attainable only "in the Church".⁸² Accordingly, in him also and his successors there are to be found only such anticipations specifically of the doctrine of the testimony of the Spirit as are afforded by the increased frequency of their references to the dependence of man for all knowledge of God and divine things on grace and the inward teaching of the heavenly Instructor. The *nostram de se locutus est*. Hilary certainly teaches that for such creatures as men there can be no knowledge of God except it be God-taught: but it is not so clear that he teaches that for sinful creatures there must be a special illapse of the Spirit that such as they may know God—may perceive Him in His Word and so recognize that Word as from Him and derive a true knowledge of Him from it. It is this soteriological doctrine which is Calvin's doctrine of the Holy Spirit's testimony: not that ontological one.

⁸⁰ Cf. article: *Augustine's Doctrine of Knowledge and Authority*, in THE PRINCETON THEOLOGICAL REVIEW for July and October, 1907.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, p. 360 sq.

⁸² *Ibid.*, p. 571 sq.

voice of men may assail our ears, says Augustine, for instance, but those remain untaught "to whom that inward unction does not speak, whom the Holy Spirit does not inwardly teach": for "He who teaches the heart has His seat in heaven".⁸³ Moses himself, yea, even if he spoke to us not in Hebrew but in our own tongue, could convey to us only the knowledge of what he said: of the truth of what he said, only the Truth Himself, speaking within us, in the secret chamber of our thought, can assure us though He speaks neither in Hebrew nor in Greek nor in Latin, nor yet in any tongue of the barbarians, but without organs of voice or tongue and with no least syllabic sound.⁸⁴ Further than this men did not get before the Reformation:⁸⁵ nor did the first Reformers themselves get further. No doubt they discerned the voice of the Spirit in the Scriptures, as the Fathers did before them; and in a single sentence, written, however, after the *Institutes* of 1539 (viz., in 1555), Melancthon notes with the Fathers that the mind is "aided in giving its assent" to divine things "by the Holy Spirit".⁸⁶ Zwingli here stands on the same plane with his brethren.

⁸³ *Tract. iii. in Ep. Joan. ad Parthos*, ii. 13 (Migne xxxv. 200 sq.). Again: "There is, then, I say, a Master within that teacheth: Christ teacheth; His inspiration teacheth. Where His inspiration and His unction are not, in vain do words make a noise from without."

⁸⁴ *Conf. xi. 3* (Migne. xxxii. 811). Cf. vi. 5 (Migne. xxxii. 723).

⁸⁵ Pannier, *loc cit.*, says: "The whole of the testimony of the Holy Spirit is not yet here. Only once is the Holy Spirit Himself named [in these passages from Augustine] in a formal way. But Augustine has the intuition of a mysterious work wrought in the soul of the Christian, of an understanding of the Bible which comes not from man but from a power exterior and superior to him; and he sets forth the rôle which this direct correspondence between the book and the reader may play in the foundation of Christian certitude. In this, as in so many other points, Augustine was the precursor of the Reformation, and a precursor without immediate followers: for except a couple of very vague and isolated hints in Salvianus (*De Provid.*, iii. 1) and Gregory the Great (†604, Homil. in Ezek. I. x), nothing further is found on this subject through ten centuries: it comes into view again at the approach of the new age, when thought aspired to free itself from the Scholastic ruts, with Biel (†1495, *Lib. iii. Sent. dist. 25*, dub. 3) and Cajetan (†1534, *Opera*. II. i. 1)."

⁸⁶ *Loci*, ed. 1555 (*Corpus Ref.* xxi. 605).

He strongly repels the Romish establishment of confidence in the Scriptures on the *ipse dixit* of the Church, indeed: and asserts that those who sincerely search the Scriptures are taught by God, and even that none acquire faith in the Word except as drawn by the Father, admonished by the Spirit, taught by the unction,—as, says he, all pious men have found.⁸⁷ But such occasional remarks as this could not fail wherever the Augustinian conception of grace was vitally felt; and show only that the doctrine of the testimony of the Spirit was always implicit in that doctrine.⁸⁸

⁸⁷ *De vera et falsa religione*: Cum constet verbo nusquam fidem haberi quam ubi Pater traxit, Spiritus monuit, unctio docuit . . . hanc rem solae piae mentes norunt. Neque enim ab hominum disceptatione pendet, sed in animis hominum tenacissime sedet. Experientia est, nam pii omnes eam experti sunt. *Articles of 1523* (Niemeyer, *Collectio conf. ref.*, p. 4): Art. 13: Verbo Dei quum auscultant homines pure et sinceriter verbum Dei discunt. Deinde per Spiritum Dei in Deum trahuntur et veluti transformantur. *Von Klarheit und Gewüsse des Worts Gottes* (Opp. I. 81): "The Scriptures came from God, not from man; . . . and the God who has shined into them will Himself give you to understand that their speech comes from God": Cf. the interesting biographical account of how he came to depend on the Scriptures only on p. 79.

⁸⁸ E. Rabaud, *Hist. de la doctr. de l'inspiration*, etc. (1883), pp. 32-33, 42-3, 47 sq., 50, expounds the earlier Reformers as in principle standing on the doctrine of the testimony of the Spirit. With respect to the interpretation of Scripture he remarks: "The hermeneutical principle of the witness of the Holy Spirit (if we may speak of it as a principle) is common to all the Reformers. Luther only, without being ignorant of it, makes no use of it. Besides that it responded to the polemic needs, it responded to the aspirations of the faith and of the piety of simple men, better than rational demonstrations" (p. 50, note 4). "In a general way", he remarks, pp. 32-33, "Luther considered the Bible as the sole incontestable and absolute authority. Here is the solid foundation of the edifice, the impregnable citadel in which he shut himself in order to repel all attacks. It is for him, in truth, a religious axiom, a postulate of faith, and not a dogma or a theory; it is revealed to his believing soul independently of all intellectual activity. Thus Luther, trusting in the action of the Holy Spirit, operating through the Scriptures, does not pause to prove its authority, nor to establish it dialectically: it imposes itself; a systematic treatment is not needed. More and more as circumstances demanded it, he gave reasons for his faith and his submission. Poor arguments to modern thinking, but in his times, and commended by his vibrant eloquence and powerful

The same remark applies to the first edition of Calvin's *Institutes* (1536) also, though with a difference. This difference,—that, if we cannot say that the doctrine of the internal testimony of the Spirit to the divinity of the Scriptures is found there already in germ⁸⁹ any more than we can say the same of the Augustinian fathers, and the criticism passed⁹⁰ on the adduction of Melancthon's single sentence in this reference to the effect that he speaks rather "of the action of the Holy Spirit with reference to the object of faith, that is to say, to the contents of the Word of God" than "with reference to the divinity of the Scriptures themselves", is valid also for Calvin's first edition; yet it is certainly true that the general doctrine of the internal testimony of the Spirit comes much more prominently forward in even the first edition of the *Institutes* than in any preceding treatise of the sort,—that much more is made in it

personality, possessing a power of persuasion very impressive. . . . It seemed idle to Luther, we may say, to enter into an argument to establish what was evident to him. He did not attempt, therefore, to prove the authority of the Bible,—he asserted it repeatedly in warm words, in passionate declarations, but rarely if ever proceeds by a formal demonstration" (p. 32-33). Raising the question of Zwingli's doctrine of the mode and extent of inspiration (p. 47), he remarks: "No more than the others does Zwingli respond to these questions, which had not yet been raised. God has spoken: the Bible contains His word: that is enough. The divinity of the Bible is once more a fact, an axiom, so much so that he does not dream of establishing it or of defending it."

⁸⁹ So Pannier, as cited, p. 63: "Like all the other essential parts of the Reformed Dogmatics, the doctrine of the internal testimony of the Holy Spirit is found in germ in the first edition of the *Institutes*, although still without any development. It is almost possible to deny that it exists there, as has been done with predestination. Nevertheless if the doctrine is not yet scientifically formulated, it may yet be perceived to preëxist necessarily as an essential member of the complete body of doctrine which is slowly to grow up." When Pannier comes, however (pp. 72-77), to expound in detail the germs of the doctrine as they lie in the edition of 1536, it turns out that there is not only no full development of the doctrine in that edition, but also no explicit mention of it, as it is applied to the conviction which the Christian has of the divinity of Scripture; so that it preëxists in this edition only as implicit in its general doctrine of the Spirit and His work.

⁹⁰ By Pannier, p. 69.

than in any of its predecessors of the poverty of the human spirit and the need and actuality of the prevalent influence of the Spirit of God that man may have—whether in knowledge or act—any good thing. We shall have to go back to Augustine to find anything comparable to the conviction and insight with which even in this his earliest work Calvin urges these things. Calvin's whole thought is already dominated by the conception of the powerlessness of the human soul in its sin in all that belongs to the knowledge of God which is salvation, and its entire dependence on the sovereign operations of the Holy Spirit: and in this sense it may be said that the chapters in the new *Institutes* of 1539 in which he develops this doctrine of the noëtic effects of sin and their cure by objective revelation, documented in Scripture, and subjective illumination wrought by the Holy Spirit, lay implicitly in his doctrine of man's need and its cure by the indwelling Spirit which pervades the *Institutes* of 1536. There he already teaches that the written law was required by the decay of our consciousness of the law written on the heart; that to know God and His will we have need to surpass ourselves; that it is the Spirit dwelling in us that is the source of all our right knowledge of God; and that it is due to the power of the Spirit alone "that we hear the word of the Holy Gospel, that we accept it by faith, and that we abide in this faith" (p. 137). With eminent directness and simplicity he already there tells us that "our Lord first teaches and instructs us by His Word; secondarily confirms us by His sacraments; and thirdly by the light of His Holy Spirit illuminates our understandings and gives entrance into our hearts both to the Word and to the Sacraments, which otherwise would only beat upon our ears and stand before our eyes, without penetrating or operating beneath them" (p. 206). There is, in other words, very rich teaching in the *Institutes* of 1536 of the entire dependence of sinful man on the Spirit of God for every sound religious movement of the soul: but there is no development of the precise doctrine of the testimony of

the Holy Spirit to the divinity of the Scriptures. It is not merely that the term *testimonium Spiritus Sancti* does not occur in this early draft, or occurs only once, and then not in this sense:⁹¹ it is that the thing is not explicated and is present only as implicated in the general doctrine of grace, which is very purely conceived.

It was left, then, to the edition of 1539 to create the whole doctrine at, as it were, a single stroke.⁹² For, as we have already had occasion to note, Calvin's whole exposition of the doctrine of the testimony of the Spirit to the divinity of Scripture appears all at once in its completeness in the second edition of the *Institutes*, the first edition which he issued as a text-book on theology, that of 1539. This exposition was reproduced without curtailment or alteration in all subsequent editions, and is thereby given the great endorsement of Calvin's permanent approval: while the additions which are made to it in the progressive expansion of the treatise, while large in amount, are rather devoted to guarding it from the misapprehension as if the necessity it asserted for the testimony of the Spirit in any way detracted from the objective value of the *indicia* of the divinity of Scripture, than modify the positive doctrine expounded. The additions within the limits of chapter vii consist essentially of the insertion of the discussion of

⁹¹ Pannier, as cited, p. 77, notes that "the words: *testimonio Spiritus Sancti* occur only a single time, at the end, and in the old sense of—'by the divinely inspired Scriptures'." He refers to the ed. of 1536, p. 470, that is, *Opp.* I. 228: and notes that this passage was dropped in the edition of 1559 (*Opp.* IV. 796, note 5). The passage runs: "Thus Hezekiah is praised by the testimony of the Holy Spirit"—that is, obviously, "by the inspired Scriptures"—"for having broken up the brazen serpent which Moses had made by Divine command."

⁹² Köstlin, as cited, p. 411, strongly states these facts. The whole of the discussion on the sources and norms of religious truth "is altogether lacking in the original form" of the *Institutes*: "Calvin worked out this section for the first time for the edition of 1539": but it is found here already thoroughly done, "in all its fundamental traits already complete and mature". He adds that the Lutheran dogmatists (as well as the Reformed) at once, however, took up the construction of Calvin and made it their own.

Augustine's doctrine in § 3 and of the caveat with reference to the underestimation of the *indicia* in § 4, while practically the whole of chapter viii—all except the opening sentence—is of later origin. If we will omit the first sentence of chapter vii, the whole of §§ 3 and 4, with the exception of the sentence near the beginning of the latter, which begins: "Now if we wish to consult the true intent of our conscience"—and the beginning and end of § 5, retaining only the central passage beginning: "For though it conciliate our reverence . . . " down to the words: "Superior to the power of any human will or knowledge", and also the two striking sentences, beginning with: "It is such a persuasion" and ending with "a just explication from heaven"—we shall have substantially the text of the edition of 1539, needing only to add the two opening sentences of chapter viii and the major part of chapter ix. It will at once be seen that the edition of 1539 contains the entire positive exposition of the doctrine of the testimony of the Spirit as retained by Calvin to the end.

The formulation of this principle of the testimony of the Spirit by Calvin in 1539 had an extraordinary effect both immediate and permanent.⁹³ Universal Protestantism perceived in it at sight the pure expression of the Protestant principle and the sheet-anchor of its position. The Lutherans as well as the Reformed adopted it at once and made

⁹³ The history of the doctrine among the Reformed is touched on by A. Schweizer, *Glaubenslehre*, I. § 32; among the old Lutherans by Klaiber, *Die Lehre der altprotestantischen Dogmatiker von dem test. Sp. Sancti* in the *Jahrbücher für d. Theologie*, 1857, pp. 1-53. Its history among French theologians is traced by Pannier, as cited, Part III, pp. 139-181, cf. 186-193: his notes on the history outside of France (pp. 181-185) are very slight. On pp. 161-163 Pannier essays to gather together, chiefly, as it appears, from the scattered citations in the Protestant controversialists of the seventeenth century (p. 162, note 2), the hints which appear in the Romish writers, mainly Jesuits of the early seventeenth century, of recognition of the internal work of the Holy Spirit illuminating the soul. These bear more or less resemblance to the Protestant doctrine of the testimony of the Spirit. Some of the passages he cites are quite striking, but do not go beyond the common boundaries of universal Christian supernaturalism.

it the basis not only of their reasoned defence of Protestantism, but also of their structure of Christian doctrine and of their confidence in Christian living.⁹⁴ To it they both continued to cling so long and so far as they continued faithful to the Protestant principle itself. It has given way only as the structure of Protestantism has itself given way in reaction to the Romish position, or, more widely, as the structure of Christian thought has given way in rationalizing disintegration. No doubt it has undergone at the hands of its various expounders, from time to time, more or less modification, and in its journeyings to the ends of the earth, has suffered now and again some sea-change,—sometimes through sheer misapprehension, sometimes through sheer misrepresentation, sometimes through more or less admixture of both. A spurious revival of the doctrine was, for example, set on foot by Schleiermacher in his strong revulsion from the cold rationalism which had so long reigned in Germany to a more vital religious faith; and sentences may be quoted from his writings which, when removed out of the context of his system of thought, almost give expression to it.⁹⁵ But after all, his revival of it was

⁹⁴ In his brief remarks on the subject in his *Dogmengeschichte des Protestantismus*, I, 1908, p. 178 sq., Otto Ritschl seeks to discriminate between the Reformed and Lutherans in their conception of the testimony of the Spirit; but his discrimination touches rather the application than the essence of the matter.

⁹⁵ Some of them are cited, *e. g.*, by Schweizer, as cited, followed, *e. g.*, by Pannier, as cited (p. 186)—such as: "Faith is already presupposed when a peculiar authority is conceded to Scripture"—"The recognition of what is canonical comes into existence only gradually and progressively, since the sense for the truly Apostolic is a gracious gift which grows up only gradually in the Church",—"Faith cannot be established in unbelievers by the Scriptures, so that their divine authority is in the first instance proved from merely rational considerations."—There is much that is true and well said in such remarks, and they enrich the writings of Schleiermacher and his followers with a truly spiritual element. But at bottom the central position occupied is vitiated by the use of "faith" as an "undistributed middle", and the remarks of writers of this type do not so much tend to exalt the place of saving faith as to depress the authority of Scripture, by practically denying the existence or validity of *fides humana*. That attitude towards the Scriptures which

rather the revival of subjectivity in religion than of the doctrine of the testimony of the Spirit as the basis of all faith: and it has borne bitter fruit in a widespread subjectivism, the mark of which is that it discards (as "external")

gladly and heartily recognizes them as the Word of the Living God, and with all delight in them as such, seeks to subject all thought and feeling and action to their direction, certainly is, if not exactly a product of "true faith", yet (as the Westminster Confession defines it) an exercise of true faith, and a product of that inward creative operation of the Holy Spirit from which all true faith comes: that keen taste for the divine which is the outgrowth of the spiritual gift of discrimination—the "distinguishing of things that differ" which Paul gives a place among Christian graces—is assuredly a "gift of grace" which may grow more and more strong as the Christian life effloresces; and such a taste for the divine cannot be awakened in unbelievers by the natural action of the Scriptures or any rational arguments whatever, but requires for its production the work of the Spirit of God *ab extra accidens*. But it is a totally different question whether the peculiarity of Scripture as a divine revelation can call out no intellectual recognition in the minds of inquiring men, but must remain wholly hidden and produce no mental reaction conformable to its nature, until true faith has already been born in the heart: whether there are no valid tests of what is apostolical except a spiritual sense for the truly apostolical which can only gradually grow up in the Church; whether the unbeliever may not be given a well-grounded intellectual conviction of the apostolic origin, the canonical authority and the divine character of Scripture by the presentation to him of rational evidence which, however unwillingly on his part, will compel his assent. The question here is not whether this *fides humana* is of any great use in the spiritual life: the question is whether it is possible and actual. We may argue, if we will, that it is not worth while to awake it—though opinions may differ there: but how can we argue that it is a thing inherently impossible? To say this is not merely to say that reason cannot save, which is what Calvin said and all his followers: it is to say that salvation is intrinsically unreasonable,—which neither Calvin nor any of his true followers could for a moment allow. Sin may harden the heart so that it will not admit, weigh or yield to evidence: but sin, which affects only the heart subjectively, and not the process of reasoning objectively, cannot alter the relations of evidence to conclusions. Sin does not in the least degree affect the cogency of any rightly constructed syllogism. No man, no doubt, was ever reasoned into the kingdom of heaven: it is the Holy Spirit alone who can translate us into the kingdom of God's dear Son. But there are excellent reasons why every man should enter the kingdom of heaven; and these reasons are valid in the forum of every rational mind, and their validity can and should be made manifest to all.

the authority of those very Scriptures to which the testimony of the Spirit is borne. Not in such circles is the continued influence of the doctrine of the testimony of the Spirit to be sought or its continued advocacy to be found. If we would see it in its purity in the modern church we must look for it in the hands of true successors of Calvin—in the writings, to name only men of our own time, of William Cunningham⁹⁶ and Charles Hodge⁹⁷ and Abraham Kuyper⁹⁸ and Herman Bavinck.⁹⁹

As we have already had occasion to note, the principle of the testimony of the Spirit as the true basis of our confidence in the Scriptures as the Word of God was almost from the hands of Calvin himself incorporated into the Reformed Creeds. We have already pointed out the sharpness and strength of its expression in the Gallican (1557-1571) and Belgian (1501-1571) Confessions, and it finds at least the expression of suggestion in the Second Helvetic Confession (1562). It was not, however, merely into the Confessions of the Reformation age that it was incorporated. It is given an expression as clear as it is prudent, as decided as it is comprehensive, in that confession of their faith which the persecuted Waldenses issued after the massacres of 1655;¹⁰⁰ and it is incorporated into the Westminister Confession of Faith (1646) in perhaps the best and most balanced statement it has ever received,—the phraseology of which is obviously derived in large part from Calvin, either directly or through the intermediation of George Gillespie,¹⁰¹ but the substance of which was but the expression

⁹⁶ *Theological Lectures*, etc., N. Y., 1878, pp. 317, 320 sq.

⁹⁷ *The Way of Life*, 1841; also *Systematic Theology*, as per Index.

⁹⁸ *Encyclopædie*, etc., II. 505 sq.

⁹⁹ *Gereformeerde Dogmatiek*, ed. 1, vol. I. 142-5, 420-22, 490-1.

¹⁰⁰ Written, no doubt, by Léger, moderator at the time of "the Table", and preserved for us in his *Histoire générale des églises évangéliques des vallées de Piémont* (1669), I. 112 (cf. 92). See Pannier, as cited, 133.

¹⁰¹ Dr. A. F. Mitchell (*The Westminster Assembly, its History and Standards*, the Baird Lecture for 1882, ed. 2, 1897, p. 441, note), following Prof. J. S. Candlish (*Brit. and For. Ev. Rev.*, 1877, p. 173), is "very sure" that Gillespie has here left his mark on the Confession". The

of that culminating Confession of the Reformed churches.

"We recognize the divinity of these sacred books", says the Waldensian Confession (ch. iv), "not only through the testimony of the Church, but principally through the eternal and indubitable truth of the doctrine which is contained in them, through the excellence, sublimity and majesty of the pure divinity (*du tout divine*) which are apparent in them, and through the operation of the Holy Spirit which makes us receive with deference the testimony which the Church gives

Miscellany Questions, in the XXI of which occurs the passage from Gillespie from which the Confession is supposed to have drawn, was a posthumous work, published in 1649; but a number of the papers of which it is made up have the appearance of being briefs drawn up by Gillespie for his own satisfaction, or as preparations for speeches, or possibly even as papers handed in to committees, during the discussions of the Westminster Assembly. The language in question, however, whether in Gillespie or in the Confession, is so strongly reminiscent of Calvin, that the possibility seems to remain open that the resemblance between Gillespie and the Confession is due to their common relation to Calvin. Here is the passage in Gillespie (*Presbyterian Armoury* ed., pp. 105-106): "The Scripture is known to be indeed the word of God by the beams of divine authority it hath in itself, and by certain distinguishing characters, which do infallibly prove it to be the Word of God; such as the heavenliness of the matter; the majesty of the style; the irresistible power over the conscience; the general scope, to abase man and to exalt God; nothing driven at but God's glory and man's salvation; the extraordinary holiness of the penmen of the Holy Ghost, without respect to any particular interests of their own, or of others of their nearest relations (which is manifest by their writings); the supernatural mysteries recorded therein, which could never have entered into the reason of men; the marvellous consent of all parts and passages (though written by divers and several penmen), even where there is some appearance of difference; the fulfilling of prophecies; the miracles wrought by Christ, by the prophets and apostles; the conservation of the Scriptures against the malice of Satan and fury of persecutors;—these and the like are characters and marks which evidence the Scriptures to be the Word of God; yet all these cannot beget in the soul a full persuasion of faith that the Scriptures are the Word of God; this persuasion is from the Holy Ghost in our hearts. And it hath been the common resolution of sound Protestant writers (though now called in question by the sceptics of this age [the allusion being to "Mr. J. J. Godwin in his Hagiomastix"]) that these arguments and infallible characters in the Scripture itself, which most certainly prove it to be the Word of God, cannot produce a certainty of persuasion in our hearts, but this is done by the Spirit of God

to them, which opens our eyes to receive the rays of the celestial light which shines in the Scriptures, and so corrects our taste that we discern this food by the divine savor which it possesses." The dependence of this fine statement on Calvin's exposition is evident; but what is most striking about it is the clarity with which it conceives and the fulness with which it expounds the exact mode of working of the testimony of the Spirit and its relation to the *indicia* of divinity in Scripture, through which, and not apart from or in opposition to which, it performs its work. So far within us, according to these Scriptures, 1 Cor. ii. 10-15; 1 Thes. i. 5; 1 John ii. 27; v. 6-8, 10; John vi. 45".—Whatever may be the immediate source of the Confessional statement, Calvin is clearly the real source of Gillespie's statement.—For the essence of the matter Gillespie's discussion is notably clear and exact, particularly with reference to the relation of the *indicia* to the testimony of the Spirit, a matter which he strangely declares had not to his knowledge been discussed before. The clarity of his determinations here is doubtless due to the specific topic which he is in this Question investigating, viz., the validity of the argument from marks and fruits of sanctification to our interest in Christ: a parallel question in the broader soteriological sphere to the place of *indicia* in our conviction of the divinity of Scripture, which he therefore uses illustratively for his main problem. "It may be asked", he remarks, "and it is a question worthy to be looked into (though I must confess I have not read it, nor heard it, handled before), How doth the assurance by marks agree with or differ from assurance by the testimony of the Holy Spirit? Has the soul here assurance either way, or must there be a concurrence of both (for I suppose they are not one and the same thing) to make up the assurance?" (105). He proves that they are "not one and the same thing"; and then shows solidly that for assurance there "must be a concurrence of both". "To make no trial by marks", he says, "and to trust an inward testimony, under the notion of the Holy Ghost's testimony, when it is without the least evidence of any true gracious marks, this way (of its nature, and intrinsically, or in itself) is a deluding and ensnaring of conscience" (p. 105). That is to say, a blind confidence and conviction, without cognizable grounds in evidence cannot be trusted. Again and very clearly: "So that, in the business of assurance and full persuasion, the evidences of graces and the testimony of the Spirit, are two concurrent causes or helps, both of them necessary. Without the evidence of graces, it is not a safe nor a well-grounded assurance" (p. 106). It remains only to add that while arguing this out in the wider soteriological sphere, Gillespie appears to take it as a matter of course in the accrediting of the Scriptures as divine—giving that case, in the course of his argument, as an illustration to aid in determining his conclusion.

of the firmly held faith of the whole body of the framers from supposing that the witness of the Spirit is of the nature of a new and independent revelation from heaven or works only a blind faith in us, setting thus aside all evidences of the divinity of Scripture, external and internal alike, this careful statement particularly explains that our faith in the divinity of Scripture rests, under the testimony of the Spirit, on these evidences as its ground, but not on these evidences by themselves, but on them as apprehended by a Spirit-led mind and heart—the work of the Spirit consisting in so dealing with our spirit that these evidences are, under His influence, perceived and felt in their real bearing and full strength.

An even more notable statement of the whole doctrine is that incorporated into the Westminster Confession (I. 4. 5), and in a more compressed form into the Larger Catechism (Q. 4). "The authority of the Holy Scripture, for which it ought to be believed and obeyed", says the Confession, "dependeth not upon the testimony of any man or church, but wholly upon God (who is truth itself) the author thereof; and therefore it is to be received, because it is the Word of God. We may be moved and induced by the testimony of the Church to a high and reverent esteem of the Holy Scripture; and the heavenliness of the matter, the efficacy of the doctrine, the majesty of the style, the consent of all the parts, the scope of the whole (which is to give all glory to God), the full discovery it makes of the only way of man's salvation, the many other incomparable excellencies, and the entire perfection thereof, are arguments whereby it doth abundantly evidence itself to be the Word of God; yet, notwithstanding, our full persuasion and assurance of the infallible truth, and divine authority thereof, is from the inward work of the Holy Spirit, bearing witness by and with the Word in our heart." In the Larger Catechism this is reduced to the form: "The Scriptures manifest themselves to be the Word of God, by their majesty and purity; by the consent of all the parts,

and the scope of the whole, which is to give all glory to God; by their light and power to convince and convert sinners, to comfort and build up believers unto salvation; but the Spirit of God bearing witness by and with the Scriptures in the heart of man, is alone able fully to persuade it that they are the very Word of God." The fundamental excellence of this remarkable statement (for the full understanding of which what is said of "faith" in chapter xiv of the Confession and Question 72 of the Catechism should be compared with it—just as Calvin referred his readers to his later discussion of 'faith' for further information on the topic of the testimony of the Spirit) is the care with which the several grounds on which we recognize the Scriptures to be from God are noted and their value appraised, and yet the supreme importance of the witness of the Spirit is safeguarded.¹⁰² The external testimony of the Church is noted and its value pointed out: it moves and induces us to a high and reverent esteem for Scripture. The internal testimony of the characteristics of the Scriptures themselves is noted and its higher value pointed out: they "abundantly evidence" or "manifest" the Scriptures "to be the Word of God". The need and place of the testimony of the Spirit is then pointed out in the presence of this "abundant evidencing" or "manifesting": it is not to add new evidence,—which is not needed,—but to secure deeper conviction,—which is needed: and not independently of the Word with its evidencing characteristics, but "by and with the Word" or "the Scriptures". What this evidence of the Spirit does is "*fully* to persuade us" that "the Scriptures are the very Word of God",—to work in us "*full* persuasion and assurance of the infallible truth and divine authority" of the Word of God. It is a matter of completeness of conviction, not of grounds of conviction: and the testimony of the

¹⁰² For the meaning of the Confession's statement, supported by illustrative excerpts from its authors, see *The Presbyterian and Reformed Review*, IV. 604-627; and cf. W. Cunningham, *Theological Lectures*, N. Y., 1878, pp. 320 sq. and *The Presbyterian Quarterly*, Jan'y, 1894, p. 22.

Spirit works, therefore, not by adding additional grounds of conviction, but by an inward work on the heart, enabling it to react upon the already "abundant evidence" with a really "full persuasion and assurance". Here we have the very essence of Calvin's doctrine, almost in his own words, and with even more than his own eloquence and precision of statement.

What Calvin has given to the Reformed Churches, therefore, in his formulation of the doctrine of the Testimony of the Spirit is a fundamental doctrine, which has been as such expounded by the whole body of their theologians, and incorporated into the fabric of their public Confessions, so that it has been made and continues to be until to-day the officially declared faith of the Reformed Churches in France and Holland, Switzerland, Italy, Scotland and America, wherever the fundamental Reformed Creeds are still professed.

Princeton.

BENJAMIN B. WARFIELD.

REVIEWS OF RECENT LITERATURE

PHILOSOPHICAL LITERATURE.

ENCYCLOPÆDIA OF RELIGION AND ETHICS. Edited by JAMES HASTINGS, M.A., D.D., Fellow of the Royal Anthropological Institute; Member of the Council of the Palestine Exploration Fund; Editor of *Dictionary of the Bible*, and *Dictionary of Christ and the Gospels*. With the Assistance of JOHN A. SELBIE, M.A., and other scholars. VOLUME I: A—ART. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons; Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. 1908. Imperial 8vo.; pp. xxii, 903, double columns; with illustrations and plates. Price, \$7.00 net, cloth; \$9.00, half morocco. (Sold only in sets: ten to twelve volumes.)

The first volume of Dr. Hastings' new encyclopædia makes a very handsome appearance. The type and the column are apparently the same as in the *Dictionary of the Bible* and the *Dictionary of Christ and the Gospels*; and we are sorry to say we cannot commend this type, which seems to make a singularly severe demand upon the eyes. But by the omission of the ruling around the page and an increase in the width of the margin, and above all by a change in the paper, a much clearer and more attractive page is secured than in the earlier *Dictionaries*. More is done also to render the use of the *Encyclopædia* convenient. The list of authors who have contributed to the volume contains an intimation of the articles written by each. This is an excellent innovation. A still more excellent innovation is the printing of a page (p. xv) of topic-headings, which do not occur in the *Encyclopædia*, but the topics represented by which are treated under other heads. This will enable the reader to find 'Aben Ezra', for example (under 'Ibn Ezra'), or 'Adventism' (under 'Chiliasm'), or 'Affinity' (under 'Blood Relationship'), and not hastily conclude that the *Encyclopædia* has overlooked such topics. The articles are ordinarily, moreover, divided into numbered sections, with headings in black type; and sometimes a summary of their contents is given at the outset in a sort of 'table of contents'. These expedients place the substance of the articles more readily at the command of the reader.

The cosmopolitanism of scholarship is illustrated anew by the list of writers whom Dr. Hastings has called to his aid in the preparation of the matter of the volume. Nearly two hundred have been engaged on the work. About a sixth of these are Americans (some 33); about a

tenth Germans (some 25); something over a twelfth Frenchmen (some 14); while a few more are derived from still other foreign sources—two or three each are Dutchmen, Belgians, Finns, Scandinavians, Hindoos; and there are also Armenians, Japs, and even an Apache Indian. It belongs also to the emancipation of scholarship from conventional bonds that we meet in this list of presumable authorities on questions of religious and moral erudition such names as Mrs. Rhys Davids, Catherine Julia Gaskell, Mary Alicia Owen, Mary Mills Patrick, Bertha Maud Horack Shamburgh, Florence Melian Stawell. *Place aux dames!* It is a principle Dr. Hastings seems to have acted on when he gave Miss Shambaugh twenty-one columns in which to tell about the "Amana Society"—a type of religious thought the influence of which is apparently confined within the narrow limits of 1800 souls. Dr. Hastings in his Preface offers no doubt an explanation of this generous allotment of space to an insignificant movement; but it is questionable if the explanation will not read to most of us more as an apology than as a justification.

The question of the proportionate distribution of space in a book like this is to be sure one of the most difficult which confronts an editor. It certainly is not a simple question. There are many other things which have to be considered besides the relative importance of the topics; and all judgments of the relative importance of the topics are not likely to agree. For the critic to object to the editor's assignment of space commonly means little more, therefore, than that he and the editor think differently in the matter. Even so, however, it is not unfair to say that Dr. Hastings' assignments of space seem sometimes bewildering. There are few greater topics than Art, and there is a great deal that is very important said in the two great articles 'Architecture', 'Art', in this volume. But the volume, which covers nearly the whole of the letter A, has only 900 pages in it; and nearly 205 of these—nearly one-quarter of the whole—are given to these two topics 'Architecture' and 'Art'. In an encyclopedia specifically of religion and ethics, that strikes us as excessive. This is not the only instance in which the special character of the encyclopædia seems to be lost sight of. Here is an article—a most excellent article—for example, on 'A Priori', extending to sixteen columns, much of it cast into fine type. There are applications of the *a priori*, no doubt, both to ethics and religion: but does the article itself, or the topic itself, fall naturally into either category? And here is an admirable article on 'Aristotle, Aristotelianism', one of the shorter articles—shorter, though one of them is on 'Arianism' and another on 'Arminianism', both of which, if they do not deserve well of religion, yet loom largely in the history of that religion which we call Christianity—which seem to keep 'Architecture' and 'Art' from running into each other and absorbing the volume. Aristotelianism also has certainly played a great part in the history of that same religion: but we hear nothing of that here, though, to be sure, we are bidden to look for 'Scholasticism', where no doubt the story will be told. Aristotle, too, had an ethical system, which is very appropriately (and

finely) outlined here, but not as if it were the main matter of concernment. In short, the article is just what an article on 'Aristotle, Aristotelianism' ought to be—in a general Encyclopædia, or an Encyclopædia of Philosophy or of Classical Biography. It has no particular adjustment to this special encyclopædia. And here is a good short article on 'Anæsthesia': we have profited from reading it—but we have looked in vain in it for any allusion to or connection with ethics or religion. The editor, it will be seen, has interpreted the scope of the *Encyclopædia* broadly. This has its advantages,—and its disadvantages. We get much more in the book than the title gives us right to expect,—much of which, perhaps, as it was not to be looked for in this *Encyclopædia*, will possibly not be looked for in it. But, as a consequence, we get perhaps less than the title might lead us to expect,—the articles more properly falling in its special field being unduly compressed to make room for those which possibly might just as well be reserved for another place.

Among the topics which seem out of place in this encyclopædia are those on the technical terms of evolutionary speculation—unless, indeed, we are to conceive 'Evolution' a religion. Such articles are those on 'Accommodation', 'Adaptation'—even 'Abiogenesis' (to which are given *two* articles of the same general import, with an additional cross-reference to yet a third, 'Biogenesis', which must cover again much the same ground). Both authors who write on 'Abiogenesis' would apparently commend it to us as the formula for the origin of life, Prof. J. A. Thompson with caution and scientific hesitancy, Mr. Edward Clodd with bold assertiveness. Mr. Clodd does not indeed tell us, as another recent writer does, with unconscious repetition of the Greek myth, that the atmosphere quickened the sea and begot life,—and prove it, as the author in question does, by a chemical analysis of the alleged parents. "The elements contained in sea-water", we read in this remarkable statement, "are sodium, calcium, magnesium, potassium, chlorine, sulphur, carbon, hydrogen, oxygen, and iron. The composition of the air is nitrogen, oxygen, and carbon. *The elements contained in living matter are these identical things.* In the heavy carbonated air above, and in the solvent water on the land beneath, there lay in mobile contiguity the essential elements of living matter." "We see, then, for there is no other way out of it, that not only did the air and water at the beginning of things contain in contiguity the elements of living matter, but that these elements did naturally unite to form this living matter." Mr. Edward Clodd, on the contrary, contents himself with the broad declaration, as one "generally accepted by biologists", that "in its passage from the nebulous to the more or less solid state, our globe reached a temperature and general conditions which made possible the evolution of the organic from the inorganic". It would be interesting to know what this temperature was, and what were these "general conditions". But though "the inter-relation between living and lifeless matter is a fundamental canon of the theory of evolution, which recognizes no

break in continuity", it has apparently no evidence for it as yet available, except the theory of evolution itself. This freedom of speculative construction is not confined, however, to evolutionary biology. It has invaded history and archaeology as well. How little the declarations of the Scriptures can stand against it may be observed from such articles as those on 'Adam', 'Antediluvians', 'Ark'. Professor Kennett, who writes the last of these, thinks he knows what was in the Ark much better than so late a writer as the Deuteronomist. It was the brazen-serpent! The Ark was originally the box in which a snake was kept, which the Israelites worshipped, and there was subsequently substituted for it "the bronze seraph, or, to call it by the name by which it is generally known, the brazen serpent." It was, in a word, the shrine of the serpent—the god of fertility. These be thy gods, O Israel! Fortunately, Professor Kennett's pseudo-scientific speculations are no more authoritative than Mr. Clodd's: there is no more reason for believing that the Ark was the shrine of the serpent than that life is the product of "a certain temperature" and "certain general conditions".

It gives the reader an odd impression, we may remark in passing, to turn over a few pages and read the article 'Adaptation' in close conjunction with these on 'Abiogenesis'. Evolution, we learn, is simply a process of 'Adaptation'. The fittest in every generation survives; that is to say, there is a constant progress towards more perfect adaptation. Why, then, one may well ask, has there not been a tolerable adaptation attained long ago? Or, remembering 'abiogenesis', we may rather ask, Why was there not a perfect adaptation from the beginning? If the living organism is in the first instance the spontaneous production of the 'environment' it is inconceivable that it should not begin by being in perfect adaptation to it. How could the environment produce an organization out of adaptation to itself? And starting thus in perfect adaptation to its environment, how could the living organism ever get out of this adaptation to the environment of which it is not only at the start but throughout merely the expression? From start to finish the 'environment' is but the mold in which the organism is cast, and the cast surely must repeat the features of the mold. If the mold changes the cast changes with it, that is all: and it is not so much a question of 'adaptation' which implies a certain independence of mold and cast, as of simple reproduction. The evolutionary idea here resembles very closely what we read of Alice in the Looking Glass, who, we remember, had to run with all her might just to keep standing still. And here another difficulty faces us. This living organism which is in the first instance the spontaneous product of its environment and must therefore begin in perfect adaptation to its environment—of which it is indeed but the expression; and which continues ever but the product of its environment and should therefore steadily express its environment and change only as it changes that it may abide in complete adaptation to it—does nothing of the sort. On the contrary, it from the beginning spurns the slime (of which it is just the expression)

and soars upwards and advances steadily to higher and higher things! That is what has happened. The law of development of organic forms has not been to ever closer and closer adaptation to the environment. They began ('abiogenesis' being postulated) in perfect adaptation to the environment. The law of their development has been to ever fuller, richer, more elevated manifestations of what looks very much like a new thing with forces all its own, which struggles with its environment and conquers it; which ends, indeed, by adapting its environment to itself. This is not the behaviour of crystals, say, which form themselves in pools of evaporating sea-water; and dissolve again and reform afresh as the water is alternately diluted by the rain or wasted by the sun—but never stand over against the mother-water and insist on going their own way. It is all very puzzling—on the postulates of the thoroughgoing evolutionism of Mr. Clodd, which Mr. Clodd tells us is the doctrine (unuttered or expressed, we may suppose) of all biologists.

Let us return, however, to our *Encyclopædia*, which goes out of its way to teach these puzzling things. The mass of the articles, of course, are those which one would naturally look for in an encyclopædia of religion and ethics, and so far as can be judged the vocabulary is very full. Nearly every name of importance in the history of religion and ethics will be found here, either the subject of a separate article or referred to in more general discussions: and if an index of names is supplied the *Encyclopædia* will be a very full guide to the leaders of religious and ethical thought. The major topics of religious and ethical import are all treated; and, what is more noticeable, a place has been found for a wealth of minor topics—down even to such as 'Accidie' and 'Action Sermon'. There are some unexpected omissions, however, among these minor topics: for example, our eye catches the heading 'Accommodation', and in an *Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics* we naturally expect to find it a discussion of the ethics of so-called 'accommodation' in teaching. It proves to treat, however, only of evolutionary and psychological 'accommodation'. We wonder whether, when 'Economy' comes to be dealt with, it will be only a 'political' (or perhaps 'household') economy, to the exclusion of ethical, that will be touched on?

We have been ourselves, naturally, interested particularly in the articles which deal with topics belonging to the history of the Christian religion, and especially to the history of Christian thought. There are many of these, some comprehensive and some more particular, and in the main they are sufficiently careful and full, although as a class they do not show a very firm grasp of either the substance or the development of doctrine. Two of them we have already mentioned, as among the shorter articles somewhat in danger of being crushed out of sight between the great articles, 'Architecture', 'Art'—those on 'Arianism' and 'Arminianism'. These are very fair samples of all of their class. 'Arianism' is dealt with quite externally, in the main correctly enough, but without insight. No one could derive from the article any real

comprehension of the place of Arianism in the history of Christian thought, or of the internal development of the doctrine. Arminianism, on the other hand, is, from the point of view of a convinced Arminian, very fairly presented. The article is rambling, not to say repetitious, and not very exact in its statements, but, on the whole, leaves on the mind a generally clear view of the nature of Arminianism. It opens, to be sure, with an amazing account of the Calvinistic doctrine of the decree. Dr. Lindsay, in the article on 'Amyraldianism', had already spoken of this, if not wisely yet not altogether without prudence. But here we hear of the "decree of salvation" being "antecedent to the Fall" (not to the decree of the Fall); and of this being a party position, that is, Supralapsarian; while the characteristic of Infralapsarianism is the "connecting the Fall with the permission of God, instead of His foreordination". Confusion could not easily be more confounded. Of course, no Calvinist imagines that a decree of God was made subsequent to any event in time; and all Calvinists hold that the Fall was permitted, and that it was also foreordained. The difference between Supralapsarianism and Infralapsarianism was (and is) merely whether in the order of thought the foreordination of the Fall (which both teach) as a thing permitted to occur (which both teach) precedes or follows the foreordination of some men to life and some men to death (which both teach). Why will men persist in writing on such themes so mechanically that they do not even consider the meaning of the terms they employ? The language elsewhere in the article and that even in matters of the first significance is often very misleading. Thus, for example, we read: "The Remonstrance is first negative, stating the five Calvinist articles in order to reject them." "The five Calvinist articles",—by no means. What was stated was five articles selected by the Remonstrants from the Calvinistic doctrinal sum, to be attacked by them. Proceeding, we read that the Synod of Dort "promulgated five heads of doctrines of its own". What was done by the Synod was to set forth clearly its own doctrine with respect to the five points of Calvinistic teaching brought into dispute by the Remonstrants. Not only are the Thirty-Nine Articles of the Church of England claimed as almost Arminian, but it looks as if even the Lambeth Articles were represented as substantially Arminian: at least the sentence referring to them (p. 811, at bottom) is ambiguous. It is allowed that Arminianism has no definite theological distinctness, and yet Arminius is ranged by the side of Athanasius and Augustine as one of the three greatest leaders in theological definition (p. 809, top). Athanasius, it seems, has determined the doctrine of God; Augustine, the doctrine of man; Arminius, the essential relations between God and man!

The article on 'Abelard' is informing and appreciative—too appreciative. That on 'Anselm' (by the same writer) is brief and sketchy, and in its remarks on the *Cur Deus Homo* is dominated by prejudice. No adequate understanding of the doctrine of Satisfaction is shown; though it is rightly denied that it owes its form to the influence of Teutonic law. The Atonement seems to have proved a thorny subject

to the contributors to this *Encyclopædia*. For example, the otherwise very excellent brief article on 'Acceptilatio' sharply criticises Turretine for the phrase: "We admit no Socinian acceptilatio." Turretine is, however, quite within his rights in this phrase: the Socinian doctrine of the Atonement, which holds that God forgives sinners their debt without any payment at all being precisely described by the term 'acceptilatio'. It may be another matter whether Socinus himself employs the term 'acceptilatio' to describe his doctrine. Grotius says he does (but not in ch. 3 of his *Defensio*, as is here stated, but in ch. 6), and the author of the article, following Crell, says he does not. We have not looked the matter up. But in any event Grotius does not misrepresent Socinus' meaning, but quite accurately defines the meaning of 'acceptilatio' (Amsterdam ed. of 1679, p. 390a),—telling us that 'acceptilatio' is used even where no payment precedes, is opposed to some payment, and is figuratively defined as an imaginary payment. It would be difficult to catch Grotius napping in the matter of significance of law-terms, whatever we may think of his own doctrine of the Atonement. It is not the Socinian but the Scottist doctrine of the Atonement which is abusively described by the term 'acceptilatio', as our author tells us, and ought thereby have been saved from his mistaken criticism of Grotius and Turretine.

Among the best of the articles of the class we are speaking of is that on Thomas Aquinas, although its encomium is somewhat excessive. The same must be said of the estimate of Origin in the excellent comprehensive article on 'Alexandrian Theology', by the side of which the equally excellent one on 'Antiochian Theology' must be placed. The article on the 'Albigenses' is thoroughly good, and that on the 'Anabaptists' is also very satisfactory. There are very few articles in this volume on specifically doctrinal points. Among them perhaps those on the 'Anger' or 'Wrath' of God and on 'Annihilation' are perhaps the most outstanding. The former is, however, a carefully rather than profoundly thought article, though it has much in it that is suggestive. Among articles of another class, we have not been attracted to that on 'Agnosticism'; and still less to that on 'Absolute', which seems to us a little pretentious. The article on 'Apologetics' does not appear to us to be quite adapted to its place in the *Encyclopædia*. Most readers would expect to find in it an account of 'Apologetics', its idea and place in the theological encyclopædia, method, history. Instead it is an attempt to outline a system of apologetics,—an attempt sure to prove unsatisfactory, if for no other reason than the limitations of space.

A notice of a work of this kind as it passes from article to article may easily run to an inordinate length. We have probably said enough to suggest the general features of the volume before us. It is comprehensive, learned and, so far as we have been able to test it, interestingly written. It is to be followed by nine or eleven more, and it is already evident that the completed work will be a welcome and valuable addition to our encyclopædic literature.

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APOLOGETICAL THEOLOGY.

AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF COMPARATIVE RELIGION. By FRANK BYRON JEVONS, Principal of Bishop Hatfield's Hall, Durham University, Durham, England. 8vo.; pp. xxx, 283. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1908. Price \$1.50 net.

"The Hartford-Lamson Lectures on 'The Religions of the World' are delivered at Hartford Theological Seminary in connection with the Lamson Fund, which was established by a group of friends in honor of the late Charles M. Lamson, D.D., sometime President of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, to assist in preparing students for the foreign missionary field. The lectures are designed primarily to give to such students a good knowledge of the religious history, beliefs, and customs of the people among whom they expect to labor. As they are delivered by scholars of the first rank, who are authorities in their respective fields, it is expected that in published form they will prove to be of value to students generally."

This expectation will be abundantly fulfilled, if the volume before us, the first of the series, is a sample of what its successors will be. The author, Principal Jevons, is preëminent in his department, and is, perhaps, the first evangelical scholar to become so in the broad and comparatively unexplored field of the science of religion. His large "Introduction to the History of Religion" is by far the most satisfactory treatise on the subject. It will be remembered as having been somewhat exhaustively and most favorably reviewed in *The Presbyterian and Reformed Review*, Vol. IX, No. 33.

In the present course of lectures Principal Jevons regards religion as "the worship of the gods of a community by the community for the good of the community", and he uses the science of religion to prove that "Christianity is the highest manifestation of the religious spirit". Thus the belief in the communion of spirits and the desire for such communion is universal; and "Christianity alone of the religions of the world teaches that self-sacrifice is the way to life eternal". So, too, magic, because of its anti-social aim, is the great enemy of religion; but it is precisely this anti-social tendency which is most opposed by the spirit of Christianity. The same is true of fetichism. "The cult of a fetich is conducted by an individual for his private ends; and the most important function of a fetich is to work evil against those members of the community who have incurred the fetich-owner's resentment." "Thus religion"—and specially Christianity—"is directed to ends not merely different from but antagonistic to fetichism." Again: "Prayer is the essence of religion"; but 'Our Lord's Prayer in its revelation of the spirit which is both human and divine is a fact which the theory of evolution is unable to account for or explain', and Christianity alone of all religions recognizes and harmonizes the universal need of an absolute God and of "a fellow struggler at our side". Once more, 'the rite of sacrifice had from the beginning in it the potentiality whereby communion with God might be attained, and so became the means

whereby, through Christ, all men might be brought to God'. So also morality demands a religious foundation, and this Christianity supplies in its doctrine that the will of God is the ground and norm of right. In conclusion, "Christianity claims to be 'final', not in the chronological sense, but in that it alone finds the true basis and the only end of society in the love of God. The Christian theory of society again differs from all other theories in that it not only regards the individuals composing it as continuing to exist after death, but teaches that the society of which the individual is truly a member, though it manifests itself in this world, is realized in the next".

This discussion is characterized by all the excellencies which we noted in the author's earlier and larger work—the same command of facts, the same fairness in interpreting them, the same skill in inductive reasoning, the same caution and reserve in the statement of conclusions; and yet we think that we detect, as would not be unlikely in this later book, an even firmer grasp of principles and an even more confident mastery of his position.

We congratulate Principal Jevons on this volume; and we congratulate yet more Hartford Seminary, both on the institution of the Hartford-Lamson Lectureship, and on the singularly high character of its initial course of lectures.

Princeton.

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

MY BELIEF. Answers to Certain Religious Difficulties. By ROBERT F. HORTON, M.A., D.D., formerly Fellow of New College, Oxford. 8vo., pp. 295. Fleming H. Revell Company, New York: Chicago: Toronto. 1908.

The writer of this volume "proposes to deal with fifteen of the questions which confront the modern mind in the search for religious truth". These questions are the following: "Is Religion Necessary?" "Is Christianity the Best Religion?" "The Claims of Rome"; "Unitarianism"; "Can We Believe the Bible?" "Is the Christian Faith Identical with the Belief in Miracles?" "The Changed Universe"; "How to regard Prayer"; "The After Life"; "The Difficulty Arising from the Variety of Religious Opinions"; "The Absence of a Certain Religious Experience"; "The Social Anarchy"; "The Return to Paganism"; "The Old Problem of Suffering and Sin"; "Atonement". The discussion of these vital questions is always interesting, usually clear, and, in the case of many of them, often helpful. Just because of these attractive qualities, however, it is positively dangerous in view of the fact that the Christianity which it undertakes to vindicate, so far from being what has been and is commonly accepted as Christianity, is the contradiction of it. For example, Paul says (Eph. 2. 12) that 'to be without Christ is to have no hope and to be without God in the world'; but Dr. Horton writes that we never dream of saying that heathenism, 'though without Christ, is without God'. Again, "to Calvin every part of the Bible was equally true, equally authoritative"; but for Dr.

Horton criticism has overthrown "the dogma of infallibility". Once more, our Lord appealed to his miracles as attesting his divine mission on the ground that they were and must be due to the immediate exercise of God's power: but Dr. Horton questions whether his miracles are historically established; and he would see in them, if they were, only the wonderful, at most "the superhuman", never the supernatural. That is to say, the Christianity which Dr. Horton defends is Christianity without its essence. For it is precisely that it is a supernatural intervention that differentiates it from all other religions and makes it the absolute religion. We wish that we might go no further. Fairness, however, compels us to add that here and there the discussion is marred by exaggeration and ignorance which are without excuse. For example, on page 114 we read, with reference to Rev. xxii. 18, 19, "this may be said to be the only evidence ever adduced for the infallibility of the Bible". Again (on p. 60) we read, "No Christian with the modern temper would venture to say that Christianity is the final revelation, or to refuse truth which would surpass Christian truth. All that he would say is this, that Christianity is the best we know". This last quotation is the true key to the whole discussion, especially when it is explained and justified by the words of the author on p. 163, "The truths of morality and religion may be only relative or provisional, but by them we have to live".

Princeton.

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

THE BELIEFS OF UNBELIEF. *Studies in the Alternatives to Faith.* By W. H. FITCHETT, B.A., LL.D., Author of *How England Saved Europe, The Unrealized Logic of Religion, Wesley and His Century*, etc. 8vo.; pp. vi, 293. New York: Eaton & Mains; Cincinnati: Jennings & Graham. 1907.

"These papers are an attempt to define and assess what may be called the positives of doubt; the strange beliefs which lurk under the mask of unbelief. Faith suffers—and rightly suffers—inconstant challenge for its credentials. But let us stop for a moment to consider what are the credentials of doubt. The fight has hitherto raged round the evidences of religion; it is surely time to ask what are the 'evidences' of irreligion. The Christian faith has its difficulties, it may be frankly admitted; but let the question be seriously considered: What are the difficulties of the alternatives to that faith?"

To this question the author confines himself rigorously, and his discussion is convincing and even brilliant. He shows, that "where theism has difficulties its alternatives", as atheism, pantheism, and agnosticism, "have incredibilities, not to say impossibilities"; that while the Gospel of Christ may seem "a tale incredible", its alternatives, as that "Christ never existed" or that he was "an impostor" or that he was "only a myth" are, every one of them, "an offense to plain reason"; that while there are difficulties and apparent mistakes in the Bible, the alternative belief, as that the Bible is "a forgery", or that it is "only one of the

sacred books of the race", or that it is "a book of dreams", is "the last of incredibilities"; and that these "beliefs of unbelief" are followed by ethical results which would condemn them, even if they were not in themselves absurd.

It will be seen at once that this line of thought is not unlike that of Mr. Ballard's great book, *The Miracles of Unbelief*. Indeed, they both represent the same style, and the most effective style, of apologetics. They might also well be used together. Our author might fittingly introduce the doubter to Ballard's more exhaustive and scientific discussion.

Princeton.

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

EXEGETICAL THEOLOGY.

BIBLE CHRONOLOGY FROM ABRAHAM TO THE CHRISTIAN ERA. By W. S. AUCHINCLOSS, C.E., author of the "Book of Daniel Unlocked." New York: For sale by D. Van Nostrand Company, Scientific Book Publishers, 23 Murray Street, 1905. Pp. 17. Also by the same author, **TO CANAAN IN ONE YEAR**, with Map of Route. 1906. Pp. 15. **HOW TO READ JOSEPHUS.** 1906. Pp. 15. **CHRISTIAN ERA: an Extract from The Book of Daniel Unlocked.** 1906. Pp. 121-133.

Along with some preliminary material these pamphlets have been republished, without essential modification, under the title: **AUCHINCLOSS' CHRONOLOGY OF THE HOLY BIBLE.** Introduction by A. H. SAYCE, LL.D., Professor of Assyriology, Queen's College, Oxford, England. New York: For sale by D. Van Nostrand Company. 1908. Pp. 97.

The scheme of **BIBLE CHRONOLOGY** has been worked out with care; but it is based in part on theories that do not command universal assent; for example, on the belief (1) That "in the matter of patriarchal birth-dates preference" should be given "to the figures of Josephus," which are "free from those irregularities which characterize the Hebrew text;" (2) That "Jacob's descent into Egypt was the Half-way Station in [the four hundred and thirty years of] the sojourning of the children of Israel in Egypt" (p. 8), so that the actual sojourn in Egypt was two hundred and fifteen years; (3) That the four hundred and eighty years in I Kin. 6: 1 are consecutive years and not, say, twelve cycles of forty years. The author thinks that in the book of Judges, where four periods of rest are given as 40, 80, 40, and 40 years, "from some unknown cause ciphers have been affixed to the true numbers; that is, to the Nos. 4, 8, 4, and 4, thus making the quantities ten times as great" (p. 9; and see explanation in *How to Read Josephus*, p. 8). If the author is wrong in these points alone, his whole chronology from Adam to Solomon is vitiated; and it is not "evident that the history of our race began with the year B. C. 5301."

In the pamphlet entitled **TO CANAAN IN ONE YEAR**, the itinerary of

the journey of the Israelites from Rameses in Egypt to Gilgal near Jericho, as drawn up by Moses and published in Num. 33, is supplemented from the narrative of the journey given in Ex., Num., and Josh., and from the allusions in the farewell address of Moses. The distances of the encampments and battle grounds from each other in the line of march are marked, and dates are assigned wherever the calculation is reasonably possible. The time between the departure of the Hebrews from Rameses and their arrival at Kadesh-barnea within the eventual bounds of the land of Israel was about a year; hence the title of the brochure. The people afterwards roamed for thirty and eight years in the wilderness. The exodus is dated in 1477 B. C., and the time of the subsequent events is, of course, calculated from it.

As appears from the brief treatise entitled *HOW TO READ JOSEPHUS*, the author is troubled by the fact that Josephus "says in one place regarding Solomon's Temple that from the building to the burning was 470 years, in another place 466 years and by computation, using figures taken from his own book, we obtain five more values. Thus in effect he assigned seven values to one period . . . In like manner Josephus gives two values to the period between the Exodus and the building of the Temple, viz: 612 years and 592, both of which are wrong." The author might have added that the Hebrew writer of I Kin. 6:1 reckons the time at 480 years, and the apostle Paul apparently at 574. However, there is no cause for the dismay. These diverse statements appear contradictory to the modern reader who lacks the historic sense and cannot divest himself of modern chronological conceptions; but they are accurate in the sense in which they were intended and in which they were understood. The method of calculation was well known, and the character and meaning of the results were fully understood. It would be a mistake to alter the statements of Josephus; although, of course, it would be quite proper to jot down on the margin of Josephus' works the true chronology, as Mr. Auchincloss proposes. His long list of suggested corrections includes the peculiarities of his own system.

Princeton.

JOHN D. DAVIS.

THE CHRISTIAN ERA is another little pamphlet that represents much study. The treatise by Mr. Auchincloss on "The Only Key to Daniel's Prophecies", was reviewed at considerable length by the Rev. J. R. Donehoo in the issue of this REVIEW for October 1904, pp. 675-679. In that work the author argued that the birth of our Lord occurred in "the Spring of A. D. 1", among his reasons being "the ABSOLUTE CERTAINTY that the death of Herod occurred in the last half of A. D. 1" (p. 75). In this reprint from "The Book of Daniel Unlocked", he endeavors to show that the death of Herod occurred "February, B. C. 1", and the birth of Christ in the "Fall, B. C. 2".

Josephus dates the accession of Hyrcanus in the 3rd year of the 177th Olympiad, i. e., 69-70 B. C. (*Ant.* xiv. 1, 2). Hyrcanus reigned 3 months (*Ant.* xv. 6. 4), Aristobulus 3 years and 6 months (*Ant.* xiv. 6. 1). As the reign of Aristobulus was terminated by the

fall of Jerusalem before Pompey in 63 B. C., Josephus antedates the accession of Hyrcanus by about 3 years. Mr. Auchincloss holds that this error has affected the Herodian chronology of Josephus. The error in question is generally recognized (Schürer²⁴ i. 256, n. 1), but as it may have originated from a faulty synchronism, the question of its influence on the Herodian chronology must be settled by evidence. In support of his theory Mr. Auchincloss directs attention to the date assigned to the death of Philip, in the 20th year of Tiberius, i. e., 33-34 A. D., after a reign of 37 years (*Ant.* xviii. 4. 6). He argues that this date is 3 years too early, for Agrippa went to Rome a year before the death of Tiberius, i. e., in 36 A. D., "to treat of some affairs with the Emperor" (*Ant.* xviii. 5. 3). Josephus does not indicate the nature of these affairs, but Mr. Auchincloss thinks that they concerned the tetrarchy of Philip; and, as it seems unlikely that Agrippa would have waited three years after the death of his uncle before urging his claims on the Emperor, it is held that Philip died in the 23rd year of Tiberius, i. e., in 36 A. D., and that his reign of 37 years began after the death of Herod the Great in 1 B. C. This argument, however, is extremely uncertain. In *Ant.* xviii. 4. 6 Josephus says that after the death of Philip the tetrarchy was added by Tiberius to the province of Syria, and there is no evidence to show that Agrippa sought to secure the succession immediately after the death of his uncle. The relations of Agrippa with Tiberius and Caligula, as described by Josephus in *Ant.* xviii. 6. 1-11, fully explain the action of Caligula in bestowing the territory of Philip on Agrippa, but they do not afford evidence of a chronological error on the part of Josephus in the date assigned to the death of Philip.

Mr. Auchincloss seeks further support for his view that Herod the Great died in 1 B. C., from the statement of Josephus (*Ant.* xvii. 6. 4) that the eclipse of the moon which preceded the death of Herod by a short time, was itself preceded by a fast day. "Astronomers say that on Jan. 9th, B. C. 1, there was an eclipse of the moon and the calendar of Rabbi Hillel ii. tells us that the tenth of the month Tebet, known as the 'fast of Tebet' coincided with January 10th in the year B. C. 1." There was another eclipse visible in Palestine on Mar. 12-13, in 4 B. C., but Mr. Auchincloss thinks that this is "absolutely out of the question" because it occurred during the "feast" of Purim, which was not a "fast". Mr. Auchincloss is correct in regard to the character of the feast of Purim. According to the *Megillath Taanith* fasting was prohibited not only on the 14th and 15th of Adar when the feast of Purim was celebrated (cf. *Ant.* xi. 6. 13), but also on the 13th when Nicanor's day was celebrated (cf. *Ant.* xii. 10. 5, 2 Macc. xv. 36, 1 Macc. vii. 49). The "fast of Esther" on the 13th of Adar as well as the custom of fasting after Purim is of much later origin (cf. *Jewish Encyclopedia*, art. "Fasting and Fast-days"). The prohibition of fasting on the 12th of Adar, Trajan's day, is also later (*Megillath Taanith*). If Mar. 12th was a fast day and it were shown that it coincided with the 13th, 14th, or 15th of Adar in the year 4 B. C., there would be some difficulty in

harmonizing the account of Josephus in this matter with other data which point to the year 4 B. C., as the date of Herod's death. But Josephus does not say that the day preceding the eclipse was a fast. The sentences beginning *ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ Μαθθίου τούτου λερωμένου* and continuing through *συγγενὴς ὧν* are parenthetical and recount an incident which occurred during the high-priesthood of Matthias in connection with the celebration of the day which the Jews observe as a fast (*ἡν Ἰουδαῖοι νηστειαν ἀγούσιν*) probably the day of atonement (cf. Schürer⁴ ii. 270, n. 7). The narrative is taken up again with the words *Ἡρώδης δὲ τὸν τε Μαθθίαν* and the eclipse is connected with the deposition of Matthias from the high-priesthood and the burning of the other Matthias and his companions who had been concerned in the tearing down of the golden eagle from the great gate of the Temple. There is thus no close chronological connection between the fast and the eclipse. On the other hand, there is considerable evidence of a cumulative character which makes it highly probable that Herod died in the Spring of 4 B. C. This evidence is derived from various sources and has been stated in detail frequently. It will be sufficient in this connection to refer to Schürer, *Geschichte des Jüdischen Volkes im Zeitalter Jesu Christi*²⁻⁴ i. 415, n. 167.

Princeton.

WILLIAM P. ARMSTRONG.

JERUSALEM. THE TOPOGRAPHY, ECONOMICS AND HISTORY FROM THE EARLIEST TIMES TO A. D. 70. By GEORGE ADAM SMITH, D.D., LL.D., Professor of Old Testament Language, Literature and Theology, United Free Church College, Glasgow; author of "The Historical Geography of the Holy Land," etc. In Two Volumes. With Maps and Illustrations. New York: A. C. Armstrong & Son, 3 and 5 West 18th Street. 1908. 8vo. Pp. xx, 498 and xvi, 631. Net \$7.50.

This comprehensive work on the city of Jerusalem is not popular in character, like the author's Historical Geography of the Holy Land; but is an elaborate discussion of the facts and theories regarding the geography, geology, water supply, climate, walls, economic conditions, and civil history of ancient Jerusalem. The constant reference to the literature of the subject and the citation of authors makes the first volume a convenient thesaurus for the student. It brings to his hand the substance of many technical papers, otherwise somewhat difficult of access, because widely scattered in periodicals and rare books. Its presentation of learned discussions fully acquaints the reader with the questions at issue. Few exceptions occur to the usual completeness of treatment, the inquiry into the date of the Siloam inscription being one of the few. It registers the information that has been obtained by excavation, and the progress in the solution of old problems that these discoveries have rendered possible. It is a handy tool for the skilled workman, but will prove cumbersome to the unskilled.

Princeton.

JOHN D. DAVIS.

STUDIES IN THE BOOK OF PSALMS. By LINCOLN HULLEY, Ph.D., President of John B. Stetson University, DeLand, Florida. New York: Fleming H. Revell Company. Pp. 178. \$1.00 net.

This little volume consists of the substance of lectures delivered at Chautauqua and other summer schools. The material has been published "in response to many requests to have printed copies." The lectures have evidently given delight to many persons, and proved informing to them. The work has its excellencies: good service is done in emphasizing the fact that uniformity of structure and a regular meter were not characteristic of Hebrew poetry (pp. 27-35); and the titles proposed for the psalms (pp. 57-60) are always suggestive and often describe the contents most happily.

But on the whole, the book is superficial and marred by carelessness. One does not read far without becoming impressed with the extravagance of the author's assertions. He shows a marked tendency to use the superlative degree and the universal negative. More's the pity; since the statements he makes are often untrue in the form in which they are made, while yet containing important truth. The author is rather heedless of facts. He makes Doeg a Moabite, and locates his early home amid the hills across the ravine of the Jordan (p. 67). It will be difficult for the author to prove that the prophets "carefully cast their messages into verses, filed their sentences, set them to music, waited for occasion, and then chanted their message" (p. 15). He informs the reader that "the book [of the Psalms] is a collection of that wider field of song such as . . . the song of the Hebrew maidens over Jep[h]tah's daughter . . . and the song of the well, chanted by the women water carriers" (p. 53). Here is certainly news. It has not been heretofore known that the lamentation of the maidens for Jephthah's daughter was an extant song, or that the song of the well was chanted by the women water carriers. He tells us on page 169 that "tradition assigns to Manasseh's period [Psalms] 140, 142, 64, 54." Tradition? The only tradition regarding these poems is embodied in their titles, and it assigns these four psalms "to David," and one of them, the fifty-fourth, definitely to the time of the persecution of David by Saul.

Several errors have been allowed to pass by the proof-reader: Delitzsch (p. 74); Renos for Reuss (p. 136); professional, as the title of a group of psalms, for processional; and the definite article inserted before the proper name Ephrathah (p. 132). A noted hero of Judah is called Sampson (p. 22).

Princeton.

JOHN D. DAVIS.

THE HISTORICAL BIBLE.—The Heroes and Crises of Early Hebrew History, from the Creation to the Death of Moses. By CHARLES FOSTER KENT, Ph.D., Woolsey Professor of Biblical Literature in Yale University. With Maps. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1908. Pp. xvi, 251.

Same Series, Author and Publishers.—THE FOUNDERS AND RULERS OF UNITED ISRAEL. From the Death of Moses to the Division of the Hebrew Kingdom. New York: 1908. Pp. xii, 238.

The volumes are the first two in a series of six, projected and announced by the same author and publishers, and "intended," in the words of the author's preface, "for use, (1) as a text-book for college, seminary and preparatory school classes; (2) as a manual for teachers' training classes; (3) as a basis of study for general readers, who desire to gain from the modern point of view a systematic knowledge of the history, literature and teachings of the Bible; (4) as a text-book for senior and adult Bible classes." This is by no means the first appearance of Dr. Kent as a popularizer of what he terms "the modern point of view" of the Old Testament, and it is, perhaps, superfluous to state what he understands that point of view to mean. But there are a few observations that can scarcely be avoided, when one takes up these little volumes to see the fulfillment of the promise contained in their strikingly pretentious title: "The Historical Bible." It is a word to conjure with in these days, on both sides of the water—this word "historical." It is selling booklets by the thousand in Germany; it is bringing in a good commercial return in this country. But, O History, what crimes are committed in thy name! It is not in the preface, which reads fairly, but in the body of the book, page after page, that the author's working concept of the word "historical" is revealed. For example, in the section on the Fall, we read of it, after a comparison of it with the parables of Jesus, "*It is in every respect historical because it is absolutely true to human experience.*" From first to last we are impressed with the effort—evidently a conscious effort—to confuse the true and the real. Even for a reader well acquainted with much that lies back of a brief comparison or criticism, it is difficult to keep clearly in mind whether what the author is commenting upon is to him an historical personage, occurrence or utterance, or whether it is merely a part of what his "prophetic authors" believed. Indeed, we are not always assured that those authors themselves believed what they recorded. For Prof. Kent has this to say of the aims of these "early prophetic historians" (J and E): "The first was to trace the outlines of Israel's history and *to interpret in the light of that record* the divine purpose which was being realized in it. . . . The second aim was to *set before later generations* in the person of their earliest ancestor *a character* that would inspire in his descendants the noblest ideals and aspirations. . . . The third aim was *to illustrate concretely*, and therefore the more effectively, certain universal truths which had been revealed through the experiences of the Hebrew race",—which truths the writer proceeds to enumerate, from one to seven. Everywhere the language is worded as carefully as that of a political platform, where two quite different ends are in view. The italics (the reviewer's) in the above quotation indicate the spots where a critical reader would prefer to have definite statements, committing the author clearly to the historical, the idealized, or the mythical view of Abraham's career

and the like. The "preachy" tone adopted is as little agreeable with the true purpose of these books as is the character of Isaac to the taste of their author: "He is conventionally pious, and goes out to meditate at eventide." If this tone is what is meant by the well-loved word "constructive", applied with such iteration to these booklets by their author, then let us have frankly destructive books! We confess that "the modern point of view" of the Bible is nowhere else so distasteful to us, as where administered in these small, cut-price doses, compounded of Kuenen, Winckler, Cheyne *et al.*, well mixed and in convenient form, "sugar-coated, but otherwise unchanged",—to borrow Mr. Cleveland's now celebrated epigram. It is not often that anything approaching an argument or a defense of the position adopted is presented. The style is almost invariably didactic, and the tone positive. This is natural, and in keeping with the purpose of the books. Yet when the author occasionally ventures an explanation, he shows that he is capable of quite as astonishing things in logic as any Cheyne or Budde. This will serve as an illustration. The sixteenth and eighteenth chapters of Genesis are brought together as one section of the J-narrative. In the sixteenth chapter the Angel of Jehovah is Hagar's interlocutor; in the eighteenth chapter Abraham's interlocutor is Jehovah. Of this noticeable change in the designation of the divine personality Prof. Kent says: "The sudden introduction of Jehovah in connection with the promise, instead of the angelic beings, suggests, perhaps, that in the earlier part of the narrative the prophetic historian did not wish to represent the Deity as partaking of food." In fact, it is in the part of the narrative where no food is in question that the Angel of Jehovah appears, and precisely where food comes into the narrative that Jehovah Himself is introduced. There are also mistakes in statements of fact, which, if recognized by the reader, will incline him to distrust the author's care in statements of opinion. We suppose it is merely a slip of memory, when the author declares that "the two accounts of Isaac's deception regarding Rebekah" are "in Genesis 12 and 26", whereas in chapter xii (and equally in chapter xx) Abraham's deception regarding Sarah is the subject. And the statements that Eridu, Ur, Lagash, Uruk, Larsa and Nisin were the important cities in the *north* of Babylonia, and Agade, Nippur, Sippar, Kutha, Kish and Babylon were those in the *south*, and that the Libyans lived *east* of Egypt, should, doubtless, be charged merely to inadvertence. But the author is quite at sea where he declares that "from southern Arabia colonists crossed the southern end of the Red Sea to Africa, and founded the nation of the Cushites or Ethiopians, of whom are descended the modern Abyssinians". The modern Abyssinians are indeed descendants (in part) of those ancient Arabian colonists. But that, in spite of their fond appropriation to themselves of the name "Ethiopians", they have any claim to descent from the "nation of the Cushites or Ethiopians" which plays its part on the pages of oriental and classical histories, is a view for which we know of no modern defenders. The kingdoms of Meroë and Napata are quite apart from everything Abyssinian and Arabic, geo-

graphically, ethnologically and linguistically. There is throughout these volumes a strange mixture of the certain, the probable, the possible, the conceivable, and the false, but all uttered with equal confidence. We are sorry for the young who follow this pied piper. For, finally, the books are attractive. They play sweet music for young ears. Some of us, however, are tired of "the comparative method", with its sudden surprises as Romulus and Remus are named beside Cain and Abel, Orion beside Isaac, Niobe beside Lot's wife. These are the puns of Biblical science. The first time they are heard they please by the surprise of recognition and discovery. But like puns they cannot bear either elaboration or repetition. The praise which we are ready heartily to accord to these books is for their pedagogical plan. Everything in the method of presentation is well adapted to accomplish the announced purpose. Both the author and the publishers are to be congratulated upon the production of volumes which both in appearance and in method are so perfectly in keeping with the end in view.

Princeton.

J. OSCAR BOYD.

NOTES ON HEBREW RELIGION. By HAROLD M. WIENER, M.A., LL.B., of Lincoln's Inn, Barrister-at-Law. Reprinted from *The Churchman*, March, April, and May, 1907, with a Prefatory Note. London: Elliott Stock. 1907. Pp.32.

In this pamphlet Mr. Wiener has collected the scattered notes on Mr. Addis' "Hebrew Religion", which appeared in *The Churchman* in successive issues. There is nothing that gives unity to these notes, except the two constants, Mr. Wiener's standpoint and Mr. Addis' standpoint, which are hopelessly at variance. Mr. Addis is the easy-going patron of the fashionable in Old Testament criticism, equally ready to adopt as verity the lightest suggestions of the leading analogists, and to combine views that are mutually antagonistic without apparently being troubled in the least by thoughts of consistency. Mr. Wiener is the fortunate and yet ill-fated critic who has found too easy a mark. The lawyer, with his demand for facts, for evidence, for proof, is embarrassed by the wealth of his material when he takes up a writer like Mr. Addis and dissects his loose assertions. The critic may do good in warning possible readers of Mr. Addis who might lack critical insight; he will hardly succeed in persuading Mr. Addis of a single fault.

Princeton.

J. OSCAR BOYD.

DER ZWEIFEL AN DER MESSIANITÄT JESU. VON D. A. SCHLATTER, Professor in Tübingen. Gütersloh. Druck und Verlag von C. Bertelsmann. Beiträge zur Förderung Christlicher Theologie. 1907. 4. Heft. Pp. 75.

The question of the Messianic consciousness of Jesus has in recent times become a burning question. To any one who sees beneath the surface it is plain that not merely critical or historical motives, but the most vital religious and theological interests are here at play. Prof.

Schlatter calls attention to this when he remarks that the unwelcome character of the religious consequences following from the recognition of Jesus' Messianic purpose has obviously influenced the denial of the latter as expressed in the conjectures of Wrede or in the vacillating reflections of Wellhausen. He does not, however, specify what are the great issues at stake. Nor does he address himself in this treatise to examining or refuting the historico-critical arguments with which the opponents of the Messianic consciousness seek to justify a doubt arising actually from dogmatic prepossessions. What the author aims at is something midway between these two. While recognizing that the deeper source of the doubt is theological, he also recognizes that there is at least a semblance of support for it in certain phenomena of the Gospel-account. But, instead of dealing with these phenomena directly, he prefers to deal with certain peculiarities of the Messianic consciousness, to which in his view the phenomena are ultimately traceable. The method is that from the center of the Messianic consciousness and the Messianic calling the conditions are deduced which would inevitably give rise to doubt. And this is justified by the peculiarity of the situation which is found in this, that the apparent grounds for the modern doubt, so far as they are objective and not merely *à-priori* theological, appear to be identical with those that already led Jesus' contemporaries to call his Messiahship into question. Wrede and Wellhausen in principle take exception to the same features in the account of Jesus' activity as did the people of Jesus' own time when confronted with these features in his actual career. The result of such a mode of treatment is that the objections are not always treated with the fulness of detail that an interested student of the controversy might desire. A full answer, *e. g.*, to Wrede would have to take into account a great many things, which Schlatter does not even touch upon. Sometimes it may be questioned whether the peculiarities of Jesus' Messianic procedure on which the author dwells actually explain the phenomena of which the sceptical critics have made so much, and whether not perhaps other factors must be brought into requisition. But, nevertheless, the author has, to a remarkable extent, succeeded in throwing light upon the perplexing aspects of our Lord's attitude with regard to the Messiahship and has shown that these perplexing elements are not accidentally there, but the necessary result of the way in which Jesus fundamentally conceived and approached the Messiahship.

The difficulties, in Dr. Schlatter's view, go mainly back to three causes. The first of these is that Jesus broke with the nation of Israel and gave to his Messiahship a meaning and value independent of its acceptance by his own people. This was the result of his absolute insistence upon the ethical and religious nature of the Messianic function. Because it existed for the very purpose of realizing righteousness, it had to adopt the method of summoning to repentance, and, where repentance was refused, not to shun the consequence of this, but to proceed unswervingly to the treatment of Israel as rejected of God. In discussing this it is strikingly brought out how thoroughly Messianic

our Lord's preaching is not merely in individual traits such as that the last messenger in the vineyard-parable is the Son or that the mission of Jesus appears in the supper-parable as a banquet for the Son, which might be explained from subsequent Messianizing remodelling of the tradition, but in its whole trend and tenor, since it everywhere implies that now the last, decisive crisis has arrived for Israel, that the nation by its attitude towards Jesus must either make or break itself, that he is set for the rising or falling of those to whom the message comes. Even if all else were discounted, Jesus' ethical preaching, although so often contrasted with his Messianic message, as if it were something independent of the latter, or even heterogeneous, would alone suffice to establish the highest conceivable official consciousness on his part. If no more than a reformer, he would still be an authoritative, royal, Messianic reformer. The conclusion of the Sermon on the Mount is not out of keeping with its beginning or central portion. All this is eminently true and of the greatest importance for a correct understanding of our Lord's work. The main question, however, is how far the phenomena which Wrede has grouped together under the rubric of "the Messianic secret" are explainable from this primary principle. So far as Jesus' holding back and keeping silence towards the people are concerned, undoubtedly much can be set down to this cause. Johannes Weiss has already pointed out that the secretive employment of the parabolic method of teaching must be explained not from Mark's desire to introduce into the Gospel a phantom-like *prae-resurrection* Messiahship, which was to appear real and unreal at the same time, but from his apologetic desire to account for Israel's unbelief by the theory of hardening, Mark following in this respect in the footsteps of Paul, Rom. ix-xi. It is only necessary to go one step farther back to arrive at Schlatter's explanation. The necessity to withdraw the truth in general, and the truth of the Messiahship in particular, was not first an apologetic necessity in the mind of Mark or Paul, but from the outset an historical necessity is the actual life of Jesus, because his presentation of himself as the Messiah of repentance had led to the forfeiture by Israel of the Messianic inheritance. Thus "the Messianic secrecy" is seen to be the first result of the ethical Messiahship. And what applies to the parables would apply to other forms of Jesus' self-withholding or self-withdrawal, such as the prohibition to make known his healing activity. The only fault that can be found with this is that it does not explain the other difficulty on which Wrede has placed equal emphasis, viz., that the disciples from whom the Messiahship was not kept secret appear, especially in Mark, utterly incapable not merely of understanding but of apprehending it. Here the solution will have to be sought in another quarter than that explored by Schlatter. It must also be remembered that the judicial withdrawal of Jesus cannot be introduced as a principle of interpretation until a somewhat advanced stage of the public ministry, since the unrepentant attitude of the people needed some time to develop and show itself. In so far as similar phenomena appear from the beginning, as to some extent they do, it will

be necessary to assume that at different times the same attitude may have been prompted by different motives. No doubt to the mind of Wrede, who insisted upon lumping all instances showing a general resemblance together and upon postulating for all one uniform explanation, this appeared tantamount to a confession of weakness or failure. It may well be questioned, however, whether on the principle that we deal here with the actual life of Jesus, and not with the mind of the Evangelist, such an exegetical monism is a safe principle to follow. Reality is not always uniform in its determining causes, even where the phenomena appear strikingly alike.

The second cause, with which the author deals more briefly, is found in Jesus' reliance on the word as an instrument for asserting his Messiahship. The hidden, spiritual character of the kingdom had for its correlate the hidden, unrecognized character of the Messiah. But here also the contradiction was only an apparent one. Not in spite of his activity through the word, rather in virtue of it Jesus carried through his true Messianic function. For to Jesus the Messiahship was not purely prospective, so that the word might have served the bare purpose of predicting it or preparing for it. The word is a Messianic instrument in the fullest sense. Hence the doubt whether such an attitude of dependence on the word can be reconciled with the claim to Messianic power. The removal of the difficulty depends again on a proper appreciation of the God-centered, religious form which the conception of Messiahship assumed in the mind of Jesus. Because the Messiahship is for the purpose of revealing God and establishing communion with God in the spiritual sphere, the word is its normal instrument. But to the people of that time, in whose minds self-centered ideas strongly colored the whole Messianic outlook, such a Messiahship naturally appeared attenuated, elusive, unreal. And that something not unlike this process repeats itself in the modern mind is clear from the suspicion into which since long the idea of the present, spiritual kingdom has fallen. It is true many of those who deny the latter, throw themselves with all the more eagerness on the eschatological kingdom as embodying the true conception of Jesus, and with reference to this at least uphold the reality of a vigorous Messianic consciousness in a prospective sense. But where less enthusiasm prevails for the eschatological, it is just as possible to construe the matter in this way that Jesus, while looking forward to a future kingdom, did not put his own person in a Messianic relation to the same. Or the Messiahship comes to be regarded as a mere accidental form in which Jesus' sense of his own religious uniqueness expressed itself. Thus the temptation reappears to substitute the preacher of religion for the Messiah. But here as in the other case the mistake is that the absolute, authoritative, royal tenor of Jesus' religious preaching is not appreciated. The trouble is not merely that the emphasis on something else rules out the Messiahship, but that with the Messiahship ruled out, this other thing becomes distorted to the view and ill-proportioned.

The third cause which Dr. Schlatter names as contributory to the ancient and modern doubt on the Messianic question is the passivity of Jesus with regard to the honor and glory of his office. Jesus did not make any effort on his own part to appropriate what was his right. He waited for the Father and for others to give him the name above every name. It is pointed out that this also was the result of the profoundly religious spirit in which he apprehended the Messiahship as something given from God and existing for the sake of God. Hence he did not force it even upon the disciples. But, while remaining silent about the Messianic title, he felt no hesitation about freely and openly claiming the Sonship which underlay the former. In the case of the Sonship the God-centered, thoroughly religious nature of the idea was so obvious that the possibility of misinterpretation in an egotistic sense was of itself excluded. Many good and striking things are said by the writer in this connection. If we were to make any stricture it would be that the self-effacement of Jesus is too exclusively placed to the account of his general filial attitude towards God and not sufficiently placed in a soteriological light as an aspect of his humiliation, after the manner of Paul in Phil. ii. Nor are we quite satisfied with the view Dr. Schlatter would seem to take of the Sonship itself. This is too much restricted to the religious sphere, the solid trinitarian underground is lacking. Hence the assertion that the Sonship cannot even be thought apart from the Messiahship, and the polemic against the Christ who could do without an office as necessarily a gnostic Christ. But if we are thoroughly in earnest with our ascription of deity to the Saviour, we cannot deny him the attribute of self-sufficiency (in this case independence of the need of office) which is characteristic of God. These, however, are matters not essential to the argument. The main point is that the self-effacement, the passivity of Jesus is set forth as an important factor in Jesus' conduct which explains his abstention from positive assertion of his Messianic dignity even in the midst of the fulness of his Messianic work, and so is adapted to resolve the doubts which the coexistence of the two apparently irreconcilable attitudes has produced in the mind of observers.

In a brief concluding chapter the author deals with the light that is thrown back from the Messianic conception of the early Church upon that of Jesus. The prae-Christian Jewish Messianic conception was far from completely ethicized and spiritualized. How then can the presence of such a thoroughly ethical and spiritual Messianic belief in primitive Christianity be explained otherwise than on the supposition that it was inherited from Jesus? The same applies to the exchange of places that appears to have happened as between "the people" and "the king" in point of importance. Previously the implication had been that he who belonged to the people would share in the Messiah and his reign. Now the watchword becomes that appurtenance to the Messiah determines one's place among the people and in the kingdom of God, and in result of this the eschatology becomes simpler, and more spiritualized because centered in the Christ. For this also a historical cause can be found

in the work of Jesus only. The unique character of primitive Christian ethics, which reckons not with relative conceptions, but with such absolute conceptions as forgiveness, justification, regeneration, sanctification, finds its explanation in nothing else but the absolute character of Jesus' Messianic work as an accomplished fact not only to the minds of those who preached such things, but also to their historical experience. Finally, the unanimity with which in early Christian teaching the Messiahship of Jesus is based on his Sonship, whereas in the abstract other derivations were possible, bears conclusive testimony to the reality of the rôle played by Sonship and Messiahship and their intimate union in the life and teaching of Jesus.

Princeton.

GEERHARDUS VOS.

INTERPRETATION OF THE BIBLE. A SHORT HISTORY. By GEORGE HOLLEY GILBERT, Ph.D., D.D., Author of *The Student's Life of Jesus*, *The Revelation of Jesus*, *The Student's Life of Paul*, *A History of Christianity in the Apostolic Age*, etc. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1908. Pp. viii, 309. \$1.25 net.

"This book surveys a great but neglected field"—the opening sentence of the preface is sufficient to gain a careful hearing for the exposition that follows. Surely the interpretation of the Bible has involved enough of human effort and exercised enough influence upon human life to be well worthy of the historian. Yet a good brief survey of the whole field has been conspicuously absent.

Gilbert possesses many of the qualifications necessary for filling the place so surprisingly left vacant by modern scholarship. His reading has evidently been very extensive; he has planned the work well, giving just enough detail to be convincing and forcible without causing the larger development of the history to be lost from view; his style is at times brilliant and always admirably clear. The result is a very instructive and thoroughly readable book.

On the other hand, Gilbert approaches his subject-matter with certain very strong convictions as to the requirements to which exegesis should conform, and unless the reader shares these convictions he will be apt to regard some of Gilbert's judgments as rather one-sided.

In the first place, in order to win our historian's approval, an interpretation must find as little dogma in the Bible as possible and display as little interest as possible for the dogma that unfortunately is there. Thus on page 144 (footnote) it is urged apparently as a reproach against the commentary of Theodore of Mopsuestia on Philippians that it devotes "about one-fifth of the entire space" to the christological passage, Phil. ii. 5-11, "which passage amounts to only one-thirteenth of the Epistle". Comparing Meyer, we find that one of the leading exponents of the modern grammatico-historical method exhibits almost the same preference for dogma by devoting over one-seventh of his space to that same passage. It should not be regarded as injudicious to devote the chief attention to passages that are at the same time most

important and most difficult. Again, Luther is taken to task for preferring "the Gospel in the semi-dogmatic form in which it appears in Paul's Epistles rather than in the simple, un-theological words of Jesus", but it may be questioned whether this may be classed among his many errors. We venture to think that not even among the words of Jesus could he have found better weapons against the legalism of the Roman Church than were afforded by the "charter of Christian liberty". Gilbert's criticism depends upon the view that Galatians and Romans are not, as they were to Luther, "the purest Gospel", but "a human *interpretation* of the Gospel". Such separation between the words of Jesus and the other revelation recorded in the New Testament is one of the greatest obstacles now standing in the way of a well-rounded development of the life of the Church. Furthermore, dogma can be removed from the words of Jesus only by a conspicuous exercise of dogmatic exegesis. The undogmatic Jesus may be required by the exigencies of the modern Church, but can be evolved from the Gospels only by an exegesis that depends as fully upon a preconceived idea as did the exegesis of the fourth century.

In the second place, Gilbert exhibits a partiality for those interpretations that break most completely with the exegesis of the first three Christian centuries. That the interpreter should see with his own eyes may certainly be conceded. The only question is whether a substantial agreement with Nicene exegesis is always a sign of bad eyes.

In the third place, Gilbert gives that interpretation the preference which abandons most completely the old doctrine of inspiration. Here again the question is a question of fact. If the Bible is merely a human book, Gilbert is right—to regard it as divine, like all other errors, will have an injurious effect upon exegesis. Perhaps, however, the history of exegesis teaches that the injury is less serious than Gilbert supposes. At any rate, it is useless to say "Peace" when there is no peace, as Gilbert does when he says (p. 273): "The Bible has been humanized, given its place among the religious literatures of the world, and thereby its divine character is being for the first time truly appreciated." Exactly how its divine character is being more truly appreciated through its humanization than it was when men regarded it as a direct message from God, Gilbert does not say. Even if modern science required us to abandon or modify our view of the Bible, it could not prevent us from recognizing the value of the old view. The authoritative Bible has been and is to-day the very foundation of popular Christianity. With it, Christianity is striving with new vigor to win the world for Christ; the Christianity that does without it has never exhibited the power to become anything more than a religion of the few. If we really have to abandon the Bible, we should at least not conceal our loss by sentimental phrases, but should address ourselves with all our might to the task of finding a real substitute for what is gone.

Of course, the three criteria just mentioned are not the only ones that Gilbert uses in estimating the progress of exegesis—far more prominent than all of them is the criterion afforded by the degree and

manner of application of the historical method in general. Here, of course, no objection can be made; the development of historical exegesis is not least among the achievements of modern science. Only, the historical method is not the only requisite for successful exegesis; it may even become a hindrance rather than a help if it causes the interpreter to evade the great "Thou art the man" of the Bible. After all, the Bible is a religious book, and a religious book must be studied in the light of religious experience. Without the religious sense and the consciousness of one's own personal need, all the historical and grammatical study in the world will never penetrate beyond the shell, and the possession of such a sense will sometimes lend an enduring value to interpretations that are woefully defective from the point of view of modern scholarship. The facts of universal human experience are just as truly part of the "setting" of the Bible, just as necessary for its comprehension, as are the facts of Jewish history. Gilbert has recognized this principle (see especially the tribute to the spiritual insight of some of the rabbis and to the commentary of Bengel), but the recognition has not been general enough or hearty enough.

The last chapter, which discusses "the scientific era of Biblical interpretation", is disappointing. A good survey of nineteenth century exegesis (in the narrower sense) is greatly needed, but Gilbert has merely added one more to the many reviews of the progress of modern Biblical study in general. The chapter is animated by an overflowing enthusiasm, which hardly seems justified by the facts of our rather prosaic age. "At the close of the eighteenth century", says Gilbert (p. 260), "the science of Biblical interpretation had reached the foothills of the 'promised land', but no one saw or could see the heights that rose in majesty just ahead. The progress of the past three centuries—yes, of the past thirteen—was to be more than duplicated before the nineteenth century should have given way to the twentieth. A simple enumeration of the discoveries affecting Scripture interpretation, and of the changes in the dominant conceptions of the Bible, which were to come in the next hundred years, would have seemed to the men of that day stranger than fiction, and by the great majority even of thinking people would doubtless have been regarded as heralding the final and irremediable collapse of true religion." Nevertheless, the fact remains that the new conceptions of the Bible have as yet given rise to no religious movement that can, for a moment, be compared with the great movements of the past, and if they have not yet brought about "the final and irremediable collapse of true religion", perhaps that is because they are not so completely "dominant" as some men suppose. Gilbert himself confesses that the "partial and imperfect dawn of a new era of interpretation is as yet seen and felt by only a few in the wide Church of God". So perhaps we are still pretty much in the same position as Gilbert's eighteenth-century observer. The new view of the Bible may produce a greater and stronger Christianity in the future; it has not done so as yet.

What Gilbert means by a "disenthralled Bible" (p. 292) is essentially a Bible from which we have been disenthralled.

Princeton.

J. GRESHAM MACHEN.

ἹΠΟΣ ΠΟΜΑΙΟΤΣ. DIE EPISTEL PAULI AN DIE RÖMER, verdeutscht und erläutert von G. RICHTER, Pfarrer in Gollantsch. Gütersloh. Druck und Verlag von C. Bertelsmann. 1907. Pp. 90.

The aim of this little book seems to be somewhat similar to that of the commentaries of Rudolf Niemann on the same epistle (see *PRINCETON THEOLOGICAL REVIEW*, Vol. VI, p. 144). The author seeks to awaken interest in the Epistle to the Romans outside the circle of the trained theologians or even of advanced students in any department. The commentary is arranged throughout in two columns, of which the former is devoted to details of exegesis, the second to an exposition of the general progress of the thought. An acquaintance with the Greek text is presupposed. The effort to attain brevity and simplicity has perhaps been carried almost to an extreme, but the book will no doubt prove useful in the place that it is intended to fill.

Princeton.

J. GRESHAM MACHEN.

The Baird Lecture for 1907. THE FOUR GOSPELS IN THE EARLIEST CHURCH HISTORY. By THOMAS NICOL, D.D., Professor of Divinity and Biblical Criticism in the University of Aberdeen. William Blackwood & Sons: Edinburgh and London. 1908. Pp. xxii, 326.

Dr. Nicol believes that the "first line of defense" of the credibility of Gospel history "must always be the external evidence". It is important that this evidence should be set forth from time to time in popular form, and in the light of recent discussion; and it is fortunate that the work has been done this time by a careful and thoroughly competent scholar. Those who have studied the masters, "Westcott and Lightfoot, Sanday and Stanton", will be upon familiar ground, but will read with enjoyment and profit this fresh presentation of the evidence. Dr. Nicol adopts the method of Salmon and Zahn and begins with the literature at the close of the second century, and works back toward the Apostolic age. This he does first for the fourfold collection and then for each Gospel separately. He makes the point (alluding to Harnack's work on Luke) that where the internal evidence, as examined by modern scholarship, is conclusive, it confirms the traditional authorship. He believes it to be a reasonable conclusion that the Four Gospels "were written by the Evangelists whose names they bear." A bibliography of some one hundred titles and an index add to the usefulness of the volume.

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HISTORICAL THEOLOGY.

THE LETTERS OF MARTIN LUTHER. Selected and translated by MARGARET A. CURRIE. London: Macmillan & Co. 1908. 8vo.; pp. xxxv, 482, with (insufficient) index.

It is a most surprising thing that no attempt has been made hitherto to set a selection of Luther's letters before that wider public which cares more for the records of a rich personality than for the documents of an ecclesiastical movement, however epoch-making. Miss Currie tells us that a small volume of *Letters to Women* is the only collection of Luther's letter which has heretofore been published in English. She herself has gathered together five hundred of his homeliest and most personal letters and, having rendered them into simple English, invites us to see in their mirror Luther the man. The principle on which she has selected the letters to be translated seems to have been biographical importance, taking the term biographical in the most personal sense. She has been guided by the citations in the Lives of Luther,—Koestlin's and Kolde's,—as well as by the citations in the Lives of many of his friends. The result is that the letters here given are particularly rich in intimate details. We see in them Luther in his household, in the midst of his friends, and in his activities having particular rather than general ends in view. As we read on through the volume we are more and more amazed at the multiplicity of his interests, the strength of his friendships, the untiring devotion he exhibits not only to his cause but to his helpers. There is no detail of the personal life of his acquaintances in which he does not concern himself. We might be prepared to find him diligent in such matters as the settlement of pastors, and the marriage of ex-priests and escaped nuns. But it becomes soon very apparent that his engrossment with these things is not merely official. He stands out clearly in his letters as the good-providence of all those into contact with whom he came. His influence at court, his intercession with superiors, his time, labor, table and house were always at their disposal. It would be scarcely possible to conceive one spending himself more freely in the interest of others. We wonder how he had time and strength left for any more general employments.

It is this picture of Luther the man that Miss Currie's selection of his letters brings before us. Her object is not historical; and her work is not to be judged from the point of view of scholarship. Those who are seeking to understand the Reformation and the work of Luther the Reformer must go elsewhere. Scholars do not need an English rendering of Luther's letters, and cannot content themselves with a mere selection of them. If we would know Luther through and through, on all sides of his personality and in all his activities, we must read all his letters, and we must read them in the originals: and then we must go on and read all his other writings and all the writings of his contemporaries and the records of the times. For those setting such ends before them Miss Currie's meagre selection would be inade-

quate indeed. But for its own proper purpose of giving the general reading public an insight into Luther's private life, the richness of his affections, the amazing breadth of his sympathies, and the daily sacrifice he made of himself on the altar of friendship, it is fully adequate. The picture it gives us is the picture of a good man, providentially placed in a position of influence and using his influence unstintedly in doing good. We cannot say we rise from reading these letters with an admiration for Luther as a letter-writer. His letters were not ends in themselves, but instruments—often very rough and ready, but always very direct instruments—for doing good. What we rise from them feeling is that Luther was a good man, and that it was good to know him and good to have him for a friend.

Incidentally, of course, we learn from his intimate letters many things of the manners and customs of the times, and of the adjustments of nascent Protestantism. How full these letters are of questions of marriage and what peculiar problems faced the first Protestants with respect to marriage! The revolution in the estimate of the marital relation wrought by the Reformation can scarcely be appreciated by us now: nor the difficulties created by the change. It has been said that Calvin kept a marital bureau. Luther much more so: it seems to have been his task to supply all escaped nuns with husbands, all Protestant pastors with wives. Over and over again in these letters he urges on his clerical correspondents to marry and the hints are frequent that he is ever bearing their marital affairs on his mind. "I am delighted", he writes to Capito at Hamburg, May 25, 1540—"I am delighted to hear of the marriage of the priests, monks and nuns among you; and that the former are now husbands in defiance of Satan, and am pleased when they get livings." This is a constantly recurring note. Evidently Luther was zealous for a married clergy. The business-like way in which the affair was sometimes managed is amusing enough. Justus Jonas is commiserated for the loss of the best of wives in a letter of Dec. 25, 1542, and congratulated on his marriage with a new one in a letter of May 4, 1543. When the pastorate at Lochau fell vacant, Luther in a letter of Sept. 3, 1528, asks the place for Michael Stiefel and adds: "Were he to become pastor in Lochau we would try to get him to help the poor widow with her two children, she being left in great poverty, perhaps by marrying her, but if not—God's will be done." Accordingly, on the 25th of October he writes: "I am just starting for Lochau to marry M. Stiefel to the widow of the Bishop of Lochau, and to introduce him to his new charge." One is glad to learn from a letter a month later (Nov., 1528) that the marriage commenced at least auspiciously: "I am delighted, dear Michael", Luther writes to the happy groom, "that you are so pleased with your wife and her children, and that she loves you. May God maintain this unity!" Luther himself, as we know, married Katharine von Bora on the 13th of June, 1525, partly as his most impressive protest against the celibacy of the clergy,—though, of course, not without also deeper and more personal motives. It is startling, however, to observe him only a few months

before (Oct. 12, 1524), in his capacity of general marriage-monger, gaily offering Katharine von Bora to another. "Moreover, if you intend marrying Katharine von Bora", he writes to Hieronymus Baumgärtner, "make haste before she is given to someone else, for C. Glatz, pastor in Orlamunde, is ready waiting. She has not yet got over her love for you. I wish that you two were married." Luther himself was apparently not yet on the waiting-list.

We must, of course, bear in mind as we smile over these things that they occurred in sixteenth century Germany, not in twentieth century America; and that in sixteenth century Germany marriage was in any event much more of a formal arrangement than it is with us. Such a serious affair was not left in the hands of young people, subject to their caprices, but it was looked upon as the duty of parents to provide proper marriages for their children and parents were prone themselves to look upon this duty as rather their right which could not be permitted to be infringed. In the general relaxation of old bonds which the Reformation brought with it, creating in men a new sense of freedom, which manifested itself here and there in lawlessness, these time-honored customs were endangered. Young people actually took the matter into their own hands and formed engagements—or entered into entanglements—for themselves without even asking their parents consent. In a university town like Wittenberg the evil was naturally particularly flagrant and there was grave danger that the newly acquired freedom would degenerate into license. Luther explains to the Elector John Frederick (letter of Jan. 23, 1544): "Many young people are here from many lands, so that the maidens have become very bold, and pursue the students into their rooms, offering them their love; and I hear some parents are ordering their sons home, declaring that we hang young women about their necks, depriving them of their sons." Of course, Luther would have none of this; and he opened a crusade against the validity of engagements of marriage entered into by young people for themselves. "I have proclaimed from the pulpit", he declares, "that a child cannot become engaged himself; and that if he do, it is no engagement, and a father must not acquiesce therein." "We must", he insisted, "adhere to the old paths, which from time immemorial have been inculcated in the Holy Scriptures, and among the heathen as well as among ourselves, viz., that parents shall dispose of their children without any previous engagement, which is an invention of the Pope, at the devil's instigation, to undermine the God-given authority of the parents, robbing them of their children to their deep grief, instead of said children honouring them according to God's command."

We may judge how widespread the tendency which Luther thus assaults was by the fact that not only had Duke Philip's son Ernest entered into such a "private engagement", but so had a son of Melancthon's, and indeed, says Luther, "something similar nearly happened in my house". And he was astonished to find that in his efforts to reëstablish "the old ways", it was "from those whom I

regarded as the truest friends of the Gospel that I have had the most opposition". It must not be supposed, however, that in his zeal in vindicating the parents' rights in arranging for the marriage of their children, Luther was disposed to treat the preferences of the young people as of no importance. In this controversy he was vindicating the rights of parents; he knew also how on proper occasions to impress on them their duties. Miss Currie prints a very pretty letter from Luther to a mother who was disposed, as he thought, to assert her authority unduly. "I have already written you", he writes, "concerning your son John, who has fallen in love with an excellent maiden, and I hoped for a favourable answer; but no attention having been paid to your son's request, I am constrained to write again, for I do not wish him to lose heart and sink into despair. But as he loves this girl so dearly, and she is quite his equal in station, besides being a gentle, quiet creature, I think you ought to be satisfied that he has shown such child-like obedience in humbling himself to ask your consent to the marriage as Samson did; and now do your part as a loving mother, by giving your consent thereto". And then he lays down both sides of the question: "For although we have written that children should not become engaged without their parents' consent, still parents should not hinder their children from marrying those they love. The son must not bring a daughter to his parents against their wish, but the father must not force a wife upon his son." Thus Luther holds the balance true—as was to be expected. What might have been unexpected is that we should get such a glimpse into the life of the young people in Wittenberg from Luther's letters. What a seething life was going on in that little university town in those days of new illumination; and how fully Luther was in it all!

The sturdy good-sense of Luther is in evidence on every page of these letters. As good an example as any is provided by his remarks on the tendency of people to criticise their ministers unduly. His tenet here is that the ministers are here not to please people but to give them the Gospel; and if they give men the Gospel, men should be satisfied with that. The people of Torgau wanted their pastors removed because, they said, their voices were too weak to fill the churches. Luther writes to Spalatin (Dec., 1554) to protest. It is an old song, he said; and people must not be permitted to change good pastors on such frivolous grounds: the only important question is, Do these pastors teach the Gospel faithfully? A few years later (July 9, 1537), he writes to Johann Schreiner: "Say to the nobility, which Spalatin refuses to do, that one cannot have the clergy exactly as they wish, and they should thank God for the pure Word, which they now hear out of one book, when they think of past times under the Pope, and the nonsense they had to listen to and pay dearly for. How can the nobles expect to procure Dr. Martins and Philips for such a beggarly service? If nothing short of St. Augustines and St. Ambrosiuses will satisfy them let them supply them themselves. When a pastor pleases the Lord Jesus and is faithful to Him, then a nobleman, who is certainly

of much less importance, ought also to be pleased with him." Obviously, with Luther the maxim rules that what is required of stewards is that they be found faithful. That being present, other things may be condoned.

In ordering the details of worship the same good sense rules. Obviously Luther's own preferences were for a simple, spiritual service: and he not infrequently announces fairly and squarely "the Puritan principle". Writing to Bartime von Sternberg (Sept. 1, 1523), for example, he exhorts him to intermit such things as masses for the dead, "primarily", he says, "because God did not institute the mass for the dead, but as a sacrament for the living, and it is a dreadful thing for man to presume, without God's permission, to turn a sacrament for the living into a sacrifice for the dead". And then he supports this by an explicit announcement of "the Puritan principle": "For a Christian must do nothing that God has not commanded, and there is no command for such masses and vigils, but it is solely their own invention"—that is, the invention of "the priests and monks". So again in a letter to Wolfgang Brauer (Dec. 30, 1536), he remarks as to the private administration of the sacraments that "it must not be lightly undertaken without special direction from God". Nevertheless, a few years afterwards (Nov. 26, 1539) he writes to Anton Lauterbach that, though for his own part he would wish these private communions to be done away with altogether, yet he only advises Lauterbach "till this matter is settled, do the best you can",—though letting it be thoroughly understood "that it will not continue". Here we have apparently Luther's principle of action. He was prepared to allow the largest liberty in things not commanded for the present distress. The chief thing was to get the Gospel preached in its purity: and when that could be got, meanwhile much of the old husk could be endured. The most striking expression of this is given in a lively letter to Buchholzer, who had complained to Luther of the half-way methods of reform insisted on in Brandenburg. Luther writes: "In regard to the things of which you complain, the cowl and surplice in the procession on feast days, and the walking round the churchyard on Sundays and at Easter, etc., etc., this is my advice: If your Lord, the Margrave and Elector, allows you to preach the Gospel of Christ purely, without man's additions, and permits the sacraments of baptism and the Lord's Supper according to Christ's appointment, and does not insist upon the worshipping of the saints as mediators and intercessors, and the carrying of the host in the procession, nor upon daily masses for the dead, nor holy water, nor responses and songs, Latin and German, in the processions, then in God's name go round with them, carrying a silver or gold cross, and cowl and surplice of velvet, silk, or linen. And if one of these be not enough, then put on three, as did Aaron, the High Priest, each one more beautiful than another, from which Church vestments in the Papacy are named Ornata. And if your Lord the Elector be not satisfied with one procession, then go round seven times, as Joshua went round Jericho with the children of Israel blowing trumpets, and if

your Lord has any desire let him go on in front, singing and dancing with harps and cymbals, drums and bells, as did David when they brought the Ark of the Lord up to Jerusalem." Here certainly "the Puritan principle" is not in evidence, but the principle that rules is that while we must do what God positively commands, yet what He does not command is "free"—though Luther adds that they do not propose to do these "free" things in Wittenberg.

If there seems to be a fine charity breathing through this attitude towards the adiaphora, this charity is certainly not extended to the Zwinglians. Luther's bitterness towards them almost passes belief, and its expression is almost the only thing which mars the geniality of these letters. "Blessed is the man", he exclaims, "who does not wander in the counsel of the Sacramentarians, nor standeth in the way of the Zwinglians, nor sitteth where the Zurich people sit" (p. 468). And a more truculent letter could scarcely be imagined than that he wrote (Aug. 31, 1543) to Froschauer the Zurich printer, who had sent him a present of a copy of the Zurich Bible. "I have received the present of the Bible", he wrote, "which you sent by your manager, and I thank you for it. But seeing it is the work of your preachers, with whom neither I nor the Church of God can have any communion, I am sorry their labor should be in vain. They have been sufficiently warned to quit their errors and not take the poor people to hell with them. But admonition is useless, therefore they must go their own way, but never again send me any of their work. I shall be no partaker of their damnation or damnable doctrines, but pray and teach against them to my end." Luther, certainly, was a good hater, as some of his letters to Roman Catholic persecutors with more propriety also testify.

But if he was a good hater he was an even better lover, and it is to this that these letters particularly bear witness. Here are letters of encouragement and consolation which still go to the heart, affectionate playful letters to his wife and children, and a true friend's letters to his friends. Very few of the letters here gathered are distinctly pastoral letters or deal directly with matters of personal religion; fewer still broach doctrinal questions. When either the one or the other is alluded to, however, it is with the hand of a master. Could a more consoling word be spoken to a burdened soul than this? "And even if your conscience tell you that you are in fault, you must not despair on that account. For it is a precious sign that God has so soon led you to repentance." Our very sense of guilt is thus made a sign of grace! And could any doctrinal exposition be clearer or more to the point than this on good works? "One single passage lights up the whole: an evil tree cannot bring forth good fruit. For as the fruit can never make a tree good, so works can never make a man pious. On the contrary, according to the tree, so of necessity the fruit; thus it is after the man is pious that good works follow, not that they make him good but that they prove that he is good. So what the Bible says concerning good works must be thus understood, that the man does

not become good thereby, but that they testify that he is good. Therefore at the last day, Christ will cite good works in proof that they who practiced them were pious."

We must not, however, multiply quotations. Enough has been said, we trust, to suggest the interest of the volume, and beyond that we need not go. Miss Currie is to be congratulated upon her success in putting so large a body of Luther's familiar letters into such easy and familiar English. There is an odd use of the phrase "in case" repeated occasionally which confuses the sense to those to whom it is (as to us) unfamiliar. Thus, p. 268: "I know of nothing to write about, so, in case of burdening you, do not write." Again, p. 430: "I let them do as they will, in case they look upon me as my own enemy." "In case" in these passages seems to be equivalent to "for fear".

Princeton.

B. B. WARFIELD.

SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.

RECHTFERTIGUNG UND WIEDERGEURT. Von E. CREMER; Pfarrer in Rehme i. W. *Beiträge zur Förderung christlicher Theologie. Elfter Jahrgang. Fünftes Heft.* 1907. Gütersloh. C. Bertelsmann. Pp. 163.

In this monograph E. Cremer defends the position which was held by H. Cremer in regard to Justification and Regeneration, against the later Lutheran theology, especially that of the Erlangen School as represented by Frank. Cremer's thesis is that Regeneration is simply Justification, and that the conception of Regeneration which regards it as an inward change in the sinner, produced by the Holy Spirit, is a departure from the doctrine of Luther, of the Apology, and of the New Testament writers. Regeneration, according to Cremer, means the translation of a sinner from a state of guilt and death into one of grace and life. This idea, Cremer affirms, was that of Luther and also of the Apology for the Augsburg Confession. The change to that conception of Regeneration which considers it as an inward renewal of the sinner by the Holy Spirit, and as distinct from Justification, begins in the Formula of Concord, and was carried out more clearly in the old Lutheran dogmatics. Cremer also maintains that the doctrine of Luther and of the Apology has the support of Paul and John, and, in fact, of all the New Testament writers. For example, in Titus iii. 5ff., Cremer affirms that Paul calls baptism a "bath of Regeneration" because it "mediates Justification", and so gives the sinner a completely new start in the Christian life. So also Romans vi. 3 ff., and Colossians ii. 11 ff., according to Cremer, afford no ground for the view that Regeneration is an inward spiritual change. The same thing is claimed to be true of the discourse of Jesus with Nicodemus, recorded in the third chapter of John's Gospel. Moreover, whenever Regeneration is referred to the Holy Spirit as its author, Cremer main-

tains that the meaning is that the judgment of God in Justification is made actual in the consciousness of the believer, *i. e.*, that the Holy Spirit produces in the believer a consciousness of justification.

Cremer's whole treatment of this subject is quite unconvincing. In fact, it is not only true that the idea of Regeneration underwent a development in the direction of a more precise statement; the doctrine of Justification also underwent a similar development, especially in Melancthon's controversy with Osiander, in which the objective and forensic character of Justification was more clearly set forth and separated from all subjective elements. Consequently the doctrine of Justification in the *Apology* is not satisfactorily stated, and so far is Cremer's position beyond doubt, that Loofs has asserted a precisely opposite view, *viz.*, that in the *Apology* the term Justification is not used in a forensic sense at all, and that instead of Regeneration being equivalent to Justification, Justification is just Regeneration, when this latter term is taken in its widest sense as denoting the entire change wrought in the sinner, including the whole of renewal. Cf. Loofs, *Die Bedeutung der Rechtfertigungslehre in der Apologie; Studien und Kritiken*, 1884; and Eichhorn maintains that while in the *Apology* the main element in Justification is the pardon of sin, it nevertheless includes the whole process of renewal or sanctification. Cf. Eichhorn, *Die Rechtfertigungslehre in der Apologie; Studien und Kritiken*, 1887.

Moreover, that the historical development of these doctrines was in the line of departure from the truth could only be maintained if Cremer's interpretation of the New Testament teaching is correct.

The exegetical basis with which Cremer supports his thesis is, however, extremely weak and unsatisfactory. He has given no adequate treatment of what Paul means by life in the Spirit as contrasted with life in the flesh, or by such expressions as ἀνακαίνωσις, καὶνὴ κτίσις, and ζωοποιεῖν. Some passages, as, for example, Romans vi. 3ff. and Colossians ii. 11ff., he treats regardless of the context, while in others, as, for example, the passage in Titus, he reads his own ideas into the context.

As an example of Cremer's exegetical method, his remarks on Titus iii. 5ff. may be taken as a fair example. He argues, correctly it seems to me, that by the word "bath" Paul here refers to baptism. He then affirms that the Apostle calls baptism "a bath of regeneration" because it "mediates justification". Cremer's main arguments in support of this view are from the meaning of the word παλιγγενεσία, and from the context. He points out that the word παλιγγενεσία occurs in the New Testament only in this place and in Matt. xix. 28, in which latter place it is used in an eschatological sense; that in extra-Biblical Greek it usually has an eschatological meaning and almost always denotes an external change. From this Cremer argues that the word cannot be here used to denote an inward change in the sinner. Hence he refuses to explain this more obscure phrase by the following clause: καὶ ἀνακαίνωσιν πνεύματος ἁγίου, which appears to be epexegetical of the former expression and the meaning of which in Paul's writings can be

determined with some accuracy. Instead of which, Cremer seeks to determine the meaning of the entire statement from the use of the term *παλιγενεσία* in extra-Biblical Greek. This is a precarious method especially when the fact is taken into consideration that in extra-Biblical Greek the word *παλιγενεσία* sometimes lost its eschatological sense and even its external sense, as, for example, in its use to denote the Pythagorean doctrine of the transmigration of souls. What could have been more natural, then, than for Paul to have chosen the word to express his idea of Regeneration, wishing to emphasize the fundamental and catastrophic character of this change in the sinner and the newness of the resulting life? In view of this it is far better to explain this word in this passage by the following word *ἀνααιρέω* which is connected with it by the word *καί* and appears to be exegetical of it. This interpretation is especially to be recommended since the meaning of the former phrase is somewhat obscure, whereas the meaning of the latter expression in Paul can be readily determined.

Furthermore, Cremer has read his view into the context. He says that the salvation here spoken of is one out of a condition of being under the "judicial consequences" of sin and God's "future wrath". But not one single word or hint of all this is to be found in the preceding context. On the contrary, it is the sinful characteristics of the sinner's life before the great change has taken place in him, which the preceding context mentions.

This will suffice to show the arbitrary character of Cremer's exegesis.

Moreover, the present writer agrees with Wendt, who, in criticising Cremer's book, says that he has missed the real problem, which is distinct from the question of the meaning of the term Regeneration. For even if it should be granted that the word Regeneration in the New Testament and in the writings of Luther had the meaning which Cremer claims that it has,—which Wendt by no means grants,—it must nevertheless be admitted that the inward renewal of the sinner is to be distinguished from his deliverance from condemnation. If this is so, then the question arises as to how the sinner obtains the power for the new life. Does it come from himself or is it due to the power and grace of God? How is the fact of the new life to be explained in harmony with the Lutheran doctrine of original sin? Cf. Wendt's criticism of Cremer in the *Theologische Literaturzeitung*, 1908, No. 24.

Such problems cannot be avoided. They are just the questions to which Cremer gives no adequate answer. His idea is that the power for the new life comes from the consciousness of the new relation to God given in the consciousness of Justification. But to such questions as to how the sinner gains the ability to exercise the faith which receives Justification, or how the consciousness of Justification obtains its renewing effect—whether by a merely immanent psychological effect or by the power of God—to these questions Cremer gives no answer. But whatever names be given to the renewal of the sinner in its various stages, it is a truth of Christianity which, as Wendt says, requires doctrinal statement from Christian dogmatics.

Princeton.

C. W. HODGE.

URSPRUNG UND VERWENDUNG DES RELIGIÖSEN ERFAHRUNGSBEGRIFFES IN DER THEOLOGIE DES 19. JAHRHUNDERTS. *Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der theologischen Erkenntnistheorie.* Von KARL WOLF, Pfarrer in Neuengeseke b. Soest. Gütersloh: C. Bertelsmann. 1906. Pp. 134.

The author of this monograph on Religious Experience, which, though published in 1906, has just come into our hands, seeks to trace the origin and development of the idea of religious and especially Christian experience in modern theology, in order to determine its value for Christian apologetics and dogmatics. The book appears to owe its origin, in part at least, to the impulse given the author by the writings on this subject by Köstlin, Petran, Bachmann, E. Cremer, Haack, H. Holtzmann, Schian, and Daxer's monograph on Frank.

Almost the entire book is devoted to a historical and critical discussion, and the author sums up his results and states his own views in the last twenty or thirty pages.

He discusses the idea of religious and of Christian experience as it appears in Schleiermacher, Hofmann, Plitt, Frank, and Dörner; closing the historical discussion with a review of the opinions of Köstlin in his two books, *Die Begründung unserer sittlich-religiösen Ueberzeugung*, 1893, and *Der Glaube*, 1895, and of Petran in his *Beiträge zur Verständigung über Begriff und Wesen der sittlich-religiösen Erfahrung*, 1898.

After the historical and critical discussion Wolf takes up the question as to the place and function of Christian experience in relation to the origin and ground of Christian belief, and its place in the theory of religious knowledge and the statement of Christian doctrine. As regards the former of these questions Wolf concludes that, although trust rather than assent is the essence of faith, nevertheless faith "presupposes and includes" a knowledge of God and of Christ which rests on a historical revelation, and that therefore Christian experience, though it plays an important part both in regard to the psychological genesis of faith and in regard to the grounds of belief, is nevertheless insufficient by itself to support faith, which must rest upon a historical basis.

In regard to the relation of Christian experience to theological knowledge and dogmatic theology, Wolf criticises adversely the attempt of the "experiential theology" to use Christian experience as a source and norm of truth in Christian theology, concluding, however, that Christian experience is necessary for the right understanding of Christian doctrine.

Princeton.

C. W. HODGE.

OUTLINES OF SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. DESIGNED FOR THE USE OF THEOLOGICAL STUDENTS. By AUGUSTUS HOPKINS STRONG, D.D., LL.D., President and Professor of Biblical Theology in the Rochester Theological Seminary. Philadelphia: The Griffith & Rowland Press. 1908. Pp. 274.

This Outline of Dr. Strong's Systematic Theology contains, as the author says, the substance of his larger work. It omits all the biblio-

graphical and illustrative material, confining itself to the statements of doctrine and main arguments. It contains, therefore, simply the matter in large print in the latest edition of Dr. Strong's Systematic Theology. This outline is designed by the author to serve as a text-book for the theological classroom. It is not necessary to state its contents, since Vols. I and II of the new edition of Dr. Strong's larger work were reviewed by the writer of this notice in THE PRINCETON THEOLOGICAL REVIEW for April, 1908.

Princeton.

C. W. HODGE.

THE CHRISTIAN METHOD OF ETHICS. By HENRY W. CLARK, Author of *The Philosophy of Christian Experience, Meanings and Methods of the Spiritual Life*, etc. 8vo., pp. 254. New York, Chicago, Toronto: Fleming H. Revell Company. London and Edinburgh. 1908.

Mr. Clark's last published work, *The Philosophy of Christian Experience*, was very favorably reviewed by Rev. Dr. Henry Collin Minton in our issue for October, 1907. Much of what he said then is so pertinent to this volume that we venture to quote it almost verbatim. "This book is a near approach to the remarkable." It is an original interpretation of the Christian's ethical development. "It holds itself rigidly to its specific theme. It is strictly a monograph in delightfully lucid English, with the clear expression which is the best proof of the clear conception. And there is no evidence of straining after effect." "The book is modest in its pretensions, reverent in its tone, and almost entirely destitute of the personal equation of the author; and it gives every evidence of devout and sincere evangelical intention. Its style raises the presumption that it was written, not for the theologian, but for the average thoughtful man who takes the twentieth century layman's view of religion generally. The theologian can find flaws that the man for whom the book was written would never dream of. The book does not say everything; indeed, it leaves unsaid some things we believe it would have been the better for saying: but if it had tried to say everything that is true, it would certainly have failed, and it would pretty certainly have said less clearly and effectively what it does say." A very brief resumé of the argument of this discussion would be something of this sort: "Man attains the spiritually ideal life by possessing within himself no thought, no feeling, no impulse, which is not born moment by moment straight from God." If this ideal were reached, there would result "an automatic right adjustment to every circumstance, an instinctive right bearing toward every question of duty and every temptation to wrong." "The moralist would be lost in and would be rendered superfluous by the saint." Ethical completeness would be demanded and would follow because it is necessary to the development of the new and divine life. As, however, the ethical ideal is never fully attained in this life, "the Christian man always retains something of his ethical affairs in his own hands". Hence, he has to

ask how in any given case "the remnant of self-activity is to be ruled". "The primary answer, of course, is that he must act as the divine life within him would act if it had all its rights. The Christian, in so far as he judges ethical questions, judges them rightly by remembering that he ought not to judge. Properly speaking, ethical questions are to be solved by permitting the divine personality, with which the Christian seeks perfect union, to attack them, rather than by any attack of his own; yet too large a margin of his own personality, so to say, remains outside the surrender at present accomplished, for this to be a true account of what is done. Obviously, therefore, that part of the Christian's own activity which remains working on its own account comes most nearly into line with the general ideal by regulating itself according to what the divine life would do (so far as this is ascertainable) if it had things to itself. The *idea* of spiritual development must be called in after all, since the spiritual development itself has not absorbed all regulative and directive power." But "it must be remembered all through that the *idea* of the divine life is capable of exercising a right regulative power only when the *fact* of it is at any rate in measure a real and present thing. The Christian man has to remember that, according to the proper ordering of things, the divine life in him is to manifest itself through, dictate to, and feed itself upon, the activities of every hour; and in his own ordering of things, so far as any remain to him, *he must act as if this, and only this, were being done*. It is as a question of spiritual biology that every ethical question will come before his mind." Hence, it is from this biological and spiritual standpoint that we should study all ethical questions, such, for example, as "Conscience", "Christian Distinctiveness", "the Christian's Relation to the World", "the Christian's Relation to His Fellowmen", "the Christian Discipline"; and if we do so, we shall take for our all inclusive rule the following: "At every emergence of crisis, the Christian must call up the living presence of the living Christ, and submit himself to its spell."

As already implied, this ethical interpretation merits high praise. A bare enumeration even of all its excellent features would be impossible within the narrow limits at our command. Perhaps, the more outstanding ones are these:

1. The insistence on the essentially religious nature of the ethical life. Morality is not what it ought to be until it is absorbed in and transmuted into religion. God must keep, and only God can keep, his own law. Hence, we cannot be truly moral save by outgrowing mere morality. To do and to be what we ought, it must be 'no more we who live, but Christ who lives in us'. This cannot be emphasized too strongly. It is both that which distinguishes Christian ethics from every other and that which gives to it its unique power.

2. The demand for faith in a Christ who *is* rather than in a Christ who *was*. It is the *living presence* of the *living Christ* that the Christian is to call up and to whom he is to submit himself for guidance and for inspiration. It is the actually indwelling Spirit of the glorified

Christ in whom he is to live and to whom he is to look for the disposition and the wisdom and the power with which to keep the law. In this we have not merely a unique distinction of Christianity, but one quite commonly unrealized. How many put their faith in the crucified Christ only to forget that he is now on the throne. Hence, the narrowness and the ineffectiveness of not a little of the Christianity of our day. "To inherit the earth" we must realize that we are "the children of the King".

3. The author's analysis and interpretation of conscience if qualified as we shall see later on. His conception of it is unusual, if not peculiar to himself. He does not regard it as personality functioning in the sphere of morals. He conceives of it much more narrowly and so much more definitely. "Conscience is the voice within everlastingly reminding man that right is the one thing to be exalted above all else; it is not a voice explaining to man what right is." "Conscience simply declares that what is judged to be right must at all costs be done." This conception guards the infallibility of conscience while admitting the diversity of moral judgments. Conscience as such does not pass any judgment as to what is right. This is left to the intellect of the individual to determine; and in so far as the individual is in the ideal ethical condition, it is left by him to the indwelling Sovereign and Life of his life, the Spirit of Christ. Nor is this to make what right is a subjective matter. It is to prevent subjectivism. In theory, at least, it is to bind one to the most objective of all standards, even the will of him whose nature is the ultimate ground and norm of right.

4. The doctrine that union with God is the only adequate foundation for love to man. The brotherhood of men cannot be realized in any true sense except through and because of obedience to God. We can really be brothers to our fellows only as we imitate our Elder Brother. His relation to God must be our relation to God; and his relation is summed up in three words, he was "*obedient unto death*". In so far as we develop his life such must be our life among men, and it was to develop his life in ourselves and then in them that we were brought into association with men. "One of the lessons the world most greatly needs to learn is that we shall not keep our relations true with man unless the stress of the whole thing falls, not upon this relation, but upon the relation with the life of God.

Here we might pause; and if Mr. Clark's book were an ordinary one, here, after pointing out its chief merits, we ought to pause: but it is so far from being an ordinary book that we must go further; it is so good that we must indicate, and thus do our best to eliminate, its defects. Though these arise altogether from the popular style and aim of the writer, that seems to us to be *the* reason why they should be noted. It is just because the water supplied to a community is so pure and so refreshing that they cannot suspect the presence of impurities that these, if there are any, ought to be made known.

We would, therefore, call attention:

1. To the author's conception of God's part in the ideal ethical life.

This would seem to be to supplant, and even to do away with, our activity, yes, with our personality. The true Christian "possesses within himself no thought, no feeling, no living impulse, which is not born moment by moment straight from God" (p. 56). These words, if taken in their obvious meaning, deny causation and even activity to the Christian. The doctrine is not that of Gal. ii. 20, where the Apostle after asserting the supremacy of the divine life in him, is at pains to affirm the persistence of his own life. It is rather the "exercise scheme" of Emmons; it is not unlike Edward's theory of continuous creation: and the objection to both of these is that they squint toward pantheism and so tend to weaken moral responsibility. Nothing is more true and more precious than that Christ, in the deepest sense, is the life of the Christian; but he is so by developing, not by supplanting or even suppressing, his personality. Our thoughts, feelings, and impulses are all the more our own because 'the grace of Christ is sufficient for us' and 'his strength is made perfect in our weakness'. Our acts are all the more ours because the power in them is wholly his. We ourselves will all the more really for the reason that it is Christ who makes us willing and who alone could do so. In a word, He lives in us by disposing and enabling us ourselves truly to live.

2. This being so, it can scarcely be said that the "Christian, in so far as he judges ethical questions, judges them rightly by remembering that he ought not to judge" (p. 131). On the contrary, he has been made a Christian that he may judge rightly. It is thus that he must live, and it is only thus that he can live, his own new and true ethical life. The mind of Christ on moral questions is not to become his mind through any abdication on his part of his rights as a person; it is to express itself in his full and perfect exercise of his right and duty to think and to judge. 'The moralist is not to be absorbed in the saint', but the saint is to unfold himself in the development of the moralist. Mr. Clark, instead of realizing the ideal of Christian ethics, would do away with it. It is true, as Augustine said, that, if we loved God as we ought, we might do as we inclined: but then no one does love God as he ought; and if one did, the fact would be, not that inclination had superseded judgment, but that inclination had become one with judgment.

3. In view of all this, "the inclusive rule for the Christian's conduct" is at least open to criticism. "At each emergence of crisis, the Christian must call up the living presence of the living Christ, and submit himself to its spell" (p. 241)—what does this mean? If it means, as the author says, that 'Christ unites Himself with men, heart with heart, thought with thought, will with will, soul with soul, *life with life*, till his personality folds itself close round theirs, substitutes itself for theirs' (p. 253); then we are in the grasp of mysticism, as even Mr. Clark is almost ready to admit. Indeed, he goes on to defend his scheme on the ground that such "mysticism" is vital both to the Christian religion and to Christian morality. We can not think so. As already remarked, Christ lives in us, to develop and perfect our own personality, not to

substitute his will for ours. Moreover, he has revealed his will for us infallibly in the Bible. To this fact, in so far as we can remember, our author makes no reference. Of course, his "all inclusive rule" might mean that at each crisis the Christian was to "call up the living presence of the living Christ" to show to him the Bible's application to the case in hand. This, however, would involve the exercise of judgment on the part of the Christian, and yet this is the very thing which he is bound to outgrow. On the whole, it looks to us as if the outcome of our author's scheme were to exalt the consciousness of the Christian above the written Word: and this we must regard as both unreasonable and dangerous; for it is only by the Word that we can discriminate and justify the Christian consciousness.

4. Mr. Clark's conception of conscience also, while, as remarked, definite and, if understood, convenient, is too narrow and so misleading. There is a material as well as a formal element in the judgment of conscience; or if the function of conscience be purely formal, to emphasize that the right ought to be done rather than to tell us what is right, then another moral faculty must be called in to account for the material element. For there is such an element. The law has been written on the heart, on the heart of man as man; and it may still be discerned there, very obscurely and imperfectly, it must be allowed, but yet as really as on the renewed heart. Evidently man was created to read for himself in his own nature the will of God. That was to be his ideal condition. That condition was not to consist in having Christ do the reading for him. Christ promised his spirit to give us spiritual discernment, not to make it unnecessary.

5. Finally, it is at least unfortunate that, so far as we can discover, there is not one reference in the whole discussion to our Lord's satisfaction for our sins. In this fact above all else the dynamic of Christ resides. It is because of His death for our guilt and in our stead that we should and can 'present even our bodies living sacrifices unto God'. Surely, then, the relation of the cross to the Christian life ought to have been more than implied. It ought to have been distinctly affirmed and strongly emphasized. "Christ crucified" is the ground, the norm, and the inspiration of the righteousness which is through Him.

Princeton.

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

THE AXIOMS OF RELIGION. A New Interpretation of the Baptist Faith.
By E. Y. MULLINS, D.D., LL.D. Philadelphia: American Baptist
Publication Society. 1908. Pp. 316.

This book, as the preface explains, grew out of addresses delivered, in 1905, before the American Baptist Publication Society, in St. Louis, Mo., and the Baptist World Congress, in London, England; in 1906, before Richmond College; and in 1907, before the Baptist Convention of North America, at Jamestown, Va. The aim in writing is to state "in a constructive and irenic spirit" the Baptist position, in order that the world may "understand us better".

According to Dr. Mullins, "Denominationalism has been, since the Reformation, the characteristic expression of Christianity on its ecclesiastical side". The test by which denominations are to be tried is twofold: Conformity to Scripture teaching and adaptation to ever-changing and enlarging tasks. These tests Dr. Mullins applies to the Baptists in order to show their superiority to all other denominations in that they are not as other men are: contradictory, inconsistent and unfaithful to the precepts of the New Testament.

The scriptural test is worked out and applied in a thoroughly novel manner. The fundamental Baptist principle is declared to be "the competency of the soul in religion under God", which is explained to mean that since man is made in God's image, and that God is a person able to reveal Himself to man, the individual soul is competent to deal directly with God. This fundamental principle, however, blossoms under Dr. Mullins' fostering care into six "Axioms of Religion", as he calls them, owing to their self-evident character. These are 1. The theological axiom: The holy and loving God has a right to be sovereign. 2. The religious axiom: all souls have an equal right to direct access to God. 3. The ecclesiastical axiom: all believers have a right to equal privileges in the Church. 4. The moral axiom: to be responsible man must be free. 5. The religio-civic axiom: a free Church in a free State. 6. The social axiom: love your neighbor as yourself. Dr. Mullins then proceeds to point out that all non-Baptist belief and practice violates these axioms. Thus Infant Baptism violates axiom 2, since it proceeds on the assumption that some souls, *i. e.*, infant souls, have a right to *indirect* access to God (*scil.* through the faith of their parents). It also violates axiom 4, since "to baptize a child in infancy is to treat it not as a free moral personality, but as a thing".

Turning from the scriptural test, applied *more geometrico*, to the practical test, we are naturally interested in these days, when the air is full of the subject, in knowing what Dr. Mullins has to say about church union. He does for the Baptists, what each member of the other denominations does for his: explains the peculiarly favorable position they occupy in this regard. It is this: Baptists accept simply the teaching of the New Testament, nothing more and nothing less. All other denominations have added to or subtracted from this teaching. It is generally agreed that church union is possible only on the basis of the New Testament. Hence, to unite, the denominations must take up what they have laid aside of the New Testament teaching and remove what they have added to it. When this is done they will find themselves Baptists! It is for this reason, in Dr. Mullins' opinion, that the Baptist who believes shall not make haste to unite with those who are not Baptists.

Lincoln University, Pa.

GEORGE JOHNSON.

GENERAL LITERATURE.

AN ALPHABETICAL SUBJECT INDEX AND INDEX ENCYCLOPAEDIA TO PERIODICAL ARTICLES ON RELIGION. 1890-1899. Compiled and edited by ERNEST CUSHING RICHARDSON. With the coöperation of Charles S. Thayer, William C. Hawks, Paul Martin, and others. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 8vo., pp. xlii + 1168. Price, \$10 net.

This large volume of more than twelve hundred pages is the fruit of the deliberate conclusion of the Coöperation Committee of the American Library Association, that such a work was most desirable, and of the discovery by the chairman of that Committee that nobody was at all likely to undertake it, unless he did. So he did it, it is needless to say, without financial recompense. Indeed, it may be assumed, with considerable personal outlay. He will be repaid by the usefulness of the work to those who use it. Its plan is simple, and is the best plan,—a subject dictionary index, with the authors and anonymous titles arranged alphabetically under each subject. And the subject includes not only articles which discuss it, but also reviews of books treating of it, as well as references to standard theological encyclopaedias and dictionaries, and the proceedings and reports of learned societies in this country and Europe. Thus it will be seen that the term, periodical literature, has been given a wide, a necessarily wide, scope. This increases the value of the list. In several respects it modernizes Poole's method. By giving the number of pages of an article, it helps the investigator to determine whether he will find it worth while to look up a given reference or not, and all who have made much use of such lists will appreciate the further help afforded by giving the date as well as the volume of the periodical referred to. The Index contains references to about 60,000 periodical articles from more than 1,500 periodicals, together with a brief definition encyclopaedia of some 15,000 subjects. This will sufficiently indicate the vast amount of labor expended upon this book. To illustrate the amount of material brought to the attention of the student of a particular subject, it may be stated that there are 108 references to "Pentateuch", almost all of which treat of its authorship. The general accuracy of the work has been secured by the verification of nearly all of the articles from the periodicals themselves. In so far as the reviewer has tested this accuracy it has been absolute. The periodicals referred to are in all of the more important languages of Europe, except Russian, which exception will not affect the most of us. The subjects cover a wide range, including many matters outside of the sphere of theology, but closely related to it. Some will think that some of the minor articles might have been omitted, but if the compiler was willing to do the extra work, some investigator is likely to thank him for it. The book is indispensable to every theological library and will prove of great value to every large library. The gratitude of all students of religion, in its broad sense, and the double thanks of every librarian, are due Dr. Richardson. He has supplemented and improved Poole, for the period traversed, where Poole was weakest.

Princeton.

J. H. DULLES.

Free Public Library, Newark, N. J.

VOLUME VII

JULY, 1909

NUMBER 3

The Princeton Theological Review

CONTENTS

John Calvin—The Man	369
JOHN DEWITT	
Calvin's Doctrine of God	381
BENJAMIN B. WARFIELD	
Calvin and Common Grace	437
HERMAN BAVINCK	
Reviews of Recent Literature	466

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LIST OF BOOKS REVIEWED

Adam, <i>The Religious Teachers of Greece</i>	471
Auburn Theological Seminary, Addresses by the Faculty of. <i>What Shall I Believe?</i>	524
Ayres, <i>Jesus Christ our Lord, an English Bibliography of Christology</i>	470
Bobertag, <i>Isaak August Dörner</i>	513
Campbell, <i>Paul the Mystic</i>	497
Carrick, <i>Wycliffe and the Lollards</i>	513
Carus, <i>The Philosopher's Martyrdom</i>	467
Curry, <i>Vocal and Literary Interpretation of the Bible</i>	524
Dulles, <i>The True Church</i>	517
Faunce, <i>The Educational Ideal in the Ministry</i>	522
Forsyth, <i>Positive Teaching and the Modern Mind</i>	519
Gregory, <i>Canon and Text of the New Testament</i>	477
Herrmann, <i>Offenbarung und Wunder</i>	515
Jackson, <i>The New Schaff-Herzog Encyclopaedia of Religious Knowledge</i>	467
Krüger, <i>Das Papsttum, Seine Idee und ihre Träger</i>	512
Lectures delivered before the Glasgow University Society of St. Ninian. <i>Religion and the Modern Mind</i>	473
Lüttke, <i>Das heilige Land im Spiegel der Weltgeschichte</i>	510
McLeod, <i>A Comfortable Faith</i>	524
Meinertz, <i>Jesus und die Heidenmission</i>	493
Misch, <i>Geschichte der Autobiographie</i>	500
Mott, <i>The Future Leadership of the Church</i>	521
Oesterley and Box, <i>The Religion and Worship of the Synagogue</i> ..	498
Periodical Literature	525
<i>Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, New Series, Vol. VIII</i>	466
Robertson, <i>A Short Grammar of the Greek New Testament</i>	491
Sérol, <i>Le Besoin et le Religieux</i>	475
Thomas, <i>A Devotional Commentary. Gen. xxv. 11-xxxvii. 8</i>	476
Thomas, <i>A Devotional Commentary. Gen. xxxvii. 1-11</i>	477

THE PRINCETON THEOLOGICAL REVIEW

VOLUME VII

JULY 1909

NUMBER 3

JOHN CALVIN—THE MAN.*

One could scarcely have assigned to him a task more difficult than that of selecting, out of a crowded and influential life, the most salient acts and events for narrative; choosing, out of the congeries of traits which constitute the character of a great man, those of the first importance for portrayal; so combining them in presentation that those who hear will carry with them at least an impression of a great historical figure; and doing all this within the limits of a manuscript which will employ for its delivery not more than thirty minutes of terrestrial time. Yet this is the duty which those responsible for this celebration have devolved on their first speaker.

But who, if he were offered the opportunity, would not seize it with avidity, to do honor to the memory of one to whom our civilization, in all its highest interests of civil government, education, morality and religion, owes a debt so incalculable as it does to John Calvin? And it is therefore with great joy and with a lively sense of the honor that is mine in being permitted to speak of him, even under these difficult conditions, that I rise only to refresh your memory concerning his career and character and the elements of his greatness.

He was born at Noyon, in Picardy, in northeastern France, on July 10, 1509. His father was apostolic notary

*One of three brief addresses delivered at the Calvin Celebration, Princeton Theological Seminary, May 4, 1909.

and procurator fiscal in the city. He was a man of influence in the local ecclesiastical and political governments, and he entertained distinct social ambitions for his family. John was therefore educated from early youth with the sons of a noble family. To defray the cost he was granted the proceeds of a small benefice; and that he might enjoy these, he received the tonsure, and was devoted to the priesthood. Zealous in study, quick in acquisition and serious in character, he made rapid progress in acquiring and in comprehending knowledge. Abundant promise of great intellectual ability was given before he was twelve years old; and he was soon after sent to Paris to continue his studies. There, in two colleges—one after the other—he worked with strained attention every day until midnight; and when he awoke in the morning his mind recalled, reviewed and clarified the study of the preceding day. Ambition to know and loyalty to his ethical ideals, were his dominant traits at this period; so distinctly indeed, that his fellow students called him the Accusative; though there is no story that his scrupulosity dealt more severely with any other object than himself.

His father's offices touched the Church on the one hand and the civil law on the other; and his increasing ambition for his brilliant son seems to have vibrated between an ecclesiastical and a legal career for him. Just at this time, the law seemed to the prudent parent to offer the son the greater rewards; and so, at his father's instance, John went first to Orleans, where, under Stella, and afterwards to Bourges, where, under Alciati, both great civilians, he pursued the study of the civil law; and with such thoroughness and sureness of grasp, that in the absence of his professors, he from time to time became the lecturer; and this before he had reached his majority.

Up to this time the trait that dominated all his other traits and unified his life was the ambition to know. To this ambition he sacrificed his health, and sowed the seeds of that multiplicity of physical ailments which grew with his

years; and these, though they never mastered his will while living, cut him off before his time, and deprived the Church and State and us of the serene wisdom of a great man's old age.

But ambition for knowledge as his dominating trait was soon displaced by one infinitely higher. This was zeal for the revealed truth. It was not that his ambition for knowledge was ever destroyed or diminished. But knowledge thereafter was sought to confirm and illustrate the ultimate truth, which he now believed and never after doubted had been revealed to him. This vision of the ultimate truth came to him partly through conversations with his kinsman Olivetan, concerning the Reformation in religion in Germany, and especially through his study of classical Greek and, above all, the Greek New Testament under Melchior Wolmar, the humanist. I think this is the point of time to which we must assign what he afterwards speaks of as his *subita conversio*, though we cannot be sure of it. For from this time on, a new principle of action governed his life. The desire to know was subordinated and made instrumental to the truth already known, whose devoted bond-slave he continued until his death. John Calvin's later work, abundant and influential as it was, was not done under the dominion of that feverish search for unattainable truth the impulse to which Lessing esteems the greatest gift of God. Firm in the newly created conviction that the truth of God for man was revealed in Holy Scripture, his labors became far more abundant and far more fruitful than they ever would have been had mere ambition for knowledge continued the regnant motive of his life.

So we find him, under this new impulse, turning from the law and from the new letters to the Biblical and theological studies in which he became so great. He did, indeed, give to the world a single volume, an edition of Seneca's *De Clementia*, as the fruit of his humanism, and justified by its publication the high hopes and prophecies of those who had watched with eagerness the unfolding of his powers. But

this was all. Henceforth, he gave all he was and all he had of talent and attainment to divine things as the ultimate truth, and in particular to that Queen of the sciences—Theological science—which he believed to be what a little later Francis Bacon called it, “the Sabbath and Port of all men’s labors and perigrinations.”

And now his life becomes so crowded that I cannot even mention all of its greater activities. The death of his father gave the loyal son liberty of action. He went to Paris. He threw himself heart and soul into the cause of theological and ecclesiastical reform. He held conferences; in which he preached sermons which always ended with the triumphant cry, “If God be for us, who can be against us”. He was enough of a man of the people to sympathize with the humble who had imbibed new hope from the watchwords of the Reformation, and his culture and social affinities made him at home with men of large learning and great affairs. He called himself “pusillanimous by nature,” but no other man who knew him ever suspected it. So now, he not only held conferences, but wrote for the rector of the Sorbonne an address on Justification by faith alone. Calvin was suspected as the author, and was obliged to fly from Paris. He was welcomed at the court of Margaret, the sister of the King, and was strengthened in soul by conferences with the aged Lefèvre. His deep interest in the already hounded and persecuted adherents of the Reform, led him back to Paris. But again he was obliged to leave it by stealth if he were to do anything more for the cause he held so dear. He fled, and, after painful adventures, reached the city of Strassburg—and soon afterwards Basel. Here he renewed his quiet studies in Greek and Hebrew, in the companionship of kindred spirits like Grynæus and Capito. He was received as a man of eminent learning, and his life only deepened the respect felt for his character and attainments, and extended his reputation and influence.

He was only twenty-six. But his faculties were already so disciplined and cultivated, and his judgment so mature, that

he was easily able to give to the world a work which at once lifted him into eminence throughout Europe; and which more than any other single work of his is the basis of his continuing influence and fame. A slander led to its composition and publication. The government of Francis I wanted an alliance with the Protestant Princes of Germany against his life-long rival, the Emperor Charles V. Of course, as Protestants, they wished to know why he was persecuting their Protestant brethren in his kingdom; and in substance, the reply of the representatives of the French King was that the Protestants of France were wild, anarchistic sectaries like the Anabaptists whom the Protestant Princes themselves were denouncing and punishing. This was the opportunity of Calvin. It appeared in his consciousness not however as opportunity but as the call to duty. "Silence", said he, "would now be treason." And he wrote "*The Institutes of the Christian Religion*", and that great Preface addressed to the King of France,—at once an appeal, a defence, and a challenge—which all, who read it in the light of the events which called it forth, agree has rarely been equalled and never excelled in its eloquence. Greater by far than the preface was the *Institutes* itself. For it organized into a unity, which all who then read it recognized as vital, the ideas of the Reformation, and gave to the movement an intellectual standing of which the Evangelical party at once became conscious, and which awakened the respect and increased the fears of the Roman theologians. It was not precisely the large treatise which we now know by the name of Calvin's *Institutes*. That is the edition of 1559. The edition of 1536 was by comparison a small book. But the conception of Christian doctrine and its organization are the same in both editions, as they are in all the seven published during his life.

The publication of this great work, and the vast increase of influence it brought him led him to believe that his career ought to be that of the scholar laboring in his study and with his pen. Of his great gifts as an ecclesiastic and states-

man he does not at this time appear to have been at all conscious. But he was soon to be introduced to work, that called into activity all the talents with which God had endowed him.

Journeying in 1536 to Strassburg from Ferrara, where he had been the guest of the Duchess Renée, daughter of Louis XII of France, he was compelled to pass through Geneva, where William Farel had organized the Reformed Church. Farel urged him to remain. Calvin, no doubt, longing for the quiet life of the scholar, was at first unwilling to do so. But his unwillingness was overcome, partly by the solemn appeal of Farel and partly by the urgent call of the people. He thus became one of the pastors of Geneva; and entered on that great and complex career during which he became the most influential Protestant in all Europe.

Geneva had lately won its independence from the Duke of Savoy, and had accepted the Reformation. But its social life had been disorganized by both the conflict and its victory, and its new won liberty was degenerating into what we have a right to call license. The party of moral order was in the minority. The Libertines were, if not in power, at least in the majority. If evangelical religion were not to be destroyed in the house of its friends, the Church and State of Geneva—for Church and State as in mediæval society were one—must organize a discipline which would secure the high individual and social life which the Reformation of religion implied. To this much needed work Calvin, with Farel and Viret as coadjutors, gave himself. It is the great work of the first stage of his Geneva life. It was not his only work by any means. His teaching, his preaching, his voluminous correspondence, and his controversies—with the Anabaptists on the nature of the Church, with theologians on the nature of the Real Presence, and with Caroli who accused him of Arianism—were themselves more than enough to engage all the powers of two or three men of ability. But, after all, it was, as I have said, the preservation of the Genevan State from renewed subjection to Savoy

and of the Genevan Church from disintegration that was at this time his greatest and most difficult work. To this period belong the Catechism, the Confession of Faith and the Articles of Discipline.

All this was too much for the pleasure-loving Genevans. Two years after Calvin had been called with enthusiasm, he became the most unpopular man in the little republic. The Libertine party won in the elections of 1538; and the grave and earnest pastors protested against their measures. It was hardly necessary to banish them; for Farel and Calvin must have felt that, in the state of Genevan opinion then existing, they had no function to fulfil. But they were banished; and Calvin went to Strassburg, where he was welcomed by Bucer, and where he became the pastor of the church of the French Refugees, lectured on theology and published his commentary on the Epistle to the Romans. The churches of Strassburg and its people rejoiced in his presence in the city. They made him a citizen. His own sympathies with other Protestants than the Reformed were deepened. He became, as he was well qualified to become, a mediator between the Protestant parties. He also became at this time the intimate friend and correspondent of Melancthon; and he represented the Protestants in the Conferences of Bonn and Frankfort and Ratisbon. The exile to Strassburg both broadened Calvin himself and widened his influence.

Meanwhile the Genevans were repenting. The absence of Calvin, and the high value placed on him by others taught them the greatness of the gift they had spurned. The disorders in their city increased. As the only remedy, Cardinal Sadolet in a letter of great skill and beauty invited their return to the bosom of the Catholic Church. To this letter Calvin from Strassburg replied in a paper which in literary form and in the noble and gentle spirit which pervaded it is surpassed by nothing he has written. The Genevans begged his return against Strassburg's affectionate protests; and Calvin was divided. Inclination would have held him

where he was. But duty, he believed, called him back to the turbulent and endangered city on Lake Lemman. He went back on his own terms, with more freedom than ever before, to exert an influence far more commanding in Church and State. Thus, from 1541 to his death in 1564, Geneva continued his home, in a high and peculiar sense his own city, though it was only a few years before his death that he became a citizen.

It would require not a few moments but a course of lectures to describe the abundant and various labors of this, the most fruitful period of his life, and to show their importance. I will only say, that in the most of them he was breaking paths for us to walk in. He organized anew the visible Church for us to find a home in. He founded the College which became the inspiration and the model of the Protestant colleges of a new continent. He opened anew the Scriptures, and became, as Farrar has said, the father of modern Exegesis. He unfolded the great principles which underlie and support government by the people, and guarantee their civil freedom. Above all, he re-discovered, expounded and organized into a great self-consistent system the truths of revelation for the Reformed Church of God.

All this he embodied in literary products the most various; each consummate in its form, and in its matter so important, and in its spirit so vital, as to be living and influential to-day. Academic lectures, elaborate treatises, commentaries on all the books of the New Testament, except the Apocalypse, and on many of the Old Testament, correspondence with ministers of the Churches and great ministers of state, and brilliant polemic discussions; these, with his earlier writings, make a collection, in the English edition of his works, of more than fifty octavo volumes. It is not too much to say, that no contemporary of his had a circle of readers so wide; and that none had readers so eager, whether they were allies or disciples or opponents.

In these writings he has discussed almost every great subject touching the Church's doctrine, discipline or cultus;

the Christian rule of faith; the Christian life of worship and of duty; practical ethics; and the moral and religious relations of civil government and human society. To the discussion of every one of these subjects, he brought large learning, a critical judgment which seldom failed to separate the essential from the merely circumstantial, a breadth of intellectual sympathy which always secured for it fairness and largeness of treatment, and, above all, a single-eyed and passionate devotion to the great vision of the truth of God by which in his earlier life he had been converted and transformed.

So large and so varied is this literary product—varied, I mean, both in form and in matter—that it would not have been strange if in some of it he had fallen below himself; if some discussion, some letter, some sermon indicated that when he wrote it the forces of his mind were wearied or distracted. But if there is such a document, I have never heard of it. All of his powers and attainments seem always to have been at his disposal for the purpose immediately in hand. It can be truthfully said of him, that the whole of the man is in every one of his literary products. This is a wonderful statement to make; but it becomes more wonderful, when I add to it, that his was not only the frailest of bodies, but a body unusually sensitive to pain, and most often in a state of acute suffering. We read without surprise that he did not live to reach the age of fifty-five. We only wonder how he could have lived so long. He is the illustration by eminence of Pascal's thinking reed.

Calvin's intellectual endowment was as imperial in quality, strength and variety of talent as that of any man of the great age in which he lived. It has been said that Luther had genius and Calvin talents. But what this means I do not know. Every great man has distinctive traits of intellect and temperament; and these give character to his outlook on life, to the work of life he chooses as his mission, and to its changes in detail as these are determined by the crises which confront him. Certainly, we have the right to

say that no man in his century did larger work than he did, or did what he did with more ability, or was more nearly equal to every exigency, or was called suddenly to meet exigencies more critical. The mind of no contemporary moved more easily over a wide area of knowledge and thought, or seized with surer eye the great subjects it embraced.

It is hard, without seeming exaggeration, to speak of his special gifts of intellect: his quick perception of truth, his great power of acquisition, his capacious memory which held and retained large stores of knowledge, his ease of recollection which called out what was needed for immediate use, his faculty of large discourse, that is to say, the faculty of marshalling the elements of his knowledge in due order, relating them to principle and combining them in a system—the great gift in virtue of which he is the greatest of modern theologians—and his sympathetic insight into other minds and his power of interpreting them, in virtue of which he is the founder of modern Biblical Exegesis.

The literary critics seem to agree with each other in the opinion that the surest and most characteristic mark of a writer's genius is that made by it on his literary expression. And there is, no doubt, profound truth in the dictum, that the man is in his style or that "the style is the man." But whose gifts of expression in that age surpassed—I had almost asked equalled—those of Calvin? I am repeating the judgments of those competent to speak when I say, that it was not Erasmus, the man of letters, or Melancthon, the preceptor of Germany, but John Calvin who came nearest to reviving in his own writings the Latin of the Augustan age; and that, when he wrote in the French of his own day, he newly and permanently and notably endowed the language with traits of nobility and precision. And then—to speak of his style in the more special meaning of that term—one has to admit that, though the reappearance of a writer's personality in his style is easily recognized, style is really indescribable in words. This is especially true of a style

which appears in such a variety of prose forms, and is so flexible to every use as the style of Calvin. One can only name its outstanding features. One can say of him as Matthew Arnold said of John Milton the poet, that he writes in "the great style," that his style is deeply serious, and is weighty with matter. The phrase which seems to me best to describe the style of Calvin is that employed by Mr. Gladstone to describe the style of Lord Macaulay. "It is paramount", says Mr. Gladstone, "in the union of ease of movement with perspicuity of matter, and of both with real splendour, and of all with immense rapidity and striking force." In employing this felicitous phrase to describe the style of Calvin, one should change the word splendor into the word grandeur; not only because of the difference between the underlying subjects which engaged Calvin's and Macaulay's minds, but also because Macaulay's splendor at times is flaunting, and this real grandeur can never be. And one should add the caution that while the suspicion is excited that Macaulay's splendor is sometimes forced or artificial, and his lustre, as has been said, is "metallic", Calvin's grandeur of style is organic; it is his sincere expression; the form and action, the force and glow and warmth which reveal and certify the living author.

Of his active, practical genius, which embodied itself in great institutions, like the Reformed Church and the Reformed Republic and the New Academy of Geneva, I can only stop to say that it sometimes appears even greater than the genius reflected in his writings. Nor may I speak of those more personal qualities, like fidelity, and constancy and self-forgetfulness in friendship, and affectionate devotion as brother, husband and father, except to say that if, as Mr. Royce tells us, loyalty is the best word to express the highest and most inclusive social and moral virtue, there never lived a soul more loyal than John Calvin.

And now to close. There is a phrase which both explains and sums up John Calvin the man. The phrase is not mine. It is the phrase of a great man of letters, a great linguist,

a great historical scholar, a student of the Apostolic documents and of the persons of the Apostles. These, because he had given up his Christianity, he studied from the outside. From the outside also he studied Calvin. In a true sense, therefore, he formed his estimate of Calvin in a judicial temper. This man is Ernest Renan. The words of Renan shall be the concluding words of this inadequate paper. "Calvin succeeded more than all, in an age and country which called for a reaction toward Christianity, simply because Calvin was the most Christian man of his age."

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JOHN DEWITT.

CALVIN'S DOCTRINE OF GOD.

Having expounded in the opening chapters of the *Institutes* the sources and means of the knowledge of God, Calvin naturally proceeds in the next series of chapters (I. x, xi, xii, xiii) to set forth the nature of the God who, by the revelation of Himself in His Word and by the prevalent internal operation of His Spirit, frames the knowledge of Himself in the hearts of His people. He who expects to find in these chapters, however, an orderly discussion of the several topics which make up the *locus de Deo* in our formal dogmatics, will meet with disappointment. Calvin is not writing out of an abstract scientific impulse, but with the needs of souls, and, indeed, also with the special demands of the day in mind. And as his purpose is distinctively religious, so his method is literary rather than scholastic. In the freedom of his literary manner, he had permitted himself in the preceding chapters repeated excursions into regions which, in an exact arrangement of the material, might well have been reserved for exploration at this later point. To take up these topics again, now, for fuller and more orderly exposition, would involve much repetition without substantially advancing the practical purpose for which the *Institutes* were written. Calvin was not a man to confound formal correctness of arrangement with substantial completeness of treatment; nor was he at a loss for new topics of pressing importance for discussion. He skillfully interposes at this point, therefore, a short chapter (ch. x) in which under the form of pointing out the complete harmony with the revelation of God in nature of the revelation of God in the Scriptures—the divine authority of which in the communication of the knowledge of God he had just demonstrated—he reminds his readers of all that he had formerly said of the nature and attributes of God on the basis of natural revelation, and takes occasion to say what it re-

mained necessary to say of the same topics on the basis of supernatural revelation. Thus he briefly but effectively brings together under the reader's eye the whole body of his exposition of these topics and frees his hands to give himself, under the guidance of his practical bent and purpose, to the two topics falling under the rubric of the doctrine of God which were at the moment of the most pressing importance. His actual formal treatment of the doctrine of God thus divides itself into two parts, the former of which (ch. xi, xii), in strong Anti-Romish polemic is devoted to the uprooting of every refuge of idolatry, while the latter (ch. xiii), in equally strong polemic against the Anti-trinitarianism of the day, develops with theological acumen and vital faith the doctrine of Trinity in Unity.

It is quite true, then, as has often been remarked, that the *Institutes* contain no systematic discussion of the existence, the nature and the attributes of God.¹ And the lack of formal, systematic discussion of these fundamental topics, may, no doubt, be accounted a flaw, if we are to conceive the *Institutes* as a formal treatise in systematic theology. But it is not at all true that the *Institutes* contain no sufficient indication of Calvin's conceptions on these subjects: nor is it possible to refer the absence of formal discussion of them either to indifference to them on Calvin's

¹ Cf. Köstlin, *Calvin's Institutio*, etc., in *Studien und Kritiken*, 1868, i, pp. 61-2: "On the other hand—and this is for us the most important matter,—there is not given there any comprehensive exposition of the attributes, especially not of the ethical attributes of God, nor is any such afterwards attempted." Again, iii, p. 423: "We cannot present and follow out the doctrine of the *Institutio* on the divine nature and the divine attributes, and their relations, as a whole, as we can its doctrine of the Trinity, because Calvin himself, as we have mentioned already, has nowhere presented them as a whole." Cf. also P. J. Muller, *De Godsleer van Zwingli en Calvijn*, 1883, p. 11: "Neither by Zwingli nor by Calvin are there offered proofs of the existence of God" (cf. p. 16). Again, *De Godsleer van Calvijn*, 1881, p. 26: "A doctrine of the nature of God as such we do not find in Calvin." *Ibid.*, p. 38: "We find nowhere in Calvin a special section which is devoted particularly to the nature of God's attributes"; "since he gives no formal doctrine of the attributes, we find in him also no classification of the attributes."

part or to any peculiarity of his dogmatic standpoint,² or even of his theological method.³ The omission belongs rather to the peculiarity of this treatise as a literary product. Calvin does not pass over all systematic discussion of the existence, nature and attributes of God because from his theological standpoint there was nothing to say upon these topics, nor because, in his theological method, they were insignificant for his system; but simply because he had been led already to say informally about them all that was necessary for the religious, practical purpose he had in view in writing this treatise. For here as elsewhere the key to the understanding of the *Institutes* lies in recognizing their fundamental purpose to have been religious, and their whole, not coloring merely, but substance, to be profoundly religious,—in this only reflecting indeed the most determinative trait of Calvin's character.

It is important to emphasize this, for there seems to be still an impression abroad that Calvin's nature was at bottom cold and hard and dry, and his life-manifestation but a piece of incarnated logic: while the *Institutes* themselves are frequently represented, or rather misrepresented—it is difficult to believe that those who so speak of them can have read them—as a body of purely formal reasoning by which intolerable conclusions are remorselessly deduced from a set of metaphysical assumptions.⁴ Perhaps M. Ferdinand

² As Köstlin, for example, has suggested, as cited, p. 423, followed by P. J. Muller in his earlier work, *De Godsleer van Calvijn*, 1881, pp. 10, 46.

³ So P. J. Muller expresses himself in his later volume—*De Godsleer van Zwingli en Calvijn*, 1883,—modifying his earlier view: "Köstlin asks if it does not belong to Calvin's dogmatic standpoint that he does not venture to seek after a bond between the several elements which come forward in God's many-sided relation to men. This question can undoubtedly be answered in the affirmative, although we should rather speak here of the peculiarity of Calvin's *method*." That is to say, Muller here prefers to refer the phenomenon in question to Calvin's *a posteriori* method rather than to his theological standpoint.

⁴ André Duran, *Le Mysticisme de Calvin*, 1900, p. 8, justly says: "The *Institutes* are remarkable precisely for this: the absence of speculation. It is especially with the heart that Calvin studies God in His

Brunetière may be looked upon as a not unfair representative of the class of writers who are wont so to speak of the *Institutes*.⁵ According to him, Calvin has "intellectualized" religion and reduced it to a form which can appeal only to the "reasonable", or rather to the "reasoning" man. "In that oratorical work which he called *The Institutes*", M. Brunetière says, "if there is any movement, it is not one which comes from the heart; and—I am speaking here only of the writer or the religious theorizer, not of the man—the insensibility of Calvin is equalled only by the rigor of his reasoning." The religion Calvin sets forth is "a religion which consists essentially, almost exclusively, in the adhesion of the intellect to truths all but demonstrated", and commends itself by nothing "except by the literalness of its agreement with a text—which is a matter of pure philology—and by the solidity of its logical edifice—which is nothing but a matter of pure reasoning." To Calvin, he adds, "religious truth attests itself in no other manner and by no other means than mathematical truth. As he would reason on the properties of a triangle, or of a sphere, so Calvin reasons on the attributes of God. All that will not adjust itself to the exigencies of his dialectic, he contests or he rejects . . . Cartesian before Descartes, rational evidence, logical incontradiction are for him the test or the proof of truth. He would not believe if faith did not stay itself on a formal syllogism. . . . From a 'matter of the heart', if I may so say, Calvin transformed religion into an 'affair of the intellect.'"

We must not fail to observe, in passing, that even M. Brunetière refrains from attributing to Calvin's person the hard insensibility which he represents as the characteristic of his religious writings,—a tribute, we may suppose, to the relations with men; and it is by the heart that he attains to complete union of man with God." For a satisfactory discussion of the "heart in Calvin's theology" see E. Doumergue, *Jean Calvin*, etc., III (1905), pp. 560-563. Compare also the third address in Doumergue's *L'Art et le Sentiment dans l'Oeuvre de Calvin*, Geneva, 1902.

⁵ *Discours de Combat*, 1903, pp. 135-140.

religious impression which is made by Calvin's personality upon all who come into his presence, and which led even M. Ernest Renan, who otherwise shares very largely M. Brunetière's estimate of him, to declare him "the most Christian man of his age."⁶ Nor can we help suspecting that the violence of the invectives launched against the remorseless logic of the *Institutes* and of Calvin's religious reasoning in general, is but the index of the difficulty felt by M. Brunetière and those who share his point of view, in sustaining themselves against the force of Calvin's argumentative presentation of his religious conceptions. It is surely no discredit to a religious reasoner that his presentation commends his system irresistibly to all "reasonable", or let us even say "reasoning" men. A religious system which cannot sustain itself in the presence of "reasonable" or "reasoning" men, is not likely to remain permanently in existence, or at least in power among reasonable or reasoning men; and one would think that the logical irresistibility of a system of religious truth would be distinctly a count in its favor. The bite of M. Brunetière's assault is found, therefore, purely in its negative side. He would condemn Calvin's system of religion as nothing but a system of logic; and the *Institutes*, the most systematic presentation of it, as in essence nothing but a congeries of syllogisms, issuing in nothing but a set of logical propositions, with no religious quality or uplift in them. In this, however, he worst of all misses the mark; and we must add he was peculiarly unfortunate in fixing, in illustration of his meaning, on the two matters of the 'attributes of God' as the point of departure for Calvin's dialectic and of the intellectualizing of 'faith' as the height of his offending.

⁶ *Études d'histoire religieuse*, ed. 7 (1880), p. 342: *l'homme le plus chrétien de son siècle*. It must be borne in mind that this is not very high praise on M. Renan's lips; and was indeed intended by him to be depreciatory. We need not put an excessive estimate on Calvin's greatness, he says in effect; he lived in an age of reaction towards Christianity and he was the most Christian man of his age: his preëminence is thus accounted for.

In Calvin's treatment of faith there is nothing more striking than his determination to make it clear that it is a matter not of the understanding but of the heart; and he reproaches the Romish conception of faith precisely because it magnifies the intellectual side to the neglect of the fiducial. "We must not suppose", it is said in the Confession of Faith drawn up for the Genevan Church,⁷ either by himself or by his colleagues under his eye, "that Christian faith is a naked and mere knowledge of God or understanding of the Scriptures, which floats in the brain without touching the heart . . . It is a firm and solid confidence of the heart." Or, as he repeats this elsewhere,⁸ "It is an error to suppose that faith is a naked and cold knowledge."⁹ . . . Faith is not a naked knowledge,¹⁰ which floats in the brain, but draws with it a living affection of the heart."¹¹ "True Christian faith", he expounds in the second edition of the *Institutes*,¹² . . . "is not content with a simple historical knowledge, but takes its seat in the heart of man." "It does not suffice that the understanding should be illuminated by the Spirit of God if the heart be not strengthened by His power. In this matter the theologians of the Sorbonne very grossly err, —thinking that faith is a simple consent to the Word of God, which consists in understanding, and leaving out the confidence and assurance of the heart." "What the understanding has received must be planted in the heart. For if the Word of God floats in the head only, it has not yet been received by faith; it has its true reception only when it has taken root in the depths of the heart." Again, to cite a couple of passages in which the less pungent statement

⁷ *Instruction et Confession de Foy dont on use en l'Eglise du Genève* (*Opp.* xxii, 47). The Strassburg editors assign it to Calvin's colleagues; Doumergue (*Jean Calvin*, II. 236-251) to Calvin.

⁸ *Vera Christianae pacificationis et ecclesiae reformandae ratio*, 1549 (*Opp.* viii, 598-9).

⁹ *nudam frigidamque notitiam.*

¹⁰ *nudam notitiam.*

¹¹ *vivum affectum qui cordi insideat.*

¹² Ed. of 1539: the quotations are made from the French version of 1541, pp. 189, 202, 204.

of the earlier editions has been given new point and force in the final edition of the *Institutes*: "It must here be again observed," says he,¹³ "that we are invited to the knowledge of God—not a knowledge which, content with empty speculation, floats only in the brain, but one which shall be solid and fruitful, if rightly received by us, and rooted in the heart." "The assent we give to God", he says again,¹⁴ "as I have already indicated and shall show more largely later,—is rather of the heart than of the brain, and rather of the affections than of the understanding."¹⁵ It is quite clear, then, that Calvin did not consciously address himself merely to the securing of an intellectual assent to his teaching, but sought to move men's hearts. His whole conception of religion turned, indeed, on this: religion, he explained, to be pleasing to God, must be a matter of the heart,¹⁶ and God requires in his worshippers precisely heart and affection."¹⁷ All the arguments in the world, he insists, if unaccompanied by the work of the Holy Spirit on the heart, will fail to produce the faith which piety requires.¹⁸

This scarcely sounds like a man to whom religion was simply a matter of logical proof.

And so far is he from making the attributes of God, metaphysically determined, the starting-point of a body of teaching deduced from them by quasi-mathematical reasoning,—as one would deduce the properties of a triangle from its nature as a triangle,—that it has been made his reproach that he has so little to say of the divine nature and attributes, and in this little confines himself so strictly to the manifest indicia of God in His works and the direct teaching of Scripture, refusing utterly to follow "the high priori" road either in determining the divine attributes or from

¹³ I. v. 9.

¹⁴ III. ii. 8.

¹⁵ *Cordis esse magis quam cerebri, et affectus magis quam intelligentiae.*

¹⁶ *fidem et veritatem cordis.*

¹⁷ *cor et animum* (*Opp.* vi, 477, 479).

¹⁸ I. vii. 4.

them determining the divine activities. Thus, his doctrine of God is, it is said, no doubt notably sober and restrained, but also, when compared with Zwingli's, for example,—equally notably unimportant.¹⁹ It is confessed, however, that it is at least thoroughly religious: and in this is found, indeed, its fundamental characteristic. Precisely where Calvin's doctrine differs from Zwingli's markedly is that he constantly contemplated God religiously, while Zwingli contemplated him philosophically—that to him God was above and before all things the object of religious reverence, while to Zwingli he was predominately the First Cause, from whom all things proceed.²⁰ "It is not with the

¹⁹ Cf. P. J. Muller, *De Godsleer van Zwingli en Calvijn*, 1883, p. 111: "A theologian like Calvin, Zwingli was not; but still in the history of the doctrine of God the pages devoted to Zwingli are more important than those devoted to Calvin. The *loci* de Trinitate, de Creatione, and de Lapso apart, Zwingli's system is undeniably more coherent than that of Calvin, in which we miss the bond by which the several parts are joined. On the other side, however, we miss in Zwingli's doctrine of God precisely what constitutes the value of a doctrine of God for the *theologian*, that is to say, its religious character. We do not find in Zwingli as in Calvin a recoil from the consequences of his own reasoning, which leads necessarily to the ascription to God of the origination of evil, or sin, just because God is *not* with him as with Calvin conceived above everything as the object of religious reverence, but rather as the object of speculative thought."

²⁰ Cf. P. J. Muller, *De Godsleer van Zwingli en Calvijn*, 1883, p. 6: "If the doctrine of God for the theologian is determined by its religious character, the contemplation of God as the object of religious reverence will take a higher place with him than the merely philosophical contemplation of God as the ultimate cause. Since it is not to be denied—as the following exposition will show,—that with Zwingli God is speculatively contemplated much more as the ultimate cause than as the object of religious reverence, we may conclude that—so far as religious value is concerned—Zwingli's doctrine of God must be ranked below Calvin's." Again (p. 20): "In the nature of the case Calvin's conceptions of the nature of God must be very sober. For to him, God was very predominantly the object of religious reverence, and he could not therefore do otherwise than disapprove of the attempt to penetrate into the nature of the Godhead (I. v. 9). With Zwingli, on the contrary, in whose system God is preëminently conceived as the ultimate cause, the doctrine of the nature of God must form one of the most important sections of the doctrine of God." Once more (p. 23): "Calvin, whose pride it was to be a 'biblical theologian', does not follow the method

doctrine of God", says the historian whose representations we have been summarizing, "but with the worship of God that Calvin's first concern was engaged. Even in his doctrine of God—as we may perceive from his remarks upon it—religion stands ever in the foreground (I. ii. 1). Before everything else Calvin is a religious personality. The Reformation confronts Catholicism with a zeal to live for God. With striking justice Calvin remarked that 'all alike engaged in the worship of God, but few really revered Him,—that there was everywhere great ostentation in ceremonies but sincerity of heart was rare' (I. ii. 2). *Reverence* for God was the great thing for Calvin. If we lose sight of this a personality like Calvin cannot be understood; and it is only by recognizing the religious principle by which he was governed, that a just judgment can be formed of his work as a dogmatician. . . ."²¹ Again, Calvin "considers the knowledge of the nature and of the attributes of God more a matter of the heart than of the understanding; and such a knowledge, he says, must not only arouse us to 'the service of God, but must also awake in us the hope of a future life' (I. v. 10). In his extreme practicality—as the last remark shows us,—Calvin rejected the philosophical treatment of the question. The Scriptures, for him the source of the knowledge of God, he takes as his guide in his remarks on the attributes. . . ."²² Still again, "Already more than once have we had occasion to note that when of the philosophers,—the aprioristic method. He is therefore sober in his conceptions of the nature of God, since he had noted that in the Scriptures God speaks little of His nature, that He may teach us sobriety"—quoting I. xiii. 1: *ut nos in sobrietate continuat, parce de sua essentia (Deus) disserit*.

²¹ Cf. P. J. Muller, *De Godsleer van Calvijn*, 1881, p. 117.

²² Cf. P. J. Muller, *De Godsleer van Zwingli en Calvijn*, 1883, p. 47. The author of the anonymous Introduction to the edition of the *Institutes* in French, published by Meyrueis et Cie, Paris, 1859 (p. xii), says similarly: "Of a mind positive, grave, practical, removed from all need of speculation, very circumspect, not expressing its thought until its conviction had attained maturity, taking the fact of a divine revelation seriously, Calvin learned his faith at the feet of the Holy Scriptures" . . .

Calvin treats of God, he does this as a *believer*, for whom the existence of God stands as a fixed fact; and what he says of God, he draws from the Scriptures as his fundamental source, finding his pride in remaining a *biblical* theologian, and whenever he can taking the field against the *philosophico more interpretari* of the Scriptural texts (see *e. g.* I. xvi. 3). His doctrine of God has the *practical* end of serving the needs of his fellow believers. It is also noteworthy that he closes every stage of the consideration with an exhortation to the adoration of God or to the surrender of the heart to Him. Of the doctrine of the Trinity he declares that he will hold himself ever truly to the Scriptures, because he desires to do nothing more than to make what the Scriptures teach accessible to our conceptions *planioribus verbis*, and this will apply equally to the whole of his doctrine of God."²⁸ In a word, nothing can be clearer than that in his specific doctrine of God as well as in his general attitude to religious truth Calvin is as far as possible from being satisfied with a merely logical effect. When we listen to him on these high themes we are listening less to the play of his dialectic than to the throbbing of his heart.

It was due to this his controlling religious purpose, and to his dominating religious interest, that Calvin was able to leave the great topics of the existence, the nature and the attributes of God, without formal and detailed discussion in his *Institutes*. It is only a matter, we must reiterate, of the omission of formal and detailed discussion; for it involves not merely a gross exaggeration but a grave misapprehension to represent him as leaving these topics wholly to one side, and much more to seek to account for this assumed fact from some equally assumed peculiarity of Calvin's theological point of view or method. Under the impulse of his governing religious interest, he was able to content himself with such an exposition of the nature and attributes of God, in matter and form, as served his ends of religious

²⁸ P. J. Muller, *De Godsleer van Calvin*, etc., 1881, pp. 103-4.

impression, and was under no compulsion to expand this into such details and order it into such a methodical mode of presentation as would satisfy the demands of scholastic treatment. But to omit what would be for his purpose adequate treatment of these fundamental elements of a complete doctrine of God would have been impossible, we do not say merely to a thinker of his systematic genius, but to a religious teacher of his earnestness of spirit. In point of fact, we do not find lacking to the *Institutes* such a fundamental treatment of these great topics as would be appropriate in such a treatise. We only find their formal and separate treatment lacking. All that it is needful for the Christian man to know on these great themes is here present. Only, it is present so to speak in solution, rather than in precipitate: distributed through the general discussion of the knowledge of God rather than gathered together into one place and apportioned to formal rubrics. It is communicated moreover in a literary and concrete rather than in an abstract and scholastic manner.

It will repay us to gather out from their matrix in the flowing discourse the elements of Calvin's doctrine of God, that we may form some fair estimate of the precise nature and amount of actual instruction he gives regarding it. We shall attempt this by considering in turn Calvin's doctrine of the existence, knowableness, nature and attributes of God.

We do not read far into the *Institutes* before we find Calvin presenting proofs of the existence of God. It is quite true that this book, being written by a Christian for Christians, rather assumes the divine existence than undertakes to prove it, and concerns itself with the so-called proofs of the divine existence as means through which we rather obtain knowledge of what God is, than merely attain to knowledge that God is. But this only renders it the more significant of Calvin's attitude towards these so-called proofs that he repeatedly lapses in his discussion from their use for the former into their use for the latter and

logically prior purpose. That he thus actually presents these proofs as evidences specifically of the existence of God can admit of no doubt.²⁴

If, for example, he adduces that *sensus deitatis* with which all men, he asserts, are natively endowed, primarily as the germ which may be developed into a profound knowledge of God, he yet does not fail explicitly to appeal to it also as the source of an ineradicable conviction, embedded in the very structure of human nature and therefore present in all men alike, of the existence of God. He tells us expressly that because of this *sensus divinitatis*, present in the human mind by natural instinct, all men without excep-

²⁴ P. J. Muller's view is different, as may be seen from the following extracts: "Neither by Zwingli nor by Calvin are there offered proofs of the existence of God, although there are particular passages in their writings which seem to recall them. The proposition 'That God exists' needed neither for themselves nor for their fellow-believers, nor even against Rome, any proof. It has been thought indeed that the so-called cosmological argument is found in Zwingli, the physico-theological argument in Calvin (Lipsius, *Lehrb. der ev. prot. Dogmatik*, ed. 2, 1879, p. 213). But it would not be difficult to show that in the case of neither have we to do with a philosophical deduction, but only with an aid for attaining a complete knowledge of God" (*De Godsleer van Z. en C.*, p. 11, cf. p. 14). In a note Prof. Muller adverts to the possible use by Calvin, I. iii. 1, of "the so-called historical argument". "If Zwingli gives us no proof of God's existence, the same is true of Calvin. It is true that the physico-theological argument has been discovered in the *Institutes*. Yet as he wrote over the fifth chapter of the first book: 'That the knowledge of God is manifested in the making and continuous government of the world',—it is already evident from this that he did not intend to argue from the teleology of the world to the existence of God as its Creator, Sustainer and Governor, but that he wished merely to point to the world as to 'a beautiful book',—to speak in the words of our (Netherlandish) Confession (Art. II),—'in which all creatures, small and great, serve as letters to declare to us the invisible things of God'. Here, too, we have accordingly to do simply with a means for a rise to a fuller knowledge of God" (*Do.* p. 16). "The Scholastics may indeed—although answering the inquiry affirmatively—begin with the question, Is there a God? Such a question cannot rise with Calvin. The Reformer, assured of his personal salvation, the ground of which lay in God Himself, could also for his co-believers leave this question to one side. Practical value attached only to the inquiry how men can come to know God, of whose existence Calvin entertained no doubt" (*De Godsleer van Calvijn*, p. 11).

tion (*ad unum omnes*) know (*intelligent*, perceive, understand) "that God exists" (*Deum esse*), and are therefore without excuse if they do not worship Him and willingly consecrate their lives to Him (I. iii. 1). It is to buttress this assertion that he cites with approval Cicero's declaration²⁵ that "there is no nation so barbarous, no tribe so savage, that there is not stamped on it the conviction that there is a God".²⁶ Thus he adduces the argument of the *consensus gentium*—the so-called "historical" argument,—with exact appreciation of its true bearing, not directly as a proof of the existence of God, but directly as a proof that the conviction of the divine existence is a native endowment of human nature, and only through that indirectly as a proof of the existence of God. This position is developed in the succeeding paragraph into a distinct anti-atheistic argument. The existence of religion, he says, presupposes, and cannot be accounted for except by, the presence in man of this "constant persuasion of God" from which as a seed the propensity to religion proceeds: men may deny "that God exists",²⁷ "but will they, nill they, what they wish not to know they continually are aware of".²⁸ It is a persuasion ingenerated naturally into all, that "some God exists"²⁹ (I. iii. 3), and therefore this does not need to be inculcated in the schools, but every man is from the womb his own master in this learning, and cannot by any means forget it. It is therefore mere detestable madness to deny that "God exists" (I. iv. 2).³⁰ In all these passages Calvin is dealing explicitly, not with the knowledge of what God is, but with the knowledge that God is. It is quite incontrovertible, therefore, that he grounds an argument—or rather the argument—for the existence of God in the very constitution of

²⁵ *ut ethnicus ille ait*: the allusion is to Cicero, *de natura deorum*, I. 16.

²⁶ *deum esse*.

²⁷ *qui Deum esse negent*.

²⁸ *velint tamen nolint, quod nescire cupiunt, subinde sentiscunt*.

²⁹ *imo et naturaliter ingentam esse omnibus hanc persuasionem, esse aliquem Deum*.

³⁰ *negantes Deum esse*.

man. The existence of God is, in other words, with him an "intuition", and he makes this quite as plain as if he had devoted a separate section to its exposition.

Similarly, although he writes at the head of the chapter in which he expounds the revelation which God makes of Himself in His works and deeds: "That the knowledge of God is manifested in the making of the world and its continuous government" (ch. v), he is not able to carry through his exposition without occasional lapses into an appeal to the patefaction of God in His works as a proof of His existence, rather than as a revelation of His nature. The most notable of these lapses occurs in the course of his development of the manifestation of God made by the nature of man himself (I. v. 4), where once more he gives us an express anti-atheistic argument. "Yea", he cries, "the earth is supporting to-day many monstrous beings, who without hesitation employ the very seed of divinity which has been sown in human nature for eclipsing of the name of God. How detestable, I protest, is this insanity, that a man, discovering God a hundred times in his body and soul, should on this very pretext of excellence deny that God exists!³¹ They will not say that it is by chance that they are different from brute beasts; they only draw over God the veil of 'nature', which they declare the maker of all things, and thus abolish (*subducunt*) Him. They perceive the most exquisite workmanship in all their members, from their countenances and eyes to their very finger-nails. Here, too, they substitute 'nature' in the place of God. But above all how agile are the movements of the soul, how noble its faculties, how rare its gifts, discovering a divinity which does not easily permit itself to be concealed: unless the Epicureans, from this eminence, should like the Cyclops audaciously make war against God. Is it true that all the treasures of heavenly wisdom concur for the government of a worm five feet long, and the universe lacks this prerogative? To establish the existence of a kind of machinery in

³¹ *Deum esse neget.*

the soul, correspondent to each several part of the body, makes so little to the obscuring of the glory of God that it rather illustrates it. Let Epicurus tell what concourse of atoms in the preparation of food and drink distributes part to the excrements, part to the blood, and brings it about that the several members perform their offices with as much diligence as if so many souls by common consent were governing one body." "The manifold agility of the soul", he eloquently adds, "by which it surveys the heavens and the earth, joins the past to the future, retains in memory what it once has heard, figures to itself whatever it chooses; its ingenuity, too, by which it excogitates incredible things and which is the mother of so many wonderful arts; are certain insignia in man of divinity. . . . Now what reason exists that man should be of divine origin and not acknowledge the creator? Shall we, forsooth, discriminate between right and wrong by a judgment which has been given to us, and yet there be no judge in heaven? . . . Shall we be thought the inventors of so many useful arts, that we may defraud God of his praise . . . although experience sufficiently teaches us that all that we have is distributed to us severally from elsewhere? . . . " Calvin, of course, knows that he is digressing in a passage like this,—that "his present business is not with that sty of swine", as he calls the Epicureans. But digression or not, the passage is distinctly an employment of the so-called physico-theological proof for the existence of God, and advises us that Calvin held that argument sound and would certainly employ it whenever it became his business to develop the arguments for the existence of God.

The proofs for the existence of God on which we perceive Calvin thus to rely had been traditional in the Church from its first age. It was precisely upon these two lines of argument that the earliest fathers rested. "He who knows himself", says Clement of Alexandria, quite in Calvin's manner, "will know God."³² "The knowledge of God", exclaims

³² *Paed.* III. 1. *Cf. Strom.* V. 13; *Cohort.* vi.

Tertullian, "is the dowry of the soul."³³ "If you say, 'Show me thy God'," Theophilus retorts to the heathen challenge, "I reply, 'Show me your man and I will show you my God'."³⁴ The God who cannot be seen by human eyes, declares Theophilus,³⁵ "is beheld and perceived through His providence and works": we can no more surely infer a pilot for the ship we see making straight for the harbor, than we can infer a divine governor for the universe tending straight on its course. "Those who deny that this furniture of the whole world was perfected by the divine reason", argues the Octavius of Minucius Felix,³⁶ "and assert that it was heaped together by certain fragments casually adhering to each other, seem to me to have neither mind, nor sense, nor, in fact, even sight itself." "Whence comes it", asks Dionysius of Alexandria, criticizing the atomic theory quite in Calvin's manner,³⁷ that the starry hosts—"this multitude of fellow-travellers, all unmarshalled by any captain, all ungifted with any determination of will, and all unendowed with any knowledge of each other, have nevertheless held their course in perfect harmony?" Like these early fathers, Calvin adduces only these two lines of evidence: the existence of God is already given in our knowledge of self, and it is solidly attested by His works and deeds. Whether, had we from him a professed instead of a merely incidental treatment of the topic, the metaphysical arguments would have remained lacking in his case as in theirs,³⁸ we can only

³³ *Adv. Marc.* I. 10: Cf. *De Test. Animae*, VI.

³⁴ *Ad Autol.* I. 2.

³⁵ *Do.* I. 5.

³⁶ C. xvii.

³⁷ *Adv. Epic.* iii.

³⁸ H. C. Sheldon, *History of Christian Doctrine*, vol. I, 1886, p. 56: "Metaphysical proofs of the existence of God, such as those adduced by Augustine, Anselm, and Descartes, were quite foreign to the theology of the first three centuries." But in the next age they had already come in; cf. Sheldon, p. 187: "We find a new class of arguments, something more in the line of the metaphysical than anything which the previous centuries brought forward. Three writers in particular aspired to this order of proofs; viz., Diodorus of Tarsus, Augustine, and Boëthius." Augustine is the real father of the ontological argument: but Augus-

conjecture; but it seems very possible that as foreign to his *a posteriori* method (cf. I. v. 9) they lay outside of his scheme of proofs. Meanwhile, he has in point of fact adverted, in the course of this discussion, only to the two arguments on which the Church teachers at large had depended from the beginning of Christianity. He states these with his accustomed clearness and force, and he illuminates them with his genius for exposition and illustration; but he gives them only incidental treatment after all. In richness as well as in fullness of presentation he is surpassed here by Zwingli,³⁹ and it is to Melanchthon that we shall have to go to find among the Reformers a formal enumeration of the proofs for the divine existence.⁴⁰

tine only chronologically belonged to the old world; as Siebeck (ZPhP, 1868, p. 190) puts it, he was "the first modern man".

³⁹Cf. P. J. Muller, *De Godsleer van Zwingli en Calvijn*, 1883, pp. 11-16, where a very interesting account is given of Zwingli's handling of the theistic proofs—though Prof. Muller thinks that Zwingli employs them not to establish the existence of God but to increase our knowledge of God. With Zwingli all knowledge of God rests at bottom on Revelation, which is his way of saying what Calvin means by his universal *sensus deitatis*. Zwingli says, on his part, that "a certain seed of knowledge [of God] is sown [by God] also among the Gentiles" (III. 158). But he argues with great force and in very striking language, that all creation proclaims its maker. Cf. A. Baur, *Zwingli's Theologie*, I. 382: "In the doctrine of God, Zwingli distinguishes two questions: first that of the nature, and secondly that of the existence of God. The answer to the first question surpasses the powers of the human mind; that of the second, does not". That the knowledge of the existence of God, which "may be justified before the understanding" (Muller, p. 13), does not involve a knowledge of His nature, Zwingli holds is proved by the wide fact of polytheism on the one hand and the accompanying fact, on the other, that natural theism is always purely theoretical (Baur, p. 382).

⁴⁰In the earliest *Loci Communes* (1521) there was no *locus de Deo* at all. In the second form (1535-1541) there was a *locus de Deo*, but it was not to it but to the *locus de Creatione* that Melanchthon appended some arguments for the existence of God, remarking (C. R. xxi, p. 369): "After the mind has been confirmed in the true and right opinion of God and of Creation by the Word of God itself, it is then both useful and pleasant to seek out also the vestiges of God in nature and to collect the arguments (*rationes*) which testify that there is a God." These remarks are expanded in the final form (1543+) and reduced to a formal order, for the benefit of "good morals". The list

That this God, the conviction of whose existence is part of the very constitution of the human mind and is justified by abundant manifestations of Himself in His works and deeds, is knowable by man, lies on the face of Calvin's entire discussion. The whole argument of the opening chapters of the *Institutes* is directed precisely to the establishment of this knowledge of God on an irrefragable basis: and the emphasis with which the reality and trustworthiness of our knowledge of God is asserted is equalled only by the skill with which the development of our native instinct to know God into an actual knowledge of Him is traced (in ch. 1), and the richness with which His revelation of Himself in His works and deeds is illustrated by well-chosen and strikingly elaborated instances (in ch. 5). Of course, Calvin does not teach that sinful man can of himself attain to the knowledge of God. The noëtic effects of sin he takes very seriously, and he teaches without ambiguity that all men have grossly degenerated from the true knowledge of God (ch. iv). But this is not a doctrine of the unknowableness of

consists of nine "demonstrations, the consideration of which is useful for discipline and for confirming honest opinions in minds". "The first is drawn from the order of nature itself, that is from the effects arguing a maker. . . . The second, from the nature of the human mind. A brute thing is not the cause of an intelligent nature. . . . The third, from the distinction between good and evil . . . and the sense of order and number. . . . Fourthly: natural ideas are true: that there is a God, all confess naturally: therefore this idea is true. . . . The fifth is taken, in Xenophanes, from the terrors of conscience. . . . The sixth from political society. . . . The seventh is . . . drawn from the series of efficient causes. There cannot be an infinite recession of efficient causes. . . . The eighth from final causes. . . . The ninth from prediction of future events." "These arguments", he adds, "not only testify that there is a God, but are also indicia of providence. . . . They are perspicuous and always affect good minds. Many others also could certainly be collected; but because they are more obscure, I leave off." . . . G. H. Lamers, *Geschiedenis der Leer aangaande God*, 1897, p. 179 [687], remarks: "It should be noted that Melancthon always when speaking of God, whether as *Spirit* or as *Love*, wishes everywhere to ascribe the highest value to God's ethical characteristics. Even the particulars, nine in number, to which he (Doedes, *Inleiding tot der Leer van God*, p. 191) points as proofs that God's existence must be recognized, show that ethical considerations

God, but rather of the incapacitating effects of sin. Accordingly he teaches that the inadequateness of the knowledge of God to which alone sinners can attain is itself a sin. Men's natures prepare them to serve God, God's revelations of Himself display Him before men's eyes: if men do not know God they are without excuse and cannot plead their inculpatory sinfulness as exculpation. God remains, then, knowable to normal man: it is natural to man to know Him. And if in point of fact He cannot be known save by a supernatural action of the Holy Spirit on the heart, this is because man is not in his normal state and it requires this supernatural action of the Spirit on his heart to restore him to his proper natural powers as man. The "testimony of the Holy Spirit in the heart" does not communicate to man any new powers, powers alien to him as man: it is restorative in its nature and in principle merely recovers his powers from their deadness induced by sin. The knowledge of God to which man attains through the testimony of the Spirit is therefore the knowledge which belongs to him as normal man: al- especially attract him." More justly Herrlinger, *Die Theologie Melanchthons*, 1879, comments on Melanchthon's use of the "proofs" as follows: "The natural knowledge of God, resting on an innate idea and awakened especially by teleological contemplation of the world, Melanchthon makes in his philosophical writings, particularly in his physics, the object of consideration, so that we may speak of the elements of a natural theology in him" (p. 168). Melanchthon heaps up these arguments, enumerating nine of them, in the conviction that they will mutually strengthen one another. Herrlinger thinks that, as they occur in much the same order in more of Melanchthon's writings than one, they may be arranged on some principle,—possibly beginning with particulars in nature and man, proceeding to human association, and rising to the entirety of nature (p. 393). He continues (p. 393): "Clearly enough it is the teleological argument which in all these proofs is the real nerve of the proof. Melanchthon accords with Kant as in the high place he gives this proof, so also in perceiving that all these proofs find their strength in the ontological argument, in the innate idea of God, which is the most direct witness for God's existence. 15. 564; 'The mind reasons of God from a multitude of vestiges. But this reasoning would not be made if there were not infused (*insita*) into the mind a certain knowledge (*notitia*) or *πρόληψις* of God'. Similarly, *De Anima*, 13. 144. 169." The relation of the proofs to the innate *sensus deitatis* here indicated, holds good also for Calvin.

though now secured by him only in a supernatural manner, it is in kind, and, so far as it is the product of his innate *sensus deitatis* and the revelation of God in His works and deeds, it is in mode also, natural knowledge of God. Calvin's doctrine of the noëtic effects of sin and their removal by the "testimony of the Spirit", that is to say, by what we call "regeneration", must not then be taken as a doctrine of the unknowableness of God. On the contrary it is a doctrine of the knowableness of God, and supplies only an account of why men in their present condition fail to know Him, and an exposition of how and in what conditions the knowableness of God may manifest itself in man as now constituted in an actually known God. When the Spirit of God enters the heart with recreative power, he says, then even sinful man, his blurred eyes opened, may see God, not merely that there is a God, but what kind of Being this God is (I. i. 1; ii. 1; v. 1).

Of course, Calvin does not mean that God can be known to perfection, whether by renewed man, or by sinless man with all his native powers uninjured by sin. In the depths of His being God is to him past finding out; the human intelligence has no plumbet to sound those profound deeps. "His essence" (*essentia*), he says, "is incomprehensible (*incomprehensibilis*); so that His divinity (*numen*) wholly escapes all human senses" (I. v. 1, cf. I. xi. 3); and though His works and the signs by which He manifests Himself may "admonish men of His incomprehensible essence" (I. xi. 3), yet, being men, we are not *capax Dei*; as Augustine says somewhere, we stand disheartened before His greatness and are unable to take Him in (I. v. 9).⁴¹ We can know then only God's glory (I. v. 1), that is to say, His manifested perfections (I. v. 9), by which what He is to us is revealed to us (I. x. 2). What He is in Himself, we cannot know, and all attempts to penetrate into His essence are but cold and frigid speculations which can lead to no useful knowl-

⁴¹ In *Psalmos*, 144: illum non possumus capere, velut sub ejus magnitudine deficientes.

edge. "They are merely toying with frigid speculations", he says (I. ii. 2), "whose mind is set on the question of what God is (*quid sit Deus*), when what it really concerns us to know is rather what kind of a person He is (*qualis sit*) and what is appropriate to His nature (*natura*)" (I. ii. 2).⁴² We are to seek God, therefore, "not with audacious inquisitiveness by attempting to search into His essence (*essentia*), which is rather to be adored than curiously investigated; but by contemplating Him in His works, in which He brings Himself near to us and makes Himself familiar and in some measure communicates Himself to us" (I. v. 9). For if we seek to know what He is in Himself (*quis sit apud se*) rather than what kind of a person He is to us (*qualis erga nos*),—which is revealed to us in His attributes (*virtutes*)—we simply lose ourselves in empty and meteoric speculation (I. x. 2).

The distinction which Calvin is here drawing between the knowledge of the *quid* and the knowledge of the *qualis* of God; the knowledge of what He is in Himself and the knowledge of what He is to us, is the ordinary scholastic one and fairly repeats what Thomas Aquinas contends for (*Summa Theol.* I, qu. 12, art. 12), when he tells us that there is no knowledge of God *per essentiam*, no knowledge of His nature, of His *quidditas per speciem propriam*; but we know only *habitudinem ipsius ad creaturas*. There is no implication of nominalism here; nothing, for example, similar to Occam's declaration that we can know neither the divine essence, nor the divine quiddity, nor anything intrinsic to God, nor anything that God is *realiter*. When Calvin says that the Divine attributes describe not what God is *apud se*, but what kind of a person He is *erga nos*,⁴³ he is

⁴² We cannot know the quiddity of God: we can only know His quality: that is to say what His essence is beyond our comprehension, but we may know Him in His attributes.

⁴³ Cf. the passage in ed. 2 and other middle editions in which, refuting the Sabellians, he says that such attributes as strength, goodness, wisdom, mercy, are "epithets" which "show *qualis erga nos sit Deus*", while the personal names, Father, Son, Spirit, are "names" which "declare *qualis apud semetipsum vere sit*" (*Opp.* I. 491).

not intending to deny that His attributes are true determinations of the divine nature and truly reveal to us the kind of a person He is; he is only refusing to speculate on what God is apart from His attributes by which He reveals Himself to us, and insisting that it is only in these attributes that we know Him at all. He is refusing all *a priori* methods of determining the nature of God and requiring of us to form our knowledge of Him *a posteriori* from the revelation He gives us of Himself in His activities. This He insists is the only knowledge we can have of God, and this the only way we can attain to any knowledge of Him at all. Of what value is it to us, he asks (I. v. 9), to imagine a God of whose working we have had no experience? Such a knowledge only floats in the brain as an empty speculation. It is by His attributes (*virtutes*) that God is manifested; it is only through them that we can acquire a solid and fruitful knowledge of Him. The only right way and suitable method of seeking Him, accordingly, is through His works, in which He draws near to us and familiarizes Himself to us and in some degree communicates Himself to us. Here is not an assertion that we learn nothing of God through His attributes, which represent only determinations of our own. On the contrary, here is an assertion that we obtain through the attributes a solid and fruitful knowledge of God. Only it is not pretended that the attributes of God as revealed in His activities tell us all that God is, or anything that He is in Himself: they only tell us, in the nature of the case, what He is to us. Fortunately, says Calvin, this is what we need to know concerning God, and we may well eschew all speculation concerning His intrinsic nature and content ourselves with knowing what He is in His relation to His creatures. His object is, not to deny that God is what He seems,—that His attributes revealed in His dealings with His creatures represent true determination of His nature. His object is to affirm that these determinations of His nature, revealed in His dealings with His creatures, constitute the sum of our real knowledge of God: and that

apart from them speculation will lead to no solid results. He is calling us back, not from a fancied knowledge of God through His activities to the recognition that we know nothing of Him, that what we call His attributes are only effects in us: but from an *a priori* construction of an imaginary deity to an *a posteriori* knowledge of the Deity which really is and really acts. This much we know, he says, that God is what His works and acts reveal Him to be: though it must be admitted that His works and acts reveal not His metaphysical Being but His personal relations,—not what He is *apud se*, but what He is *quoad nos*.

Of the nature of God in the abstract sense, thus,—the *quiddity* of God, in scholastic phrase—Calvin has little to say.⁴⁴ But his refusal to go behind the attributes which

⁴⁴ Cf. P. J. Muller, *De Godsleer van Calvijn*, p. 26: "A doctrine of the nature of God as such we do not find in Calvin." To teach us modesty, Calvin says, God says little of His nature in Scripture, but to teach us what we ought to know of Him he gives us two epithets—immensity and spirituality (p. 29). Again, *De Godsleer van Zwingli en Calvijn*, pp. 30-31: "The little that Calvin gives us on this subject (the Divine Essence) limits itself to the remark that God's essence is 'immense and spiritual' (I. xiii. 1), 'incomprehensible to us' (I. v. 1)." Again, p. 38: "If the aprioristic method [as employed by Zwingli] is thus not favorable to the development of a doctrine of the Trinity, Calvin's aposterioristic method is on the other hand the reason that his conceptions of the nature of God—apart from the Trinity—are of less significance than Zwingli's. Since our understanding, according to Calvin, is incapable of grasping *what* God is, it is folly to seek with arrogant curiosity to investigate God's nature, 'which is much rather to be adored than anxiously to be inquired into' (*On Romans* i. 19: 'They are mad who seek to discover what God is'; *Institutes* I. ii. 2: 'The essence of God is rather to be adored than inquired into'). If we nevertheless wish to solve the problem up to a certain point, let this be done only by means of the Scriptures in which God has revealed His nature to us so far as it is needful for us to know it. The warning he gives us is therefore certainly fully comprehensible,—that 'those who devote themselves to the solving of the problem of what God is should hold their speculations within bounds; since it is of much more importance for us to know *what kind of a being God is*' (I. ii. 2). How can a man who cannot understand his own nature be able to comprehend God's nature? Let us then leave to God the knowledge of Himself: and—so Calvin says—we leave it to Him when we conceive Him as He has revealed Himself to us, and when we seek to inquire with reference to Him, nowhere else than in His Word' (I. xiii. 21)"

are revealed to us in God's works and deeds, affords no justification to us for going behind them for him and attributing to him against his protest developed conceptions of the nature of the divine essence, which he vigorously repudiates. Calvin has suffered more than most men from such gratuitous attributions to him of doctrines which he emphatically disclaims. Thus, not only has it been persistently asserted that he reduced God, after the manner of the Scotists, to the bare notion of arbitrary Will, without ethical content or determination,⁴⁵ but the contradictory concep-

⁴⁵ This is fast becoming the popular representation. Cf. e. g. Williston Walker, *John Calvin*, 1906, p. 149: "Thus he owed to Scotus, doubtless without realizing the obligation, the thought of God as almighty will, for motives behind whose choice it is as absurd as it is impious to inquire." Again, p. 418: "Whether this Scotist doctrine of the rightfulness of all that God wills by the mere fact of His willing it, leaves God a moral character, it is perhaps useless to inquire." But Calvin does not borrow unconsciously from Scotus: he openly repudiates Scotus. And Calvin is so far from representing the will of God to be independent of His moral character, that he makes it merely the expression of His moral character, and only inscrutable to us. Cf. also C. H. Irwin, *John Calvin*, 1909, p. 179: "Holding as he did the theory of Duns Scotus, that a thing is right by the mere fact of God willing it, he never questioned whether a course was or was not in harmony with the Divine character, if he was once convinced that it was a course attributed to God in Scripture." But Calvin did not hold that a thing is made right by the mere fact that God wills it but that the fact that God wills it (which fact Scripture may witness to us) is proof enough to us that it is right. The vogue of this remarkable misrepresentation of Calvin's doctrine of God is doubtless due to its enunciation (though in a somewhat more guarded form) by Ritschl (*Jahrb. für deutsche Theologie*, 1868, xiii, pp. 104 sq.). Ritschl's fundamental contention is that the Nominalistic conception of God, crowded out of the Roman Church by Thomism, yet survived in Luther's doctrine of the enslaved will and Calvin's doctrine of twofold predestination (p. 68), which presuppose the idea of "the groundless arbitrariness of God" in His actions. Calvin was far from adopting this principle in theory or applying it consistently. He is aware of and seeks to guard against its dangers (p. 106); but his doctrine of a double predestination (in Ritschl's opinion) proceeds on its assumption: "In spite of Calvin's reluctance, we must judge that the idea of God which governs this doctrine comes to the same thing as the Nominalistic *potentia absoluta*" (p. 107). The same line of reasoning may be read also in Seeberg, *Text-Book of the History of Doctrines*, § 79, 4 (E. T. II. 397), who also is compelled to admit that this conception of God is both repudiated by

tions of a virtual Deism⁴⁶ and a developed Pantheism⁴⁷ have with equal confidence been attributed to him. To instance but a single example, Principal A. M. Fairbairn permits himself to say that "Calvin was as pure, though not as conscious and consistent a Pantheist as Spinoza".⁴⁸ Astonishing as such a declaration is in itself, it becomes more aston-

Calvin and is destructive of his "logical structure"! For a sufficient refutation of this whole notion see Max Scheibe's *Calvin's Prädestinationslehre*, pp. 113 sq. "Calvin", says Scheibe, "could therefore very properly repudiate the charge of proceeding on the Scoto-nominalistic idea of the *potentia absoluta* of God. . . . With Calvin, on the contrary, the conception of the will of God as the highest causality has the particular meaning that God is not determined in His actions by anything lying outside of Himself, . . . while it is distinctly not excluded that God acts by virtue of an inner necessity, accordant with His nature."

* Cf. e. g. A. V. G. Allen, *The Continuity of Christian Thought* (1884), p. 299: "The God who is thus revealed is a being outside the framework of the universe, who called the world into existence by the power of His will. Calvin positively rejected the doctrine of the divine immanence. When he spoke of that 'dog of a Lucretius' who mingles God and nature, he may have also had Zwingli in his mind. In order to separate more completely between God and man, he interposed ranks of mediators. . . ." Also, p. 302: "In some respects the system of Calvin not merely repeats but exaggerates the leading ideas of Latin Christianity. In no Latin writer is found such a determined purpose to reject the immanence of Deity and assert His transcendence and His isolation from the world. In his conception of God, as absolute, arbitrary will, he surpasses Duns Scotus. . . . The separation between God and humanity is emphasized as it has never been before, for Calvin insists, dogmatically and formally, upon that which had been, to a large extent, hitherto, an unconscious though controlling sentiment." Prof. Allen had already represented the Augustinian theology as "resting upon the transcendence of Deity as its controlling principle",—which he explains as a tacit "assumption of Deism" (pp. 5, 191).

* Cf. Principal D. W. Simon, *Reconciliation by Incarnation*, p. 282, where he speaks of "the Pantheism . . . with which Calvin is logically chargeable—strongly as he might resent the imputation—when he says: 'Nothing happens but what He has knowingly and willingly decreed'; 'All the changes which take place in the world are produced by the secret agency of the hand of God'; 'Not heaven and earth and inanimate creatures only, but also the counsels and wills of men are so governed as to move exactly in the course which He has destined.' To Dr. Simon providential government of the world implies pantheism!

* *The Place of Christ in Modern Theology*, 1893, p. 164. Even H. M. Gwatkin, *The Knowledge of God*, etc., 1906, II. 226, having spoken of Calvin as "taking over from the Scotists" his conception of God as

ishing still when we observe the ground on which it is based. This consists essentially in the discovery that the fundamental conception of Calvinism is that "God's is the only efficient will in the universe, and so He is the one ultimate causal reality",⁴⁹—upon which the certainly very true remark is made that "the universalized Divine will is an even more decisive and comprehensive Pantheism than the universalized Divine substance".⁵⁰ The logical process by which the Calvinistic conception of the sovereign will of God as the *prima causa rerum*—where the very term *prima* implies the existence and reality of "second causes"—is transmuted into the Pantheising notion that the will of God is the sole efficient cause operative in the universe; or by which the Calvinistic conception of God as the sovereign ruler of the universe whose "will is the necessity of things" is transmuted into the reduction of God, Hegelian-wise, into pure and naked will,⁵¹—although it has apparently appealed to many, is certainly very obscure. In point of fact, when the Calvinist spoke of God as the *prima causa rerum*—the phrase is cited from William Ames⁵²—he meant by it only that all that takes place takes place in accordance with the divine will, not that the divine will is the only efficient cause in the universe; and when Calvin quotes approvingly

"sovereign and inscrutable will", adds that he needed only to suppose further that "the divine will" is "necessitated as well as inscrutable" to have taught a Pantheistic system. But as he thus allows Calvin did not suppose this, and had just pointed out that Calvin explains that God is not an "absolute and arbitrary power", we probably need not look upon this language as other than rhetorical: it certainly is not true to the facts in either of its members.

⁴⁹ P. 164. Cf. p. 430. It is Amesius to whom Dr. Fairbairn appeals to justify this statement; but he misinterprets Amesius.

⁵⁰ P. 168.

⁵¹ Cf. Baur, *Die christliche Lehre von d. Dreieinigkeit*, III (1843), pp. 35 sq.

⁵² *Medulla*, I. vii. 38: "Hence the will of God is the first cause of things. 'By thy will they are and were created' (Apoc. iv. 11). But the will of God, as He wills to operate ad extra, does not presuppose the goodness of the object, but by willing posits and makes it good."

from Augustine—for the words are Augustine's⁵³—that “the will of God is the necessity of things”, so little is either he or Augustine making use of the words in a Pantheistic sense that he hastens to explain that what he means is only that whatever God has willed will certainly come to pass, although it comes to pass in “such a manner that the cause and matter of it are found in” the second causes (*ut causa et materia in ipsis reperiatur*).⁵⁴

Calvin beyond all question did cherish a very robust faith in the immanence of God. “Our very existence”, he says, “is subsistence in God alone” (I. i. 1). He even allows, as Dr. Fairbairn does not fail to inform us, that it may be said with a pious meaning—so only it be the expression of a pious mind—that “nature is God” (I. v. 5 end).⁵⁵ But Dr. Fairbairn neglects to mention that Calvin

⁵³ The phrase is quoted by Dr. Fairbairn (p. 164) as Calvin's, to support the assertion that he was “as pure a pantheist as Spinoza”. But it is cited by Calvin (III. xxiii. 8) from Augustine. The matter in immediate discussion is the perdition of the reprobate.

⁵⁴ III. xxiii. 8.

⁵⁵ Cf. Muller, *De Godsleer van Zwingli en Calvijn*, p. 26: “Accordingly also Pliny was right—according to Zwingli (*De Provid. Dei Anamnema*, iv. 90)—in calling what he calls God, nature, since the learned cannot adjust themselves to the conceptions of God of the ununderstanding multitude; while by nature he meant the power which moves all things together, and that is nothing else but God.” Again, on the general question of the charge of Pantheism brought against Zwingli, pp. 27-8: “As is well known, it has been supposed that there is a pantheistic element in Zwingli's *Anamnema*. It cannot be denied that there are some expressions which sound Spinozistic; and for those who see Pantheism in every controversion of fortuitism, Zwingli must of necessity be a Pantheist. Yet if we are to discover Spinozism in Zwingli, we can with little difficulty point to traces of Spinozism also in Paul. Such a passage as the following, for example, would certainly have been subscribed by Paul: ‘If anything comes to pass by its own power or counsel, then the wisdom and power of our Deity would be superfluous there. And if that were true, then the wisdom of the Deity would not be supreme, because it would not comprehend and take in all things; and his power would not be omnipotent, because then there would exist power independent of God's power, and in that case there would be another power which would not be the power of the Deity’ (*Opp.* vi. 85). In any case, Zwingli cannot be given the blame of standing apart from the other Reformers

adds at once, that the expression is "crude and unsuitable" (*dura et impropria*), since "nature is rather the order prescribed by God"; and, moreover, noxious, because tending to "involve God confusedly with the inferior course of His works". He neglects also to mention that the statement occurs at the end of a long discussion, in which, after rebuking those who throw an obscuring veil over God, "retire Him behind nature", and so substitute nature for Him,—Calvin inveighs against the "babble about some sort of hidden inspiration which actuates the whole world", as not only "weak" but "altogether profane", and brands the speculation of a universal mind animating and actuating the world as simply jejune (I. v. 4 and 5). Even his beloved Seneca is reproved for "imagining a divinity transfused through all parts of the world" so that God is all that we see and all that we do not see as well (I. xiii. 1), while the Pantheistic scheme of Servetus is made the object of an extended refutation (II. xiv. 5-8). To ascribe an essentially Pantheistic conception of God to Calvin in the face of such frequent and energetic repudiations of it on his own part⁵⁶ is obviously to miss his meaning altogether. If he "may be said to have anticipated Spinoza in his notion of God as *causa immanens*", and "Spinoza may be said . . . to have perfected and reduced to philosophical consistency the Calvinistic conception of Deity",⁵⁷—this can mean nothing more than that Calvin was not a Deist. And in point of fact on this point. Calvin certainly recognizes (*Inst.* I. v. 5) that—so it occurs, simply—"it may be said out of a pious mind that nature is God" (*cf. Zwingli*, VI. a. 619: 'Call God Himself Nature, with the philosophers, the principle from which all things take their origin, from which the soul begins to be'); although he adds the warning that in matters of such importance 'no expressions should be employed likely to cause offence'. Danaeus (Lib. I. 77 of his *Ethices Christ. lib. tres*), marvels that those who would fain bear the name of Christians, should conceive of God and nature as two different hypostases, since even the heathen philosophers (and like Zwingli, he names Seneca) more truly taught that 'the nature by which we have been brought forth is nothing else than God'." . . .

⁵⁶ *Cf.* instances in addition at I. xiv. 1, I. xv. 5.

⁵⁷ Fairbairn, *op. cit.*, pp. 165-6.

he repudiated Deism with a vehemence equal to that which he displays against Pantheism. To rob God of the active exercise of His judgment and providence, shutting Him up as an idler (*otiosum*) in heaven, he characterizes as nothing less than "detestable frenzy", since, says he, "nothing could less comport with God than to commit to fortune the abandoned government of the world, shut His eyes to the iniquities of men and let them wanton with impunity" (I. iv. 2).⁵⁸

Calvin's conception of God is that of a pure and clear Theism, in which stress is laid at once on His transcendence and His immanence, and emphasis is thrown on His righteous government of the world. "Let us bear in mind, then", he says as he passes from his repudiation of Pantheism, "that there is one God, who governs all natures" (I. v. 6, *init.*), "and wishes us to look to Him,—to put our trust in Him, to worship and call upon Him" (I. v. 6); to whom we can look up as to a Father from whom we expect and receive tokens of love (I. v. 3). So little is he inclined to reduce this divine Father to bare will, that he takes repeated occasion expressly to denounce this Scotist conception. The will of God, he says, is to us indeed the unique rule of righteousness and the supremely just cause of all things; but we are not like the sophists to prate about some sort of "absolute will" of God, "profanely separating His righteousness from His power", but rather to adore the governing providence which presides over all things and from which nothing can proceed which is not right, though the reasons for it may be hidden from us (I. xvii, 2, end). "Nevertheless", he remarks in another place, after having exhorted his readers to find in the will of God a sufficient account of things,—“nevertheless, we do not betake our-

⁵⁸ Cf. I. xvi. 1: "To make God a momentaneous creator, who entirely finished all His work at once, were frigid and jejune", etc. Also the Genevan Catechism of 1545 (*Opp.* vi. 15-18): The particularization of God's creatorship in the creed is not to be taken as indicating that God so created His works at once that afterwards He rejects the care of them. It is rather so to be held that the world as it was made by Him at once, so now is conserved by Him; and He is to remain their supreme governor, etc.

selves to the fiction of absolute power, which, as it is profane, so ought to be deservedly detestable to us: we do not imagine that the God who is a law to Himself is exlex, . . . the will of God is not only pure from all fault, but is the supreme rule of perfection, even the law of all laws" (III. xxiii, 2, end).⁵⁹ In a word, the will of God is to Calvin the supreme rule for us, because it is the perfect expression of the divine perfections.⁶⁰

Calvin thus refuses to be classified as either Deist, Pantheist or Scotist; and those who would fain make him one or the other of these have nothing to go upon except that on the one hand he does proclaim the transcendence of God and speaks with contempt of men who imagine that divinity is transfused into every part of the world, and that there is a portion of God not only in us but even in wood and stone (I. xiii. 1, 22); and on the other he does proclaim the immanence of God and invites us to look upon His works or to descend within ourselves to find Him who "everywhere diffuses, sustains, animates and quickens all things in heaven and in earth", who, "circumscribed by no

⁵⁹ It is not uncommon for historians of doctrine who are inclined to represent Calvin as enunciating the Scotist principle, therefore, to suggest that he is scarcely consistent with himself. Thus, *e. g.*, H. C. Sheldon, *History of Christian Doctrine* (1886), II. 93: "Some, who were inclined to extreme views of the divine sovereignty, asserted the Scotist maxim that the will of God is the absolute rule of right. Luther's words are quite as explicit as those of Scotus. . . . 'The will of God', says Calvin . . . (VI. iii. 23). . . . Calvin, however, notwithstanding this strong statement, suggests after all that he meant not so much that God's will is absolutely the highest rule of right, as that it is one which we cannot transcend, and must regard as binding on our own judgment; for he adds, 'We represent not God as lawless, who is a law to Himself'."

⁶⁰ Cf. Bavinck, *Geref. Dogmatiek*, II. 226, who after remarking on Calvin's rejection of the Scotist notion of *potentia absoluta*, as a "profane invention"—adducing *Instt.* III. xxiii. 1-5; I. xvi. 3, II. vii. 5, IV. xvii. 24, *Comm. in Jes.* 239, in *Luk.* 118, adds: "The Romanists on this account charge Calvin with limiting and therefore denying God's omnipotence (Bellarmine, *De Gratia et Lib. Arbitrio*, III. c. 15). But Calvin is not denying that God can do more than He actually does, but only opposing such a *potentia absoluta* as is not connected with His Being or Virtues, and can therefore do all kinds of inconsistent things."

boundaries, by transfusing His own vigor into all things, breathes into them being, life and motion" (I. xiii. 14); while still again he does proclaim the will of God to be inscrutable by such creatures as we are and to constitute to us the law of righteousness, to be accepted as such without murmurings or questionings. In point of fact, all these charges are but several modes of expressing the dislike their authors feel for Calvin's doctrine of the sovereignty of the divine will, which, following Augustine, he declares to be "the necessity of things": they would fain brand this hated conception with some name of opprobrium, and, therefore, seek to represent Calvin now as hiding God deistically behind His own law, and now as reducing Him to a mere stream of causality, or at least to mere naked will.⁶¹ By thus declining alternately to contradictories they show sufficiently clearly that in reality Calvin's doctrine of God coincides with none of these characterizations.

The peculiarity of Calvin's conception of God, we perceive, is not indefiniteness, but reverential sobriety. Clearing his skirts of all Pantheistic, Deistic, Scotist notions,—and turning aside even to repudiate Manichaeism and Anthropomorphism (I. xiii. 1) — he teaches a pure theism

⁶¹ A flagrant example may be found in the long argument of F. C. Baur, *Die christl. Lehre von der Dreieinigkeit*, III. (1843), pp. 35 ff., where he represents the Calvinistic doctrine of election and reprobation as postulating in God a schism between mercy and justice which can be reduced only by thinking of Him as wholly indifferent to good and evil, and indeed of good and evil as a non-existent opposition. If justice is an equally absolute attribute with God as grace, he argues, then evil and good are at one, in that reality cannot be given to the attribute in which the absolute being of God consists without evil. Evil has the same relation to the absolute being of God as good; and "God is in the same sense the principle of evil as of good"; and "as God's justice cannot be without its object, God must provide this object". "But if evil as well as the good is from God, then on that very account evil is good: thus good and evil are entirely indifferent with respect to each other, and the absolute Dualism is resolved into the same absolute arbitrariness (*Willkür*) in which Duns Scotus had placed the absolute Being of God." This, however, is not represented as Calvin's view, but as the consequence of Calvin's view—as drawn out in the Hegelianizing dialectic of Baur.

which he looks upon as native to men (I. x. 3). The nature of this one God, he conceives, can be known to us only as He manifests it in His works (I. v. 9); that is to say, only in His perfections. What we call the attributes of God thus become to Calvin the sum of our knowledge of Him. In these manifestations of His character we see not indeed what He is in Himself, but what He is to us (I. x. 2); but what we see Him to be thus to us, He truly is, and this is all we can know about Him. We might expect to find in the *Institutes*, therefore, a comprehensive formal discussion of the attributes, by means of which what God is to us should be fully set before us. This, however, as we have already seen, we do not get.⁶² And much less do we get any metaphysical discussion of the nature of the attributes of God, their relation to one another, or to the divine essence of which they are determinations. We must not therefore suppose, however, that we get little or nothing of them, or little or nothing to the point. On the contrary, besides incidental allusions to them throughout the discussion, from which we may glean much of Calvin's conceptions of them, they are made the main subject of two whole chapters, the one of which discusses in considerable detail the revelation of the divine perfections in His works and deeds, the other the revelation made of them in His Word. We have already remarked upon the skill with which Calvin, at the opening of his discussion of the doctrine of God (ch. x), manages, under color of pointing out the harmony of the description of God given in the Scriptures with the conception of Him we may draw from His works, to bring all he had to say of the divine attributes at once before the reader's eye. The Scriptures, says he, are in essence here merely a plainer (I. xi. 1) republication of the general revelation given of God in His works and deeds: they "contain nothing" in

⁶² Cf. P. J. Muller, *De Godsleer van Zwingli en Calvin*, p. 40: "Neither in Zwingli nor in Calvin do we meet with a formal 'doctrine of the attributes' or with a classification of the attributes. No doubt it happens that both occasionally name a number of attributes together; and have something to say of each attribute in particular."

their descriptions of God, "but what may be known from the contemplation of the creatures" (I. x. 2, *med.*). And he illustrates this remark by quoting from Moses (Ex. xxxiv. 6), the Psalms (cxlv) and the prophets (Jer. ix. 24) passages in which God is richly described, and remarking on the harmony of the perfections enumerated with those which he had in the earlier chapter (v) pointed out as illustrated in the divine works and deeds. This comparison involves a tolerably full enumeration and some discussion of the several attributes, here on the basis of Scripture, as formerly (ch. v) on the basis of nature. He does not, therefore, neglect the attributes so much as deal with them in a somewhat indirect manner. And, we may add, in a highly practical way: for here too his zeal is to avoid "airy and vain speculations" of what God is in Himself and to focus attention upon what He is to us, that our knowledge of Him may be of the nature of a lively perception and religious reaction (I. x. 2 *init. et fin.*).

In a number of passages Calvin brings together a plurality of the attributes—his name for them is "virtues"⁶³—and even hints at a certain classification of them. One of the most beautiful of these passages formed the opening words of the first draft of the *Institutes*, but fell out in the subsequent revisions—to the regret of some, who consider it, on the whole, the most comprehensive description of God Calvin has given us.⁶⁴ It runs as follows: "The sum of holy

⁶³ *Virtutes Dei*, I. ii. 1; v. 9, 9, 10; x. 2. In xiii. 4 *med.* he uses the term *attributa*. In xiii. 1, speaking of the divine spirituality and immensity, he used *epitheta*.

⁶⁴ Köstlin, as cited, p. 62: "On the other hand,—and this is the most important for us,—there is not given in the *Institutes* any comprehensive presentation of the attributes, especially of the ethical attributes of God, nor is any such attempted anywhere afterwards; the first edition, which began with some comprehensive propositions about God as infinite wisdom, righteousness, mercy, etc., rather raises an expectation of something more in the later, more thoroughly worked out editions of the work: but these propositions fell out of the first edition and were never afterward developed." In the intermediate editions (1543-1550) this paragraph has taken the form of: "Nearly the whole sum of our wisdom—and this certainly should be esteemed true and solid wisdom—consists in two facts: the knowledge of God and of

doctrine consists of just these two points,—the knowledge of God and the knowledge of ourselves. These, now, are the things which we must keep in mind concerning God. First, we should hold fixed in firm faith that He is infinite wisdom, righteousness, goodness, mercy, truth, power (*virtus*) and life, so that there exists no other wisdom, righteousness, goodness, mercy, truth, power and life (Baruch iii. 31, 35; James i. 16), and wheresoever any of these things is seen, it is from Him (Rev. xvi. 1-4, 9). Secondly, that all that is in heaven or on earth has been created for His glory (Ps. cxlviii. 1-14; Dan. iii. 28, 29); and it is justly due to Him that everything, according to its own nature, should serve Him, acknowledge His authority, seek His glory and obediently accept Him as Lord and King (Rev. i. 25). Thirdly, that He is Himself a just judge, and will therefore be severely avenged on those who depart from His commandments, and are not in all things subject to His will; who in thought, word and deed have not sought His glory (Ps. lxxix. 10, 18; Rev. ii. 6, 11). In the fourth place that He is merciful and long-suffering, and will receive into His kingdom, the miserable and despised who take refuge in His clemency and trust in His faithfulness; and is ready to spare and forgive those who ask His favor, to succor and help those who seek His aid, and desirous of saving those who put their trust in Him (Is. lv. 3, 6; Ps. xxv. 6-11, lxxxv. 3-5, 10)." In the first clause of this striking paragraph we have a formal enumeration of God's ethical attributes, which is apparently meant to be generically com-

—ourselves. The one, now, not only shows that there is one God whom all ought to worship and adore, but at the same time teaches also that this one God is the source of all truth, wisdom, goodness, righteousness, justice, mercy, power, holiness, so that we are taught that we ought to expect and seek all these things from Him, and when we receive them to refer them to Him with praise and gratitude. The other, however, by manifesting to us our weakness, misery, vanity and foulness, first brings us into serious humility, dejection, diffidence and hatred of ourselves, and then kindles a longing in us to seek God, in whom is to be found every good thing of which we discover ourselves to be so empty and lacking."

plete,—although in the course of the paragraph other specific forms of attributes here enumerated occur; and all of them are declared to exist in God in an infinite mode. The list contains seven items: wisdom; righteousness; goodness (clemency); mercy (long-sufferingness); truth; power; life.⁶⁵ If we compare this list with the enumeration in the famous definition of God in the Westminster *Shorter Catechism* (Q. 4),⁶⁶ we shall see that it is practically the same: the only difference being that Calvin adds to the general term 'goodness' the more specific 'mercy', affixes 'life' at the end, and omits 'holiness', doubtless considering it to be covered by the general term 'righteousness'.

If just this enumeration does not recur in the *Institutes* as finally revised, something very like it evidently underlies more passages than one. Even in the first section of the first chapter, which has taken its place, we have an enumeration of the 'good things' (*bona*) in God which stand opposed to our 'evil things' (*mala*), that brings together wisdom, power, goodness and righteousness: for in God alone, we are told, can be found "the true light of *wisdom*, solid *power* (*virtus*), a perfect affluence of all *good* things, and the purity of *righteousness*" (I. i. 1). In the opening section of the next chapter we have two enumerations of the divine perfections, obviously rhetorical, and yet betraying an underlying basis of systematic arrangement: the later and fuller of these brings together power, wisdom, goodness, righteousness, justice, mercy,—closing with a reference to God's powerful 'protection'. God, we are told, "sustains this world by His immense *power* (*immensa potentia*), governs it by His *wisdom*, preserves it by His *goodness*, rules over the human race especially by His *righteousness* and *justice* (*judicium*), bears with it in His *mercy*, defends it by His *protection*

⁶⁵ In the list which takes the place of this in the middle editions of the *Institutes*, the order is different (and scarcely so regular), and 'life' is omitted, while 'justice' is added to 'righteousness', and 'sanctity' appended at the end, and 'potentia' substituted for 'virtus': "truth; wisdom; goodness; righteousness; *justice*; mercy; (power); *holiness*."

⁶⁶ "Wisdom, power, holiness, justice, goodness, and truth."

(*praesidium*).” The most complete enumerations of all, however, are given, when, leaving the intimations of nature, Calvin analyses some Scriptural passages with a view to drawing out their descriptions of the divine perfections. His analysis of Exod. xxxiv. 6 is particularly full (I. x. 2). He finds the divine eternity and self-existence embodied in the name Jehovah; the divine strength and power (*virtus et potentia*) expressed in the name Elohim; and in the description itself an enumeration of those virtues which describe God not indeed as He is *apud se*, but as He is *erga nos*—to wit, His clemency, goodness, mercy, righteousness, justice, truth. The strongest claim which this passage has on our interest, however, is the suggestion it bears of a classification of the attributes. The predication to God of eternity and self-existence (*αὐτοσύλα*) evidently is for Calvin something specifically different from the ascription to Him of those virtues by which are described not what He is *apud se*, but what He shows Himself to be *erga nos*. They in a word belong rather to the quiddity of God than to His *qualitas*. In a subsequent passage (xiii. 1) we have a plainer hint to the same effect. There we are given “two epithets” which we are told are applied by Scripture to the very “essence” of God, in its rare speech concerning His essence—immensity and spirituality.⁶⁷ It seems quite clear, then, that Calvin was accustomed to distinguish in his thought between such epithets, describing what God is *apud se*, and those virtues by which He is manifested to us in His relations *erga nos*. That is to say, he distinguishes between what are sometimes called His physical or metaphysical and His ethical attributes: that is to say, between the fundamental modes of the Divine Being and the constitutive qualities of the Divine Person.⁶⁸

If we profit by this hint and then collect the attributes

⁶⁷ Quod de immensa et spiritali Dei essentia traditur in Scripturis . . . parce de sua essentia disserit, duobus tamen illis quae dixi epithetis. . . .

⁶⁸ See the distinction very luminously drawn out by J. H. Thornwell, *Works*, I. 168-9.

of the two classes as Calvin occasionally mentions them, we shall in effect reconstruct Calvin's definition of God.⁶⁹ This would run somewhat as follows: There is but one only true God,⁷⁰ a self-existent,⁷¹ simple,⁷² invisible,⁷³ incomprehensible⁷⁴ Spirit,⁷⁵ infinite,⁷⁶ immense,⁷⁷ eternal,⁷⁸ perfect,⁷⁹ in His Being, power,⁸⁰ knowledge,⁸¹ wisdom,⁸² righteousness,⁸³ justice,⁸⁴ holiness,⁸⁵ goodness⁸⁶ and truth.⁸⁷ In ad-

⁶⁹ Perhaps as near as Calvin ever came to framing an exact definition of God *apud se*, is the description of God in the middle edd. of the *Institutes*, VI. 7 (*Opp.* xxix, 480), summed up in the opening words: "That there is one God of eternal, infinite and spiritual essence, the Scriptures currently declare with plainness." The *essence* of God then is eternal, infinite and spiritual. Cf. *Adv. P. Caroli Calumnias* (*Opp.* vii. 312): "The one God which the Scriptures preach to us we believe in and adore, and we think of Him as He is described to us by them, to wit, as of eternal, infinite and spiritual essence, who also alone has in Himself the power of existence from Himself and bestows it upon His creatures."

⁷⁰ unicus et verus Deus, I. ii. 2; unicus Deus, xii. 1; xiii. 2; unus Deus, ii. 1; v. 6; x. 3; xii. 1; verus Deus, x. 3; unitas Dei, xiii. 1, etc.

⁷¹ a se principium habens, v. 6; *abrovela*, x. 2; *abrovela*, id est a se ipso existentia, xiv. 3.

⁷² simplex Dei essentia, xiii. 2; simplex et individua essentia Dei, xiii. 2; una simplexque Deitas, *Adv. Val. Gent.*

⁷³ invisibilis Deus, II. vi. 4 (made visible in Christ, so also II. ix. 4); invisibilis I. xi. 3 (of Holy Spirit).

⁷⁴ incomprehensibilis v. 1; xi. 3 (in xiii. 1 apparently used for *immensa*).

⁷⁵ spiritualis Dei essentia, xiii. 1; spiritualis natura, xiii. 1.

⁷⁶ in Deo residet bonorum infinitas, i. 1 (cf. ed. I. I. *ad init* [p. 42], *infinitam*).

⁷⁷ immensa essentia Dei, xiii. 1; ejus immensitas, xiii. 1; immensitas, xiii. 1; immensa Dei essentia, xiii. 2.

⁷⁸ aeternitas, v. 6; x. 2; xiii. 17; xiv. 3; aeternus [Deus], v. 6.

⁷⁹ exacta justitiae, sapientiae virtutis ejus perfectio, i. 2.

⁸⁰ potentia, ii. 1; v. 3, 6, 8; x. 2; immensa potentia, ii. 1; v. 1, 3, 6, 8; omnipotentia, xvi. 3; omnipotens, xvi. 3; virtus, i. 1, 3; v. 6; x. 2; virtus et potentia, x. 2.

⁸¹ notitia, III. xxi. 5; praescientia, III. xxi. 5.

⁸² sapientia, i. 1, 3; ii. 1; v. 1, 2, 3, 8, 10; mirifica sapientia, v. 2.

⁸³ justitia, ii. 1; x. 2; III. xxiii. 4; justitiae puritas, i. 1; justitia judiciumque, ii. 1.

⁸⁴ judicium ii. 1; x. 2; justitia judiciumque, ii. 1; justus judex, ii. 1.

⁸⁵ sanctitas, x. 2; puritas, i. 3; divina puritas, i. 2.

⁸⁶ bonitas, ii. 1; v. 3, 6, 9; x. 1, 2; xv. 1: bonus, iii. 2.

⁸⁷ veritas, x. 2; Deus verax, III. xx. 26.

dition to these more general designations, Calvin employs a considerable number of more specific terms, by which he more precisely expresses his thought and more fully explicates the contents of the several attributes. Thus, for example, he is fond of the term "severity"⁸⁸ when he is endeavoring to give expression to God's attitude as a just judge to the wicked; and he is fond of setting in contrast with it the corresponding term "clemency"⁸⁹ to express His attitude towards the repentant sinner. It is especially the idea of "goodness" which he thus draws out into its several particular manifestations. Beside the term "clemency" he sets the still greater word "mercy", or "pity",⁹⁰ and by the side of this again he sets the even greater word "grace",⁹¹ while the more general idea of "goodness" he develops by the aid of such synonyms as "beneficence"⁹² and "benignity",⁹³ and almost exhausts the capacity of the language to give expression to his sense of the richness of the Divine goodness.⁹⁴ God is "good and merciful" (iii. 2), "benign and beneficent" (v. 7), "the fount and source of all good" (ii. 2), their fecund "author" (ii. 2), whose "will is prone to beneficence" (x. 1), and in whom dwells a "perfect affluence", nothing less than an "infinity", of good things. And therefore he looks upwards to this God not only as our Lord (ii. 1) the Creator (ii. 1), Sustainer (ii. 1) and Governor (ii. 1) of the world—and more particularly its "moral governor" (ii. 2), its "just judge" (ii. 2),—but more especially as our "defender and protector",⁹⁵ our Father⁹⁶ who is also

⁸⁸ *severitas*, ii. 2; v. 7, 10; xvii. 1.

⁸⁹ *clementia*, v. 7, 8, 10; x. 2.

⁹⁰ *misericordia*, ii. 1; x. 2; *misericors*, iii. 2 (*bonus et misericors*).

⁹¹ *gratia*, v. 3.

⁹² *beneficus*, v. 7; *voluntas ad beneficentiam proclivis*, x. 1; *Dei favor et beneficentia*, xvii. 1.

⁹³ *benignitas*, v. 7; *benignus et beneficus*, v. 7.

⁹⁴ *bonus et misericors*, iii. 2; *benignus et beneficus*, v. 7; *bonorum omnium fons et origo*, ii. 2; *bonorum omnium autor*, ii. 2; *voluntas ad beneficentiam proclivis*, x. 1; *bonorum omnium perfecta affluentia*, i. 1; *in Deo residet bonorum infinitas*, i. 1.

⁹⁵ *tutor et protector*, ii. 2.

⁹⁶ *Dominus et Pater*, ii. 2.

our Lord, in whose "fatherly indulgence"⁹⁷ we may trust.

There is in the *Institutes* little specific exposition of the manner in which we arrive at the knowledge of these attributes. The works of God, we are told, illustrate particularly His wisdom (v. 2) and His power (v. 6). But His power, we are further told, leads us on to think of His eternity and His self-existence, "because it is necessary that He from whom everything derives its origin, should Himself be eternal and have the ground of His being in Himself":⁹⁸ while we must posit His goodness to account for His will to create and preserve the world.⁹⁹ By the works of providence God manifests primarily His benignity and beneficence; and in His dealing with the pious, His clemency, with the wicked His severity¹⁰⁰—which are but the two sides of His righteousness: although, of course, His power and wisdom are equally conspicuous.¹⁰¹ It is precisely the same body of attributes which are ascribed to God in the Scriptures,¹⁰² and that not merely in such a passage as Ex. xxxiv. 6, to which we have already alluded, but everywhere throughout their course (x. 1, *fin.*). Psalm cxl, for example, so exactly enumerates the whole list of God's perfections that scarcely one is lacking. Jeremiah ix. 24, while not so full, is to the same effect. Certainly the three perfections there mentioned are the most necessary of all for us to know,—the divine "mercy in which alone consists all our salvation; His justice, which is exercised on the wicked every day, and awaits them more grievously still in eternal destruction; His righteousness, by which the faithful are preserved and most lovingly supported." "Nor" adds Calvin, is there any real omission here of the other perfections—"either of His truth, or power, or holi-

⁹⁷ Paterna indulgentia, v. 7.

⁹⁸ v. 6: iam ipsa potentia nos ad cogitandam ejus aeternitatem deducit; quia aeternum esse, et a se ipso principium habere necesse est unde omnium trahunt originem.

⁹⁹ *Do.*

¹⁰⁰ v. 7.

¹⁰¹ v. 8.

¹⁰² x. 2.

ness, or goodness". "For how could we be assured, as is here required, of His righteousness, mercy and justice, unless we were supported by His inflexible veracity? And how could we believe that He governs the world in justice and righteousness unless we acknowledged His power? And whence proceeds His mercy but from His goodness? And if all His ways are justice, mercy, righteousness, certainly holiness also is conspicuous in them." The divine power, righteousness, justice, holiness, goodness, mercy, and truth are here brought together and concatenated one with the others, with some indication of their mutual relations, and with a clear intimation that God is not properly conceived unless He is conceived in all His perfections. Any description of Him which omits more or fewer of these perfections, it is intimated, is justly chargeable with defect. Similarly when dealing with those more fundamental "epithets" by which His essence is described (xii. 1), he makes it plain that not to embrace them all in our thought of God, and that in their integrity, is to invade His majesty: the fault of the Manichaeans was that they broke up the unity of God and restricted His immensity.¹⁰⁸

There is no lack in Calvin's treatment of the attributes, then, of a just sense of their variety or of the necessity of holding them all together in a single composite conception that we may do justice in our thought to God. He obviously has in mind the whole series of the divine perfections in clear and just discrimination, and he accurately conceives them as falling apart into two classes, the one qualities of the divine essence, the other characteristics of the Divine person—in a word, essential and personal attributes: and he fully realizes the relation of these two classes to one another, and as well the necessity of embracing each of the attributes in its integrity in our conception of God, if we are to do any justice whatever to that conception.

What seems to be lacking in Calvin's treatment of the

¹⁰⁸ I. xiii. 1: *Certe hoc fuit et Dei unitatem abrumpere, et restringere immensitatem.*

attributes is detailed discussion of the notion imbedded in each several attribute and elaboration of this notion as a necessary element in our conception of God. Calvin employs the terms unity, simplicity, self-existence, incomprehensibility, spirituality, infinity, immensity, eternity, immutability, perfection, power, wisdom, righteousness, justice, holiness, goodness, benignity, beneficence, clemency, mercy, grace,¹⁰⁴ as current terms bearing well-understood meanings, and does not stop to develop their significance except by incidental remarks.^{104a} The confidence which he places in their conveyance of their meaning seems to be justified by the event; although, no doubt, much of the effect of their mere enumeration is due to the remarkable lucidity of Calvin's thought and style: he uses his terms with such consistency and exactness, that they become self-defining in their context. We are far, then, from saying that his method of dealing with the attributes, by mere allusion as we might almost call it, is inadequate for the practical religious purpose for which he was writing: and certainly it is far more consonant with the literary rather than scholastic form he gives his treatise. When we suggest, then, that from the scholastic point of view it seems that it is precisely at this point that Calvin's treatment of the attributes falls

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somewhat short of what we might desire, we must not permit to slip out of our memory that Calvin expressly repudiates the scholastic point of view and is of set purpose simple and practical.¹⁰⁵ He does not seek to obtain for himself or to recommend to others such a knowledge of God as merely 'raises idle speculation in the brain'; but such as 'shall be firm and fruitful' and have its seat in the heart. He purposely rejects, therefore, the philosophical mode of dealing with the attributes and devotes himself to awakening in the hearts of his readers a practical knowledge of God, a knowledge which functions first in the fear (*timor*) of God and then in trust (*fiducia*) in Him.

And here we must pause to take note of this two-fold characterization of the religious emotion, corresponding, as it does in Calvin's conception, to the double aspect in which God is contemplated by those who know Him. God is our

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Lord, in whose presence awe and reverence become us; God is our Father, to whom we owe trust and love. Fear and love—both must be present where true piety is: for, says Calvin, what “I call piety (*pietas*) is that reverence combined with love of God, which a knowledge of His benefits produces” (I. ii. 1). In the form he has given this statement the element of reverence (*reverentia*) appears to be made the formative element: piety is reverence, although it is not reverence without love. But if it is not reverence in and of itself but only the reverence which is informed by love, love after all may be held to become the determining element of true piety. And Calvin does not hesitate to declare with the greatest emphasis that the apprehension of God as deserving of our worship and adoration—in a word as our Lord—*simpliciter*, does not suffice to produce true piety: that is not born, he says, until “we are persuaded that God is the fountain of all that is good and cease to seek for good elsewhere than in Him” (*ibid.*); that is to say, until we apprehend Him as our Father as well as our Lord. “For”, adds he, “until men feel that they owe everything to God, that they are cherished by His paternal care, that He is the author to them of all good things and nothing is to be sought out of Him, they will never subject themselves to Him in willing obedience (*observantia*, *reverent* obedience); or rather I should say, unless they establish for themselves a solid happiness in Him they will never devote themselves to Him without reserve truly and heartily (*vere et ex animo totos*).” And then he proceeds (I. ii. 2) to expound at length how the knowledge of God should first inspire us with fear and reverence and then lead us to look to Him for good. The first thought of Him awakes us to our dependence on Him as our Lord: any clear view of Him begets in us a sense of Him as the fountain and origin of all that is good,—such as in anyone not depraved by sin must inevitably arouse a desire to adhere to Him and put his trust (*fiducia*) in Him,—because he must recognize in Him a guardian and protector worthy of complete confidence

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We have quoted this eloquent passage at length because it throws into prominence, as few others do, Calvin's deep sense not merely of reverence but of love towards God. To him true religion always involves the recognition of God not only as Lord but also as Father. And this double conception of God is present whether this religion be conceived as natural or as revealed. "The knowledge of God", says he (I. x. 2 *fin.*), "which is proposed to us in the Scriptures is directed to no other end than that which is manifested to us in the creation: to wit, it invites us first to the fear of God, then to trust in Him; so that we may learn both to serve Him in perfect innocence of life and sincere obedi-

ence, and as well to rest wholly in His goodness." That is, in a word, the sense of the divine Fatherhood is as fundamental to Calvin's conception of God as the sense of His sovereignty. Of course, he throws the strongest conceivable emphasis on God's Lordship: the sovereignty of God is the hinge of His thought of God. But this sovereignty is ever conceived by him as the sovereignty of God our Father. The distinguishing feature of Calvin's doctrine of God is, in a word, precisely the prevailing stress he casts on this aspect of the conception of God. It is a Lutheran theologian who takes the trouble to make this plain to us. "The chief elements which are dealt with by Calvin in the matter of the religious relation", he says, "are summed up in the proposition: God is our Lord, who has made us, and our Father from whom all good comes; we owe Him, therefore, honor and glory, love and trust. We must, so we are told in the exposition of the Decalogue in the first edition of the *Institutes*, just as we are told in Luther's Catechism—we must 'fear and love' God. . . . [But] we find in the *Institutes*, and, indeed, particularly in the final edition, expressions in which the second of these elements is given the preference. . . . We may find, indeed, in Luther and the Lutherans, the element of fear in piety still more emphasized than in Calvin."¹⁰⁶ In a word, with all his emphasis on the sovereignty of God, Calvin throws an even stronger emphasis on His love: and his doctrine of God is preëminent among the doctrines of God given expression in the Reformation age in the commanding place it gives to the Divine Fatherhood. "Lord and Father"—fatherly sovereign, or sovereign Father—that is how Calvin conceived God.

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Certainly the zeal of Calvin burned warmly against the dishonor he felt was done to God by the methods of worshipping Him prevalent in the old Church. God has revealed Himself not only in His Word, but also in His works, as the one only true God. But the vanity of man has ever tended to corrupt the knowledge of God and to invent gods many and lords many, and not content with that, has sunk even to the degradation of idolatry,—fabricating gods of wood or stone, gold or silver, or some other dead stuff. It is, of course, not idolatry in general, but the idolatry of the Church of Rome that Calvin has his eye particularly upon, as became him as a practical man, absorbed in the real problems of his time. He therefore particularly animadvertes upon the more refined forms of idolatry, ruthlessly reducing them to the same level in principle with the grossest. God does not compare idols with idols, he says, as if one were better and another worse: He repudiates all without exception,—all images, pictures or any the fundamental tendency to which they all belong. This can be represented as a dominating protest against all that is pagan"; p. 25: "Protestation against the deification of the creature is therefore everywhere the dominating, all determining impulse of Reformed Protestantism". (Cf. pp. 40, 59, and the exposition there of how this principle worked to prevent all half-measures and inconsequences in the development of Reformed thought.) Cf. also Scholten, *De Leer d. Hervormde Kerk.*, II. 13: "Schweizer finds the characteristic of the Reformed doctrine in the Biblical principle of man's entire dependence on God, together with protestation on the ground of original Christianity against any heathenish elements which had seeped into the church and its teaching. That in the opposition of the Reformed to Rome, such an aversion to all that is heathenish exhibited itself, history tells us, and cannot be denied"; p. 17: "The maintenance of the sovereignty of God is the point from which, with the Reformed, everything proceeds. Hence as well their protest against the pagan element in the Romish worship" . . . ; p. 151: "What led Luther to repudiate the intercession and adoration of Mary and the saints was primarily the conviction that the saints are sinners and their intercession and merits, therefore, cannot avail us, cannot cover our sins before God. Zwingli and Calvin take their starting point here, from the conception of *God* and deny that the love of *God* can be dependent on any intercession, and reject the worship of Mary and the honoring of the saints as a deification of creatures, and an injury to the sovereignty of God" (cf. also pp. 139-140: 16 sq.).

other kind of tokens by which superstitious people have imagined He could be brought near to them (I. xi. 1, end). He embraces all forms of idolatry, however, in his comprehensive refutation; he even expressly adverts to the "foolish subterfuge" (*inepta cautio*) of the Greeks, who allow painted but not graven images (I. xi. 4, end). Or rather he broadens his condemnation until it covers even the false conceptions of God which we frame in our imaginations (I. xi. 4, *init.*), substituting them for the revelations He makes of Himself: for the "mind of man", he says, "is, if I may be allowed the expression, a perpetual factory of idols" (I. xi. 8). Thus he returns to "the Puritan conception" which we have seen him already announcing in former chapters, and proclaims as his governing principle (I. xi. 4 *med.*) that "all modes of worship which men excogitate from themselves are detestable".¹⁰⁹

He does not content himself, however, with proclaiming and establishing this principle. He follows the argument for the use of images in worship into its details and refutes it item by item. To the plea that "images are the books of the illiterate" and by banishing them he is depriving the people of their best means of instruction, he replies that no doubt they do teach something, but what they teach is falsehood: God is not as they represent Him (§§ 5-7). To the caveat that no one worships the idols, but the deity through the idols; that they are never called 'gods' and that what is offered them is *δουλεία* not *λατρεία*;—he replies that all this is distinction without difference; the Jews in their idolatry reasoned in a similar manner, and it is easy to erect a distinction between words, but somewhat more difficult to establish a real difference in fact (§§ 9-11). To the reproach that he is exhibiting a fanaticism against the representative arts, he rejoins that such is far from the case; he is only seeking to protect these arts from abusive application to wrong purposes (§ 12, 13). And finally to the

¹⁰⁹ Ut hoc fixum sit, detestabiles esse omnes cultus quos a se ipsis homines excogitant.

appeal to the decisions of the Council of Nice of 786-7 favorable to image-worship, he replies by an exposure of the "disgusting insipidities" and "portentous impiety" of the image-worshipping fathers at that Council (§ 14 *sq.*). The discussion is then closed (ch. xii), with a chapter in which he urges that God alone is to be worshipped and only in the way of His own appointment; and above all that His glory is not to be given to another. Thus the ever-present danger of idolatry, as evidenced in the gross practices of Rome, is itself invoked to curb speculation on the nature of the Godhead and to throw men back on the simple and vitalizing revelation of the word of a God like us in that He is a spiritual person, but unlike us in that He is clothed in inconceivable majesty. These two epithets—immensity and spirituality—thus stand out as expressing the fundamental characteristics of the divine essence to Calvin's thinking: His immensity driving us away in terror from any attempt to measure Him by our sense; His spirituality prohibiting the entertainment of any earthly or carnal speculation concerning Him.¹¹⁰

In the course of this discussion there are three matters on which Calvin somewhat incidentally touches which seem too interesting to be passed over unremarked. These are what we may call his philosophy of idolatry, his praise of preaching, and his recommendation of art.

His philosophy of idolatry¹¹¹ takes the form of a psychological theory of its origin. While allowing an important place in the fostering and spread of idolatry to the ancient customs of honoring the dead and superstitiously respecting their memory, he considers idolatry more ancient than these customs, and the product of debased thoughts of God. He enumerates four stages in its evolution. First, the mind of man, filled with pride and rashness, dares to imagine a god after its own notion;¹¹² and laboring in its dullness and sunk in the crassest ignorance, naturally conceives a vain

¹¹⁰ I. xiii. i.

¹¹¹ I. xi. 8, 9.

¹¹² *pro captu suo*.

and empty spectre for God. Next man attempts to give an outward form to the God he has thus inwardly excogitated; so that the hand brings forth the idol which the mind begets. Worship follows hard on this figment: for, when they suppose they see God in the images, men naturally worship Him in them. Finally, their minds and eyes alike being fixed upon the images, men begin to become more imbruted, and stand amazed and lost in wonder before the images, as if there were something of divinity inherent in them. Thus easy Calvin supposes to be the descent from false notions of deity to the superstitious adoration of stocks and stones, and thus clearly and reiteratedly he discovers the roots of idolatry in false conceptions of God and proclaims its presence in principle wherever men permit themselves to think of God otherwise, in any particular, than He has revealed Himself in His works and word.

As we read Calvin's energetic arraignments of the sinfulness of our deflected conceptions of God,—the essential idolatry of the imaginary images we form of Him—and our duty diligently to conform our ideas of God to the revelations of Himself He has graciously given us, we are reminded of an eloquent picture which the late Professor A. Sabatier once drew¹¹³ of a concourse of professing Christians coming together to worship in common a God whom each conceives after his own fashion. Anthropomorphists, Deists, Agnostics, Pantheists—all bow alike before God and worship, says Prof. Sabatier: and the worship of one and all is acceptable, equally acceptable, to God. Not so, rejoins M. Bois:¹¹⁴ and there is not a less admirable spectacle in the world than this. Calvin was of M. Bois' opinion. To his thinking we have before us in such a concourse only a company of idolaters—each worshipping not the God that is but the God who in the pride of his heart he has made himself. And to each and all Calvin sends out the cry of,

¹¹³ In his *Discourse on the Evolution of Religion*, quoted by H. Bois, *De la Connaissance Religieuse*, p. 35.

¹¹⁴ As above, p. 36.

Repent! turn from the God you have made yourself and serve the God that is!

It is in the midst of his response to the specious plea that images are the books of the illiterate and the only means of instruction available for them that Calvin breaks out into a notable eulogy on preaching as God's ordained means of instructing His people (I. xi. 7). Even though images, he remarks, were so framed that they bore to the people a message which might be properly called divine—which too frequently is very far from the case—their childish suggestions (*naeniae*) are little adapted to convey the special teaching which God wishes to be taught His people in their solemn congregations, and has made the common burden of His Word and Sacraments,—from which it is to be feared, however, the minds of the people are fatally distracted as their eyes roam around to gaze on their idols. Do you say the people are too rude and ignorant to profit by the heavenly message and can be reached only by means of the images? Yet these are those whom the Lord receives as His own disciples, honors with the revelation of His celestial philosophy and has commanded to be instructed in the saving mysteries of His kingdom! If they have fallen so low as not to be able to do without such "books" as images supply, is not that only because they have been defrauded of the teaching which they required? The invention of images, in a word, is an expedient demanded not by the rudeness of the people so much as by the dumbness of the priests. It is in the true preaching of the Gospel that Christ is really depicted—crucified before our eyes openly, as Paul testifies: and there can be no reason to crowd the churches with crucifixes of wood and stone and silver and gold, if Christ is faithfully preached as dying on the cross to bear our curse, expiating our sins by the sacrifice of His body, cleansing us by His blood and reconciling us to God the Father. From this simple proclamation more may be learned than from a thousand crosses. Thus Calvin vindicates to the people of God their dignity as God's children taught by

His Spirit, their right to the Gospel of grace, their capacity under the instruction of the Spirit to receive the divine message, and the central place of the preaching of the atonement of Christ in the ordinances of the sanctuary.

It seems the more needful that we should pause upon Calvin's remarks on art in this discussion long enough to take in their full significance, that this is one of the matters on which he has been made the object of persistent misrepresentation. It has been made the reproach of the Reformation in general and of Calvinism in particular that they have morosely set themselves in opposition to all artistic development, while Calvin himself has been inveighed against as the declared enemy of all that is beautiful in life. Thus, for example, Voltaire in his biting verse has explained that the only art which flourished at Geneva (where men cyphered but could not laugh) was that of the money-reckoners: and that nothing was sung there but the antique concerts of "the good David" in the belief "that God liked bad verses". Even professed students of the subject have passionately assailed Calvin as insensible to the charms of art and inimical to all forms of artistic expression. Thus, M. D. Courtois, the historian of sacred music among the French Reformed, permits himself, quite contrary to the facts in the sphere of his own especial form of art, to say that Calvin "nourished a holy horror for all that could resemble an intrusion of art into the religious domain"; and M. E. Müntz, who writes on "Protestantism and Art", exclaims that "in Calvin's eyes beauty is tantamount to idolatry"; while M. O. Douen, the biographer of Clément Marot, brands Calvin as "anti-liberal, anti-artistic, anti-human, anti-Christian". The subject is too wide to be entered upon here in its general aspects. Professor E. Doumergue and Dr. A. Kuyper have made all lovers of truth their debtors by exposing to the full the grossness of such calumnies.¹¹⁵

¹¹⁵ See: A. Kuyper, *Calvinisme en de Kunst*, 1888; *Calvinism*, Stone Lectures for 1898-99, Lecture 5; E. Doumergue, *L'Art et le Sentiment*

In point of fact Calvin was a lover and fosterer of the arts, counting them all divine gifts which should be cherished, and expressly declaring even of those which minister only to pleasure that they are by no means to be reckoned superfluous and are certainly not to be condemned as if forsooth they were inimical to piety. Even in the heat of this arraignment of the misuse of art-representations in idolatry which is at present before us, we observe that he turns aside to guard himself against being misunderstood as condemning art-representations in general (§ 12). The notion that all representative images are to be avoided he brands as superstition and declares of the products both of the pictorial and of the sculptural arts that they are the gifts of God granted to us for His own glory and our good. "I am not held", he says, "in that superstition, which considers that no images at all are to be endured. I only require that since sculptures and pictures are gifts of God, the use of them should be pure and legitimate; lest what has been conferred on us by God for His own glory and for our good, should not only be polluted by preposterous abuse, but even turned to our injury." Here is no fanatical suspicion of beauty: no harsh assault upon art. Here is rather the noblest possible estimate of art as conducive in its right employment to the profit of man and the glory of the God who gives it. Here is only an anxiety manifested to protect such a noble gift of God from abuse to wrong ends. Accordingly in the "Table or brief summary of the principal matters contained in this Institution of the Christian religion", which was affixed to the French edition of 1560, the contents of this section are described as follows: "That when idolatry is condemned, this is not to abolish the arts of painting and sculpture, but to require that the use of both shall be pure and legitimate, and we are not to amuse ourselves in the Work of Calvin, 1902 (the second "Conference" is on "Painting in the Work of Calvin"); *Jean Calvin*, etc., II. 479-487; *Calvin et l'Art* in *Foi et Vie*, 16 May, 1900. Cf. also H. Bavinck, *De Algemene Genade*; also Article "Calvin and Common Grace" in this number of this REVIEW, pp. 437-465.

selves by representing God by some visible figure but only such things as may be objects of sight."¹¹⁶ Calvin, then, does not at all condemn art, but only pleads for a pure and reverent employment of art as a high gift of God, to be used like all others of God's gifts so as to profit man and glorify the Great Giver.

If we inquire more closely what he held to be a legitimate use of the pictorial arts, we must note first of all that he utterly forbids all representations of God in visible figures.¹¹⁷ This prohibition he rests on two grounds: first, God Himself forbids it; and secondly, "it cannot be done without some deformation of His glory",—in which we catch again the note of zeal against everything which detracts from the honor of God. To attempt the portraiture of God is, thus, to Calvin, not merely to disobey God's express command, but also to dishonor Him by an unworthy representation of Him, which is essential idolatry. Highly as he esteemed the pictorial arts, as worthy of all admiration in their true sphere, he condemned utterly pressing them beyond their mark, lest even they should become procurers to the Lords of Hell. We note secondly that he dissuaded from the ornamentation of the churches with the products of the representative arts;¹¹⁸ but this on the ground not of the express commandment of God or of an inherent incapacity of art to serve the purposes contemplated, but of simple expediency.¹¹⁹ Experience teaches us, he says, that to set up images in the churches is tantamount to raising the standard of idolatry, because the folly of man is so great that it immediately falls to offering them superstitious worship. And a deeper reason lies behind, which would determine his judgment even if this peril were not so great. The

¹¹⁶ *Opp.* iv. 1195. Cf. the parallel remark in the *Genevan Catechism* of 1545 (*Opp.* vi. 55): "It is not to be understood then, that all sculpture and painting are forbidden, in general; but only all images which are made for divine service or for honoring Him in things visible, or in any way abusing them in idolatry."

¹¹⁷ *Deum effingi visibile specie nefas esse putamus.*

¹¹⁸ Ch. xiii.

¹¹⁹ *expediat.*

Lord has Himself ordained living and expressive images of His grace for His temples, by which our eyes should be caught and held, — such ceremonies as Baptism and the Lord's Supper,—and we cannot require others fabricated by human ingenuity; and it seems unworthy of the sanctity of the place to intrude them. There is, of course, an echo here of Calvin's fundamental "Puritan principle" with reference to the worship of God: his constant and unhesitating contention that only that worship which is ordained by Himself is acceptable to God. Had God desired the aid of pictorial representations to quicken the devotions of His people He would have ordained them: to employ them is in principle to despise the provisions He has made and to invent others—and we may be sure inadequate if not misleading ones—for ourselves.

This is not the place to inquire into Calvin's positive theory of art-representation. It is worth while, however, as illustrating the wide interests of the man, to note that he has such a theory and betrays the fact that he has it and somewhat of the lines on which it runs, in incidental remarks, even in such a discussion as this. It emerges, for example, that he would confine the sphere of the representative arts to the depicting of objects of sight (*ea sola quorum sint capaces oculi*)—of such things as the eye sees. Of these, however, he discovers two classes,—“histories and transactions” on the one side, “images and forms of bodies” on the other.¹²⁰ The former may be made useful for purposes of instruction or admonition, he thinks; the latter, so far as he sees, serve only the ends of delectation. Both are, however, alike legitimate, if only they be kept to their proper places and used for their proper ends: for the delectation of man is as really a human need as his instruction. So little does Calvin then set himself with stern moroseness against all art-representation, that he is found actually forming a

¹²⁰ A. Bossert, *Calvin*, 1906, pp. 203-4, after quoting this statement of Calvin's adds: "It is the program of Dutch painting", in this repeating what E. Doumergue in his "Conference" on "Painting in the Work of Calvin" (as cited, pp. 36-51) had fully set forth.

comprehensive theory of art-representation and pleading for its use, not only for the profit, but also for the pleasure of man.

It remains to speak of Calvin's doctrine of the Trinity.

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CALVIN AND COMMON GRACE.

Christianity has from the beginning laid claim to be the one true religion. Already in the Old Testament the consciousness exists that Jehovah alone is Elohim and that the gods of the heathen are things of naught and vanity; and in the New Testament the Father of Jesus Christ is the only true God, whom the Son reveals and declares, and access to whom and communion with whom the Son alone can mediate. This conviction of the absoluteness of the Christian religion has entered so deeply into the consciousness of the Church that the whole history of Christian doctrine may be viewed as one great struggle for upholding it over against all sorts of opposition and denial. For the life of the Church as well as for every individual man the fundamental question is: What think ye of the Christ? This was the issue in the christological and anthropological controversies of the ancient Church, this the issue at the time of the Reformation and in the age of the "Enlightenment", and this is still the issue at the present day in the spiritual battles witnessed by ourselves. No progress can be marked in this respect: the question of the ages is still the question of our time,—Is Christ a teacher, a prophet, one of the many founders of religions; or is he the Only-begotten from the Father, and therefore the true and perfect revelation of God?

But if Christianity bears such an absolute character, this fact immediately gives rise to a most serious problem. The Christian religion is by no means the sole content of history; long before Christianity made its appearance there existed in Greece and Rome a rich culture, a complete social organism, a powerful political system, a plurality of religions, an order of moral virtues and actions. And even now, underneath and side by side with the Christian religion a rich stream of natural life continues to flow. What, then, is the relation of

Christianity is this wealth of natural life which, originating in creation, has under the law there imposed upon it, descended from age to age? What is the connection between nature and grace, creation and regeneration, culture and Christianity, earthly and heavenly vocation, the man and the Christian? Nor can it be said that this problem has now for the first time forced itself upon us, owing to the wide extension of our world-knowledge, the entrance of the heathen nations into our field of vision and the extraordinary progress made by civilization. In principle and essence it has been present through all the ages,—in the struggle between Israel and the nations, in the contest between the Kingdom of Heaven and the world-power, in the warfare between the foolishness of the cross and the wisdom of the world.

To define this relation, Scripture draws certain lines which it is not difficult to trace. It proceeds on the principle that for man God is the supreme good. Whatever material or ideal possessions the world may offer, all these taken together cannot outweigh or even be compared with this greatest of all treasures, communion with God; and hence, in case of conflict with this, they are to be unconditionally sacrificed. "Whom have I in heaven but thee? and there is none upon earth that I desire besides thee." This, however, does not hinder earthly possessions from retaining a relative value. Considered in themselves they are not sinful or unclean; so long as they do not interfere with man's pursuit of the kingdom of heaven, they are to be enjoyed with thanksgiving. Scripture avoids both extremes, no less that of asceticism on the one hand than that of libertinism on the other hand. The recognition of this as a principle appears most clearly in its teaching that all things, the entire world with all its treasures, including matter and the body, marriage and labor, are created and ordained of God; and that Christ, although, when He assumed a true and perfect human nature, He renounced all these things in obedience to God's command, yet through His resurrection took them all back as henceforth purified of all sin and consecrated through

the Spirit. Creation, incarnation and resurrection are the fundamental facts of Christianity and at the same time the bulwarks against all error in life and doctrine.

It needs no pointing out, however, that in the first age Christians had to assume a preponderantly negative attitude towards the culture of their time. They were neither sufficiently numerous nor on the whole sufficiently influential in the world to permit of their taking an active, aggressive part in the affairs of state and society, of science and art. Besides this, all institutions and elements of culture were so intimately associated with idolatry and superstition that without offense to conscience it was impossible to take part in them. For the first Christians nothing was to be expected from the Graeco-Roman world but persecution and reproach. Consequently, nothing was left for them but to manifest their faith for the time being through the passive virtues of obedience and patience. Only gradually could the Church rise to the higher standpoint of trying all things and holding fast to that which is good, and adopt an eclectic procedure in its valuation and assimilation of the existing culture.

Often in the past, and again in our own time has the charge been brought against the Christian Church, that in applying this principle, it has falsified the original Gospel. Harnack finds in the history of doctrine a progressive Hellenizing of original Christianity. Hatch regards the entire Christian cultus, particularly that of the sacraments, in the light of a degeneration from the primitive Gospel. To Sohm the very idea of ecclesiastical law appears contradictory to the essence of the Christian Church. But such assertions partake of gross exaggeration. If in all these respects nothing but degeneration is to be found, it will be easy to show that to a considerable degree the degeneration must have set in with the Apostles and even with the writers of the synoptic Gospels, as has been freely acknowledged by not a few writers of recent date. The Christian Church is indeed charged with having falsified the original Gospel,

but those who bring the charge retain practically nothing of this Gospel or are at least unable to say in what this Gospel consisted. It is as a rule made out to have been a simple doctrine of morals with an ascetic tinge. Then the problem arises, how such a Gospel could ever have come into real contact with culture, especially to the extent of suffering corruption from culture. A conception is thus formed, both of the original Gospel and of the attitude of the Christian Church toward pagan culture, which is based wholly on fancy and is at war with all the facts.

For not only is the Gospel not ascetic, but even the Christian Church, at least in its first period, never adopted this standpoint. However much it might be on its guard against paganism, it never despised or condemned natural life as in itself sinful. Marriage and family life, secular calling and military estate, the swearing of the oath and the waging of war, government and state, science and art and philosophy,—all these were recognized from the beginning as divine institutions and as divine gifts. Hence theology early began to form relations with philosophy; the art of painting, as practiced in the catacombs, attached itself to the symbols and figures of antiquity; architecture shaped the churches after pagan models; music availed itself of the tunes which Graeco-Roman art had produced. On every hand a strong effort is perceptible to bring the new religion into touch with all existing elements of culture.

It was possible for the first Christians to do this because of their firm conviction that God is the Creator of heaven and earth, who in times past has never left Himself without witness to the heathen. Not only was there an original revelation, which, though in corrupted form, yet survived in tradition; it was also regarded as probable that certain philosophers had possessed a degree of acquaintance with the writings of the Jews. But in addition to this there existed in paganism a continued revelation through nature and the reason, in heart and conscience,—an illumination of the Logos, a speech from the wisdom of God through the hidden work-

ing of grace. *Anima naturaliter Christiana*, the man is older than the philosopher and the poet, Tertullian exclaimed, thus formulating a truth which lived in the hearts of all. No doubt among the heathen this wisdom has in many respects become corrupted and falsified; they retain only fragments of truth, not the one, entire, full truth. But even such fragments are profitable and good. The three sisters, logic, physics and ethics, are like unto the three wise men from the east, who came to worship in Jesus the perfect wisdom. The good philosophical thoughts and ethical precepts found scattered through the pagan world receive in Christ their unity and center. They stand for the desire which in Christ finds its satisfaction; they represent the question to which Christ gives the answer; they are the idea of which Christ furnishes the reality. The pagan world, especially in its philosophy, is a pedagogy unto Christ; Aristotle, like John the Baptist, is the forerunner of Christ. It behooves the Christians to enrich their temple with the vessels of the Egyptians and to adorn the crown of Christ, their king, with the pearls brought up from the sea of paganism.

In saying this, however, we by no means wish to imply that the attitude of the Church towards the world has at all times and in every respect measured up to the Church's high calling. *A priori* it is not to be expected that it should, inasmuch as every human development shows abnormal traits and the life of every individual Christian is tainted with error and sin. When the Church of Rome maintains that the Gospel has been preserved by her and unfolded in its original purity, this claim is made possible only through ascribing infallibility to the Church. But by the very act of subscribing to this dogma, Rome acknowledges that without such a supernatural gift the development could not have been kept pure. Further, by attributing this gift to the Pope alone, Rome admits the possibility of error not only in the *ecclesia discens* but also in the *ecclesia docens*, even where the latter convenes in œcumenical council. And Rome's confining the effect of this infallible guidance to papal de-

liverances *ex cathedra* involves the confession that the Roman Catholic system, as a whole, with all its teaching and practice, enjoys no immunity from corruption. The dogma of papal infallibility is not the ground or cause, but only one of the many consequences and fruits of the system. And this system itself has not grown up from one principle; it has been developed in the course of the ages by the coöperation of numerous factors,—a development the end of which has not yet been reached.

Although Roman Catholicism has been built up out of varied, even heterogeneous elements, it nevertheless forms a compact structure, a coherent view of the world and of life, shaped in all its parts by a religious principle. This religion embraces in the first place a series of supernatural, inscrutable mysteries, chief among which are the Trinity and the Incarnation. These truths have been entrusted to the Church to be preserved, taught and defended. To discharge these functions the Church, in the person of the Pope, as successor of Peter, needs the gift of infallibility. The doctrines are authoritatively imposed by the Church on all its members. The faith which accepts these mysteries has for its specific object the Church-dogma; it does not penetrate through the dogma to the things themselves of which the dogma is the expression; it does not bring into communion with God; it does not represent a religious but an intellectual act, the *assensus*, the *fides historica*. Faith is not a saving power in itself, but is merely preparatory to salvation; nevertheless, it is something meritorious because and in so far as it is an act of submission to ecclesiastical authority.

The Church, however, is not merely the possessor of supernatural truth; in the second place it is also the depository and dispenser of supernatural grace. As the Church doctrine is infinitely exalted above all human knowledge and science, so the grace kept and distributed by the Church far transcends nature. It is true this grace is, among other things, *gratia medicinalis*, but this is an accidental and adventitious quality. Before all else it is *gratia elevans*, some-

thing added to and elevating above nature. As such it entered into the image of God given to Adam before the Fall, and as such it again appears in the restoration to that original state. In view of its adding to exalted nature a supernatural element, it is conceived as something material, enclosed in the sacrament, and as such dispensed by the priest. Thus every man becomes, for his knowledge of supernatural truth and for his reception of supernatural grace, that is, for his heavenly salvation, absolutely dependent on the Church, the priest and the sacrament. *Extra ecclesiam nulla salus.*

But even this grace, which, to be sure, remains subject to loss and recovery until the end of life, does not assure man of attainment to fellowship with God. All it does is to impart to him the power whereby, if so choosing, he may merit, through good works, supernatural salvation, the *visio Dei*. Since work and reward must be proportionate, the good works which merit supernatural salvation must all be of a specific kind and therefore need to be defined and prescribed by the Church. The Church, besides being the depository of truth and the dispenser of grace, is in the third place also law-giver and judge. The satisfactions which the Church imposes are according to the character of the sins committed. The rapidity or slowness with which a man attains to perfection, how much time he shall spend in purgatory, how rich a crown he will receive in heaven,—all this depends on the number of extraordinary, supernatural works which he performs. Thus a spiritual hierarchy is created. There exists a hierarchy in the world of angels, and a hierarchy in the ecclesiastical organization, but there is a hierarchy also among the saints on earth and the blessed in heaven. In an ascending scale the saints, divided into orders and ranks, draw near to God, and in proportion as they become partakers of the divine nature are admitted to the worship and adoration of the deity.

In view of what has been said it is evident that truth, grace and good works bear, according to Rome, a specific, supernatural character. And because the Church is the

God-appointed depository of all these blessings, the relation between grace and nature coincides with that between the Church and the world. The world, the state, natural life, marriage and culture are not sinful in themselves; only they are of a lower order, of a secular nature, and, unless consecrated by the Church, easily become an occasion for sinning. This determines the function of the Church with reference to the world. It is the calling of the Church to declare unto the world that in itself the world is profane, but that nevertheless, through the consecration of the Church, it may become a vehicle of grace. Renunciation of the world and sovereignty over the world with Rome spring from one and the same principle. The celibacy of the priesthood and the elevation of marriage to the rank of a sacrament are branches of the same stem. The whole hierarchical idea is built on the sharp distinction between nature and grace. Where the supernatural character of the Church and the efficacy of the sacrament and the priestly office are concerned, this system brooks neither compromise nor concession; but aside from this, it leaves room for a great variety of steps and grades, of ranks and orders in holiness and salvation. The Church contains members that belong to it in body only, and members belonging to it with a part of their powers or with all their powers; it makes concessions to the weak and worships the saints; a lax morality and a severe asceticism, an active and a contemplative mode of life, rationalism and supernaturalism, unbelief and superstition equally find a place within its walls.

Towards the close of the Middle Ages this system had become corrupt in almost every respect. In the sphere of truth it had degenerated into nominalistic scholasticism; in the sphere of grace into demoralizing traffic in indulgences; in the sphere of good works into the immoral life of priests and monks. Numerous efforts were made to remedy these faults and to reform the Church from within. But the Reformation of the sixteenth century differed from all these attempts in that it not merely opposed the Roman

system in its excrescences but attacked it internally in the foundations on which it rested and in the principles out of which it had been developed. The Reformation rejected the entire system, and substituted for it a totally different conception of *veritas*, *gratia*, and *bona opera*. It was led to this new conception not through scientific reflections or philosophical speculations, but through earnest, heartfelt concern for the salvation of souls and the glory of God. The Reformation was a religious and ethical movement through and through. It was born out of the distress of Luther's soul.

When a helpless man, out of distress of soul, looks to the Gospel for deliverance, the Gospel will appear to him in a totally new light. All at once it ceases to be a set of supernatural, inscrutable mysteries to be received on ecclesiastical authority, with renunciation of the claims of reason, by meritorious assent. It straightway becomes a new Gospel, good tidings of salvation, revelation of God's gracious and efficacious will to save the sinner, something that itself imparts the forgiveness of sin and eternal life and therefore is embraced by lost man with joy, that lifts him above all sin and above the entire world to the high hope of a heavenly salvation. Hence it is no longer possible to speak of the Gospel with Rome as consisting of supernatural mysteries to be responded to by man in voluntary assent. The Gospel is not law, neither as regards the intellect nor as regards the will; it is in essence a promise, not a demand but a gift, a free gift of the divine favor; nay, in it the divine will itself through the Gospel addresses itself to the will, the heart, the innermost essence of man, and there produces the faith which rests in this divine will and builds on it and puts its trust in it through all perils, even in the hour of death.

By reason of this new conception of the Gospel, which in principle was but a return to the old, Scriptural conception, it could not be otherwise than that faith also should obtain a totally new significance. If the Gospel is not a *veritas* to which the *gratia* is added later on, but is itself *gratia* in its

very origin, the revelation of God's gracious will, and at the same time the instrument for making this will effective in the heart of man, then faith can no longer remain a purely intellectual assent. It must become the confidence in the gracious will of God, produced by God himself in man's heart; a surrender of the whole man to the divine grace; a resting in the divine promise; a receiving of a part in God's favor; admission into communion with him; an absolute assurance of salvation. With Rome, faith is but one of the seven preparations, which lead on to the reception of the *gratia infusa* in baptism, and hence bears no religious character; it is naught but a *fides historica*, which stands in need of the supplement of love in order to become complete and sufficient unto salvation. To the Reformers faith from its very first inception is religious in nature. As *fides justificans salvifica* it differs not in degree but in principle and essence from the *fides historica*. It has for its object God himself, God in Christ, and Christ in the garb of Holy Scripture, *Christum Evangelio suo vestitum*;¹ it is in its essence *firma certaue cognitio*,² *cordis magis quam cerebri, et affectus magis quam intelligentiae*,³ to be defined rather as *certitudo* than as *apprehensio*.⁴ Faith places beyond doubt *Dei bonitatem perspicue nobis propositam* and enables us to stand before God's presence *tranquillis animis*.⁵ Thus it is seen to be the principle of the true fear of God, for *primus ad pietatem gradus [est] agnoscere Deum esse nobis Patrem, ut nos tueatur, gubernet ac foveat, donec colligat in aeternam haereditatem regni sui*.⁶

To all the Reformers, therefore, there lies behind the Gospel and behind faith the gracious and efficacious will of God. Nay, more than this, in the Gospel and in faith the divine will is revealed and realized. This is the reason why the religious conception of the Gospel and of faith is with the Reformers most intimately connected with their belief

¹ Calvin, *Institutio*, II, 6, 4; III, 2, 6.

² III, 2, 7.

³ III, 2, 8.

⁴ III, 2, 14.

⁵ III, 2, 16.

⁶ II, 6, 4.

in predestination. We in our time no longer understand this. We have lost the habit of religious thinking, because we feel less for ourselves the personal need of communion with God, and so feel less of the impulse to interpret the world from a religious point of view. Instead, our age has learned to think in the terms of natural science; it has substituted for the divine will the omnipotent law and the omnipotent force of nature, and thus thrown itself into the arms of determinism. It claims to have long since outgrown the belief in predestination. And undoubtedly there exists between these two, however often they may be mixed and confounded, a difference of principle. Determinism is in principle rationalistic; it cherishes the delusion of being able to explain everything from the reign of natural law, holding that all existing things are rational since reason perceives that they could not be otherwise than they actually are. Predestination, on the other hand, is a thoroughly religious conception. While able to recognize natural law and to reckon with the forces of nature, it refuses to rest in this or to consider natural necessity the first and last word of history.

He who has learned to regard communion with God as the supreme good for his own person, must feel bound to work his way back, behind the world and all its phenomena, until he arrives at the will of God. He must seek an explanation of the origin, development and goal of the world-process, which shall be in accordance with that will and hence bear an ethico-religious character. This is the reason that, so soon as a religious movement appears in history, the problem of predestination comes to the front. In a way, this is true of all religions, but it applies with special pertinence to the history of the Christian religion. In proportion as the Christian religion is distinctly experienced and appreciated in its essence as true, full religion, as pure grace, it will also be felt to include, and that directly, without the need of dialectic deduction, the confession of predestination. Hence all the Reformers were

agreed on this point. It is true that with Luther it was afterwards, for practical reasons, relegated to the background, but even he never recanted or denied it. It was in the controversy about the *servum* or *liberum arbitrium* that the Reformation and humanism parted ways once for all. Erasmus was and continued to be a Romanist in spite of his ridicule of the monks. As late as 1537 Luther wrote to Capito: *nullum agnosco meum justum librum nisi forte de libero arbitrio et catechismum*. The doctrine of predestination, therefore, is no discovery of Calvin; before Calvin it had been professed by Luther and Zwingli. It sprang spontaneously from the religious experience of the Reformers. If Calvin introduced any modification, it consists in this, that he freed the doctrine from the semblance of harshness and arbitrariness and imparted to it a more purely ethico-religious character.

For, all affinity and agreement notwithstanding, Calvin differed from Luther and Zwingli. He shared neither the emotional nature of the one nor the humanistic inclinations of the other. When, in a manner as yet but very imperfectly known to us, he was converted, this experience was immediately accompanied by such a clear, deep and harmonious insight into Christian truth as to render any subsequent modification unnecessary. The first edition of the *Institutio* which appeared in March, 1536, was expanded and increased in the later issues, but it never changed, and the task which, in his view, the Reformation had to accomplish, remained from beginning to end his own goal in life. While Luther's faith was almost entirely absorbed in the *fides justificans*, and while Zwingli one-sidedly defined faith as *fides vivificans* or *regenerans*, Calvin widened the conception to that of *fides salvificans*,—a faith which renews the entire man in his being and consciousness, in soul and body, in all his relations and activities, and hence a faith which exercises its sanctifying influence in the entire range of life, upon Church and school, upon society and state, upon science and art. But in order to be able to perform this comprehensive

task,—in order to be truly, always and everywhere a *fides salvificans*, it was necessary for faith first of all to be fully assured of itself, and no longer to be tossed to and fro by every wind of doubt. This explains why, more than with Zwingli and Luther, faith is with Calvin unshaken conviction, firm assurance.

But if faith is to be such an unshaken assurance it must rest on a truth removed from all possibility of doubt; it must attest itself as real by its own witness and power in the heart of man. A house that will defy the tempest cannot be built on the sand. Behind faith, therefore, must lie the truth, the will and act of God. In other words, faith is the fruit or effect of election; it is the experience of an act of God. Always and everywhere Calvin recurs to this will of God. The world with its infinite multitude of phenomena, with its diversities and inequalities, its disharmonies and contrasts, is not to be explained from the will of the creature nor from the worth or unworthiness of man. It is true, inequality and contrast appear most pronounced in the allotment of man's eternal destiny. They are, however, by no means confined to this, but show themselves in every sphere, in the different places of habitation appointed for men, in the different gifts and powers conferred upon them in body and soul, in the difference between health and sickness, wealth and poverty, prosperity and adversity, joy and sorrow, in the varying ranks and vocations, and, last of all, in the fact itself that men are men and not animals. Let the opponents of the doctrine of election, therefore, answer the question, *cur homines sint magis quam boves aut asini, cur, quum in Dei manu esset canes ipsos fingere, ad imaginem suam formavit*.⁷ The more we reflect upon the world the more we are forced to fall back upon the hidden will of God and find in it the ultimate ground for both the existence of the world and its being what it is. All the standards of goodness and justice and righteous recompense and retribution for evil which we are accustomed to apply, prove wholly

⁷ III, 22, 1.

inadequate to measure the world. The will of God is, and from the nature of the case must be, the deepest cause of the entire world and of all the *varietas* and *diversitas* found in it. There is no more ultimate ground for this than the *absconditum Dei consilium*.⁸ The unfathomable mystery of the world compels the intellect and the heart, theology and philosophy alike to fall back upon the will of God and seek rest in it.

It frequently happens, however, that theology and philosophy are not contented with this. They then endeavor, after the manner of Plato and Hegel, to offer a rational explanation of the world. Or, while falling back upon the will of God, they make out of this will a *βυθὸς ἀγνωστος*, as is done by Gnosticism, or a blind, irrational and unhappy will, as is done by Schopenhauer, or an unconscious and unknowable power, as is done by von Hartmann and Spencer. By his Christian faith Calvin was kept from these different forms of pantheism. It is true, Calvin upholds with the utmost energy the sovereignty of the divine will over and against all human reasoning. Predestination belongs to the *divinae sapientiae adyta* which man may not enter and in regard to which his curiosity must remain unsatisfied; for they form a labyrinth from which no one can find the exit. Man may not even investigate with impunity the things God meant to keep secret. God wants us to adore, not to comprehend, the majesty of His wisdom.⁹ Nevertheless God is not *exlex*. He sufficiently vindicates His justice by convicting of guilt those who blaspheme Him in their own consciences. His will is not absolute power, but *ab omni vitio pura, summa perfectionis regula, etiam legum omnium lex*.¹⁰ And the Gospel reveals to us what is the content, the heart and the kernel, as it were, of this will.

For since the Fall nature no longer reveals to us God's paternal favor. On every side it proclaims the divine curse which cannot but fill our guilty souls with despair. *Ex mundi conspectu Patrem colligere non licet*.¹¹ Aside from

⁸ III, 22, 1; 23, 2.

⁹ III, 21, 1.

¹⁰ III, 23, 2.

¹¹ II, 6, 1.

the special revelation in Christ, man has no true knowledge of heavenly things. He is ignorant and blind as respects God, His fatherhood and His law as the rule of life. Especially of the *divinae erga nos benevolentiae certitudo* he is without the faintest consciousness, for human reason neither can attain nor strives to attain to this truth, and therefore fails to understand *quis sit verus Deus, qualisve erga nos esse velit*.¹² And herein precisely consists the essence of God's special revelation in Christ, and this is the central content of the Gospel: God here makes Himself known to us not merely as our *Creator*, but as our *Redemptor*.¹³ He does not here tell us what He is, to enable us to indulge in speculation, but causes us to know *qualis sit et quid ejus naturae conveniat*.¹⁴ The *gratuita promissio*, the *promissio misericordiae*, the *liberalis legatio qua sibi Deus mundum reconciliat*,—these constitute the essence of the Gospel and the firm foundation of faith.¹⁵ He is a true believer, who, firmly convinced that God is to him a gracious and loving Father, expects everything from His loving-kindness. *Fidelis non est, nisi qui suae salutis securitati innixus, diabolo et morti confidenter insultet*.¹⁶

This concentration of the Gospel in the promise of divine mercy not only provided Calvin with a firm footing in the midst of the shifting opinions of his time, but also widened his outlook and enlarged his sympathies, so that, while resolutely standing by his own confession, he nevertheless perpetually mediated the things that made for unity and peace among all the sons of the Reformation. To be sure, the conception usually formed of Calvin differs widely from this. His image as commonly portrayed has for its only features those of cruel severity and despotic intolerance. But such a conception does grave injustice to the Genevan Reformer. Unfortunately, he must be held responsible for the death of Servetus, although in this respect he only stands on a level with the other Reformers, none of whom had

¹² II, 2, 18.¹³ I, 2, 1; II, 6, 1.¹⁴ I, 2, 2.¹⁵ III, 2, 29.¹⁶ III, 2, 16.

entirely outgrown all the errors of their age. But the Calvin who gave his approval to the execution of Servetus is not the only Calvin we know. There is also a far different Calvin, one who was united with his friends in the bonds of the most tender affection, whose heart went out in sympathy to all his suffering and struggling brethren in the faith, one who identified himself with their lot, and supplied them with comfort and courage and cheer in their severest afflictions. We know of a Calvin who without intermission labored most earnestly for the union of the divided Protestants, who sought God in His Word alone and was unwilling to bind himself even to such terms as "Trinity" and "Person", who refused to subscribe to the Nicene and Athanasian creeds, who discountenanced every disruption of the Church on the ground of minor impurities of doctrine, who favored fraternal tolerance in all questions touching the form of worship. There was a Calvin, who, notwithstanding all differences of opinion, cherished the highest regard for Luther, Melancthon and Zwingli, and recognized them as servants of God; who himself subscribed to the Augsburg Confession and, reserving the right of private interpretation, acknowledged it as the expression of his own faith; who recommended the *Loci* of Melancthon, although differing from him on the points of free-will and predestination; who refused to confine the invisible Church to any single confession, but recognized its presence wherever God works by His Word and Spirit in the hearts of men.

Still another injustice, however, must be laid to the charge of the average conception of Calvin. Men sometimes speak as if Calvin knew of nothing else to preach but the decree of predestination with its two parts of election and reprobation. The truth is that no preacher of the Gospel has ever surpassed Calvin in the free, generous proclamation of the grace and love of God. He was so far from putting predestination to the front, that in the *Institutio* the subject does not receive treatment until the third book, after the completion of the discussion of the life of faith. It is en-

tirely wanting in the *Confessio* of 1536 and is only mentioned in passing, in connection with the Church, in the *Catechismus Genevensis* of 1545. And as regards reprobation, before accusing Calvin, the charge should be laid against Scripture, against the reality of life, against the testimony of conscience; for all these bear witness that there is sin in the world, and that this awful reality, this *decretum horribile*, cannot have its deepest ground in the free will of man. And there are still other features in Calvin's doctrine of reprobation to which attention should be called. There is in the first place the fact that he says so little about the working of reprobation. The *Institutio* is a work characterized by great sobriety, wholly free from scholastic abstruseness; it everywhere treats the doctrines of faith in the closest connection with the practice of religion. This is especially true of eschatology. As is well known, Calvin never could bring himself to write a commentary on the Apocalypse, and in his *Institutio* he devotes to "the last things" only a few paragraphs. He avoids all *spinosae quaestiones* with reference to the state of glory, and interprets the descriptions given by Scripture of the state of the lost as symbolical: darkness, weeping, gnashing of teeth, unquenchable fire, the worm that dies not,—all these serve to impress upon us *quam sit calamitosum alienari ab omni Dei societate*, and *majestatem Dei ita sentire tibi adversam ut effugere nequeas quin ab ipsa urgearis*.¹⁷ The punishment of hell consists in exclusion from fellowship with God and admits of degrees.¹⁸ In connection with Paul's words, that at last God will be all in all, it is not forbidden to think of the devil and the godless, since in their subjection also the glory of God shall be revealed.¹⁹

But of even greater significance is it that with Calvin reprobation does not mean the withholding of all grace. Although man through sin has been rendered blind to all the spiritual realities of the kingdom of God, so that a

¹⁷ III, 25, 12.

¹⁸ *Comm. on Luke*, xii. 47.

¹⁹ *Comm. on I Cor.*, xv, 28.

special revelation of God's fatherly love in Christ and a *specialis illuminatio* by the Holy Spirit in the hearts of the sinners here become necessary,²⁰ nevertheless there exists alongside of these a *generalis gratia* which dispenses to all men various gifts.²¹ If God had not spared man, his fall would have involved the whole of nature in ruin.²² As it was, God immediately after the Fall interposed, in order by His common grace to curb sin and to uphold in being the *universitas rerum*.²³ For after all sin is rather an *adventitia qualitas* than a *substantialis proprietas*, and for this reason God is *operis sui corruptioni magis infensus quam operi suo*.²⁴ Although for man's sake the whole of nature is subject to vanity, nevertheless nature is upheld by the hope which God implanted in its heart.²⁵ There is no part of the world in which some spark of the divine glory does not glimmer.²⁶ Though it be a metaphorical mode of expression, since God should not be confounded with nature, it may be affirmed in a truly religious sense that nature is God.²⁷ Heaven and earth with their innumerable wonders are a magnificent display of the divine wisdom.²⁸

Especially the human race is still a clear mirror of the operation of God, an exhibition of His manifold gifts.²⁹ In every man there is still a seed of religion, a consciousness of God, wholly ineradicable, convincing all of the heavenly grace on which their life depends, and leading even the heathen to name God the Father of mankind.³⁰ The supernatural gifts have been lost, and the natural gifts have become corrupted, so that man by nature no longer knows who and what God seeks to be to him. Still these latter gifts have not been withdrawn entirely from man.³¹ Reason and judgment and will, however corrupt, yet, in so far as they belong to man's nature, have not been wholly lost. The fact that men are found either wholly or in part deprived of

²⁰ II, 2, 18ff.²¹ II, 2, 17.²² II, 2, 17.²³ II, 3, 3.²⁴ II, 1, 4.²⁵ *Comm. on Romans*, viii. 19-21.²⁶ I, 5, 1.²⁷ I, 5, 5.²⁸ II, 6, 1.²⁹ I, 5, 3, 4.³⁰ I, 3, 1, 3; 5, 3; II, 2, 18.³¹ II, 2, 12.

reason, proves that the title to these gifts is not self-evident and that they are not distributed to men on the basis of merit. None the less, the grace of God imparts them to us.³² The reason whereby man distinguishes between truth and error, good and evil, and forms conceptions and judgments, and also the will which is inseparable from human nature as the faculty whereby man strives after what he deems good for himself,—these raise him above the animals. Consequently it is contrary to Scripture as well as to experience to attribute to man such a perpetual blindness as would render him unable to form any true conception.³³ On the contrary, there is light still shining in the darkness, men still retain a degree of love for the truth, some sparks of the truth have still been preserved.³⁴ Men carry in themselves the principles of the laws which are to govern them individually and in their association with one another. They agree in regard to the fundamentals of justice and equity, and everywhere exhibit an aptness and liking for social order.³⁵ Sometimes a remarkable sagacity is given to men whereby they are not only able to learn certain things, but also to make important inventions and discoveries, and to put these to practical use in life.³⁶ Owing to all this, not only is an orderly civil society made possible among men, but arts and sciences develop, which are not to be despised. For these should be considered gifts of the Holy Spirit. It is true the Holy Spirit as a spirit of sanctification dwells in believers only, but as a spirit of life, of wisdom and of power He works also in those who do not believe. No Christian, therefore, should despise these gifts; on the contrary, he should honor art and science, music and philosophy and various other products of the human mind as *praestantissima Spiritus dona*, and make the most of them for his own personal use.³⁷ Accordingly, in the moral sphere also distinctions are to be recognized between some men and others. While all are corrupt, not all are fallen to an equal depth;³⁸

³² II, 2, 14, 17.³³ II, 2, 12.³⁴ II, 2, 12, 18.³⁵ II, 2, 13.³⁶ II, 2, 14.³⁷ II, 2, 15, 16.³⁸ II, 3, 4.

there are sins of ignorance and sins of malice.³⁸ There is a difference between Camillus and Catiline. Even to sinful man sometimes *speciosae dotes* and *speciales Dei gratiae* are granted. In common parlance it is even permissible to say that one man has been born *bene*, another *pravae naturae*.³⁹ Nay, every man has to acknowledge in the talents entrusted to him a *specialis* or *peculiaris Dei gratia*.⁴⁰ In the diversity of all these gifts we see the remnants of the divine image whereby man is distinguished from all other creatures.⁴¹

In view of all these utterances, which it would be easy to increase and enforce from the other works of Calvin, it is grossly unjust to charge the Reformer with narrow-mindedness and intolerance. It is, of course, a different question whether Calvin himself possessed talent and aptness for all these arts and sciences to which he accords praise. But even if this be not so, even if he did not possess the love for music and singing which distinguished Luther, this is not to his discredit, for not only has every genius its limitations, but the Reformers were and had to be by vocation men of faith, and for having excelled in this they deserve our veneration and praise, no less than the men of art and science. Calvin affirms, it is true, that the virtues of the natural man, however noble, do not suffice for justification at the judgment-bar of God,⁴² but this is due to his profound conviction of the majesty and spiritual character of the moral law. Aside from this, he is more generous in his recognition of what is true and good, wherever it be found, than any other Reformer. He surveys the entire earth and finds everywhere the evidence of the divine goodness, wisdom and power. Calvin's theological standpoint does not render him narrow in his sympathies, but rather gives to his mind the stamp of catholicity.

This appears with equal clearness from the calling which he assigns to the Christian. In regard to this also Calvin takes his point of departure in the will of God. To the

³⁸ II, 2, 25.

⁴¹ II, 2, 17.

³⁹ II, 3, 4.

⁴² II, 3, 5.

⁴⁰ II, 2, 14, 17.

Romanist view he brings in principle the same objection that bears against the pagan conception: the doctrine of the meritoriousness of good works is a delusion; the monastic vows are an infringement of Christian liberty; the perfection striven after by this method is an arbitrary ideal, set up by man himself. Romanism and paganism both minimize the corruption of human nature, and in the matter of good works start from the free will of man. In contradistinction to this Calvin proceeds on the principle: *nostri non sumus, Dei sumus*. The Christian's life ought to be one continual sacrifice, a perfect consecration to God, a service of God's name, obedience to His law, a pursuit of His glory.⁴³ This undivided consecration to God assumes on earth largely the character of self-denial and cross-bearing. Paganism knows nothing of this; it merely prescribes certain moral maxims and strives to bring man's life into subjection to his reason or will, or to nature.⁴⁴ But the Christian subjects also his intellect and his will and all his powers to the law of God. He does not resign himself to the inevitable, but commits himself to the heavenly Father, who is not like unto a philosopher preaching virtue, but is the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ.⁴⁵

The result is that for Calvin the passive virtues of submission, humility, patience, self-denial, cross-bearing stand in the foreground. Like St. Augustine, Calvin is mortally afraid of pride, whereby man exalts himself above God.⁴⁶ His strong insistence upon the inability of man and the bondage of the will is not for the purpose of plunging man into despair, but in order to raise him from his lethargy and to awaken in him the longing for what he lacks, to make him renounce all self-glorying and self-reliance and put all his confidence in God alone.⁴⁷ Calvin strips man of everything in order to restore unto him all things in God.⁴⁸ *Quanto magis in te infirmus es, tanto magis te suscipit Dominus; nostra humilitas ejus altitudo.*⁴⁹ *Humilitas* thus

⁴³ III, 7, 1.⁴⁴ I, 15, 8; II, 2, 2.⁴⁵ III, 6, 2-4; 8, 11.⁴⁶ II, 2, 2; III, 7, 4.⁴⁷ II, 2, 1, 2, 9.⁴⁸ II, 2, 10.⁴⁹ II, 2, 4.

becomes the first virtue; it grows on the root of election;⁵⁰ we are continually taught it by God in all the adversity and crucifixion of the present life;⁵¹ it places us for the first time in the proper relation towards God and our fellow-man.⁵² For it reconciles us to the fact that this life is for us a land of pilgrimage, full of perils and afflictions, and teaches us to surrender ourselves in all things to the will of God: *Dominus ita voluit, ergo ejus voluntatem sequamur*.⁵³ It likewise teaches us to love our neighbor, to value the gifts bestowed upon him and to employ our own gifts for his benefit.⁵⁴

Still, it would be a mistake to imagine that according to Calvin the Christian life is confined to the practice of the passive virtues. It is true, he often speaks of despising the present and contemplating the future life.⁵⁵ But on considering the times in which Calvin lived, the persecution and oppression to which the Reformation was exposed in well-nigh every country, the bodily and mental suffering the Reformer himself had to endure,—on considering all this we cannot wonder that he exhorts the faithful before all things to the exercise of humility and submission, to patience and obedience, to self-denial and cross-bearing. This has always been so in the Christian Church, and may be traced back to the teaching of Jesus and the Apostles. It does not speak favorably for the depth and intensity of our spiritual life, if we are inclined to find fault with Calvin, the other Reformers, and the martyrs of the Church for this alleged one-sidedness of their faith. It rather should excite our admiration that, in the midst of such circumstances, they so largely kept still an eye open for the positive vocation of the Christian. With Calvin at least the reverse side to the attitude thus criticized is not wanting. Nor does it appear merely after an incidental fashion, by way of appendix to his ethics; it is the outcome of his own most individual

⁵⁰ III, 21, 1.

⁵¹ III, 8, 2ff.

⁵² III, 8, 2.

⁵³ III, 7, 4-7.

⁵⁴ II, 2, 11; III, 7, 4.

⁵⁵ II, 9, 1ff.

principle; its root again lies in his conception of the will of God.

As is universally acknowledged, we owe to Luther the restoration of man's natural calling to a place of honor. Calvin, however, carried this principle enunciated by his predecessors to its furthestmost consequences. He viewed the whole of life from the standpoint of the will of God and placed it in all its extent under the discipline of the divine law. It was the common conviction of the Reformers that Christian perfection must be realized not above and outside of, but within the sphere of the calling assigned us by God here on earth. Perfection consists neither in compliance with arbitrary human or ecclesiastical commandments, nor in the performance of all sorts of extraordinary activities. It consists in the faithful discharge of those ordinary daily duties which have been laid by God upon every man in the conduct of life. But much more strongly than Luther, Calvin emphasizes the idea that life itself in its whole length and breadth and depth must be a service of God. Life acquires for him a religious character, is subsumed under and becomes a part of the Kingdom of God. Or, as Calvin himself repeatedly formulates it: Christian life is always and everywhere a life in the presence of God, a walking before His face,—*coram ipso ambulare, ac si essemus sub ejus oculis*.⁵⁶

When, therefore, Calvin speaks of despising the present life, he means by this something far different from what was meant by mediæval ethics. He does not mean that life ought to be fled from, suppressed, or mutilated, but wishes to convey the idea that the Christian should not give his heart to this vain, transitory life, but should possess everything as not possessing it, and put his confidence in God alone.⁵⁷ But life in itself is a *benedictio Dei* and comprises many *divina beneficia*. It is for believers a means to prepare them for the heavenly salvation.⁵⁸ It should be hated only

⁵⁶ *Comm. on Isaiah*, xxiii. 12.

⁵⁷ III, 7, 8-10; 8, 2ff.; 9, 1, 6.

⁵⁸ III, 9, 3.

quatenus nos peccato teneat obnoxios, and this hatred should never relate to life as such.⁵⁹ On the contrary, this life and the vocation in it given us by God are a part which we have no right to abandon, but which without murmuring and impatience we must faithfully guard, so long as God Himself does not relieve us.⁶⁰ So to view life, as a *vocatio Dei*,—this is the first principle, the foundation of all moral action; this imparts unity to our life and symmetry to all its parts; this assigns to each one his individual place and task, and provides the precious comfort *quod nullum erit tam sordidum ac vile opus, quod non coram Deo resplendeat et pretiosissimum habeatur*.⁶¹

Thus Calvin sees the whole of life steeped in the light of the divine glory. As in all nature there is no creature which does not reflect the divine perfection, so in the rich world of men there is no vocation so simple, no labor so mean, as not to be suffused with the divine splendor and subservient to the glory of God's name. And Calvin applies this point of view to a still wider range. All the possessions of life are after the same manner rescued from the dishonor to which ascetic moralism had abandoned them. To be sure, he protests against defiling the conscience in the use of these possessions and insists upon it that the Christian shall be actuated by *praesentis vitae contemptu et immortalitatis meditatione*. But he maintains with equal emphasis that all these possessions are gifts of God, designed not merely to provide for our necessities, but also bestowed for our enjoyment and delight. When God adorns the earth with trees and plants and flowers, when He causes the vine to grow which makes glad the heart of man, when He permits man to dig from out the earth the precious metals and stones which shine in the light of the sun,—all this proves that God does not mean to restrict the use of earthly possessions to the relief of our absolute necessities, but has given them to man also for enjoyment of life.⁶² Prosperity, abundance

⁵⁹ III, 9, 4.

⁶⁰ III, 9, 4.

⁶¹ III, 10, 6.

⁶² III, 1, 10ff.

and luxury also are gifts of God, to be enjoyed with gratitude and moderation. And Calvin does not want to bind the conscience with regard to this to rigid rules, but expects it freely to regulate itself by the general principles laid down in Scripture for this purpose.⁶³

It must be admitted that the Reformer of Geneva did not always adhere in practice consistently to this golden rule. Instead of leaving room for individual liberty he endeavored to bring the entire compass of life under definite rules. The Consistory had for its task *invigilare gregi Domini ut Deus pure colatur* and had to exercise censorship over every improper word and every wrong act; it had to watch over orthodoxy and church-attendance, to be on the lookout for Romish customs and worldly amusements, to oversee domestic life and the education of children; it had to keep its eyes on the tradesman in his store, on the craftsman in his workshop, on the merchant in the market-place, and to subject the entire range of life to the strictest discipline. Even regulations for fire-departments and night-watches, for market-facilities and street-cleaning, for trade and industry, for the prosecution of law-suits and the administration of justice are to be found among Calvin's writings. It is possible to justify all these measures in view of the circumstances under which they were introduced in Geneva. But nobody can deny that Calvin went too far in the creation of a moral police of this kind, that he introduced a régime which, while perhaps necessary and productive of excellent results for that age, is yet unsuited to other times and to different conditions.

But this criticism of Calvin's practice by no means detracts from the glory of the principle proclaimed by him. What he advocates in imitation of Zwingli was not a mere religious and ecclesiastical reform, but a moral reformation embracing the whole of life. Both Zwingli and Calvin waged war not merely against the Judaistic self-righteous-

⁶³ III, 10, 1; *Comm. on Deut.*, i: 15; xii: 15; xxii. 5; *on Isaiah*, iii: 16; *on Lam.*, v. 5.

ness of the Roman Church, but assailed with equal vigor all pagan license. Both desired a national life in all its parts inspired and directed by the principles of the divine Word. And both were led to this view by their theological principle; they took their point of departure in all their thought and activity in God, walked with Him through all of life and brought back to God as an offering all they were and had. Behind everything the sovereign will of God lies hidden and works. The content, the kernel of this will is made known to us in the Gospel; from it we know that God is a merciful and gracious Father, who in spite of all opposition proposes to Himself the salvation of the Church, the redemption of the world, the glorification of His perfections. But this will of God is not an impotent desire, it is omnipotent energy. It realizes itself in the faith of the elect; true faith is an experience of the work of God in one's soul, and for this reason affords unshakable assurance, immovable confidence, the power to surmount all pain and peril through communion with God. Though this gracious and omnipotent will of God is made known in the Gospel alone and experienced in faith only, nevertheless it does not stand isolated, but is encompassed, supported and reinforced by the operation of the same will in the world at large. Special grace is encircled by common grace; the vocation which comes to us in faith is connected and connects us with the vocation presented to us in our earthly calling; the election revealed to us in faith through this faith communicates its power to our entire life; the God of creation and of regeneration is one. Hence the believer cannot rest contented in his faith, but must make it the point of vantage from which he mounts up to the source of election and presses forward to the conquest of the entire world.

History has demonstrated that the belief in election, provided it be genuine, that is, a heartfelt conviction of faith, does not produce careless or Godless men. Especially as developed and professed by Calvin, it is a principle which cuts off all Romish error at the root. Whereas with Rome

special revelation consists primarily in the disclosure of certain mysteries, with Calvin it receives for its content the gracious fatherly will of God realizing itself through the Word of revelation. With Rome faith is nothing more than an intellectual assent, preparing man for grace on the principle of *meritum congrui*; with Calvin faith is the reception of grace itself, experience of the power of God, undoubting assurance of God, through and through religious in its nature. With Rome grace chiefly serves the purpose of strengthening the will of man and qualifying him for the performance of various meritorious good works prescribed by the Church; with Calvin the grace received through faith raises man to the rank of an organ of the divine will and causes him to walk in accordance with this will before the presence of God and for the divine glory. The Reformation as begun by Luther and Zwingli, and reinforced and carried through by Calvin, put an end to the Romish supernaturalism and dualism and asceticism. The divine will which created the world, which in the state of sin preserves it through common grace and makes itself known through special grace as the will of a merciful and gracious Father, aims at the salvation of the world, and itself through its omnipotent energy brings about this salvation. Because it thus placed the whole of life under the control of the divine will, it was possible for Calvin's ethics to fall into too precise regulations, into rigorism and puritanism; but in principle his ethics is diametrically opposed to all ascetism, it is catholic and universal in its scope.

In order to prove this by one striking example attention may be called to the fact that mediæval ethics consistently disapproved the principle of usury⁶⁴ on the ground of its being forbidden by Scripture and contrary to the unproductive nature of money. Accordingly it looked with contempt upon trade and commerce. Luther, Melanchthon, Zwingli and Erasmus adhered to this view, but Calvin,

⁶⁴ Usury is here meant in the old sense of the taking of reasonable interest.

when this important problem had been submitted to him, formulated in a classic document the grounds on which it could be affirmed that a reasonable interest is neither in conflict with Scripture nor with the nature of money. He took into account the law of life under which commerce operates and declared that only the sins of commerce are to be frowned upon, whereas commerce itself is to be regarded as a calling well-pleasing to God and profitable to society.⁶⁵ And this merely illustrates the point of view from which Calvin habitually approached the problems of life. He found the will of God revealed not merely in Scripture, but also in the world, and he traced the connection and sought to restore the harmony between them. Under the guidance of the divine Word he distinguished everywhere between the institution of God and human corruption, and then sought to establish and restore everything in harmony with the divine nature and law. Nothing is unclean in itself; every part of the world and every calling in life is a revelation of the divine perfections, so that even the humblest day-laborer fulfils a divine calling. This is the democratic element in the doctrine of Calvin: there is with God no acceptance of persons; all men are equal before Him; even the humblest and meanest workman, if he be a believer, fills a place in the Kingdom of God and stands as a colaborer with God in His presence. But—and this is the aristocratic, reverse side to the democratic view — every creature and every calling has its own peculiar nature: Church and state, the family and society, agriculture and commerce, art and science are all institutions and gifts of God, but each in itself is a special revelation of the divine will and therefore possesses its own nature. The unity and the diversity in the whole world alike point back to the one sovereign, omnipotent, gracious and merciful will of God.

In this spirit Calvin labored in Geneva. But his activity was not confined to the territory of one city. Geneva was to Calvin merely the center, from which he surveyed the entire

⁶⁵ *Comm. on Isaiah* xxiii.¹²; *on the Psalms* xv.⁵; *on I Cor.* vii.²⁰.

field of the Reformation in all lands. When his only child was taken away from him by death, he consoled himself with the thought that God had given him numerous children after the Spirit. And so it was indeed. Through an extensive correspondence he kept in touch with his fellow-laborers in the work of the Reformation; all questions were referred to him; he was the councillor of all the leaders of the great movement; he taught hundreds of men and trained them in his spirit. From all quarters refugees came to Geneva, that bulwark against Rome, to seek protection and support, and afterwards returned to their own lands inspired with new courage. Thus Calvin created in many lands a people who, while made up from all classes, nobles and plain citizens, townspeople and country-folk, were yet one in the consciousness of a divine vocation. In this consciousness they took up the battle against tyranny in Church and state alike, and in that contest secured liberties and rights which are still ours at the present day. Calvin himself stood in the forefront of this battle. Life and doctrine with him were one. He gave his body a living, holy sacrifice, well-pleasing unto God through Jesus Christ. Therein consisted his reasonable service. *Cor Deo mactatum offero.*

Amsterdam.

HERMAN BAVINCK.

REVIEWS OF RECENT LITERATURE.

PHILOSOPHICAL LITERATURE.

PROCEEDINGS OF THE ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY. NEW SERIES. Vol. VIII.

Containing the Papers read before the Society during the Twentieth Session, 1907-1908. 8vo, pp. 268. Published by Williams & Norgate, 14 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, London, W. C. 1908. Price, ten shillings and sixpence net.

This compact and well printed volume contains the following papers: I. The Methods of Modern Logic and the Conception of Infinity, by R. B. Haldane; II. Purpose, by R. Latt; III. Prof. James' Pragmatism, by G. E. Moore; IV. The Religious Sentiment: an Inductive Enquiry, by A. Caldecott; V. The Idea of Totality, by Shadworth H. Hodgson; VI. Impressions and Ideas—The Problem of Idealism, by H. Weldon Carr; VII. On the Concept of Epistemological Levels, by T. Percy Nunn; VIII. The Relation of Subject and Object from the Point of View of Psychological Development, by G. David Hicks; IX. The Nature of Mental Activity—A Symposium by S. Alexander, James Ward, Carreth Read, and G. F. Stout.

It is impossible, of course, to refer to all of these papers. Two, however, should have peculiar interest for American readers. That on "The Religious Sentiment: an Inductive Inquiry", is in marked contrast with the investigations of Leuba, Starbuck, James, Hall, Coe, *et id omne genus*. Like theirs, it is an investigation in the psychology of religion. Unlike theirs, however, it succeeds in holding itself to the proper field of psychology. It does not, as James, cross the line into metaphysics, and posit in the subliminal consciousness a Supernatural Cause of the experiences examined. Neither does it, as Leuba and Coe, cross the same line, and deny either the fact of supernatural agency or the necessity of positing it. On the other hand, Professor Caldecott is far more sympathetic than the American scholars in his attitude toward the experiences reviewed and, therefore, much more just in his description and in his interpretation of them.

The other paper referred to, "Professor James' Pragmatism", is the best analysis and refutation of the Harvard professor's position that has come under our notice. It is little short of a *reductio ad absurdum*. Moreover, it is so simple and lucid in style that the tyro in philosophy cannot fail to follow and to appreciate it. And this

points, perhaps, the distinguishing characteristic of these discussions, and that is their clearness. They are more or less remarkable for clean cut thought and for the absence of technical terms. In this respect some of our American philosophical associations might well learn of them. We notice that in the List of Officers and Members Prof. J. Mark Baldwin is put down as from "Princeton, N. J." He is, however, from Baltimore, Maryland.

Princeton.

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

THE PHILOSOPHER'S MARTYRDOM, A Satire. By PAUL CARUS. Illustrated by G. Kopetzky. 8vo.; pp. vi, 66. Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Co. London Agents: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co., Ltd. 1908.

"The present story is a tale with a moral. The story is humorous but the lesson is serious. It is a satire which has been written to point out the fallacies of agnosticism, and it indicates that a better philosophy is possible." With the aim of the well-known author we find ourselves in this instance in hearty accord, and we are glad to add that in our judgment he has realized his aim. His satire is more than clever, it is effective. To us it seems to be a *reductio ad absurdum* of the agnostic philosophy and specially of the agnostic ethics, particularly as exemplified in Herbert Spencer's *Data of Ethics*.

Princeton.

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

GENERAL THEOLOGY.

THE NEW SCHAFF-HERZOG ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RELIGIOUS KNOWLEDGE. Based on the Third Edition of the Realencyklopädie founded by J. J. HERZOG, and edited by ALBERT HAUCK. Prepared by more than six hundred scholars and specialists under the supervision of SAMUEL MACAULEY JACKSON, D.D., LL.D., with a distinguished staff of associate and department editors. To be complete in twelve volumes, large quarto. Funk & Wagnalls Company, New York and London. \$5.00 per volume in cloth. Volume I. Aachen-Basilians, pp. xxx, 500. May, 1908. Volume II. Basilica-Chambers, pp. xvi, 500. December, 1908.

The last volume of the original Schaff-Herzog Encyclopedia was published in 1883, with a thin biographical supplement in 1886. The larger Cyclopaedia of McClintock and Strong was completed in 1881, with a supplement published later. The interval since those dates has been characterized by unprecedented intellectual activity, desirable and undesirable, and especially by archeological discoveries, and by discussions in comparative religion and on religious questions old and new. There is no room for doubt that the time has come for a new encyclo-

pedia on religious subjects. In proof that they are adequately meeting the need of the time the publishers of the new Schaff-Herzog say that they are expending \$300,000 on it. A yet better guarantee is their list of contributors, their strong corps of editors, their distinguished editor-in-chief. Of course, their list of six hundred includes the contributors, now living or now dead, to the old and the new Herzog encyclopedia, and to the old Schaff-Herzog, as well as those who contribute directly to the new Schaff-Herzog. But when you have discounted the list as much as you think it needs, the names in it will still be numerous and great.

The work is not a mere reprint. It is enlarged to nearly three times the size of the old Schaff-Herzog. As compared with that work probably five-sixths of the matter is new. The old articles that are retained have been recast or extensively revised.

It includes a full line of Bible Dictionary articles, but includes very much more—histories of religions and of religious denominations and societies and movements and work, articles on religious organization and pedagogy, the biographies of men, living and dead, whose names are connected with the religious progress of the human race, discussions of religious doctrines and writings, data of comparative religion. Here is a vast field, outside the proper boundaries of the Bible Dictionary, and not extensively occupied by the secular encyclopedias, but which the student of religion needs to explore.

Necessarily a large proportion of the topics presented are those over which there is controversy. In some instances controverted matters are presented from the different points of view of the different contestants. The claims of denominations and of movements are usually presented by contributors who are in sympathy with them. It is not to be expected that readers will always agree with the contributors in their views, but in matters of difference the editors have been guided by what seemed to them the principles of fair play. The point of view of the whole work is that of a liberal evangelical Protestantism.

One of the most marked changes, as compared with the earlier Schaff-Herzog, is in the attitude assumed toward the current schools of biblical criticism. The announcement concerning this is as follows:

"The inclusion of the results of the latest Biblical and historical criticism and discovery, given from the evangelical standpoint from which the entire encyclopedia is prepared, and with a painstakingly fair statement of opposing theories, furnishes the reader some reasonable basis for forming an opinion of his own."

There are two fallacies in this presentation of the matter. One consists in the assumption that the reading of both sides, in a controverted question, gives one "some reasonable basis for forming an opinion of his own". Nothing can give one such a basis except his own personal examination of the data. Reading both sides may be better than reading one side only; but if it is made a substitute for the actual weighing of the evidence it will result in confusion. The other fallacy is that in this scheme both sides are to be presented to the reader by the advocate

of one side, and it is on the basis of this doubly onesided presentation that the reader is expected to form his unbiased opinion.

In spite, however, of this shallow theory of fair play, announced in the circular, there is nothing to complain of in the fact that the Encyclopedia adopts the critical position which its editors regard as the best. They have to deal with this as with other controverted questions. To those who agree with them their critical position seems to be a virtue; to those who disagree with them it seems to be a vice. To some of us this mild sugar-and-nutmeg kind of Wellhausenism is even less palatable than what seems to us the genuine, pungent article. But the editors of the Schaff-Herzog Encyclopedia had to decide for themselves. Necessarily they must lay stress upon their own opinions. It is commendable in them to call attention to other opinions along with their own. There is no reason for accusing them of intentional unfairness.

The makeup of the volumes is excellent, and the mechanical work fine. An especially good feature is the remarkably full bibliography appended to each of the more important articles. In the second volume the bibliography is brought up to date by printing in a separate list the titles of works that have been published since the final proof-reading of the two volumes.

Volume I, of course, has not many biblical articles. But in the full and strong treatment of such subjects as Armenia, Asia Minor, Assyria, Babylonia, there are abundant and valuable materials bearing on the Bible. One notes that the writers on Abraham and Babylonia ignore the conclusive proofs recently presented by Dr. King and others to the effect that the accession of Hammurabi cannot have been earlier than 2000 B. C. Among theological articles those on Atonement and Baptism attract attention. The very full article on Africa is especially valuable in view of the existing political, religious, and missionary conditions in that continent. Other classes of topics are represented by Architecture and Augustine. The article on the "Auburn Declaration", like all other treatments of that subject, neglects to credit the men of Lane Theological Seminary with their splendid leadership in that affair.

Of Volume II about one-fourth is devoted to biblical topics of different kinds. Bible, Bible Christians, Bible Reading by the Laity, Bible Societies, Bible Text, Bible Versions, Bibles, Biblical Criticism, Biblical Introduction, Biblical Theology, Canon of Scripture, and the like. The treatment of these subjects is from the point of view that has been announced, though it is mainly a gathering of facts rather than the propaganda of opinions. The questions of inspiration and authority seem to be reserved for future treatment. Among the interesting topics that strike the eye in a random turning over of the leaves are Benedict of Nursia and the Benedictine Order, Bernard of Clairvaux, the half dozen other Bernards, Beza, Bohemian Brethren, Brahmanism, Buddhism, the Cabala, Calvin, Calvinism, Catechisms.

At present the new Schaff-Herzog has no rivals. The minister or religious worker who needs to cover this ground has his choice between using the Schaff-Herzog, or contenting himself with older works, or

using a collection of encyclopedias, those edited by Dr. Hastings, for example, or betaking himself to more scattered sources of information. He will find the first of these alternatives very convenient and satisfactory.

Auburn, N. Y.

WILLIS J. BEECHER.

JESUS CHRIST OUR LORD, an English Bibliography of Christology comprising over Five Thousand Titles Annotated and Classified. By SAMUEL GARDINER AYRES, B.D., Librarian of Drew Theological Seminary. New York: A. C. Armstrong & Son. 1906. 502 pp.

This book is the result of the labor of many years, having been first undertaken in 1888, the compiler tells us, and in some ways it justifies the toil spent upon it. In twenty-three sections, with subdivisions, it gives a large number of works bearing on the person and work of Jesus Christ, beginning with the doctrine of Christ's preëxistence and closing with devotional works relating to Him. After the first section follow sections giving books that treat of Christ as revealed in the Old and New Testaments. The latter part of the volume is concerned with the person and work of Christ and His witness to Christianity. The classification scheme covers the ground quite thoroughly. It would have been better, had the table of contents, which gives this scheme, shown the page of each division and subdivision, although this small defect is counterbalanced by a full topical index at the close of the volume. In the judgment of the reviewer more discrimination in the selection of the books listed would have increased the value of the Bibliography to the persons for whom, apparently, it was chiefly intended, the preacher and general Bible student. It includes many important books and with them many of little importance. The exclusion of these latter would have allowed the inclusion of some not given. For example, under the rubric, The Second Advent, we miss a number of well known authors: Bellamy, Edwards, Bickersteth, Bousset, Guinness, Miller, Seiss, West and Woods. Under Anti-Christ, we would certainly mention Andrews's Christianity and Anti-Christianity, and under The Divinity of Christ, Burn's Primitive Doctrine concerning the Person and Character of Jesus Christ, Bushnell's God in Christ and Lecordaire's Jesus Christ, God, God and Man. It is not sufficient to give only two books on The Language of Christ, these two being practically one work in support of the thesis that Christ spoke Greek. We miss The Imitation of Christ from the Devotional works, although the compiler's selection is broad enough to have included it. In the index of authors Thomas a Kempis is referred to page 321, but is not to be found there. We fear that there may be a misunderstanding as to one of the authors "recommended" under The Holy Childhood as "Van Dyke", "for the artist's view of the subject". This name, without initials, is given with the title, The Christ Child in Art, and is likely to be thought to be Dr. J. C. Van Dyke, so well known for his writings on art, and not Dr. Henry van Dyke, the author of the book. The collection of sermons of the

late Dr. Purves, entitled from the first one, *The Sinless Christ*, is put in the section devoted to works on the moral character of Christ. It should have been noted that this is the theme of the first sermon only. And it may be said here that it would have been better to have omitted the word, annotated, from the title page of Mr. Ayres's volume, as the annotations are so few as to be quite negligible. Credit should be given the compiler for the painstaking industry shown in his book, whose usefulness will be due to the fact that it contains a large number of valuable works, under appropriate headings, that pertain to the person and work of Christ.

Princeton.

J. H. DULLES.

APOLOGETICAL THEOLOGY.

THE RELIGIOUS TEACHERS OF GREECE, being Gifford Lectures on Natural Religion delivered at Aberdeen. By JAMES ADAM, Litt.D., Hon.LL.D. of Aberdeen University, Fellow and Senior Tutor of Emmanuel College, Cambridge. Edited, with a Memoir, by his wife, Adela Marion Adam. 8vo.; pp. xix, iv, 467. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 38 George St. 1908.

These noble lectures set forth better probably than any other work, at least in English, the development of Greek theology. The lecturer aims "to reproduce, as far as may be without prejudice or passion, the kind of answers which the religious teachers of ancient Greece—that is to say, the poets and philosophers—were able to supply to those spiritual problems which are not of to-day or yesterday, but for all time". "The particular suggestion which he desires to make is that the religious ideas of Greek philosophy are of peculiar importance for the student of early Christian literature in general, and more especially for the student of St. Paul's Epistles and the Fourth Gospel." With this end in view, "as well as on account of the bearing of his subject upon Natural Theology and Theism", he considers, first, "the poetical development from Homer to Sophocles, and afterwards the philosophical from Thales to Anaxagoras". "The teaching of the Sophists and of Euripides then claims his attention; and the remainder of the lectures are devoted to Socrates and Plato."

Dr. Adam's execution of his task is as admirable as his conception of it. He brings to it an exactness and a fulness of classical learning which would surprise us, could we forget his training or his position. The whole range of both Greek and Latin literature is evidently at his command. But what is surprising is that he is almost as much at home in the history and philosophy of religion. With even the latest works in these departments he would seem to be familiar. Yet he is never overmastered by the abundance or by the richness of his material. On the contrary, he has it all so organized as to contribute directly to his one end, the presentation of the development of Greek theology.

Nor is his style less remarkable than is his grasp of his subject. Indeed, perfection of form is as characteristic of his writing as it is of the great masters of expression whom he made his constant study. Some of his sentences are models of terse and striking statement. For example, his description of Homer's view of the ghosts in Hades, "They are both alive and dead: but though alive enough to feel that they are dead, they are hardly dead enough to forget that they are alive" (p. 59).

In make-up the book is worthy of its author and of his subject. The page is clear and beautiful; the proof-reading has been most thorough, we have not detected a single slip; there is a full, well-arranged index; the volume is light in weight and opens easily.

To indicate which part of the discussion is the best when all is of the highest excellence would not be easy. Perhaps we have been most impressed by the four great lectures on Plato. Yet this may be because of the inherent attractiveness and importance of the subject rather than because of any superiority in the writer's treatment of it. Our limits forbid any presentation of Dr. Adam's positions. We may, however, in passing, remark, that he finds Homer's conception of the self physical rather than spiritual; that he brings out specially in connection with Hesiod the melancholy of Greek religion; that he emphasizes the contrast between Orphism and Homer in regard to immortality, sin, and the relation of the human to the divine; that he sees in Pindar an almost unique conception of immortality and finds in Plato, at least in this respect, his true successor; that he makes the characteristic of the teaching of Aeschylus the stress which he lays on the primitive aspect of the divine justice; that he sees the glory of Sophocles in his doctrine of an eternal and immutable morality; that he makes the Logos of Heraclitus to be the divine reason immanent in nature and in man; that he holds that the Nous of Anaxagoras was a spiritual and not a material substance; that he regards Anaxagoras as the founder of theism in the western world; that he makes Democritus the first Greek thinker who "in so many words denied the immortality of the soul"; that he traces the religious influence of Euripides to "his stimulative or majestic force rather than to any positive doctrine"; that he finds in Socrates the union of rationalism and transcendentalism; that he discovers many parallels between Plato and the New Testament; and that he identifies the Platonic Idea of Good with God and regards him as a person and immortality in him as individual and conscious.

We cannot refrain from expressing the wish that Dr. Adam had given us in closing a summary of the characteristics and trend of Greek theology as a whole. This might have been somewhat aside from his evidently controlling principle to describe rather than to generalize. On ourselves, however, his descriptions have made so strongly the impression that while the highest culture of the world knows of itself much of God, quite enough to secure responsibility and guilt, still, with all its knowledge, it knows nothing of salvation—

this seems so clear to us—and we doubt not to him—that we wonder how he could have kept from saying it.

The value of this book is much enhanced by the most interesting memoir of the author by his wife. His life is even more suggestive and stimulating than are his writings, were that possible. In him indomitable industry combined with genius to make him the superb scholar that he became; but that industry was stimulated unduly and unwisely. He himself felt so. In after life he used frequently to say—and the original dictum is attributed to the late Prof. Bain—"All distinguished Aberdonians die before they are fifty." This ought not to be. A system of education which even permits such pressure is self-condemned. The premature cutting off of such a man is not compensated for even by the production of such a scholar.

Princeton.

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

RELIGION AND THE MODERN MIND. Lectures delivered before the Glasgow University Society of St. Ninian. New York: A. C. Armstrong & Son.

A not inappropriate title for the volume containing these ten various lectures. Not, it need scarcely be said, that the ten lectures present an exhaustive, or even symmetrical, treatment of this wide subject, for the lectures are unrelated and occasional in character; but that the title indicates the object of the existence of the infant society before whose members they were delivered during the year 1907. The Society of St. Ninian was organized in Glasgow University during that year, for the free discussion of vital current topics in this field. The *personnel* of its invited speakers in this its first year certainly indicates, if not a catholicity of religious sympathies, at least an admirable candour and a praiseworthy desire to hear all sides of all questions, embracing as it does men so widely apart as Mr. John M. Robertson, M.P., of the Rationalist Press Association, Rev. P. Carnegie Simpson, the keen and active Glasgow pastor, and Rev. G. A. Johnston Ross, till lately of Cambridge, England, now of Byrn Mawr, Pa., and these in the company of Father Crofton and Father Power of the Society of Jesus.

The three papers on Comparative Religion are the least valuable of the series. Mr. Robertson disdains even to employ the term "religion", dealing with "Comparative *Hierology* and the Claims of Revelation", and dealing with it in a manner characterized by much parade of logic-chopping process within a sadly limited spiritual horizon. Although this description does not apply to the other two papers, they are not notable contributions.

Most readers will find Mr. Johnston Ross's introductory lecture on "The Religionist and the Scientist" the freshest and most suggestive in the volume. The ideal relation which should maintain itself in our day between the man of scientific interests and the man of religious interests Mr. Ross finds indicated in the words Independence, Comradeship, Debtorship and Benefactorship. The spheres of the religionist and the scientist are independent. They are not on that account un-

related: nay, "we are only at the beginning of the science of their mutual interpenetration." But the facts each deals with are a different set of facts; and Mr. Ross believes that if the scientific man says "This room was swept with a broom", we religionists are saying just as *real* a thing when we say, "This room was swept with a purpose." The guilty conscience of the murderer is at least as real a thing as the corpse. Again, both of us are called upon to cherish a spirit of patient comradeship, because each science is a progressive one and each problem ever an unfinished one, and it is only through this spirit that the attitude of mutual impatient intolerance will be avoided and misunderstandings dissipated as they arise. As to debtorship and benefactorship, Mr. Ross finds that both are greater on the side of the modern religionist than on the side of the modern scientists. For on the one hand the religionist owes largely to the scientist the new emphasis which he has been led to place upon unity, law and progress. "Science has proclaimed aloud its monodynamism: theology has overheard and has been startled into a new understanding of its own monotheism." "At least in evangelical circles the popular conception of forgiveness sadly needed the counter-emphasis of science on retribution and the inviolability of law." "The evolutionary idea . . . has even for the least religious mind suffused history, if I may so speak, with the Providential idea." On the other hand, if the religionist is in such matters debtor to the scientist, he is in far more weighty matters benefactor. "The scientist cannot escape from the fact that he possesses certain moral experiences which continually impinge upon questions of origin, purpose and destiny; and (quâ scientist) he has no faculty and no materials for dealing with these moral experiences. . . . The scientist needs religion, not only when shaken by storms of sorrow or remorse; he needs religion to relieve the *malaise* of spiritual hunger and discontent, to hearten him in the midst of these nameless faintings of faith in life which come to the believer and unbeliever alike; to quiet, if not to explain, turbulent moods of the spirit which in all tend to over-set the balance of self-poise in the face of life's troubles; to nourish and respond to aspirations, without the uplift of which, life were a poor and jejune thing; to fortify and prepare, not so much for death as for judgment, of which last the unbeliever has as definite an instinct as the Christian has; and, finally, to transmute into a glad certainty, through Jesus Christ, his hopeful guesses about immortality." In conclusion, "The scientific temper is needed in religion, as the religious temper is in science. But the tempers are not really two, but one. In both spheres, men need patience, fidelity to their ignorance, freedom from pride and prejudice, sacrificial love of truth, the spirit of adventure, and the spirit of reverence." This is admirably said.

One rises with a certain amusement from the *naïveté* of an article bathed in such ardent devotion to a particular philosophical school as suffuses that of Rev. James Robertson Cameron, of Glasgow, on "The Answer of Idealism to Agnosticism in Relation to the Person of Christ." For Mr. Cameron "Ideal-

ism" means Hegel, and Hegel means his old teacher, the late revered Master of Balliol. That philosophy of which Germany has for years been weary with an infinite weariness is still "the Absolute Philosophy" in very truth to the glowing enthusiasm of this loyal disciple of Dr. Caird. One can gladly recognize the debt of gratitude under which the Hegelian movement has laid us by its real contributions to the thought of our day; and recognize, too, not least, the elements of profound truth which it offers to aid our speculative reflection upon those Christian facts which contain the mysteries of the Trinity and the Incarnation. One may own to finding a refreshment, too, in the stimulating intellectualism of these English Neo-Hegelians, after certain other contemporaries have been requesting us to "believe with all our heart what we have rejected with all our head," and bidding us satisfy our imperious cravings for an intellectually adequate construction of the great facts of our faith with the emotional hero-worship and sentimental idolatry of the Ritschlian school. Mr. Cameron's conclusion, however, is that as faith's "forms must always be the forms of the present time", so "the forms which are most congenial to the time and the most capable of articulating its faith 'would seem' to be those of Idealism." And yet, it "would seem" to us easier to agree with the vigorous and always attractive thinker whose address followed that just referred to, Mr. Carnegie Simpson, in his remark that "the Christian way of dealing with agnosticism about God" is "not by a mere philosophy—idealistic or any other. It is not a different philosophy the Agnostic needs (I do not now refer to Spencerianism): it is data. G. H. Lewes dismissed religion from the region of verifiable knowledge because, he says, 'it confesses its inability to furnish knowledge with any available data.' The Christian religion furnishes knowledge with the biggest fact in all history—the fact of Jesus Christ. Here is not merely a new philosophy to write a review about." And then he continues in the vein of his own now already familiar and most convincing and useful book, "The Fact of Christ."

Dr. David Smith's name is found prefixed to a clear and genial little paper on "The Divinity of Christ," which follows the familiar lines of reasoning on this great theme. The remaining articles, on "The Doctrine of the Holy and Undivided Trinity" by Professor Cooper, and on "Science and Religion" and "The True Rationalism," by the two Jesuit Fathers, Crofton of Glasgow and Power of Edinburgh, offer nothing calling for more especial remark.

EDWIN HENRY KELLOGG.

LE BESOIN ET LE RELIGIEUX. Par MAURICE SÉROL, Docteur en Philosophie, Secrétaire-Général de la Revue de Philosophie. Paris: Gabriel Beauchesne et Cie, Editeurs; Ancienne Librairie Delhomme & Brugnet; Rue de Rennes 117; 1908.

The aim of this work as announced by the author is to demonstrate that natural law imposes religious obligation upon a man; and to determine the content of that obligation.

The author proceeds by psychological method to show that the ineradicable demands of the human soul can be met only by the assurances of religion. This position is confirmed by the concilient testimony of History and Psychology. Adequate fixity of aim and purpose in life can spring alone from the fact that a man's convictions go down to the eternal Rock of the unseen.

Methods of Solution—The naturalistic, which strives to bring down all human aspirations to the level of natural objects; and the religious, which appeals to a supernatural world and seeks to satisfy these aspirations at their best. This result is not to be obtained by a stoical stifling of each rising emotion. Pedagogical experience corroborated by contemporaneous psychology has fully shown that the art of self-control consists, not so much in stifling (*etouffer*) emotion, as to make it subservient to reason; i. e., religion.

But for the filling out of the content of this religion, one is not to be left to the mere investigation of rationalistic criticism or natural experience. The basis of the whole is to be found in a supernatural authoritative revelation. In the chapter on *L'Autorité doctrinale* (perhaps the most pregnant in the book) our author enters upon an examination of the position of the new liberal Protestantism called '*Fidéisme*', and represented by such men as Sabatier and Jean Réville. This is one of the living questions among French theologians to-day. The heart of the matter as stated by J. Réville is "the rejection of all religious authority exterior to man (p. 149). It is particularly refreshing to see the foundations of religious persuasion lifted out of the shifting sands of subjective experience and planted upon the impregnable rock of divine revelation. We cannot go into details, but if anyone wishes to see a helpful handling of the subject, he will do well to consult our author's chapter on "*L'autorité doctrinale*".

The author's style is simple yet forceful. His manner of treatment is logical and progressive. In a time like the present, when there is such a prevalent tendency to scout at the binding obligation of religion as revealed in the Scriptures—a tendency leading to the general unsettling of religious things—the book is to be hailed as a welcome addition to Christian apologetic literature.

Chazy, N. Y.

WM M. JACK.

EXEGETICAL THEOLOGY.

A DEVOTIONAL COMMENTARY. Edited by the Rev. A. R. BUCKLAND, M.A. Genesis xxv.11-xxxvi.8, by the Rev. W. H. GRIFFITH THOMAS, D.D., Principal of Wycliffe Hall, Oxford. London: The Religious Tract Society. 1908. Pp. viii, 182.

This second volume on Genesis, the first volume of which received notice in the REVIEW for April, 1908, maintains the high standard set by its predecessor. Indeed, we are even more impressed in this

volume by the value of the author's comments. In the first place, they are based upon the conviction that the narratives of Genesis are historical and personal, not mythical nor idealized. Again, they are not fragmentary, but based upon sections of the text treated each as a unit. Thus in this volume the chapters are entitled "The Birth of Jacob", "The Birthright", "Isaac", "The Blessing", "An Interlude", "Bethel", "The New Life", "In the Shadows", "Turning Homewards", "God's Host for Man's Help", "Peniel—The Face of God", "After Peniel", "Results of Unfaithfulness", "Bethel at Last", "The School of Sorrow", "A Profane Person". These titles also suggest the point of view in the choice of comment: that which is of ethical and religious value is given the preference. Finally, the comments are a happy mean between the meagre and the diffuse. No words are wasted, yet there is no unpleasant impression of crowding, hurry and economy, such as the reader receives from a large proportion of modern commentaries. All in all, this production is very heartily recommended to all who seek suggestive and intelligent guidance as readers, teachers or preachers of the book of Genesis.

Princeton,

J. OSCAR BOYD.

THE SAME: Vol. III, Genesis xxxvii-l. 1908. Pp. viii, 225.

With each volume of this admirable series our admiration for it grows. The part of Genesis which deals with the fortunes of Joseph and his brethren has been made the subject of homiletic treatment and religious meditation more often, perhaps, than any other historical section of the Old Testament. But it would be hard to find in all this literature a more attractive, lucid, comprehensive, judicious, and yet feeling presentation of the "lessons" which Christian faith may learn from the story of Joseph. Section by section the different situations and events are taken up in the successive chapters, and at the end a few chapters sum up the gains of the previous study in an estimate of the life and character of Jacob, then of Joseph, then of Joseph's typical character, and, finally, in a brief review of Genesis as a whole. If the suggestions which the preacher and religious teacher can gain in the volumes of this series might be passed on to their hearers and pupils, it is impossible to set any limit to the good that would result, both in the knowledge and appreciation of God's word, and in the quickening of Christian character.

Princeton,

J. OSCAR BOYD.

CANON AND TEXT OF THE NEW TESTAMENT. By CASPAR RENE GREGORY. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1907. Pp. 539. \$2.00.

I suppose that Dr. Gregory's book may be called a textbook. If so, it is unique. At least the writer knows of no other just like it. From the dedication, "To my old friend, John Kemp", to the last page, the personality of the author is everywhere in evidence—and a very genial personality it is. The style is throughout familiar, sometimes almost

intimate and occasionally even "chatty". At the same time it never offends one's sense of decorum, and, instead of in any way lessening the reader's esteem and cordial respect for the author, rather enhances them. It is only genius that can discuss the canon and text of the New Testament with lightness of touch and constant gleams of genial humor, and yet not jar upon the reader's sense of the fitness of things. This, however, is just what Dr. Gregory has succeeded in doing. He has transformed a textbook upon one of the greatest and gravest of subjects into something very much like good literature. He evidently does not believe—nor do we—that in order to be serious one has to be sombre, or that there is anything of genuine piety in mere deadly dullness.

The following will serve as a specimen of the glints of humor with which Dr. Gregory lights up his discussion: "The textual critic must know all about book-making, not for races, but for literature" (p. 318). And again: "The reason we have to speak of the sizes of parchment is this: the quires are made according to a certain law. Even if this be not important, I like to tell about this law, because I discovered it." A little further on we have this: "A quire in a Greek manuscript of a respectable family consists, like a quire in an ordinary modern octavo printed book, of four double leaves or eight single leaves. It is called a four-er, and the usual name is a quaternion; but those ten Latin letters say no more than the six Saxon letters: 'four-er', only you must know that the latter word comes from 'four' or else you will not pronounce it right" (p. 324). After having suggested the term "Re-Wrought Text" as a substitute for Westcott's and Hort's "Western Text", in justification for so doing, Dr. Gregory says: "But a name has its influence upon the thoughts, and if we recognize that a name is one that leads the thoughts astray in spite of ourselves, the sooner we change it the better. To call this Re-Wrought Text the 'Western Text' pulls the mind awry, and compels a constant astigmatism of view. The figure is doubtless all wrong, for I am no oculist, but I mean that the eye of the mind sees Western and does not see Western, and that the rays refuse to centre" (p. 489). And, comparing this Re-Wrought Text with what he calls the Original Text, Dr. Gregory says: "Alongside of the original text it was more juicy, more popular and more full. It left almost nothing out. It added almost all that it could lay its hands upon" (p. 490). Or, take this as a specimen of the same sort: "Herewith we close the short list of old texts. We might in one way term these three texts single-eyed texts. The Original Text, the Re-Wrought Text and the Polished Text were all simple texts. . . . For the Re-Wrought Text is the result of the fact that the application of the foreign material to the Original Text takes place more in the way of accretion than in that of combination. I hope that this is as sensible and as intelligible as it sounds" (p. 494).

But it is time to pass to other and more important aspects of Dr. Gregory's informing discussion. Here, first of all, it will be well to get before us Dr. Gregory's method in his discussion of the canon.

His book begins with an introduction which falls into six parts. The first consists of a general survey of the field. This is followed by a brief discussion of the word canon; another of the Jewish canon; a fourth dealing with inter-communion in the Roman Empire; and a fifth on book-making of old. Dr. Gregory's treatment of the word Canon cannot be pronounced satisfactory, but as we shall have to return to it again, more need not be said here. What he says about inter-communion in the Roman Empire and book-making of old, are informing and helpful, as furnishing the necessary background for an intelligent consideration of the main subject. The sixth and last section is the most satisfying part of his introductory matter. In this Dr. Gregory defines with precision the specific questions with which at every turn his inquiry will be concerned. These are three. First, was a given book in existence at a given period and a given place? The evidences of the existence are given in the order of their relative weight: (1) use; (2) quotation; (3) specific mention; in regard to each of which forms of evidence of existence Dr. Gregory makes some very judicious remarks. Second, What signs have we that a given book possesses special value in the eyes of Christians and particularly in those of Christians of eminence and authority? Here Dr. Gregory enumerates five kinds of evidence: (1) Preference in literary use for a given book of the New Testament as compared with others not in the New Testament; (2) Designation for use by private Christians for purposes of instruction, edification or comfort; (3) Designation for public use in church; (4) Evidence that a book was placed upon the same level as the books of the Old Testament; (5) The designation of a book as canonical. The whole period through which these inquiries are prosecuted extends from the year 30 A. D. to the year 700 A. D. By the later date, "the treatment of the books of the New Testament has become to such a degree uniform in the different parts of the church, or has, in the case of the variation of some communities from the general rule, attained to such stability that it is no longer necessary to follow it up in detail" (p. 15). For purposes of convenience this period is broken up into six briefer periods. And here it will be to the reader's interest to let Dr. Gregory speak for himself:

"The first period extends from the year 30 to 90 after Christ, and may be termed the period of the Apostles. In it the most of the books with which we have to do were written. The second period, from 90 to 160, places before our eyes the earlier use of the books that are in the New Testament, and the gathering them together into groups, preparing for their combination into a single whole. This period is, as a matter of fact, by far the most important period in the course of our discussion. For it is during these years of this post-apostolic period that these books pass from a common to a sacred use. The third period, from 160 to 200, we may call the period of Irenaeus. Here the Old Catholic Church is on a firm footing, and the life in several of the great natural divisions of the Church begins to be more open and more confident. The fourth

period, from 200 to 300, bears the stamp of the giant Origen, but brings with it many a valiant man, not least Dionysius of Alexandria and Tertullian of Carthage. The fifth period, from 300 to 370, the period of Eusebius, sees the opening of the series of great councils in the Council of Nice in 325. Eusebius himself, the quoter of the earlier literature of the Church, has done a vast deal for the definition of the canon. The sixth period, from 370 to 700, bears the name of the much defamed scholar, the great theologian Theodore of Mopsuestia, and brings us into the work of Jerome and of Augustine" (p. 14).

The following will serve as specimens of the conclusions reached by Dr. Gregory in regard to the existence, value and canonical authority of the books of the New Testament by the close of each period.

The Apostolic Period, 30-90 A. D.:

"We are at the close of the apostolic age. We see the numerous little Churches, that is to say, companies of Christians, scattered over the Roman Empire, meeting from week to week in private houses and exhorting one another to a firm faith, a good life, and a living hope. A number of books have been written that these Christians find particularly valuable. Part of them look a little like histories, part of them are simply letters, one of them is a book of dreams. But for all these writings the thing which holds the attention of the Christian Churches is still the living word, the weekly sermon, if the given Church be so fortunate as to have a preacher every week.

"So far as we can see, there is as yet no collection of Christian books. That must soon come. We have nearly closed the first century. The apostolic age laps over on to the post-apostolic age. It closes about the year 100, but the post-apostolic age begins about the year 90. The reason for this double boundary lies in the wish to include in the former age the Fourth Gospel, and in the latter age the letter of the Church at Rome to the Church at Corinth, the letter called Clement's of Rome" (p. 52).

The Post-Apostolic Period, 90-160 A. D.:

"Little by little during all this post-apostolic age the written treasures of the Churches had been growing and gathering. The great Churches in the great cities on the great roads of travel will have at a very early time gotten by far the larger part of what we now have in the New Testament. City after city and Church after Church will have sent in its contribution to the list. In the provinces and in the villages the process will have spread but slowly. There was too little money and too little education to secure for the small places for decades that which had long been in the hands of the large Churches. The same influence wrought in a like manner in reference to other books, to books that were not to the same degree acceptable to the Churches. A certain uncertainty and a vacillating determination will here and there have played a part in helping a book upwards into the more treasured, or downward into

the less favoured regions of Christian literary liking. No authority saw to the due criticism. The book rose or fell. It was more used, it was less used. But one thing was gradually going forth from the process of writing and of preserving and of valuing the books and that was the general acceptance of the mass of the books of the New Testament as books that were of peculiar value to Christians. The peculiar value showed itself in their being placed with or even placed before the books of the Old Testament. The equality of the two series of books came most distinctly to view in the public services of the Churches. On the other hand, the lack of value that showed itself in the case of other books, was seen more clearly than anywhere else in the fact that these other books were not allowed in the public services of the Churches to claim for themselves the first rank, to reach the point at which they could be read at the chief place in the Church as the expression of words which God had to say to Men" (p. 109).

The Age of Irenaeus, 160-200 A. D.:

"All in all it seems to me to be likely that before the middle of the second century the books of the New Testament in general, and I may name the four Gospels and the Epistles of Paul in particular, had passed over from the liturgical division Man to Man into the division God to Man. That in some places doubts should have arisen as to whether one book or another belonged within or without the peculiarly sacred books was not strange. It was the less strange because even then some of the books of the Old Testament were scarcely fixed in their position of strictly normative value.

"A single suggestion is here in place. It is constantly argued, from the presence of other than New Testament books in the Sinaitic, the Vatican and the Alexandrian manuscripts of the Greek Bible, that the said books were at the places at which those manuscripts were written, regarded as fully equal to the books of the New Testament. It seems to me to be a question whether at that early date this conclusion is valid. As regards the Sinaitic and the Vatican manuscripts, I think it likely that they are among the earliest leaf-books and among the earliest complete Bibles, among the earliest books which brought together the many rolls which till then had contained the Scriptures. Under these circumstances, I think it possible that the other books were added to the books of the New Testament for convenience in use in the church services, without an intention on the part of those who inserted them in the manuscript to say that they were divine Scripture. This is, I think, possible. But it is necessary to insist upon the point urged above, that uncertainties and doubts as to the various books are under such circumstances thoroughly natural and to be looked for" (p. 216).

The following paragraph sums up briefly the results reached by Dr. Gregory in regard to the canon:

"In spite of all that, there never was an authoritative, generally

declared and generally received canon. To the supposition that a canon exists is to be said: firstly, that the supposed state of affairs is, strictly taken, not the real state of affairs; and secondly, that the thing which produced the actual, not the supposed state of affairs, was no single circumstance, no historical single event, but a series of causes working in one district one way, in another district and church in another way" (p. 290).

If now we turn to his discussion of the text, the general course that Dr. Gregory pursues will be sufficiently indicated by giving his chapter headings: I. Papyrus; II. Parchment; III. Large Letter Greek Manuscripts; IV. Small Letter Greek Manuscripts; V. Lesson-Books; VI. Translations; VII. Church Writers; VIII. Printed Editions; IX. The Externals of the Text; X. Early History of Text.

The last of these chapters, that on the early history of the text, is one of special interest. Dr. Gregory is careful to distinguish between the task that confronts the editor of a Greek or Latin classic and that that confronts the textual critic of the New Testament. The former has merely to do with accidental and unintentional errors such as have crept into a manuscript in the course of its transmission. Even so distinguished a philologist as Richard Bentley failed to appreciate this fact. Indeed, it was not until Westcott and Hort appeared that the difference between the task of reconstructing the original text of a classical writing and that of reconstructing the original text of the New Testament was fully appreciated. Dr. Gregory states frankly that in his work he builds upon theirs. His words are: "What I have to say is the view of Westcott and Hort, with some slight and external modifications, modifications which they would in part probably have made themselves had they been less cautious, less prudent, and less modest than they were" (p. 483). He divides the history into five periods: first, that of what he calls the "Original Text", closing with the year 100 (p. 486); second, that of the Re-Wrought Text, which closes with the year 200 (p. 490); third, that of the Polished Text, which closes with the year \pm 200 (p. 494); fourth, that of the First Syrian Revision, which closes with the year 312 (p. 499); and last, that of the Second Syrian Revision, or Official Text, which closes with the Council of Nice in the year 325 (p. 501). We shall not follow Dr. Gregory in his discussion of particular passages, such as 1 John v. 7-8; Mark xvi. 9-20; John vii. 35; viii. 11; and Luke xxii. 43-44; etc.

The foregoing brief outline is the most that our space will permit us to do in the way of putting the reader in possession of Dr. Gregory's standpoint, method and larger conclusions. Looking at his work as a whole, there is much about it that is reassuring. In the matter of the canon, for instance, his impartial, careful and scholarly investigation leads Dr. Gregory to the conclusion that by the end of the first century A. D., the New Testament books, with the exception of Second Peter, were in existence, in use and in high esteem among Christians. With this fact placed beyond cavil—as surely all must now admit it to be—one need feel no great concern over Dr. Gregory's statement near the

close of his discussion: "In spite of all this, there never was an authoritative, generally declared and generally received canon" (p. 290). For, once connect the several books of the New Testament with the apostles or apostolic sanction, once establish the fact that they are the only books proceeding from the apostles or enjoying apostolic sanction that have come down to us, and then for those who recognize the authority of Christ and his apostles, the rest follows. As Dr. B. B. Warfield with his usual insight has perceived and with his usual felicity has said, "the church is a manufactured article". And, of course, every creature receives the law of its being from its Creator. This lies in the very relation of creature and Creator. And, happily for us all, this fact does not wait, either for its reality or its efficiency, upon either the recognition or the acceptance of the creature. The law of gravitation is dependent neither for its existence nor for its operation upon the formal recognition of any scientific association.

No review of Dr. Gregory's book will be complete that fails to call attention to certain blemishes, some of them less, some of them more serious, by which it is marred. Among the lesser blemishes are occasional sentences lacking in lucidity. The following will serve as specimens: "On the other hand, not clashing in the least with the foregoing, the monks think over the matter for themselves, connect it with what they hear, but do not understand, about the value of the manuscript, and then project their fancy, as to what they, from their present standpoint, would do if the case were presented to them, into the past" (p. 332, bottom). The "into" here seems, to us, a little isolated and lonesome. Again: "But these classes, such classes, have scarcely a distinct relationship to the classes of tradition of the New Testament text, properly so-called" (p. 482, bottom). The "such classes" here looks almost like a "conflate" reading. Once more: "the revision of the Syrian text, to make it agree with the revised Greek text, may have been cared for in Antioch or, it may be, in one of the more definitely Syrian centres, centres of Syrian speech, Nisibis and Edessa" (p. 499). Here "centres of Syrian speech", coming as it does upon the heels of "Syrian centres", is a species of palindromy that we meet with not infrequently in Dr. Gregory's pages. These, however, are small matters.

Again, Dr. Gregory's ratiocination is not always cogent. For instance, one may be excused who fails to feel the force of the "therefore" in the following statement: "To return to our point, the early Christian societies will often not have had all the books of the Old Testament at their command and will therefore have had still less inclination to look beyond them for new books" (p. 50). This statement is destitute of even plausibility, unless the lack of all the books of the Old Testament by Christian societies was due solely to a lack of inclination on their part to possess the Old Testament in its entirety. But Dr. Gregory seems to trace the lack to a wholly different cause. And even apart from this, I think that reflection will convince him that his "therefore" is greatly lacking in cogency. In other words, it is easy to conceive

that early Christian communities may have been much more concerned to get hold of a Gospel or an Epistle than they were to get hold of a copy of the Minor Prophets, for instance. Again, we find Dr. Gregory saying: "If we turn back to the early days, we may calmly say, that it is in every way probable that one or another letter of the apostles that would, humanly speaking, have or seem to have, afforded us as much instruction, comfort and help as certain epistles in the New Testament has simply been lost" (p. 55). It is, of course, perfectly safe to indulge in such surmises as this about *lost epistles*—that is, if one thinks it worth while. To me, however, the probabilities all appear to be quite the other way. If anything further were needed to render such a surmise simply superfluous, it would be Dr. Gregory's indirect admission that God's judgment of the lost epistles may have been quite different from man's.

Again, underlying the whole of Dr. Gregory's position is a series of assumptions which come into collision with very definite information that we have regarding the situation in the apostolic age. For instance, Dr. Gregory calmly assumes that "The early Christians had no thought of history, no thought of an earthly future. They were soon to cut loose from all their surroundings. Why should they then save up books, or, rather, save up letters? They would read and heed the given letter. That was all. They knew what was in it. No more was needed. Why keep the letter?" (p. 55). All of this, while very pleasantly stated, is not only without evidence, but against positive evidence as to the attitude of the early Christians toward apostolic letters. For the correctness of this statement, we have unimpeachable testimony, to wit, the testimony of Dr. Gregory himself. For while the ink was drying on the words just cited, we find him saying: "In the case of the epistles which we possess, some were surely kept with the greatest care, read duly by the members of the church, read in occasional meetings, lent to neighboring churches, copied off for distant churches, and copied off for themselves, as soon as they began to grow old and were threatened with decay" (p. 56). Regarding the soundness of the judgment as to the value of the supposed lost epistles on the part of those to whom they came, there may very well be a question, but in the light of what Dr. Gregory himself has said, all of the probabilities are that if any apostolic writings were lost—as no doubt some were—their loss is to be traced to causes wholly different from those suggested by Dr. Gregory. What those causes may have been, we need not stop to speculate. By the following statement Dr. Gregory will, with a certain class of thinkers, at any rate, needlessly discredit what we regard as the most important result of his investigations: "In approaching thus the year 200, what have we before us in the way of clear use of the books of the New Testament? We have in advance pre-supposed that the most of them were in existence, and where we do not hear of anything to the contrary, anything that excludes their early existence and proves their later composition, we go upon the theory that they were in use" (p. 162, bottom). Why Dr. Gregory would speak thus, when he himself has

been careful to adduce very respectable positive evidence for the existence of the books of the New Testament prior to the close of the first century, must be a matter of conjecture.

It must be reckoned another defect of Dr. Gregory's discussion that he allows himself too frequently to tell us merely what he thinks without going on to tell us why he thinks what he thinks. It is a matter of course that all are interested to know what Dr. Gregory thinks upon any subject, concerning which he may regard it worth his while to express himself. At the same time, to be too frequently fed out of a spoon with pre-chewed food is neither wholesome nor altogether pleasant.

The defects of Dr. Gregory's book, as it seems to me, are three, namely,—a lack of clear definition; a consequent failure to get before his own mind, or that of his readers, a definite clear-cut issue, or problem; and lastly, a failure to recognize or to use the primary sources of information as to the nature of the canon of the Christian Church. These cannot be regarded as minor blemishes. Any one of them must be fatal to a really satisfactory discussion. Taking them up in the order mentioned, it will be worth while to trace with some detail their baleful influence upon Dr. Gregory's treatment of his subject.

To begin with, then, there is, as has been said, a lack of definition. The title of the first part of Dr. Gregory's volume is "The Canon of the New Testament". But a moment's reflection will convince anyone that neither the connotation of the phrase as a whole, nor that of either of its two principal members, is self-revealing. What is the meaning of the phrase "The Canon of the New Testament"? Until that question has been clearly settled, a really satisfactory investigation is simply impossible. The phrase "The Canon of the New Testament" may be a breviloquence for "The Canon of the New Testament Church". Or the genitive "of the New Testament" may be an appositional genitive, and then the phrase will mean "The Canon consisting of the New Testament". Or the genitive may be what Winer would call a genitive of inner relation, and then the phrase may mean "The Canon setting forth the New Testament; or adopted by, or imposed upon the New Testament Church". The fact is that, current and familiar to all as the phrase is, it is one to which for the most part little effort is made to attach any intelligible meaning. No doubt had Dr. Gregory undertaken to fix its meaning for the investigation he had in hand, he would have done it to our admiration. The more's the pity he has done nothing of the kind.

And just so Dr. Gregory uses repeatedly the phrase "the New Testament" without ever pausing to tell us either what it is, or why it is what it is. We learn, indeed, indirectly, that it consists of "books". And we are led by Dr. Gregory's use of the definite article to suppose that the number of these books is well known and definitely fixed. But before we are through we find that this last notion is a mistake. For it turns out that what Dr. Gregory calls "our New Testament" has, in his judgment, no more right to be called "the New Testament" than

any one of several other New Testaments; and, indeed, is after all only "a New Testament", and not even necessarily *primus inter pares*. Then we begin to wish to know more clearly just why it is "our New Testament". And our confusion becomes yet greater when we find Dr. Gregory speaking of "the right" of a book to a place in "the New Testament", without in the least hinting in what such a "right" grounds itself. For if there is, or may be, a question as to the "right" of a book to a place in a "New Testament", then one interested in the subject will be likely to ask, Is there one law for all "New Testaments"? and, if so, How can there be more than one real "New Testament"? Difference of opinion as to whether this book or that had made good its "right" to a place in "the New Testament" would, of course, sufficiently explain why "our New Testament" differed in composition from somebody else's "New Testament", but so long as contradictory opposites cannot both be true, judgments that are the contradictory opposites of each other as to the "right" of a particular book to a place in "the New Testament" cannot both be valid. And, on the other hand, if there is not a fixed and unchangeable basis of "right" to a place in "the New Testament", one is at a loss to understand what necessity there is for tracing the fortunes of certain books through seven centuries in order to prove that certain other books have as good a "right"—shall I say?—to be in some other "New Testament", as said books have to be in "our New Testament". Perhaps so; but what does it matter? Dr. Gregory feels competent to put certain statements of one Aristion upon an equality with those of "Mark's Gospel". This looks very much as if the standard by which the "right" of a book to a place in "the New Testament" were purely subjective. And, if so, why need any of the rest of us be more diffident than Dr. Gregory? *Quot homines, tot sententiae; quot sententiae, tot Nova Testamenta*. This much at least seems certain, namely, until we know just what a "New Testament" is, we may well feel a measure of embarrassment in picking out one that we shall call "our New Testament".

And when we turn to Dr. Gregory's dealing with the word "Canon", the case is neither different nor better. With something very much like a tone of dissent, if not of protest, Dr. Gregory says: "The discussions touching the proper contents of the New Testament have been dominated by the word canon" (p. 7). One is tempted to ask in surprise, If the subject under discussion be "The Canon of the New Testament", how is it possible to avoid having the discussion dominated by the word canon? Certainly Dr. Gregory's discussion has been dominated to its great detriment by the word "canon", which is a constantly recurring but never defined term. Again, with an undertone of disapproval, Dr. Gregory tells us that "many Christians have nailed themselves to the word canon". If this means, as it seems to mean—that is, if "it is as sensible and intelligible as it sounds"—if this means, that many Christians have insisted upon fixing a definite meaning upon the word "canon" and attaching much importance to such meaning, then, unfortunately, the same cannot be said for Dr. Gregory. So far as Dr. Gregory's discussion

of two hundred and ninety-five pages goes, no study of it will throw any light upon the *Canon* of the New Testament. After reading it one does not even know "whether there be any" canon, or whether there ought to be one, or whether if there were one what it would be as to its essence, or what it would be like as to its outer form—at least not from any opinion that Dr. Gregory has thought it worth while to express upon the subject. No doubt had Dr. Gregory seen fit to express himself upon any of the points mentioned, he would have been as informing and in every way as interesting as he has proved to be regarding matters upon which he has expressed himself. Perhaps it is not worth while for one to have any opinions about the "canon". But then the question emerges, Why announce a treatise upon a subject that one means carefully to eschew touching upon? Why not write upon some such topic as "A List of Books Which Should Form the Library of a Christian"?—a very good subject, forsooth, and one upon which it is quite certain that Dr. Gregory would have said many things much to the point.

It is all very well, of course, to tell us, "The general supposition is that a canon exists. It is in approaching the subject taken for granted as a thing long ago proved, that a certain canon was settled upon at a very early date in the history of the Christian Church. And the word canon in connection with this view means a sharply defined and unalterable collection, made, put together, decided upon by general Church authority under the guidance of the Holy Spirit" (p. 7). But the very language used implies that "in connection with" some other "view" the word canon may have a more satisfactory, possibly even a saner meaning. If so, why should Dr. Gregory have withheld from his readers this possibly more satisfactory and saner meaning of the term? But he does. If he knows of a better meaning for the term, Dr. Gregory is careful to keep his knowledge to himself. True, he tantalizes us by saying on his next page, "For the moment we may here hold fast to the current use of the expression", thus arousing the suspicion that he knows of some other meaning of the word "canon" which, even if less current, may be more hopeful, and that he will in due time bring it to the light. But we are doomed to disappointment. True, it comes out as Dr. Gregory proceeds that he does know other meanings that have been attached to the word. And if the mere mention of them can be called holding fast to them "for a moment", then to them also, as to what he esteems the "current" meaning of the word, he "holds fast for a moment". But that is just the trouble. Dr. Gregory holds fast to no meaning of the word for more than "a moment". But if Dr. Gregory does not hold fast to any of the meanings of the word "canon" that he mentions, the reader must not for even "a moment" suppose that he formally rejects, or even dismisses them. He simply holds fast to them "for a moment", lets them slip, and as he advances they recede: only if the reader holds on long enough to be, so to speak, "in at the death", he will find, possibly to his surprise, that it is "the current" view of the canon that has been done

to death. I say to his "surprise", because, if thoughtful, the reader must ask himself, Why should Dr. Gregory have thought it worth his while to take two hundred and ninety-five pages to prove that the books now known "in Western Europe and America" as "the New Testament"—these very twenty-seven, no more and no less—have not been received as "the New Testament" *semper, ubique et ab omnibus*? Dr. Gregory might have, and, indeed, he has disposed of this misconception in ten lines (p. 290, bottom). And if that is what he had in mind to do when he began, then the remaining eleven thousand seven hundred and ninety lines of his discussion are for the most part just so much surplusage. Of course, from another point of view they are at the farthest possible remove from being surplusage. With ample scholarship and laborious care, Dr. Gregory has done a piece of work that brings us all into his debt. More than that, his work will enable us to do for ourselves what Dr. Gregory has not done for us, namely, satisfy ourselves if not as to the nature—that we must learn from other sources—at least as to the true extent of "the Canon of the New Testament". For this we are deeply obliged to him.

This lack of definition, upon which we have been dwelling, had its inevitable result. Dr. Gregory entered upon his discussion without a definite issue before his own mind,—or perhaps, I should say without placing a definite issue before his readers. On the second page of his introduction proper, Dr. Gregory says, "The first thing to be done is to determine whether or no there is a canon". And again on the very same page, "Our first aim is not the history of the canon, but the criticism of the canon" (p. 8). I must venture respectfully to disagree with him. The first thing to be done is to determine *what is a canon*. As well undertake to criticise the "beauty spots" or color blemishes of the famous "pig in a poke" as to criticise a "canon" before determining "whether or not there is a canon"; and to try "to determine whether or not there is a canon" before determining what a "canon" is. Success in any such an attempt lies beyond the reach of even Dr. Gregory's fine gifts and ample equipment.

Current usage would have furnished Dr. Gregory with three perfectly clear definitions of the word "canon", any one of which would have furnished him a point of departure for his discussion. According to one of these definitions, a canon is a *normative list* setting forth the names of the books that are entitled to be considered a part of the New Testament of the Christian Church (Romish). According to another definition of the word, a canon is a body of books whose *treatment* of the beginnings of the Christian Church is *normative*, that is, whose treatment of these matters is relatively the best in existence (Rationalist). And according to the third of these definitions, a canon is a body of writings put forth by the Founder of the Christian Church through His commissioned and specially qualified agents *whose contents are normative* for the faith and conduct of those who profess allegiance to Him (some Protestants). To be sure each of these definitions presupposes that there is a Christian Church, with a Founder and historic begin-

nings. And two of them presuppose farther that there is a "New Testament", and that it is in some way intimately connected with the Christian Church. Nor is it possible to pass an intelligent judgment upon these proposed definitions without giving reasonable consideration to the presuppositions upon which they repose. To plunge into a discussion of the canon without giving due attention to the presuppositions that must lie behind every definition of "the canon of the New Testament", will be not to plunge *in medias res*, but *in mediam paludem*. This is only saying that the possibility of profitable discussion hinges upon the presentation of an intelligible issue, or issues.

But perhaps the gravest, and certainly the least excusable, fault of Dr. Gregory's book is his treatment of his primary sources. Whatever else the New Testament may be, it is the earliest literature of the Christian Church. And in a day in which the question, Was Paul or Jesus the Founder of Christianity? is seriously discussed, it is easy to see that the writers of certain of these books sustained a unique relation to the Christian Church. One, then, might altogether reasonably expect Dr. Gregory to collate what these writers or certain of them have to say upon the matter of the "value" of the books composing what he calls "our New Testament". Do these earliest representatives of the Christian Church "designate for use in church" the books that compose "our New Testament" or any of these books? Do these earliest representatives of the Christian Church say that the books of "our New Testament", or any of them, were assigned, or were to be assigned to that division of public worship to which Dr. Gregory gives the title of "God to Men"? If so, then clearly such statements are entitled to a consideration that Dr. Gregory has nowhere given them. This, however, is stating the case far too mildly. Dr. Gregory makes positive assertions that are not only not supported by any evidence—unless Dr. Gregory's bare assertion can be esteemed evidence—but that are in the face of unimpeachable evidence. For instance, we find him saying, "The earliest Christian authors did not for an instant suppose that they were writing sacred books" (p. 49). Now, if Dr. Gregory means by this that these earliest Christian authors did not attach to their writings a label formally declaring "This is a sacred book", then unquestionably he is correct. But neither did Moses, or whoever wrote the Pentateuch, neither did Isaiah, nor any of the prophets. Again, we find Dr. Gregory saying, "Now it is evident that the reading of letters from apostles, and, when the Gospels were there, the reading of the Gospels, must have taken place under the third part or (c), for that was all: 'Man to Men'" (p. 58): which leads one to wonder what scientific theology would do without the phrases "it is evident" and "must have". Of course, if this statement of Dr. Gregory is correct, it largely explains, even though it may not justify, his treatment of his primary sources. But in a matter of so much importance, with the primary evidence in the case at his elbow, one may be excused if he should not accept the easy assertion made above, even upon the *ipse dixit* of Dr. Gregory. And when one turns to the "letters" of the apostles themselves, he finds

in almost all of them that which is wholly irreconcilable with Dr. Gregory's statements.

For one thing, it is upon the face of these "letters"—despite Deissmann I must still regard "epistles" as the proper term—that they are official documents. Otherwise, why the formal "Paul, called to be an apostle", "Peter, an apostle of Jesus Christ", with which as a rule they are introduced? Farther they are pervaded by a tone of authority: indeed, one is warranted in saying an unmistakable, unequivocal tone of authority (1 Cor. iv. 19-21; 2 Cor. xiii. 1-2). Nor are we surprised at this tone of authority, when we learn the nature of the official relation of the Apostle Paul, let us say, to the Christian Church (Eph. ii. 20. The reader will note that in this statement "the apostles" precedes "the prophets"), and what he has to say as to the source of "his gospel" (Gal. i. 1-12). And these same primary sources tell us that the high claims made by the apostle for himself and for his "gospel" met a cordial recognition at the hands of those to whom his "letters" came (1 Thess. ii. 13). Indeed, even though he has not troubled himself about his primary sources, Dr. Gregory himself is witness to the fact that apostolic origin or sanction gave to the writings that possessed it a significance wholly unique, if not wholly determinative for value. For we find him—still using his phrase "the New Testament" in his quaint, all-up-in-the-air fashion—saying, "The number of books in the New Testament simply grew. When anyone had the question as to the sacred character of a book to decide, he was very likely to ask whether it was from an apostle or not. We see that Tertullian, like others before him, succeeds in agreeing to Mark and Luke by the connection of the one with Peter and of the other with Paul. And this same Tertullian, much as he likes Hebrews, lets it stand aside because its author, whom he may well have rightly thought to be Barnabas, was not a Twelve-Apostle and not Paul the special apostle" (p. 293). Nor is the force of the foregoing testimony in the least impaired—though Dr. Gregory himself seems to be seeking to impair it—when he adds, "Many another reason came into play at one time and at another, in one place and the other. A book favored Gnosticism, therefore it certainly was not sacred. A book used an apocryphal book, therefore it could not be received. There was no general rule that everywhere held good" (p. 294). One need not dispute any of these statements, not even the last. For obviously there might be but one really solid ground for receiving a book as "sacred", and practically an infinite number of grounds for denying to it such a character. If, however, the early Church as a whole had shared Dr. Gregory's "free"—I believe that that is the correct word—standpoint, it is quite inconceivable I think that either the composition or the history of "our New Testament" should be just what, as a matter of fact, they are. Dr. Gregory, for instance, says of Aristion, to whom he ascribes the verses now found in Mark xvi. 9-20, "Aristion is called by Papias a disciple of the Lord, and his words are every whit as good as Mark's words" (p. 511). Now, while there was but one Mark who was amanuensis to the apostle Peter,

there were, so to speak, many Aristions, or disciples of our Lord. This being the case, had the early Church shared Dr. Gregory's standpoint, it would be passing strange that it should pass by all the utterances of the many Aristions, and content themselves with the gospel of Mark.

The simple fact is that it is time that "scientific theology" were outgrowing some of its petty *apriorism*, and were getting the courage of the habit of looking fully in the face *all* the facts with which it is called to deal. And surely it may do this without fear of becoming "orthodox". It has only openly to break with the history of the Christian Church, not as history, but simply as history that is in any way entitled to shape present day beliefs. If its representatives are not willing to take the humble position of disciples under the old regime, what is to prevent them from themselves becoming the apostles and prophets of a new order? One cannot avoid the feeling that there is justice in what Canon Cheyne says, when he virtually charges them with mistaking moral cowardice for modesty or for becoming caution. Surely they have among them the material, first and last, by and large, for a very "goodly fellowship of prophets", and—though it must be confessed that none are at present in sight—who can say that they will never develop a "noble army of martyrs"?—though, to be sure, when one stops to think of it, they have not much that is really worth witnessing for, at least at any great personal cost.

But I must close, and I cannot do so without again expressing the very great pleasure I have had in reading Dr. Gregory's valuable book. True, he has not added much—at least directly—to our knowledge either of the nature or the origin of the canon of the New Testament. But he has, in his own delightful way, made accessible to us much material that can be used with fine effect for that purpose.

Columbia, S. C.

W. M. MCPHEETERS.

A SHORT GRAMMAR OF THE GREEK NEW TESTAMENT for students familiar with the Elements of Greek. By A. T. ROBERTSON, A.M., D.D., Professor of New Testament Interpretation, Southern Baptist Theological Seminary, Louisville, Ky. A. C. Armstrong & Son, 3 and 5 West 18th Street, near Fifth Avenue, New York, 1908. Pp. xxx, 240. Second edition, 1909.

Dr. Robertson's book is intended to be "an intermediate handy working grammar for men familiar with the elements of Greek both in school and in the pastorate", but in reality he has not confined himself to such a limited sphere. The frequent observations upon questions of comparative philology, especially the abundant use of the Sanskrit, make the book something more than an elementary text-book. Indeed it may well be questioned whether the author has not sometimes gone farther afield than is advisable for any work on New Testament grammar, whether elementary or not. The contribution of a New Testament grammar to the history of the Greek language should be limited to an exposition of the changes that took place between the classical period of prose literature and the first Christian century; ear-

lier changes should be discussed only where they throw light upon these problems.

The book contains many good observations, evidently the result of independent thought as well as of a diligent employment of the literature of the subject. But it is perhaps a stimulating book to be read through, rather than a convenient book of reference. It has a place among the discussions of the language of the New Testament, but that place is hardly the "definite and unoccupied field" of "the last year in college and the first in the seminary." The beginner is unfortunately only too likely to be confused rather than stimulated by Dr. Robertson's references to the ablative, locative, associative-instrumental, and the like.

On p. vi, the author remarks that "it is a satisfaction to note how commonly the excellent critical text of Nestle agrees with that of Westcott and Hort." This agreement is hardly surprising, in view of the fact that Nestle's text is simply a combination of Westcott and Hort with the texts of other modern editors. Dr. Robertson's arrangement of material is at times faulty; for example, on p. 24, the number of verbs with neuter plural subject is discussed under "declension of substantives," whereas it certainly belongs under syntax. On p. 89, the author speaks of "the practical equivalence" in the New Testament "of *eis* and accusative and *en* (the locative) with verbs of rest and motion". This is misleading. If the blending occurs at all, it occurs only in a very small proportion of cases. On p. 90, we read, "But instead of the predicate nominative we often have *eis* and the accusative as in the Attic Greek." Something is wrong here. The usage mentioned is of course not Attic. On p. 153, the author underestimates rather than overestimates the intelligence of his readers when he warns them that the Greek *τοῦ* which is used with the infinitive to express purpose is not our English "to"!

The style of the book is hardly what might have been expected from the author of the admirable *Epochs in the Life of Jesus*. It is at times abrupt almost to the verge of crudeness, and is not always clear. At times, one is almost tempted to suppose that the author has jotted down detached notes without revision. Thus, on p. 79, second line from the bottom, "either" is used for "any". On p. 131, it is said that "the doctors much disagree". On p. 133, we read, "That is another matter to be raised on other grounds." On p. 179, l. 9, the use of "alone" for "only" obscures the sense. What is the meaning of the following sentence that occurs on p. 12: "The hiatus was not considered so objectionable after the manner of the Ionian writers"?

A bibliography which embraces such widely different works as Westcott and Hort, *The New Testament in Greek* (inaccurately called *Greek New Testament*) and Whitney, *Sanskrit Grammar*, would better have been subdivided. On p. 60, Deissmann's *Philology of the Greek Bible* is called "the best single handbook of the new knowledge from the papyri and the Septuagint." Such high praise would lead one to expect something more than a modest little collection of four popular lectures, which makes no pretence whatever at anything like detail. The

usefulness of Dr. Robertson's book would be increased by the addition of an *index rerum*.

The early appearance of a second edition indicates the usefulness of the work. Typographical errors have been corrected, but no important changes have been introduced.

Princeton.

J GRESHAM MACHEN.

JESUS UND DIE HEIDENMISSION. Biblisch-Theologische Untersuchung von DR. MAX MEINERTZ, A.O.Ö., Professor der Neutestamentlichen Exegese in Braunsberg. Münster i. W. 1908. Verlag der Aschen-dorffschen Buchhandlung. (Neutestamentliche Abhandlungen herausgegeben von Prof. Dr. A. Bludau, Münster i. W. Heft 1, 2.) 8vo.; pp. xii, 244. Mk. 6. 40.

The question of Jesus' attitude towards universalism and missions, while ever of supreme importance, especially in a missionary age like ours, has acquired new interest from the manner of its treatment in Harnack's work "The Mission and Expansion of Christianity in the First Three Centuries". The chapter devoted to "Jesus Christ and Universal Missions" marks undoubtedly a weak spot in an otherwise exceptionally strong and able book. True, Harnack's position on the negative side does not differ from that of many recent critics. He denies the authenticity of the great missionary commandment recorded in Matt. xxviii. 19 and of the more or less parallel passages at the close of Mark and Luke. But, in characteristic consonance with his general disposition to treat the tradition as gently as possible and to remove difficulties rather by skillful exegesis or textual reconstruction than by violent critical measures, he maintains that in the body of the Synoptic Gospels there is on a fair interpretation comparatively little to be found that puts Jesus in a false historic light. The Synoptists have, in his opinion, exercised great self-restraint in not to any large extent carrying back the missionary idea and missionary sentiment of their own time into the sayings of Jesus. Now other critics who on the historical question share the negative attitude of Harnack, yet fail to observe this self-restraint in the Synoptical record. Johannes Weiss, to mention only one writer, while just as sceptical as regards the great commission, succeeds in discovering much more material steeped in the missionary-spirit in Jesus' teaching. Harnack tones down and puts a minimizing exegesis on such statements, so as to bring them in line with the view that Jesus' universalism was confined to the "intensive" kind and to the O. T. eschatological forecast of the ultimate inclusion of Gentiles in the kingdom of God, neither of which called for positive missionary effort. Weiss, on the other hand, gives the statements their full force, thus explaining them, so far as their missionary import is concerned, from the outlook of the later church. Harnack recognizes more as authentic, Weiss more as influenced by the missionary-principle. Only in regard to Jesus' historical position they practically agree.

In view of the new interest thus imparted to the discussion, Meinertz'

treatise is most timely. After stating the problem it deals in succession with the universalism of the Old Testament, cotemporary Judaism, the "intensive" universalism of Jesus' doctrine and person, his explicit universalism, his missionary-ideas, his missionary command, the teaching of the several Gospels, the missionary-command and the subsequent development in the Apostolic Church. This scheme is natural and lucid. In the statement of the problem a good orientation is given as regards the history of opinion in recent criticism. The treatment of Old Testament teaching and of Judaism is not merely important from a dogmatic point of view, in so far as it exhibits the organic development of the ideas of universalism and of missions, but also apologetically important, because it creates a strong *à priori* presumption that Jesus must have formed definite, positive views of the conversion of the Gentiles. For, if such views were entirely lacking in his consciousness, it would have to be said that he remained behind the highest development of the Old Testament, on which even Judaism marks an advance, so far as the putting into actual missionary practice of the prophetic universalistic missionary teaching is concerned. On this as on other points the out-come of negative criticism is that the ideal perfection of Jesus' belief and teaching is impaired. He ceases to be not merely divine, but also ceases to be our absolute standard as a man. In the present case he fails to rise to an adequate appreciation of the trend of Old Testament prophecy. For in the Old Testament there is not merely an unconscious reaching out towards universalism, nor merely a prophetic eschatological forecast of the reception of the Gentiles, there is also, especially in the latter part of Isaiah, a prediction of positive missionary activity. And it can be shown in other ways that in the figure of the Servant-of-Jehovah, so prominent in this part of the prophecy, Jesus found his own person and office portrayed. How inevitable then it must have become for him to transfer to himself this particular feature also, that the Servant shall be a light to the Gentiles? But, if we are to believe Harnack and the others, Jesus failed to follow prophecy in this highest flight, where it caught the vision of a truly universalistic preaching of the true religion among the Gentiles. To be sure, it might be replied that the conditions were not alike, that Jesus believed the end of the world to be near, and that this foreshortening of his outlook kept under the missionary-thought, and that therefore the comparison between him and the prophets is unfair. But, altogether apart from the question of fact involved here, ought not the shortness of the time, instead of suppressing the missionary-idea, to have proven an incentive to greater ardor in its execution? And, strictly speaking, the theory of men like Harnack seems to be not that Jesus consciously conceived the missionary-idea with reference to the Gentiles, and then kept it in abeyance in view of the near approach of the end, but rather that he naively remained shut up to the narrower outlook, that he never so much as contemplated even in the abstract a mission outside of the limits of Israel. The difficulty becomes still more acute if this position be compared with the attitude

of cotemporary Judaism. The Jews of that day conducted an active missionary propaganda, as Harnack himself has most strikingly shown, and the bearing of which on the conception and pursuit of apostolic missions he has not failed to perceive. The New Testament itself bears witness to this, Matt. xxiii. 15, Jno. vii. 35, Rom. ii. 17-23. Why should Jesus have escaped the force of this example? It is not necessary, of course, to put the missionary spirit of Judaism on a line with the missionary spirit of the Christian Church. Meinertz well observes that its motives were frequently far from pure, and that the position accorded to the Gentile converts was not, either for the present or the Messianic future, one of full equality with the Jews. He makes it quite clear that a new and fresh start was made by Christianity, that a new force was brought into play. But nevertheless the thought was there and it is difficult to believe that Jesus could have entirely passed it by and to no extent incorporated it into his teaching.

Since the "intensive universalism" and the "explicit universalism" (in the sense of prophetic forecast of the coming in of Gentiles) are acknowledged by the advocates of the negative view, most interest attaches to the chapters on "The Missionary Ideas of Jesus" and "The Missionary Command". As is well known in regard to the discourse in Matt. x, exegetical opinions differ sharply. Some, especially Harnack, say the whole discourse is meant as an instruction for the Jewish mission, and that not as a purely provisional enterprise of the moment, but conceived by the early Jewish-Christian Church as final, witness vs. 23, where it is foretold that the Apostles will not have gone over the cities of Israel, till the Son of Man shall have come. Others say that, whatever the original import of the discourse, Matthew at least means it as an instruction for missions in the widest sense. Meinertz takes the view that both parties are right. According to him there are two elements in the chapter. Up to the 16th verse it is an instruction of the Apostles for their preliminary mission to Israel at that juncture. From the 16th verse to the 42d the situation is an entirely different one. Matthew here has, in accordance with his general method, grouped together with the preceding a piece of the great eschatological discourse belonging to the closing days of our Lord's life. The parallel passages, therefore, are found in Mk. xiii and not in Mk. vi or Lk. ix. The piece describes not directly the work of missions, but the persecution to which the disciples will be exposed. But this persecution is placed at a future time, beyond Jesus' life on earth. And the description indirectly shows that it will come upon the disciples while engaged in missionary-propaganda. This missionary-activity is further one that relates to the Gentiles, for v. 18 predicts that the disciples will be brought before governors and kings. Now by this division of the discourse into two distinct parts Meinertz removes the difficulty, that in v. 23 the first mission of the Apostles to Israel would be represented as lasting until the Parousia. Vs. 23 is simply an encouragement for the disciples in their later persecutions. They will never be without some protecting-place, they will not exhaust the

possibilities of finding refuge, till the Son of Man be come. But why are these places of refuge designated as the cities of Israel, if in the preceding the area of movement for the disciples is drawn so widely as to include their appearance before Gentile governors and kings? Meinertz replies that, even if the coming of the Son of Man refers to the end of the world, there is no difficulty here, because it was natural to clothe the thought in a form adjusted to the outlook of the disciples of that time. But, as a matter of fact, he thinks the coming of the Son of Man here relates to the destruction of Jerusalem, and up to that time, while the Gospel was being carried into foreign lands, the Jewish land remained more or less the base of operation, so that the persecution and flight were literally from one city of that land to another. The author's view on this point is interlinked with his interpretation of the great eschatological discourse in general. Here also he thinks that the preaching of the Gospel to the world spoken of in Matt xxiv. 14 and Mk. xiii. 10 precedes the destruction of Jerusalem, and compares Paul's mode of speech in Rom. i. 8, Col. i. 6, 23. Thus he explains the coupling together of "the end" in Matt. v. 14 and "the abomination of desolation" in v. 15 and the same phenomenon in Mk. vss. 10 and 14.

The two points named are the most difficult and perhaps also the most interesting in the author's treatment of the material. But many other things he says are equally suggestive and instructive. The twelve Apostles, by their number, apart from their temporary mission, imply the idea of a new people of God, to take the place of the twelve ancient tribes. He hesitates, however, to apply this same principle to the 70 (or 72) disciples, as pointing by their number to the 70 or 72 Gentile nations known to Jewish lore. In the pericope of the Syro-Phoenician woman, which he thinks Luke omitted on account of its apparent particularism, he rightly presses the "first" in "let the children be satisfied first", although Harnack somewhat irresponsibly says that it should not be pressed, and quotes the interesting suggestion of Resch that this "first" is echoed in the Pauline sequence "first to the Jew then to the Greek". In the Sermon on the Mount attention is called to such universalistic terms as "earth", "world", "men", Matt. v. 13, 14, 16, and a careful inquiry into the New Testament usage of $\gamma\eta$ brings out that almost everywhere it has universalistic associations. In connection with the parable of the supper, Matt. xxii and Lk. xiv, not only the universalistic but also the missionary element is well brought out, as the latter finds expression in such terms as ἀποστέλλειν, καλεῖν, εἰσάγειν repeatedly used. The author does not, however, accept Zahn's view, according to whom the sequence between Matt. xxii. 7 and 8 implies that the Apostles are not commanded to go to the Gentiles until after the destruction of Jerusalem. On the other hand, in Matt. xxvi. 13 he adopts Zahn's interpretation to the effect that "this gospel" is the gospel which Jesus has preached and has commanded his Apostles to preach, not the gospel of the passion of Jesus ("she has done it to prepare me for burial"), as some critics interpret, making use of this

interpretation to cast discredit upon the authenticity of the saying.

In the interesting chapter on the missionary-command and the subsequent development the author attacks the difficult problem how, taking for granted the authenticity of our Lord's explicit universalistic and missionary-teaching, the rise of the Gentile missionary-propaganda in the early church could be so long delayed and, when it developed, could develop without apparent contact with or appeal to the authority of Jesus in this matter. The main answer given is that the problem with which the early church was confronted was not the abstract problem of the ultimate inclusion of the Gentiles in the kingdom, but the very concrete problem of the mode of their inclusion, of their standing after conversion as related to the church of the circumcision. For the solution of this problem, no appeal to the words of Jesus could have contributed much. Hence in the Cornelius-episode and on the occasion of the Council neither Peter nor James make such appeal. Further providential guidance and new revelation were required to bring about progress in the solution of this problem, and these were afforded in the martyrdom of Stephen, the experience of Peter, and the train of events which the scattering of the Hellenistic disciples consequent upon the death of Stephen set in motion.

What has been said will suffice to show that Meinertz' book constitutes a valuable contribution to the treatment of an important subject. It opens most creditably the new series of "Neutestamentliche Abhandlungen" to be published under the auspices of Dr. Bludau. For the work of an orthodox Roman-Catholic theologian it is eminently fair and unbiased in its exegetical methods. The only difference we have observed in this respect between what is here given and what a modern Protestant scholar might have offered, is that among the exegetical authorities quoted the older Protestant exegetes (not the modern ones) are conspicuously absent, although the Romanist commentators are not infrequently referred to. We are afraid, however, that many Protestant writers do no better.

In conclusion we cannot help regretting that (perhaps owing to a predominantly apologetic intent) the discussion is largely confined to the field of the Synoptical Gospels. From so well-informed a guide we should have liked to learn more than is here given concerning the universalistic teaching of the Fourth Gospel.

Princeton.

GEERHARDUS VOS.

PAUL THE MYSTIC, a Study in Apostolic Experience. By JAMES M. CAMPBELL, D.D., Author of "The Indwelling Christ", "After Pentecost—What?", "Clerical Types," etc. G. P. Putnam's Sons: New York and London. The Knickerbocker Press. 1908. Pp. vi, 285.

We naturally think of John as the mystic of the apostolic circle, but Paul was also a mystic after a Pauline manner. Dr. Campbell has written a bright, timely and attractive book about Paul the Mystic, and about mysticism in general, taking Paul as a text. He appreciates alike

the necessity of mysticism to a true spiritual Christianity and the pitfalls of mysticism, and the nearness of "ripeness" and "rotteness" in religious experience. He rightly regards Paul as an example of the true Christian mystic, and thinks that the study of Paul as an "evangelical", "practical" and "rational" mystic may check the pantheizing tendency of philosophical mysticism, and may keep back Christian mysticism from emotional excess.

As to the crux of mysticism, the relation between the inner light and the external authority, the author is scarcely consistent. In his earlier chapters he argues strongly that the Christ of experience must be constantly interpreted by the Christ of history, and under the caption, "As a rational mystic Paul tested his subjective experience by objective revelation", he says, "He was not like those mystics whose only Scriptures are themselves. . . . He enjoins Timothy, his son in the gospel, to 'give heed to reading', to 'abide in the teaching of the sacred writings', etc." (p. 145). The tone is different, however, in the last chapter, on Paul's message to the Church of to-day, where a contrast is drawn between an external revelation and "the Bible of the soul", between the "inward authority of the spirit" and external forms, and it is even asserted that Paul's Master "knew nothing of an infallible Church or an infallible book". The earlier chapters, it may be said, represent better the author's general attitude. At the close of his discussion of Paul as an evangelical mystic he finely says: "Throughout the Christian centuries the Cross of Calvary, on which our blessed Redeemer has died, has ever been acknowledged to be the source of the power by which the inner fruits of the Christian experience and the outer fruits of Christian service have been produced".

The book abounds in apt quotations from the mystics and the poets and in striking sentences of its own, and will be found serviceable and stimulating to the preacher.

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WM. HALLOCK JOHNSON.

HISTORICAL THEOLOGY.

THE RELIGION AND WORSHIP OF THE SYNAGOGUE. An Introduction to the Study of Judaism from the New Testament Period. By W. O. E. OESTERLEY, B.D., Jesus College, Cambridge; and G. H. BOX, M.A., Late Scholar of St. John's College, Oxford; sometime Hebrew Scholar at Merchant Taylors' School, London. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1907. Pp. ix, 443.

The writers of the present volume have had, according to their own statement, in mind the requirements more especially of general Christian readers and students. While scholarly throughout, it is not technical; it gives what is likely to be of interest and use to the class of readers named and avoids discussion of points which only the expert student is apt to enquire into. Thus, *e. g.*, although a brief account is

given of the Essenes and their mode of life, no opinion is expressed on the origin of the order, nor on its relation to Christianity, even the question of its connection with the Therapeutae is passed by in silence. The book is divided into three parts: I. Introductory; II. Dogmatic Judaism; III. Practical Religion. Of these three the second and third are, in our opinion, most in harmony with the proposed scope of the work. In the first division, which is largely occupied with the antecedents and sources of Judaism, perhaps too much is given. We can well imagine that the protracted survey of the literature of tradition, Targums, Mishnah, Tosephta, Baraitas, the two Talmuds, Midrashim and liturgies will somewhat weary and discourage the average reader before he comes to the more interesting second and third divisions. It is only fair, however, to say that the authors have made the best of what is inherently a very unwieldy and confusing subject. The reader who should feel the need and desire of making a general acquaintance with these matters is less likely to find himself bewildered and lost here than if he were to resort for enlightenment to some technical encyclopædia either Jewish or Christian. In the discussion of the Apocalyptic literature we notice an inclination to adopt the view of Baldensperger, according to whom the Messianic hope as voiced in this literature represents the better, more spiritual, more universalistic, less self-centered element in Judaism,—the opposite pole of the Nomistic tendency usually held responsible for the typical faults of the Jewish system. In a later connection this view assumes the more specific form that the Apocalyptic writings are identified with the Hellenistic strain of Judaism, and that particularly as regards the Messianic concept, a position reminding of Friedländer. Altogether apart from the problematical character of this theory, it would have been more in keeping with the general scope of the work in its avoidance of abstract technical problems if no exception to this had been made in the present case.

The second division, on Dogmatic Judaism, deals in succession with the Law, the Jewish Conception of God, Intermediate Agencies between God and Man, the Jewish Doctrine of the Messiah, Eschatology, the Jewish Doctrine of Sin and the Jewish Doctrine of Baptism. Among the many interesting things here set forth we would call special attention to the reasons assigned on pp. 132ff. for the decline in synagogue attendance and the largely prevailing indifferentism with regard to the traditional orthodox type of religion among modern Jews. As such are stated: the conduct of the services in the synagogue in a language not understood by the people—the dulness and unimpressing nature of these services—the passive rôle assigned to the congregation—the archaic character of some of the customs in vogue in the worship, which renders them alien to the modern at least to the Western mind, *e. g.*, that no women are allowed in the body of the synagogue—the time of the chief service, on Saturday, when the world around is busy. Some of these reasons invite a comparison with the Roman Catholic worship, which labors to some extent under similar disadvantages, and yet, in spite of these, seems to have a firm hold upon the people. Undoubtedly

the main reason for the difference lies in this, that the Roman Church is what the Jewish Church is not, a soteriological, sacramentarian institution, which throws the emphasis not upon what comes to its adherents through the channel of consciousness but through the mystical operation of the means of grace. It is here that Judaism is deficient: it has all the disadvantages and none of the advantages of its archaic make-up. The sacrifices are gone and the Messianic hope is purely a matter of the future.

Of equal interest with the foregoing is the parallelism, suggested on p. 149, between what may be observed in the Roman Church of to-day and has in the last hundred years been observed in Judaism, viz., that the doctrine of tradition as a rule of truth is made to do service for incorporating to a considerable extent the results of modern biblical criticism. The attitude of such a writer as Loisy reminds from a formal point of view strongly of the position of Jewish scholars like Krochmal, Rappoport and Zunz, "who sought to compensate for the loss of the Bible as formerly interpreted by elevating the authority of tradition." This puts the finishing touch to the striking similarity which the development of the idea of tradition in the Romish Church bears to its development in Judaism.

In working out the third division of the work, although there are two chapters devoted to the education and life of the Jew, the authors have for the rest given attention mainly to a portrayal of the religious customs connected with the synagogue. The ritual elements in the every-day life of the Jew, not directly associated with the public conduct of worship are not so clearly brought out. More than half of the illustrations belong to this section of the book. A general index and glossary, as well as an index of reference to the Bible, the Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha are appended. We regret to observe that in the earlier signatures the proof-reading has been rather carelessly done. We note on p. xv "end edition" for "2nd edition"; on p. 23 the ungrammatical sentence: "it may perhaps be due to the contrast . . . that accounts"; p. 31, J. Rendel Harrison; p. 49, ἀγγελος; p. 51, the incomplete sentence: "The earliest text-book of the oral law (compiled in its present official form about 200 A. D.)."

Princeton.

GEERHARDUS VOS.

GESCHICHTE DER AUTOBIOGRAPHIE. VON GEORG MISCH. Erster Band: Das Altertum. Leipzig und Berlin: B. G. Teubner. 1907. 8vo.; pp. viii, 472.

This considerable volume is only one of three which shall contain a comprehensive history of autobiography. The work was undertaken in response to an offer of a prize for such a history, made through the Prussian Academy of the Sciences in 1900 (*Sitzungsber. der Kgl. Preuss. Akad. der Wiss.*, 1900, p. 55). Two manuscripts were presented,—the one written more from the point of view of purely literary history (a history, therefore, of autobiographies), the other from a more philosophico-social standpoint (a history, therefore, more of

autobiography). The prize fell to the latter (*Sitzungsber.*, etc., 1905, p. 686); and it is this treatise, the first part of which now lies before us. Although only a fragment of the whole work, this first part has nevertheless a completeness of its own. It gives us the entire history of autobiography in the old world. It has indeed a higher claim to unity than this merely external fact may suggest. For the history of autobiography in the old world is not merely the history of the inception and development of autobiographical writing through a definitely marked literary period. It is the history of the growth of this literary form from its first tentative beginnings to its culmination; for this literary form reached its culmination as the old world was passing away. We can say even more than that. Both as a purely literary mode and as the expression of individuality autobiography attained its climax in a single work, which came into existence just as the old world was dying. The history of autobiography in antiquity may almost be read, therefore, as the history of the production of a single great work—the long preparation for it, ending in the finished product. And this is really the ground of our deepest interest in this history. For this one great work into which all these lines of preparation, so carefully traced by Dr. Misch, issue, is Augustine's *Confessions*. The history of autobiography in antiquity may be looked at, then, as at bottom only an orderly study, in a genetic way, of Augustine's *Confessions*. All that goes before them but leads slowly up the long slope to these heights. All that comes after rests in their shadow.

No one who reads Dr. Misch's detailed study of the origin and development not merely of autobiographical forms, but of autobiographical life-expression, will fail to feel this. Dr. Misch feels it himself, and from the beginning of his work keeps his readers' eyes set on the *Confessions* as the goal to which all tends. He is eager that it shall not be inferred from the circumstance that complete autobiographies in the strict sense scarcely attract attention in the Graeco-Roman literature until the time of Augustine, that they were a new invention of that age. In point of fact, he insists, the bases for all the autobiographical developments of this age were laid in antiquity, "and Augustine's work is not a beginning but a completion" (p. 9). It is a part—a very large part—of his task to trace out the lines of development through which autobiography thus slowly came to its rights. He begins at the beginning, by pointing out the autobiographical form which is taken in the Assyrio-Babylonian and Egyptian inscriptions. He fully recognizes, however, that the creation of true autobiography depends on the development of personality and the individualistic habit of looking at things. Thus he finds to have arisen first on Greek soil and to have received its first impulse from the introspection fostered by the Socratic self-consciousness, reinforcing our natural need of self-expression and desire to be understood—not to say to be admired. Nevertheless autobiographical writing was slow in working out its inevitable destiny. Throughout the whole period of Greek culture up to the birth of Christ, it held only a very secondary place in literature. Only in

the 'one species of political autobiography have we anything like a complete series of works of this order either preserved or witnessed to us. Beyond this, the cultivation of this literary form was in the hands of the rhetoricians, and it was from this subordinate region of life that the first Greek autobiography worthy of its name—the so-called *Antidosis* of Isocrates—has come down to us (B. C. 353). In this artificial defense of himself against an imaginary opponent, the rhetorician, in full consciousness of the novelty of his task, undertook, for the benefit of the ill-informed and of future generations, to depict his own character, his course of life, and his training: to make known the truth concerning himself, and to set out "an image of his mind and of his whole life"; fondly hoping thus "to leave behind him a monument to himself more lasting than statues of brass". The example thus set by Isocrates was not, however, at once widely followed. At least there have come down to us, for the space of some 300 years, outside of the steady succession of political autobiographies from Alexander down, little or no traces of autobiographical writing. After the time of Cicero, however, the stream began to flow with gradually increasing fullness, and by the second century after Christ we find ourselves in the presence of an astonishing variety of autobiographical forms. Here side by side appear Hadrian's *Vita*, Galen's treatises on his own books, Marcus Aurelius' *Meditationes*, the romance of Apuleius with its autobiographical conclusion, the "sacred orations" of Aelius Aristides, the subject of which is his daily communion in his sickness with the deity, the visions of the martyr Perpetua and numerous Hellenizing histories of conversion like those of Justin and Cyprian.

One of Socrates' immediate pupils, Antisthenes, on being asked what he had gained from philosophy, replied, "the power to hold converse with my soul". Yet throughout all the centuries alike of Hellenic and Hellenistic culture few attempts seem to have been made to create a literary form of self-inspection. The history of his development which Cicero gives in his *Brutus* is perhaps the completest attempt at self-analysis which was made before Augustine (p. 196). From Cicero the line of the evolution of the literary expression of self-consciousness ran through Marcus Aurelius' *Meditationes*, to culminate in connection with Hellenistic Mysticism, in the lyrics of Gregory of Nazianzum and the soul-history of Augustine (p. 48). From the second Christian century on, there appears in particular a whole series of what we may call "conversion-histories". These move at first in the purely intellectualistic region, but more and more lay stress not merely on the result but the process. Rhetoricians, moral philosophers, Christian Apologists all supply examples. It became the fashion for a would-be teacher, as a device of argumentation, to tell of his own conversion to the philosophical standpoint which he would fain commend. Perhaps the most striking illustration of this fashion is supplied by Dio Chrysostom, the best of the cynico-stoic traveling preachers of the first century. He had had an uncommonly deep experience of transition, itself not uncommon at the time, from mere rhetoricism to practi-

cal philosophy; and on the basis of his varied experiences as a cynic apostle, he delivered in Athens on his return from exile his great oration *περὶ φυχῆς*, in which he commends his experiences as a guide to life (p. 293). The narration of his conversion given by Justin Martyr at the opening of his *Dialogue with Trypho* is of essentially the same type: it is intended as an illustration of the insufficiency of heathen philosophy drawn from his own experience. And the matter is not essentially altered when, in the next century, the climax is no longer a merely intellectual surrender to a new teaching, but is traced to the divine grace and attributed to the effect of baptism—as in Cyprian's letter to Donatus. Here too belongs the autobiographical sketch which Hilary prefixed to his *De Trinitate*, as a description of how he came to be a believer in the true God, whom he commends to his readers. Aristides of Smyrna (A. D. 170-179) claims to have invented, in his *Ἱεροὶ Λόγοι*, a new form of those religious orations which it was customary to deliver at religious feasts, in honor of the Divinity which was being celebrated. The novelty of his performance consists, however, only in transferring the real motive of the discourse from the glorification of the Deity—the materials for which might be gathered from other spheres than his own experiences—to the most intimate portrayal of the orator's own personality. Sick in body and soul, he had cast himself on the mercy of Asclepius, and now wishes to tell all the healing operations of the God of which he had been made the recipient. Thus throughout the whole Hellenistic and Hellenistic-Roman period—say from 250 B. C. to 250 A. D.—the stock of autobiography (growing out of roots set in the Attic period) was flourishing and throwing out abundant branches to this side and that. Its flowering time was, however, not yet.

That came only in the changed conditions of the fourth century after Christ, as the old world was passing away and men, in the dissolution of the social fabric which had seemed so stable, were driven back upon themselves. Seven hundred years after Isocrates had first invented autobiography as a rhetorical form, the last of the great heathen rhetors, Libanius, opens the series of great autobiographies of the flowering-time of this species of literature (p. 357). From the century and a half beginning with, say, 360 A. D. more non-political autobiographies are known to us than from all the preceding years put together. And in what variety do they come! And how wide a sphere of interest do they sweep! "Now we could fancy we were holding converse with a monk or a feudal lord of the middle ages, now we see before us a later humanist, now we hear the tone of romantic lyricism, and Augustine's work in its tendency to the philosophical grounding of the life-whole recalls the type of the newer autobiography since Rousseau" (p. 357). "In the seventh decade of the fourth century there falls the notable autobiography (now lost) written in the mixed style of the moral romance, by the converted Spaniard Acilius Severus, the title of which, *Peira or Catastrophe*, has been preserved for us by Jerome. The leader of the Syrian Church, Ephrem († 373), wrote at

about the same time autobiographical '*Confessions*'. From the last famous representative of pure Rhetorism, the 'heathen' Libanius, to whom one of the greatest Christian preachers in the Greek tongue, John Chrysostom, went to school, we have a long autobiography, *Bios, or of my own Tyche*; nor is it without religious significance. His friend and admirer, the Emperor Julian, . . . was certainly prevented only by his early death from putting together his life in an independent representation. Then the new epoch in autobiography vigorously announced itself in Gregory of Nazianzum, the poet among the Church fathers: his great autobiographical poems from the eighth and ninth decades of the century, the product of ecclesiastical controversy and solitary contemplation, have internal form and beauty; and his subjective religious lyric, nourished on metaphysical speculation, stands over against the historical portion of Augustine's *Confessions* as another typical form of the expression of personal religion. About A. D. 400 Augustine's book appeared. It made an epoch only in the West, since it was the Western culture alone which was able to bear Augustine's spirit and to enrich itself from him. In the East, the development proceeds in the autobiographical species, too, along the antique way, and precisely because the working of genius is here not in question, the further constructions from this time, which nevertheless have their place in the general evolution, illustrate the necessity in the course of things. Along with Gregory, there appears in the Greek Church the Neoplatonic-Christian bishop Synesius of Cyrene; he too built out of his metaphysics a personal religious poem and in a special work, *Dio or of my own life*, he delineated his conduct of his life (about 406). And that it was not in Gregory alone that the mighty conflicts of the church awoke a sympathetic subjective echo, we are advertized by the title, *Tragoedia*, by which was designated the autobiographical work of a heresy-hating Bishop of Constantinople who was cast out as a heresiarch, Nestorius,—a work (about 432) of which we can now ascertain only that there was room in it for the justification of his own teaching, and for the communication of records after the fashion of the church history writing of the day. But even in Latin Christendom, Augustine's *Confessions* were not the end of the antique development; side by side with direct imitations of this work there were still composed in Southern Gaul and Ireland autobiographies of quite individual types. And while the Hellenistic traditions were still making themselves independently felt,—in autobiographical opening poems and in the end even in a great antique phenomenon, in Boëthius' *Consolation of Philosophy* (524)—Augustine himself in the evening of his life produced still something new in this department, in his *Retractations* (427)" (p. 347-8).

We have transcribed this rather long passage because it sets Augustine's *Confessions* for us in the midst of its congeners and helps us to realize how much, in the matter of form at least, it belongs to its time. There was no lack of analyses of the human soul in that period: it was rather the epoch of searching studies of men—in history, biography

and romance. "The age in which Augustine's *Confessions* came into being, must be thought of as flooded with such soul-portraits" (p. 110). Nor was it an age in which men were backward in speaking frankly of themselves. Witness, for example, the autobiographical opening verses not only of an Ausonius, but of a hymn-writer like Prudentius; and the autobiographical *prolalia* of a Hilary. Or witness rather the smug satisfaction with which Jerome closes his work on *The Illustrious Men* with an account of himself. It is not because Augustine's *Confessions* do these things that they are so remarkable and great: it is because they do these things so remarkably and greatly. Needless to say that Dr. Misch fully appreciates the unique greatness of the *Confessions* among other books of their order which have come down to us from antiquity,—or perhaps we should rather say among other books of what Dr. Misch looks upon as of their order. For we cannot for ourselves admit that the *Confessions* are exactly described when they are called an autobiography or a self-portraiture, or an analysis of the writer's soul, or even a history of his conversion. The *Confessions* contain these things rather than are them. It is often a nice question, no doubt, whether a book of autobiographical contents shall be classed as strictly an autobiography or not. But the question does not seem to be so very nice a one, when the book to be classified is only in part of autobiographical contents, and even in its autobiographical contents does not seem to be governed by a strictly autobiographical motive. Only nine or ten of the thirteen books of the *Confessions* contain any autobiographical material at all, and as Dr. Misch duly points out (p. 424) a "full half of the autobiographical part of the work deals with one period of only four years,—the time in which Augustine's conversion fell; the entire period of youth up to Augustine's twenty-eighth year being compressed into a first briefer part". It would appear more appropriate, therefore, to speak of the book as a "conversion-narrative" than as an autobiography, and to find its forerunner as such in Dio Chrysostum's *περὶ φυχῆς* and its analogies in the *prolaliae* of Justin and Tatian and Hilary and Augustine himself in his earliest and most Hellenistic writings, composed at Cassiciacum. Dr. Misch seems occasionally almost on the point of so classifying it, inadequate as such a characterization of the book obviously would be. And he frankly allows not only that Augustine's fundamental purpose lies outside the autobiographical narrative, which is really only ancillary to it, but that a very large portion of the contents of the book are out of place in an autobiography and mar the unity of the work considered as such. "The essential and conscious purpose of Augustine," he writes (p. 414), "does not lie in the narration of his individual experiences, but in the arousing of religious affections and ideas." Again (p. 415): "He not only interposes in the life-history philosophical speculations, the unfathomable problems of which are resolved into questions addressed to God, but he adjoins to it as its last part—filling more than a quarter of the whole—purely didactic discussions, which, strung on the thread of the first chapter of Genesis,

enlarge in turn on God, the Trinity, the creation of the world." Such topics, Dr. Misch very properly remarks, one would expect to find discussed in a dogmatic rather than in an autobiographical treatise, and in their treatment he thinks the form of 'confession' can be only artificially kept up. Dr. Misch has, of course, his own way, if not of justifying, at least of accounting for and so far of condoning the inclusion of this incongruous matter in an autobiography. Augustine passes at the eleventh book, it seems, for example, into a 'confession of his knowledge and ignorance'—surely a topic sufficiently autobiographical. This appears much the same as to say with Dr. Gibb and Mr. Montgomery in their recent edition of the *Confessions* (p. 332) that what Augustine does here is to pass from the description of his religious and moral condition to outlining "what might be called in modern phraseology, his 'theological position'". Would it not be better frankly to allow that neither these closing books—constituting "more than a quarter of the whole" work—nor much else in the *Confessions* can be brought without forcing into the legitimate scope of an autobiography or yet of a "conversion-history"? And that, therefore, the *Confessions*, despite the wealth of autobiographical material which they contain, and despite the central place taken in them by Augustine, are not strictly speaking either an autobiography or a 'conversion-history'?

In point of fact, the subject of the *Confessions* is not Augustine's self, nor were they written to make himself known; though they were so written as to make him known and to enable him to say that the first ten books are about himself. This Dr. Misch partly perceives, not merely in recognizing that in the autobiographical details which Augustine incorporates into the *Confessions* he has a purpose beyond "the narration of his individual experiences", and in describing that purpose as "the awaking of religious affections and ideas", but also in discovering at the bottom of the *Confessions* the underlying purpose (securing their unity) not to make known the soul alone, but the soul and God. This Dr. Misch interprets as Neoplatonic mysticism. He wishes us to find "the fundamental religious sentiment of the *Confessions*" in "the yearning of the mystic for cessation, rest, eternity" (p. 416), and its great end, in the depicting of the hidden working of God in all that is, and the rising of the soul towards and its losing itself in God. "For this," says he (pp. 417-18), "is the kernel of the inner form: the several component parts are not brought together according to the rhetorical rule of pleasing variety, but the nature of the connection is the result of a firm structure, and this fundamental form itself is not simple, but issues from the higher unity which comprehends in itself the contradictions which are resolved in it. God and man draw apart from one another in the phenomena of life and in the description of these phenomena, and yet remain always bound together; in the hymns of longing and love their perfect unity sounds forth. The form does not wish to follow the historically given psychological reality of the individual existence, but will make perceptible that which is in truth going

on in the objective reality: this reality lies in a metaphysical Beyond, out of which the narrated history, like a variagatedly agitated color-play, proceeds without separating itself from it,—and the Beyond itself lies not in a transcendental distance, but in the continual presence of God's person, who embraces even erring souls with His love and is to be found by their will. Thus the history of the soul which the first ten books of the *Confessions* depict and explain, receives its unitary structure through a Neoplatonic-Christian monotheistic mysticism, which conceives the relation of God with the soul at once as uniform presence and as historical process. The inner form is two-voiced, comparable to the relation of two lines, one of which, symbolizing the Being of God, goes smoothly and quietly on from eternity to eternity, while the other, in broken, ultimately ascending course, pictures the struggle and striving of the soul towards its divine source and end; the two, however near they may approach each other, can never in any natural way come together, until the unfathomable experience of unity with God brings the resolution of all contradictions."

We certainly do not agree with Dr. Misch in this neoplatonization of the *Confessions*—as we do not agree with him in his too generous estimate of the amount of Neoplatonism Augustine carried over into Christianity with him and the consequent relation of his first Christian writings to his later ones. But there is involved in Dr. Misch's construction, however obscurely, recognition of the fact that Augustine is not primarily writing of himself in the *Confessions*, but at least of the relation of God to his soul, or let us say, better, of the dealings of God with his soul. The true subject of Augustine's *Confessions* is not himself but God, and his real object in writing them was not that men might know him in all the depths of his being—though he does reveal himself in them in all the depths of his being: but that men might know God and learn from His dealings with Augustine the wonders of His Grace. Its fundamental note is therefore not even that great declaration, "Our hearts are restless till they find their rest in Thee", fundamental as this note is to the whole fabric of the *Confessions*; but may be summed up, in Augustine's own language, in the two words *Ab Eo*, "From Him!" And therefore Dr. Misch is perfectly right when he writes (p. 424): "All gifts of nature, even his mother herself and the nourishing of his infancy, are derived from the superabundance of Grace. It belongs to the nature of a pragmatic biography to carry the life-history as far back as possible, to the very generation itself: but in this case the exposition proceeds not from the natural derivation but from the metaphysical obscurity which surrounds the origin of the soul: and thus the narrator can advance regularly without a break from the introductory prayer." And therefore it was also that the *Confessions* from the first wrought so powerfully in the world as a religious force—even on Augustine himself, both when writing them and whenever he reread them (p. 414). They focussed men's eyes on God, the God of Grace, and worked in them that frame of mind which lies at the root of all true religion—utter dependence on God.

We have permitted our attention to drift somewhat away from Dr. Misch's book to Augustine's. Our excuse is that it is Dr. Misch's aim to direct our attention to Augustine's book. We must return, however, for a moment, before closing to Dr. Misch's volume. His analysis of Augustine's *Confessions* as the culminating autobiography of the old world, filling some forty pages, is very able and suggestive. We have already indicated that there are some things in his view of the *Confessions* with which we cannot agree. There are many more to which our assent is very hearty; and the discussion as a whole is very informing. It is immediately preceded by chapters on the general tendencies of autobiography in this age of declining antiquity, and especially on the lyrics of Gregory of Nazianum. In these chapters we are made acquainted with all the similar works which immediately preceded Augustine's—including his own *Soliloquies*. In a closing chapter the final shoots of the tree of antique autobiography are described to us—particularly the *Eucharisticos Deo* of Paulinus of Pella, the *Confession* of St. Patrick, Augustine's own *Retractions*, and last of all Boëthius's *Consolation of Philosophy*. One or two quotations may perhaps help us to catch the note in which Dr. Misch brings his survey of autobiography in antiquity to a close:

"Thus Augustine's *Confessions* have entered as an active force into Time. They are one of the few books which in all periods in which spiritual life has existed in the West have been much read; the verbal expression of inward conditions has been influenced by Augustine up to our own day. He himself at the end of his life bore witness to the effect of his autobiography upon his contemporaries, and subordinated to it in point of effectiveness all his other writings, which were nevertheless of extraordinary influence. 'No one of my works has found a wider circulation, or more eager reading, than the books of my *Confessions*.' And already in the succeeding decade there appeared literary imitations of it: they continued among the newer peoples, ending by passing outside the religious sphere to coöperate in the development of spiritual history in the world's literature. The continuity of autobiography in the West rests in large part on the effect of this one work" (pp. 440-441).

"No fewer than four autobiographical works with the title *Confessio* or 'Thanksgiving', *Eucharisticos*, are known to us from the century following the *Confessions* (about 400). Three of their authors come from Southern Gaul; there had long existed there a lively literary impulse and rhetorical training held its place, unaffected by Christianity, into the time of the Ostrogoths, so that this province of the disintegrating western empire attained at last the leadership in the decadent literature" (pp. 442-443).

"This was the first wave of *Confessions*, which swept over the West and laid hold even of an unlettered man in the far North. He who gave rise to it was a great writer without a fellow in the Latin tongue since Cicero and Tacitus. Summoning all his art,

Augustine related to the human race the history of the spirit: the spiritual development reached its goal with his conversion and the self-biography ended with the question, What am I now? . . . the answer to which gave a poetic delineation of the inner form of the religious life, which had hitherto been a closed book. To narrate his further life-history,—his administration as bishop and his ecclesiastico-political acts,—which would seem to be the natural ending of his autobiography, time—so the *Confessions* explain—was too precious. What was left was his writings: in them he conceived was gathered up his work which belongs to God and the world. They gave him occasion for a special biographical work [the *Retractions*], which coming from another attitude towards life, exhibits the self-delineation of later antiquity from a new side" (p. 455).

"What an immense undertaking it is, however, for a leading mind to take its own product again as material for treatment and to compact it into an ultimate whole! We think of Goethe, whom the idea of a history of his works, taken up as a consequence of a collected edition, drove onwards to the great product of an evolutionary-historical biography in *Dichtung und Wahrheit*. Or of Vico's *Vita*, which, remaining in the narrower limits of the exposition of his life-work, made for the first time in this type of authors the notion of a natural development fruitful for biography" (p. 456).

"Here again, as in the *Confessions*, Augustine could borrow the outward form from literature. Independent treatises on their own books are encountered by us among the Hellenistic autobiographies, and it is no doubt simply an accident of transmission that this species is met with only in isolation, in the cases of Galen and Cicero. Hellenistic traditions were still operative in the epoch of Augustine; this is evident precisely for the lesser sorts of author-autobiography. The autobiographical opening poem appears not only in an Ausonius, but even in the hymn-poet Prudentius, who expected a future reward for his pious verses and accordingly transmuted the enconiums with which these autobiographies customarily ended into hopes for heaven; the biographical *prolaliae* in didactic writings, served in Hilary and the young Augustine to display the spiritual development of the author, and Saint Jerome did not deny himself in his book on *The Illustrious Men*, the addition at the end of his own self, with name, origin and catalogue of writings" (p. 459).

"Philosophy in person appeared to Boëthius. She bears the appearance of antiquity: her self-woven garment is faded, soiled and torn, but an inexhaustible youth and radiant eyes shine from her awe-inspiring countenance. She had once in her freedom pointed out to the Greeks the way to make men known in their personality; while still a maiden she was able to give to the best a consciousness of themselves. Autobiography was as deeply indebted

to her as to religion which found the divine kernel in men as 'life'. And the *Consolatio Philosophiae* along with Augustine's *Confessions* stands, with Dante, under the foundations of the *Vita nuova*" (p. 466).

It is with such words that Dr. Misch ends the first volume of his survey of the history of autobiography.

Princeton.

B. B. WARFIELD.

DAS HEILIGE LAND IM SPIEGEL DER WELTGESCHICHTE, by A. LÜTTKE. With 12 illustrations and 3 maps. Gütersloh, C. Bertelsmann, 1908. Pp. viii, 568.

This is a book of popular character based upon scholarly research, written with the purpose of bringing together within limits neither too crowded nor forbiddingly wide the story of Palestine from the dawn of history to the present day. When preparing for a journey to Palestine, the author tells us in his preface, he experienced difficulty in finding any work which should enable him best to appreciate this land, not only in itself, but in the part it has played in the great movements of mankind. To fill such a gap he has prepared this interesting book. To a remarkable degree he paints the figures and scenes of the Holy Land.

The following fragment of the chapter on Joseph is translated at some length, in order to show more clearly than any description could do, the author's purpose and method. When Joseph goes down to Egypt he takes us with him in the caravan of the Midianites. "Slaves were gladly bought in Egypt; those of light color brought higher prices than the negroes common in Egypt . . . It is a long, anxious journey that he had to make. Over bare, stony heights, through mountain ravines goes the path. Once more he looks from the high ground southward, where his beloved father dwells, then the way leads down to the shore of the Mediterranean, till the yellow dead wilderness appears, the shining blue of the sea gradually disappears. Bones of men and beasts, whitened in the bleaching sun, indicate the route through the desert, and remind the beholder of how many an animal, many a slave collapsed here from exhaustion and lay where he fell, food for the vultures. Glowing burns the sun, the tongue cleaves to the jaws; blows of the whip compel the tired youth continually to mend his pace. So it goes day and night; full of care Joseph might well look up to the God of his fathers with the anxious question: whither art Thou leading me?

"After a wandering of several days through the desolate wilderness of the Sinaitic peninsula the picture of the surroundings alters. There appears to the view a level, green meadow-land, everywhere traversed by canals; at the spots richest in water are beautiful groups of trees, palms, acacias, tamarisks; strange birds, the white and black ibis, the rose-red flamingo and many others enliven the green plain. After a long time, appears on both sides, in the distance, the yellow desert.

There the astonished gaze of the youth rests upon triangular edifices gleaming bright on the edge of the desert; drawing nearer, he beholds the gigantic pyramids, which, covered with smooth granite blocks, mirrored in the lakes that lave their base, tower majestically heavenwards as witnesses to a great past. Before he passes these, the caravan enters a populous city; in its midst rises a great temple, overtopping all the houses and palaces; the entrance is guarded by two high temple gates (pylons), from which float streamers on long poles. In front are two lofty obelisks of red granite, hewn out of a single block, one of which still rises to-day lonely on this very spot. This city is the far-famed On (Heliopolis), chief sanctuary of the sun-god Re (or Ra)—Harmachis, whose statue with its hawk's head stood in the holy place within the temple, and of the god Atum, there revered in the holy Mnevis-bull, his manifestation.

"After the caravan has left the city, passed the pyramids, and crossed the Nile flowing between its flat banks, there again come to view in the distance the houses of a city of vast dimensions; almost half a day the caravan traverses its streets with the houses of yellow and red bricks, little reed-thatched cottages containing but a single room, and spacious palaces surrounded by court-yards; as the most splendid edifice here also a temple claims attention, surrounded by a great wall and embracing a whole city within its precincts, the great sanctuary of the god Ptah, a divinity resembling the Hephaestus of the Greeks, who was worshipped here with his consort, the lion-headed Sechmet and his son Nefertem. The next largest edifice is the great temple of the bull Apis. A great tower-crowned building, the citadel, rises girt with a high white wall. Such is the capital city of Memphis, old even in Joseph's time. On the streets is a swaying and crowding of the populace; coal-black, woolly-haired negroes, clad only in an apron, sweat beneath their heavy loads, driven along by overseers with blows of the staff; women in long blue cotton tunics go to fetch water, great pitchers on their heads; dignified men in snowy linen clothing, with heads shaved bald, stalk along, through the crowd, long staves in their hands—the elite; hawkers with piercing cry offer water and fruits; through the press a funeral pushes its way, men and women lamenting loudly, marching along behind the mummy with ashes on their heads and with rent garments. Yonder there run through the streets outrunners bathed in sweat, crying aloud and beating back the people with staves, whilst after them come the chariots with the women of Pharaoh's harem, accompanied by eunuchs.

"Now the market is reached; the Midianites unload their treasures from the camels, a mass of people crowd up, a lively trade and bargaining begins. The young Hebrew is dragged to the slave-market and there among black negroes from the interior, bronze Nubians, Arabs, and light-colored Syrians is exposed for sale. Now the whole misery of his situation seizes him, his heart trembles in terror, he waits full of anxiety to see to whom he will fall prey; passionately he prays to the God of his fathers. The auctioneer with loud voice praises his excel-

lent points; many would like to buy him, but the price is too high. Here comes a man in linen dress, his staff, the symbol of his dignity, in his hand, on which a costly seal-ring gleams; all respectfully make way for him; for it is one of Pharaoh's magnates, Potiphar (Peti-Phra, the Dedicated of Ra), chief of Pharaoh's palace-guard, commandant of the citadel. He buys the handsome young slave. Thus is the young Hebrew transported from his nomadic home to the land of a highly developed hoary culture, which was in no wise inferior to that of Babylon."

Thus the ancient Orient, as archaeology, combined with biblical and extra-biblical literatures, enables us to restore it, is made to live again before our eyes, as vividly as is possible with word-painting. Human interest is everywhere sought. The biblical records are on the whole received as trustworthy records, though there is an evident distaste for the supernatural. The narrative does not cease with the end of the Old Testament, nor even with the end of New Testament times, as is the case in many kindred works. Down through Christian times, the Moslem conquest, the Crusades, the Turkish occupation, this story of Palestine is traced, and always in closest connection with world-movements, political and intellectual, until the present time is reached, and the lasting impression is left upon the reader that this little land of change has, after all, a history that is continuous, intelligible and supremely interesting.

Princeton.

J. OSCAR BOYD.

"DAS PABSTTUM. Seine Idee und ihre Träger"; von PROF. DR. GUSTAV KRÜGER; Giefsen. Tübingen, 1907.

The one discipline of perennial interest is the study of biography. This truth receives a special emphasis when, under the guiding hand of men of large insight, with a genius for organization, we watch the web of time unrolling and see the institutions of Church or of State moulded into permanent form. In the choice of the theme indicated by the above title, Dr. Krüger has understood how to gain the full advantage from this principle. In a field where the material lies around the worker in heaps, the chief difficulty of the task is one of exclusion. Our author has succeeded in seizing the salient points of the discussion without repulsing us by the cadaverous sutures of an historical skeleton. By a series of ably executed pictures of the various stages en route, he carries the reader along from the almost imperceptible beginning of Episcopal oversight on the part of the Church of Rome; down through the period in which the Church absorbed the strength and prestige of the decaying empire into itself; along to the day when Innocent made the unqualified avowal that God has committed the government, not of the Church only, but of the whole world to Peter and his successors. The full logical efflorescence of this idea is reached in our day in the declaration of the Infallibility—*ex cathedra*—of the Pope. One thing especially is repeatedly pressed upon the reader's attention—the fact that

this assumption of Weltherrschaft springs from the explicit commission of Christ in the classic "Feed my sheep" passage.

The book is one of the rare combinations of fascination and much needed instruction. It has all the charm of a romance. In view of certain recent public utterances involving the relationship of Protestant States to the Church of Rome, the book is invested with a deep and timely interest. If the claims of world dominion as exhibited by Dr. Krüger, are still put forth by the Pope—then Dr. Krüger's little book furnishes matter for serious reflection.

Chazy, N. Y.

WM. M. JACK.

The World's Epoch-Makers. Edited by Oliphant Smeaton. WYCLIFFE AND THE LOLLARDS. By J. C. CARRICK, Author of *The Abbey of St. Mary, Newbottle, S. Cuthbert and St. Cuthbert's*, etc., etc. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark; New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1908. Crown 8vo.; pp. x, 329. Price \$1.25.

To speak the whole truth frankly, this is a very inferior book, quite unworthy of a place in the excellent series of which it forms a part. It is dreadfully padded and is incredibly repetitious; and it conveys only the slightest information on its proposed subject.

Princeton.

BENJAMIN B. WARFIELD.

ISAIAK AUGUST DORNER. SEIN LEBEN UND SEINE LEHRE MIT BESONDERER BERÜCKSICHTIGUNG SEINER BLEIBENDEN BEDEUTUNG FÜR THEOLOGIE UND KIRCHE. Von J. BOBERTAG, Pastor in Ihlow bei Dahme (Mark). Gütersloh. Druck und Verlag von C. Bertelsmann. 1906. Pp. 134. Mit Porträt. Preis 1.50 M., geb. 2 M.

This book, written by a pupil, personal friend and ardent admirer of Dorner, has in view not only the scientific theologian but also the wider circles of cultured readers, and is sent to these under the conviction that the essential points of Dorner's theology are adapted for the clarification and confirmation of their Christian views (p. 7). This is the author's conviction: it is not the thesis of his book, as the aim is clearly not to prove but to portray. And sometimes a good portrayal is not a bad argument.

The distribution of the material is simple and natural, there being three sections: (1) Youth,—Dorner's home, years of instruction and travel. (2) Manhood,—Dorner's career as professor at Tübingen, Kiel, Königsberg, Bonn, Göttingen and Berlin; Dorner the father and friend, the theological writer and the man of ecclesiastical practice. (3) Dorner's theology,—brief extracts on his Pisteology, Doctrine of God, God and the World, Man, God and Man, Sin, the Person of Christ, Christ's Work of Reconciliation, Christ's Exaltation, Order of Salvation, Church and Means of Grace. The section on "The Theological Author" (pp. 61-87) gives an interesting account of Dorner's great works: *Die Entwicklungsgeschichte der Lehre von der Person Christi* (1839, 1855-6), *Geschichte der protestantischen Theologie* (1867),

Das System der christlichen Glaubenslehre, and the posthumous *System der christlichen Sittenlehre*.

Other noteworthy elements are Dorner's interest in the Evangelical Alliance (pp. 36, 49-50), the *Jahrbücher für deutsche Theologie* (p. 36), church government (pp. 13, 21-25, 89-90), and church union (pp. 38, 59-60), including his idea of a German national church (p. 88). Considerable attention is given to Dorner's friendships, in particular Hermann and Bishop Martensen (pp. 55-61); his relation to Richard Rothe in Bonn (pp. 32-36), and his opposition to Hengstenberg (pp. 39-43, 47-49).

Perhaps the most prominent impression which the author seeks to leave, is the preëminently ethical feature of Dorner's life and labors. The cardinal point of his theology is found in John vii. 17, while the study of Kant gave an ethical trend to his thought (pp. 14-15). His whole theological thinking became surcharged with the ethical (pp. 85, 94, 130, 133, Cf. pp. 16, 53, 66, 75, 101). A good example appears on page 103, where Dorner is quoted as saying: "The good is good because God wills it, and God wills it because it is good", then adds: "He is Himself the eternal good." Hence the moral argument stands first in Dorner's Theism. God is *Urleben*, *Urwissen*, and *Urgute* (pp. 101-102). In thus emphasizing the ethical in Dorner's theology, Mr. Bobertag intends in no way to encourage the easy inference that the subject of his study was simply a philosophical moralist. He is careful to point out (p. 94) that Dorner's doctrines are enlivened by the ethical not in the sense of the modern "ethical culture", but in the sense that the greatest stress is placed upon the objective reality of Christian truths.

Coming from Tübingen, Dorner's Christology has peculiar interest. Not that his Christology originated in the Tübingen school, for Mr. Bobertag would not consent to that. The Person of Christ and justification by faith became the two foci of Dorner's theology (p. 16), the Incarnation and Justification are the framework of the Christian faith (p. 98). His standpoint was Christocentric (p. 87. Cf. pp. 63, 78-79, 96), and his christological idea is so bound up with his whole theological system that in holding the fundamentals one cannot possibly exclude his christology (p. 120). Dorner is absolutely out of sympathy with the Hegelian idealism of the Tübingen school, and as such opposes the mythical views of David Strauss (pp. 15-17, 72) and Baur (pp. 28, 64). "All history, like Holy Scripture, leads to Christ, not simply as an idea, but as a real person in history" (p. 62. Cf. Preface, pp. 5-6). The doctrine of the Kenosis is given mainly by direct quotation from Dorner's works (pp. 116-121. Cf. p. 77).

With regard to method, Dorner begins with Scripture, not with the faith-consciousness (pp. 80-81). On pages 73-74 the author speaks of Dorner as a mediating theologian, belonging with Nitzsch, Julius Müller and Köstlin, viewing the "first creation" not absolutely as anti-christian, but desiring to see it penetrated by the light and power of the "second creation", desiring also a voluntary reconciliation of the two Protestant confessions without a levelling of their differences.

Several typographical errors occur, due partly to careless proof-reading and partly to the German's habit of forgetting the rules for the capitalization of English words. Thus "Presbyterian Review" is spelled with small initials (pp. 9, 52, 67). Likewise "review" in "Andover Review" (pp. 18, 83), "Common Prayer-Book" (p. 22), "General Assembly" (p. 24), and "United Presbyterian Church" (p. 25). Other mistakes are: "s" omitted in "seeing" (p. 67), "thau" for "than" (p. 67), "though" for "thought" (p. 84), "sufficiëntta" for "sufficiëntia" (p. 97). Also "Apostes" for "Apostels" (p. 78), "eingedruugen" for "eingedrungen" (p. 90) "erzänzen" for "ergänzen" (p. 102).

The book is written in a very attractive style. Theological technicalities are for the most part avoided, and where used are translated into the vernacular. It is, as has been said above, only a portrayal—nothing more. Just how far the picture is true to the original, what degree of accuracy, sufficiency and perspicuity it contains—these are questions that would lead us too far. It is a good, readable account of a great man. Both thought and style are enlivened without being warped by the author's affection for and sense of indebtedness to the subject of his sketch.

Langhorne, Pa.

BENJAMIN F. PAIST, JR.

SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.

OFFENBARUNG UND WUNDER. Von W. HERRMANN, Professor der Theologie zu Marburg. Verlag von A. Töpelmann Giessen, 1908. Pp. 71.

In this little volume are bound together two theological essays of Professor Herrmann. The first of these is the second edition of his well known address, *Der Begriff der Offenbarung*, which he delivered at the theological conference at Giessen in 1887, and the contents of which are well known.

The second of these essays is the address entitled, *Der Christ und das Wunder*, which was delivered at the theological conference at Giessen in 1908.

In this latter address he wishes to emphasize the "collision" between what he conceives to be the true idea of a miracle and that of nature or natural law. He sets forth this view over against the view which seeks to avoid this "collision" by an inadequate conception of the inviolability of natural law, and over against the opposite view, which seeks to obtain the same result by doing away with the supernatural character of the miracle. Herrmann criticises the view of Stange as not doing justice to the modern conception of nature, and that of Schleiermacher as seeking to explain the miracle by purely natural causes. Over against these views Herrmann affirms that he goes further than the

"*Ad dogmatic*" in emphasizing the idea that a miracle is something "*supra et contra naturam*." Herrmann's view, he tells us, differs from that of the older evangelical theology in emphasizing more strongly the supernatural character of the miracle, and especially in this, viz., that whereas the old theology sought to give a rational and metaphysical basis for its conception of a miracle, he not only acknowledges but also emphasizes the fact that this conception of a miracle is logically irreconcilable with our idea of nature and of natural law.

It might appear, from what has been said, that Herrmann believes that we have two conflicting world-views—a scientific and a religious—each in conflict with the other, and both equally valid. And this is the idea which one gets from reading the first half of the address. If this were the situation in which the Christian faith finds itself, it would go hard with that faith. It is impossible for the mind to rest in such an inner contradiction. We cannot be persuaded of the truth of anything upon one set of grounds, and at the same time be convinced of its irrationality upon another set of grounds.

As one reads on, however, it becomes evident that this is not Herrmann's view. Instead of two conflicting views—a scientific and a religious—it becomes clear that according to Herrmann the one is objective and the other subjective: or perhaps it would be more accurate to say that from the former standpoint any event is viewed from the point of view of its causation, whereas from the latter standpoint the same event is viewed from the standpoint of the impression or experience of God's power and care which it makes upon the Christian.

That this is Herrmann's view can be seen from what he says about the New Testament miracles and also from what he says in criticism of Seeberg's position in this matter. Herrmann commends Seeberg for seeking the proof of miracles in Christian experience. He differs from Seeberg in that while Seeberg seeks in Christian experience a standpoint from which the reality of the New Testament miracles may be established, or at least from which their evidence must be considered; Herrmann, on the contrary, sees a miracle in any event which produces such an experience. This amounts to saying that it is the experience which after all constitutes the said event a miracle. And Herrmann says that it is the inner life of Jesus and not the miraculous events recorded in the New Testament which really has this religious value.

It is difficult indeed to see how this view differs from that which he expressly rejected at the beginning of the essay, and which would explain a miracle wholly by natural causes so far as its mode of occurrence is concerned, the miraculous element being reduced to the subjective impression made upon the mind. This is not the supernaturalism of the writers of the New Testament, which is the only supernaturalism which has any historical right to be called Christian supernaturalism, whatever be said as to the truth of Christianity.

It is difficult, moreover, to see why, upon Herrmann's view of a miracle, he should emphasize so strongly the idea that it is, to use his words, "*supra et contra naturam*." If a miracle is, to use his words,

"the effect upon ourselves of the special care or Providence (*Fürsorge*) of God"; or, in other words, if a miracle is simply the religious impression made upon us by a providential event, then it does not at all transcend explanation by purely natural causes, and it is impossible to see how any such conflict as Herrmann maintains between this view of a miracle and our theoretic or scientific world-view can arise, unless we are deists and deny the providential control of God over the whole course of nature.

It will thus be seen that this essay, which is written with all the religious warmth and fervor so characteristic of its author, is not free from some confusion of thought.

Princeton.

C. W. HODGE.

THE TRUE CHURCH. By ALLAN MACY DULLES, D.D., PROFESSOR OF THEISM AND APOLOGETICS, in the AUBURN THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY; New York: Fleming H. Revell Company; cloth; 12mo; pp. 319.

The substance of this valuable Study was given in the form of lectures to the students of the Auburn Theological Seminary, but it is of personal interest not only to ministers but to every thoughtful Christian and to every American patriot; for it is in essence an argument designed to oppose the threatening claims of Roman Catholicism, to check the rising tide of ecclesiasticism, and to promote the increasing desire and effort for a closer and more scriptural Christian unity. With this in view, and "not to show that any one form of church government is better than another", "the evangelic concept of the Church" is stated and defended. The true Church is accordingly defined as "the whole body of God's children, of whom Christ is Savior and head". "It has no perfect existence, in visible, organized form or unity, on earth, but is manifest and apparent in the many churches". External organization is not essential to the being of the church, however necessary it is to its well-being.

The Catholic concept, whether advocated by the Greek, the Roman or the Anglican, regards the church as an institution created by Jesus Christ, in which his authority and power are vested in a governing body of his own appointment. These officers, and the successors selected by them, can alone administer the sacraments, and thus communicate divine grace. This theory is summarized by an Anglican bishop who defines the church as "Christians under the rule of bishops, successors to the apostles". Thus visible organization, and that too of a particular form, is of the very essence of the church.

This divergence of views constitutes a problem not only difficult but of immediate and practical importance, for not only religious liberty and Christian unity are at stake, but the very matter of personal and eternal salvation. When one seeks to discuss the problem he is met by the obstacles of prejudice and ignorance and superstition and indifference. The last is the most serious of all. It is expressed in a willingness to passively surrender to traditional and assumed authority.

By a review of New Testament passages, the writer shows that "the church is in the universal and ideal sense nothing other than the total number of Christians. In its secondary sense, a church and the churches are manifestations of the one true church".

In opposition to the claims of the Roman Catholic Church, it is shown that there is no ground for concluding,

1. That Christ made Peter head shepherd over his flock;
2. That Peter had authority from Christ to hand over his rule to others;
3. That in the Church of Rome and it alone are the successors of Peter to be found.

So, in denial of the assumption of the Anglican Church, it is demonstrated that there is no evidence that our Lord gave to his apostles the office of perpetuating a ministerial priesthood, or that they exercised any such authority in the church, or that this was attempted or sought by the churches. Nor is it possible to argue in favor of such a priesthood from Old Testament institutions. "Never once in the New Testament is any minister called a priest, nor any priestly duty ascribed to any minister". The primitive churches were independent, self-governing bodies, organizing themselves originally by the establishment of a number of elders, from which arose, by a process of evolution, the office of bishop. In answer to the claim that the Roman Church is proved to be the true church by her unity, sanctity, catholicity and apostolicity, the author shows that the true marks of a church and of the true church are the marks of Jesus Christ; *i. e.*, a spiritual worship of God and a loving service of man; but, as to the other marks which have been named, they can as truly be claimed by any particular church as by the Greek or Roman or Anglican Church. The mission of the church is shown to be the proclamation of the gospel and especially in preparation for the kingdom of God. Its ministry had its rise in the spiritual gifts granted by the ascended Lord for the edification of his body. The recognition of these gifts on the part of the church, and the consecration of those spiritually gifted, is of the essence of ordination, and out of these "gifted ones" came the officers who by reason of service were also rulers. These officers do not constitute a priestly or superior order. "They were the servants of the church; only in later years did they become its masters." The New Testament gives no hint that the apostles prescribed any form of organization for the whole Church. Each church determined the simple matter as to who should be servant, deacon or overseer. Organization, with government, was determined by local and temporary needs, and neither one was essential to the existence of The Church.

In the closing chapter it is shown that this conception of the church is vital to its future growth and unity. "This future is not inseparably involved in the prosperity of any church nor of all the present churches". Of no church can it be said that its form of government, its mode of worship, its doctrine is so fixed and eternal that it is the one church to which all others must come. Interest in the true church requires

that we be interested in all the churches. These churches must present, and represent Christ, who offered himself for man's redemption. "This, and this alone, will secure the triumph of the church".

Such is a partial outline of this Historical and Scriptural Study. The author shows an accurate knowledge of the literature, and a careful review of the sources, with which the discussion is concerned.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

PRACTICAL THEOLOGY.

POSITIVE TEACHING AND THE MODERN MIND. By P. T. FORSYTH, M.A., D.D. New York: A. C. Armstrong & Son; Cloth; 8vo. Pp. 374, price \$1.75 net.

These lectures stand at the farthest possible remove from the superficial, the skeptical, the careless or the commonplace; they suggest deep thought, patient effort, seriousness and spiritual enthusiasm; yet, while at times brilliant, they are not always illuminating; while stimulating they are not altogether satisfying. For instance, while revealing a broad culture and vast acquisition, the lecturer has confined himself rather strictly to the sphere of what he calls "The Cross"; but, after all the pages are finished, one does not feel qualified to state in plain language what view or theory of the atonement is held. He suspects that the cross means to the author more than it does to the "liberals" who are condemned, but possibly little more than is allowed by some of the "modern" theologians who are approved. That the lecturer expresses a reverent devotion to the Cross, none will question. This devotion is as definite as is the author's antipathy to the alleged authority of the Bible, especially to anything as shocking and evil as "verbal inspiration". This distrust of the available sources of Christian doctrine seems to weaken the arguments and to suggest difficulties in the way of "positive preaching". It, however, does not prevent the author from taking the position, in the opening lecture, that the Bible is "The Charter of the Preacher", "The World's Greatest Sermon", "the book where the seeking God meets and saves the seeking man". It is insisted that "the Bible is not read by the Christian or even by the church-going public; and that "preaching must be adjusted to the people's disuse of the Bible". This latter demands Gospel preaching and expository preaching, and this, too, with the "Bible context" in mind, by which is meant "the moral context of the Bible as a whole in the race's conscience,—the human sin which the holy Saviour casts into the deeper shade, the lostness revealed by the Gospel that finds."

To this Bible, however, the place of authority in religion or in preaching is denied. What the substitute may be, is discussed in the second lecture, which has as its theme "The Authority of the Preacher". This

substitute is apparently the Christian consciousness. It is true this is not the exact language of the author. It may not even be his opinion. He insists that Christ is the final authority; yet it is not the Christ who speaks through His Word and Spirit, but "the authority of Christ in the consciousness"; or "The seat of authority is not the enlightened conscience but the redeemed and regenerate;" and this authority is inseparable from the cross: "the last authority is God in his supreme saving act of grace to mankind in Christ's cross which is the power of God addressed to what is at once the power and the weakness in us, our will, conscience and total moral self."

A most helpful and practical lecture is the third, which deals with "the preacher and his church," or "preaching as worship". The author shows that the first duty of a preacher is to his own church. His preaching is an act of worship. It is indeed a main part of worship. It is the church expressing itself to itself. It is the church confessing its faith. The preacher is responsible for the interpretation and proclamation but not for the creation of a Gospel.

The fourth lecture contains interesting suggestions in relation to "The Preacher and the Age". It shows that his duty toward the world of modern thought should be that of detachment rather than of accommodation. In all adaptations to natural and rational culture the church must be self-sufficient, autonomous and independent. There must be, however, a reduction in the bulk of our creed. Still more must there be a change of accent in its statement. Emphasis must fall on "other parts of the great Word". "In the order of importance we must go to the world, first of all with the Atoning Christ; second with the resurrection of Christ; third, with the life, character, teachings and miracles of Christ; fourth, with the preëxistence of Christ." In this reduction of belief the great theologians are not to be treated lightly. "The need of the hour in respect of past theologians is informed and sympathetic reinterpretation." "We must ask what they aimed at, though we modify their way of securing it." What is needed is "a theology of experienced grace. It is not merely the *bene esse*; it is the *esse* of the church".

The fifth lecture, entitled "The Preacher and Religious Reality", contains a stimulating discussion. The demand for spiritual reality must be met. The church is shown to be suffering from triviality, from uncertainty, from complacency. The first is seen in the efforts to institutionalize our religious agencies, in the grasping after new and popular methods, in superficial activities supported by weak sentiment, in the absence of deep and abounding spiritual life. It can only be remedied by the grasp of the deeper truths of Christianity, by a real appropriation of Christ. "It is by the fellowship of the supreme moral action of the spiritual world in Christ's cross that our Soul comes to reality." So too it is "only the certainty of the Christ that can give us the sanctity of the spirit", and to secure certainty we need a new earnestness and perseverance in prayer. As to the prevalent spiritual self-satisfaction it can only be cured by a deeper daily sense, not only

of our unworthiness, but of our perdition, except for the mercy of the Christ.

In the sixth and seventh chapters "liberal" theology is carefully distinguished from a "modernized" theology. By the former is meant "the theology that begins with some rational canon of life or nature to which Christianity has to be cut down or enlarged"; by the latter is meant "a theology that begins with God's gift of a super-logical revelation in Christ's historic person and cross, whose object was not to adjust a contradiction but to resolve a crisis and save a situation of the human soul". The modern theology must, therefore, be in contrast with the liberal, be positive and not negative, be creational not evolutionary, be regulated by the norm of the New Testament Gospel, be adequate to the human tragedy, in placing due emphasis upon sin, and avoiding the "pathetic fallacy of fatherhood in which the holy has no meaning and judgment no place". A modern theology must include "the Eternal Sonship, the Mediatorship, and the Resurrection of Jesus Christ".

It must recognize the freedom of the individual from external authority (of the Bible, Church or Dogma)—the social idea—the development of personality—the distinction between practical and theoretical knowledge,—the need of popularisation—the principle of evolution—the passion for reality. It must suggest a living and positive faith moving in such great categories as grace, sin, judgment, repentance, incarnation, atonement, redemption, justification, sacrifice, eternal life.

Perhaps the most significant chapters of this volume are the last two, which treat of "The Preacher and Modern Ethic", and "The Moral Poignancy of the Cross". They leave little place for mere moral influence theories of atonement, or for theologies which move in the sphere of a weak and benignant, but unholy Fatherhood. Even "the modern demand for social righteousness when it is applied to the cross means the demand for its explanation in terms of the holiness of God rather than His pitying love or altruism alone". "An ethicised theology must emphasize holiness. Christ not only redeemed, He atoned", "He changed the relation between God and man and made communion possible again on both sides". A true view of the cross is "vital to the Church's total message and to the final prospects of Christianity".

It is earnestly hoped that even such a brief and imperfect review of these lectures may suggest how worthy they are to occupy a place in the series of "Yale Lectures on Preaching", for which course they were especially prepared, and may further indicate how necessary it is for the herald of the Gospel to have a definite positive message, phrased with a view to currents of modern thought but true to the divine revelation and centering in the cross of Christ.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

THE FUTURE LEADERSHIP OF THE CHURCH, by JOHN R. MOTT, M.A.,
General Secretary of the World's Student Christian Federation.
New York, Student Department, Young Men's Christian Association,
1908, 12mo. Pp. 208.

In the present discussion of the problem of the supply of candidates for the Christian Ministry no one has taken a more prominent or a more helpful part than Mr. Mott. His recent volume is in substance the lectures delivered in Toronto, Berkeley, Cal., and Nashville; and these lectures embodied results of investigations carried on continuously during the past six years. This volume, therefore, represents the matured opinions of one who has had very unusual opportunities of investigating the problem, and constitutes the most valuable contribution which has yet been made in the discussion of the matter of the supply of ministerial candidates. Mr. Mott defines the problem as one not merely of numbers but more particularly of qualifications. Not merely are more men needed, but more men of strength and ability. This insistence upon quality rather than upon quantity, is by no means intended to reflect unfavorably upon the existing ministry nor upon the character of ministerial candidates. It is intended rather to suggest the increasing greatness and difficulty of the minister's task. It is the serious demands which are made upon the minister by modern problems which suggests the need of strong men for the leadership of the church. Among these problems are the critical spirit of the age, the theological unrest, the rapid growth of our cities, the great flood of immigrants, the enterprise of world wide missions. The reasons which have operated to deter men from volunteering for the ministry are the materialistic spirit of the age, the attractiveness of other lines of work in which Christian service can be rendered, the fear of loss of personal liberty, the inadequacy of financial support but chiefly the lack of any definite effort on the part of the church to enlist candidates for its ministry. In the solution of this problem Mr. Mott suggests that the minister himself holds the key. The last chapter of the book, in fact, summons the entire church to a more resolute effort to enlist men for this sphere of Christian activity. The call is made to pastors, to theological professors, to Sabbath School teachers and to parents, to hold before the young men of the present generation the large opportunities for usefulness, and the demands now made by the present need, for men of large ability to serve as leaders in the Christian church. Above all, Mr. Mott insists upon recourse to faithful, united and believing prayer, that the Lord of the Harvest may thrust forth laborers into his harvest.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

THE EDUCATIONAL IDEAL IN THE MINISTRY. The Lyman Beecher Lectures at Yale University in the year 1908. By WILLIAM HERBERT PERRY FAUNCE, President of Brown University. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1908. Cloth, 12mo., pp. 286. Price \$1.25 net.

These lectures were designed to give, not information, but a point of view. They defend the educational conception of the ministry as opposed to the liturgical, the magisterial or the oratorical; and insist that the church must return to its original idea of an *ecclesia docens*.

Yet as the minister is not to "enthroned dogma over life" but is to teach moral ideals and standards and values, the work of the minister is here discussed under the terms of the "educational ideal" rather than the "teaching function". The writer defines the task of the modern minister as consisting in "the creation and maintenance of Christian ideals".

In view of the new truths which are being discovered, it is insisted that the minister must accept "the evolutionary world-view" and "the reign of law", and must translate his message into "forms of present day speech". While true to his own convictions, he should "soften the impact of new truth upon his congregation".

The Scriptures should be thoroughly known, and should be taught as "the record of the progressive growth of the divine thought in Israel's thinking, of the gradual revelation of the divine life in Israel's living". They will reveal "the experience of the greatest travellers in regions of the soul". They will give us a sense of social and civic duty and "an appreciation of the order and beauty of nature". They are needed "for the formation of character in childhood and youth".

The supreme need of the day is declared to be that of "ethical leadership". In contrast with the ideals of the Greeks, of a Thomas à Kempis, or of a Franklin, the minister must exalt the Christian ideal which makes love the center of the moral life. He will thus emphasize service as the key-note of daily living whether in the commercial or civic or social sphere.

In the accomplishment of his difficult task the minister will find great assistance by the study of applied psychology, which has demonstrated the reality of religious experience, the unreality of many conventional sins and traditional virtues, the inter-dependence of mind and body, the importance of the emotions and will as the center of personality, and the value of action in the development of character.

The sphere of service which the minister can least of all neglect, if he is to be a true leader in religious education, is the Sabbath School. Here will be found for the "educational director" his unrivalled opportunity; yet his leadership will be needed also in the prayer meeting and in the evangelistic service, that both may have an educational value. His influence too must be used to stimulate all the educational institutions and processes in the community.

A special effort should now be made to bring the church and the college into closer relations, in which they shall be "allied in advancing the kingdom of truth". So too the theological seminaries "need not less scholarship but more persistent focusing of scholarship on life". But the chief need of both college and church is to emphasize the ideal and spiritual elements in human life.

Last of all the minister is reminded of the educative influence exerted upon his own character by the nature of his task. For one who is possessed by the "educational ideal", his daily service will mean broadening horizons, wider knowledge, a continuous and symmetrical development.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

"A COMFORTABLE FAITH", by MALCOLM JAMES McLEOD. New York: Fleming H. Revell Company; 12mo; cloth; pp. 191; price \$1.00 net.

This is a volume of nine popular sermons, all of which are designed to bring the comfort which is afforded by the familiar truths of Christianity. While the sermons may not suggest great originality of thought nor unusual breadth of knowledge they are bright, vivid, stirring, and calculated to engage the attention of a popular audience. Their striking characteristics are an abundance of concrete illustrations, a vivacity of style and an unflinching optimism. The subjects are as follows:

The God of all Comfort,
The Gospel of Comfort,
The Comfort of a Lively Hope,
Good Health and Comfort,
A Comfortable Equipment,
Comfort and Enthusiasm,
Comfort by Beholding,
Comfort and the Christian Ideal,
The Comfort of Final Victory.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

"WHAT SHALL I BELIEVE"? Addresses by the Faculty of the Auburn Theological Seminary. Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication, 1908; cloth; 12mo; pp. 220; price \$1.00.

These addresses were delivered in the Second Presbyterian Church of Auburn, New York, in the year 1907. They are excellent examples of doctrinal discourses. While not intended to present a complete system of theology, they are "popular treatments of important matters concerning which some Christians may be asking: 'What shall I believe?'".

The subjects treated relate to Faith, to God, to Jesus Christ, to the Bible, Man, the Church, the Resurrection, and the Future Life.

The discussions are uniformly interesting, clear, concise; and merit the permanent form and wider circulation insured by their present publication.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

VOCAL AND LITERARY INTERPRETATION OF THE BIBLE. S. S. CURRY, Ph.D. The Macmillan Company, New York. Pp. 384.

The public reading of the Scriptures does not hold the prominent place in church services which it once held and which God's message to men should hold. Where we expect careful preparation, clear understanding and spiritual sympathy, we often find lack of understanding, coldness, or a stilted mannerism. This book was written to emphasize the importance of Scripture reading in public worship, to indicate methods of study that will lead to a sympathetic appreciation of the various messages of the Bible, and to explain the principles of vocal expression by which this message can be interpreted to others. Much may be done by proper modulations of the voice to make clear what is difficult

and obscure, and to manifest the feeling prompting the thought, or inspired by it. No one can make an effective Bible reader of a light-minded, conceited, self-assertive, or sentimental man. But this book will stimulate every earnest, teachable man to more careful preparation of the Scripture lessons, will quicken his imagination and insight, and will help him to give to his audience simply, clearly and effectively, the thought and feeling which his study has revealed to him.

Princeton.

H. W. SMITH.

PERIODICAL LITERATURE.

AMERICAN JOURNAL OF THEOLOGY. Chicago. April. The Resurrection Faith of the First Disciples. Professor Shirley Jackson Case. Ph.D. The Gift of Tongues and Related Phenomena at the Present Day. Frederick G. Hencke. The Red Heifer. Professor Henry Preserved Smith, D.D. A Fragment of the Cosmologic Argument. Rev. William Hayes Ward, D.D., LL.D.

BIBLIOTHECA SACRA. Oberlin. April. Social Outlook in Matthew and Luke. William Allen Knight. The Glacial Epoch and the Noachian Deluge. Herbert William Magoun. The Seat of Authority in the Christian Religion. Jerome D. Davis. Ethics of the Mosaic Law. Charles Edward Smith. The New Birth. Thomas K. Davis. Essays in Pentateuchal Criticism (IV). Harold M. Weiner. The Mistakes of Darwin and his Would-Be Followers. The Kingdom of God in the Light of Jewish Literature. George D. Castor.

CHURCH QUARTERLY REVIEW. London. April. Modernism. Rev. Herbert H. Jeaffreson. The Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas. An American Diocese. Ethelbert Talbot, D.D. The Numeration of New Testament Manuscripts. F. G. Kenyon, F.B.A., D.Litt. The Ethics of Division. Alfred Pearson, D.D. The Grounds of Belief in God: an Essay in Apologetics. Rev. F. R. Tennant, D.D. The Resurrection Body: a Study in the History of Doctrine. The Problem of Reunion in Scotland. Rev. James Cooper, D.D.

EXPOSITOR. London. May. The Positive Elements in the Conception of Sin. Rev. F. R. Tennant, D.D. Some Criticisms of Professor Harvack's "Sayings of Jesus." Rev. Professor J. H. Moulton, M.A., Litt.D. The Excavations at Gezer and Religion in Ancient Palestine. Rev. Professor G. Buchanan Gray, D.D., Litt.D. How the Resurrection Narratives explain one another. Lieut.—Col. W. H. Turton, D.S.O. Luke's Authority in Acts i-xii. Professor Sir W. M. Ramsay, D.C.L., LL.D., D.D.

HARVARD THEOLOGICAL REVIEW. Cambridge. April. Edward Caird. Robert M. Wenley. Calvin and Servetus. Ephraim Emerton. The Moral Justification of Religion. Ralph B. Perry. The Evangelization

of Japan. Danjo Ebina. Truth and Immortality. Charles F. Dole. Individualism and Religion in the Early Roman Empire. Clifford H. Moore.

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS. Philadelphia. April. The Meaning of Evolution in Ethics. Professor Norman Wilde. Some Ethical Aspects of Industrialism. Professor D. H. MacGregor. The Meaning of Experience for Science and Religion. Professor Frank Granger. A Socialist's Interpretation of Ethical Evolution. E. Belfort Bax. An Experiment in Social and Religious Education—the Alpha Union. W. R. Hughes.

IRISH THEOLOGICAL QUARTERLY. Dublin and New York. April. Repetition of Extreme Unction. Rev. P. J. Toner, D.D. The Just Price. Rev. T. Slater, S.J. The Present State of Unitarianism. Rev. George S. Hitchcock. The Latin Writers of Medieval Ireland. Mario Exposito. The Ethical Relations of Contractors and Public Institutions. Rev. David Barry. Some Theories of Our Lord's Resurrection. Rev. J. MacRory, D.D.

JOURNAL OF THEOLOGICAL STUDIES. London. April. Christ Before Herod. A. W. Verrall, Litt.D. Historical Introduction to the Textual Criticism of the New Testament. III. The Contents of the Canon of the New Testament: (B) The Pauline Epistles. C. H. Turner. Lanfranc's Monastic Constitutions. Very Rev. J. Armitage Robinson, D.D. Addenda to "Some Coptic Apocryphal Legends." E. O. Winstedt, B.Litt.

LONDON QUARTERLY REVIEW. London. January. Materialism and Life. John Butler Burke, M.A. The Challenge of Secularism. G. S. Streatfield, M.A. The Social Basis of Immortality. F. Herbert Stead, M.A. The Unification of British South Africa. Amos Burnet. The Public Reading of the Scriptures. Frank Ballard, D.D., M.A., B.Sc. The Pauline Doctrine of Union with Christ. W. W. Holdsworth, M.A.

LUTHERAN CHURCH REVIEW. Philadelphia. April. Christ's Resurrection and Modern Thought. W. J. Sparrow Simpson, A.M. The Resurrection of Christ the Keystone in the Arch of His Redeeming Work. F. P. Mayser, D.D. Up-to-Date Views on Miracles. George M. Scheidy, A.M.

LUTHERAN QUARTERLY. Gettysburg. April. Wundt's Theory of the Soul. Professor C. F. Sanders, M.A., B.D. "God Between Four Walls." Professor W. H. Wynn, Ph.D., D.D. Freedom of Teaching. Professor David H. Bauslin, D.D. Preaching Christ Crucified. Professor Luther A. Fox, D.D. God's Fellow-Workers in the Ministry. Professor David B. Floyd, D.D. Recent German Research Concerning Luther. Abdel Ross Wentz, M.A., B.D. Some New Light Concerning the Schwabach Articles. Professor J. L. Neve, D.D. Beneficiary Education in the General Synod. Rev. C. B. Gruver. Sociology and the pulpit. Rev. C. W. Heffner, Ph.D.

METHODIST REVIEW. New York. May-June. The "Parables of the Kingdom" in the Light of To-day. Part I. Professor J. B. Thomas, D.D., LL.D. Horace Bushnell and the "Vicarious Sacrifice." Lynn

H. Hough, A.M., B.D. Petrarch—The First Modern Man. Professor Oscar Kuhns, Ph.D. Heretics and Orthodoxy. W. I. Haven, D.D. The Nether Side of Immortality—A Study in Consciousness. F. B. Stockdale, D.D. The Gospel for a Materialistic Age. G. A. Neeld, A.M., B.D. Evolution and the Atonement. G. D. Chase, D.D. Christian Science and Insanity. Frank Crane, D.D.

METHODIST REVIEW QUARTERLY. Nashville. April. The Secret of the Physical Universe. W. H. Fitchett. "The Creed of Methodism: Where Can It Be Found?" Bishop Hoss. Method in Methodist Theology. J. G. Granbery. The Real Greatness of Tolstoy. John M. Fletcher. The Law of Moses. An English Lawyer. The Reconstruction Trilogy of Thomas Dixon. Mrs. F. L. Townsend. Two Current Views of Christianity. John C. Hockenberry. Roman Catholicism at Headquarters. David Leith. "The Servant of Jehovah." Henry Stiles Bradley. "The Second Coming." R. G. Martin.

PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW. New York. May. The Idealism of Edward Caird. II. Professor John Watson. The Springs of Art. Professor J. Mark Baldwin. The Present Meaning of Idealism. Professor Ernest Albee. Absolutism and Teleology. Professor A. W. Moore.

REFORMED CHURCH REVIEW. Lancaster. April. John Calvin, the Man. Rev. H. M. J. Klein, Ph.D. Calvin as an Interpreter of the Bible. Professor Irwin Hoch de Long, D.B., Ph.D. Calvin's Doctrine of Predestination. Rev. Theo. F. Herman. The Doctrine of the Lord's Supper in Calvin's System of Thought. Rev. A. S. Weber, D.D. The Ethics of Calvinism. John S. Stahr, D.D., LL.D. Calvin as a Preacher. Professor John C. Bowman, D.D. Calvin and Civil Liberty. Professor A. V. Hiester. Calvinism in the Reformed Churches of Germany. Professor George W. Richards, D.D. Illustrative Anecdotes from the Life of Calvin. Rev. Victor William Dippell, Ph.D.

THEOLOGICAL QUARTERLY. St. Louis. April. The Infallible Pope. Luther and Liberty. Matt. 16: 18f. and the Primacy of Peter.

UNION SEMINARY MAGAZINE. Richmond. April-May. A Serviceable Life. Harris E. Kirk. Grammatical Interpretation: Its Primary Problems and Products. W. M. McPheeters. The Premillennial Theory. C. R. Vaughan. The Decline in the Sense of Sin. J. K. Hall. Church Discipline from the Standpoint of the Bible and Reason. Joseph Rennie.

REVUE D'HISTOIRE ECCLÉSIASTIQUE. Louvain. Avril. Les Actes apocryphes de Pierre. II. Doctrine des actes de Pierre (suite, à suivre). J. Flamion. La Summa Sententiarum appartient-elle à Hugues de Saint-Victor. P. Claeys Bouúaert, S.J. Le traité de Pierre Lombard sur les sept ordres ecclésiastiques: ses sources, ses copistes (à suivre). J. de Ghellinck, S.J. La question franciscaine. Le manuscrit II. 2326 de la Bibliothèque royale de Belgique. Table des citations. A. Fierens. L'Église catholique en Russie sous Catherine II. La création

d'un évêché de Blanche-Russie et le maintien des Jésuits (suite et fin). J. Bois.

REVUE DE THÉOLOGIE ET DE PHILOSOPHIE. Lausanne. Janvier-Avril. Le parler en langues à Corinthe d'après les textes de Paul et les analogies modernes. Emile Lombard. La connaissance religieuse d'après Calvin, étude d'histoire et de dogmatique. P. Lobstein. Les idées morales chez les grands prosateurs français du premier Empire et de la Restauration (suite et fin). J. Cart.

REVUE DE THÉOLOGIE ET DES QUESTIONS RELIGIEUSES. Montauban. Mars. Calvin écrivain. Jacques Pannier. Fantasies exégétiques et critiques. Ch. Bruston. L'affaire Tyrrell (suite). Raoul Gout. Contre la "folie" de Jésus. André Arnal. La mission historique de Jésus (suite et fin). Ch. Bruston.

The Princeton Theological Review

CONTENTS

Music in the Work of Calvin	529
ÉMIL DOMUERGUE	
Calvin's Doctrine of the Trinity	553
BENJAMIN B. WARFIELD	
Reviews of Recent Literature	653

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LIST OF BOOKS REVIEWED

Allen, <i>A Parable of the Rose and Other Poems</i>	703
Astley, <i>Prehistoric Archaeology and the Old Testament</i>	666
Avebury, <i>Peace and Happiness</i>	702
Bavinck, <i>The Philosophy of Revelation</i>	657
Brown, <i>The Why and How of Foreign Missions</i>	694
Carus, <i>God. An Inquiry and a Solution</i>	653
Clifton, <i>The Miller and the Toad</i>	702
Coit, <i>National Idealism and the Book of Common Prayer</i>	695
Couard, <i>Die religiösen und sittlichen Anschauungen der alttestamentlichen Apokryphen und Pseudepigraphen</i>	667
Crooker, <i>The Church to To-day</i>	691
Dau, <i>The Logical and Historical Inaccuracies of the Hon. Bourke Cockran</i>	703
Faulkner, <i>Erasmus: The Scholar</i>	684
Fernald, <i>A Working Grammar of the English Language</i>	704
Gibb and Montgomery, <i>The Confessions of Augustine</i>	678
Gordon, <i>The Early Traditions of Genesis</i>	665
Greene, <i>Saint Peter</i>	700
Herridge, <i>The Coigne of Vantage</i>	694
Hoyt, <i>The Preacher</i>	698
Jackson, <i>The New Schaff-Herzog Encyclopædia of Religious Knowledge. Vol. III</i>	655
Jones, <i>India, Its Life and Thought</i>	690
Kleiser, <i>How to Develop Power and Personality in Speaking</i>	700
Leipoldt, <i>Geschichte des Neutestamentlichen Kanons. Vols. I, II.</i> ,	674
Locy, <i>Biology and its Makers</i>	701
Moisant, <i>Psychologie de l'Incroyant</i>	654
Murray, <i>A Handbook of Christian Ethics</i>	687
Richard, <i>Christian Worship: Its Principles and Forms</i>	696
Schaffler et al., <i>Training the Teacher</i>	699
Schmiedel, <i>The Johannine Writings</i>	670
Shaw, <i>The Precinct of Religion in the Culture of Humanity</i>	661
Shearer, <i>The Sermon on the Mount</i>	669
Stacy, <i>Handbook of Prophecy</i>	667
Stalker, <i>The Atonement</i>	685
Standard Bible Dictionary.....	662
Wright, <i>Light from the Egyptian Papyri</i>	666

THE PRINCETON THEOLOGICAL REVIEW

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MUSIC IN THE WORK OF CALVIN.*

I have been brought before you this evening, ladies and gentlemen, by circumstances at once encouraging and intimidating,—odd and yet logical,—such as would suggest a long introduction. The response which I bring you to lectures delivered, respectively, four months ago and one month ago, was in point of fact worked out and prepared at least eighteen months ago. I can do little more, at best, than adjust it to the situation.

Yet, in view of the length of our road and the shortness of the time at our disposal, I feel bound to sacrifice all retrospective or personal explanations. I shall not even try to take advantage of that fellow-citizenship with you in heart, if not in blood, to which more and more frequent and pleasant visits to you, and friendships among you every year growing older and more numerous, seem to give me a

* [An Address delivered by Professor Émile Doumergue, now Dean of the Protestant Theological Faculty of Montauban, in the "Salle de la Réformation", at Geneva, in April, 1902. The allusions at the opening of the Address are explained by the circumstance that there had shortly before been delivered at Geneva, by MM. Brunetière and Münz, similar but sharply critical Addresses on phases of Calvin's work. It is pleasant to be able to record that the harsh judgments of these lecturers were rapidly modified, and in the opening words of a second Address delivered shortly afterwards, Professor Doumergue was able to advert gracefully to their change of heart.—*Translator.*]

claim. I shall set aside the classical and useful *captatio benevolentia* altogether and confine myself to four preliminary remarks, which I shall make as brief as possible.

First of all I make my compliments to M. Brunetière and I congratulate him on having impressed on the discussion a character so grave, elevated and altogether urbane. His example has been followed by M. Münz, and I shall endeavor to imitate it in my turn.

Then, I thank the innumerable adversaries of Calvin for having made Calvinism such a living question, for having recovered for our Reformer something which almost looks like popularity. Nothing like this has been seen for centuries.

Next, I felicitate myself that, by a mysterious sort of preëstablished harmony, leading to identical conclusions from opposite points of view, assailants and defenders have found ourselves at one in drawing the attention of the public to the *intellectualism* of Calvin. The eminent critics who have addressed you—as well as others—have thought that, this point being universally reputed the weakest, it would be by it that it would be easiest to attack the whole system: just as I have thought that, this point being universally reputed the weakest, if I could show that it is sufficiently strong to resist all attacks, it would be precisely by it that it would be easiest to defend the whole system.

Finally, very respected hearers, I take the liberty to say to you frankly that my lively desire is to interest you; but that my more lively desire still is to convince you. Now, in history there is no true proof except authentic documents. I am going to bring them to you: texts, songs, pictures. Possibly these documents will seem to you sometimes too numerous, and even a little wearisome. But it has seemed to me that in a question so eminently Protestant, I ought to follow the Protestant method; which consists in placing the auditors in a position to decide for themselves,—against error, for the truth.

I shall commence by reading to you the very terms in

which there has been brought against our Reformer the general accusation of anti-artistic intellectualism.

The honorable member of the Institute, a most competent critic, no doubt, in artistic matters, and the last you have heard speak on art and Protestantism, M. Münz, in his articles in the *Revue des Revues* of two years ago, after having gladly made an exception of Luther, has brought his criticisms to bear on "the haughty and cruel Calvin", on "the most fanatical of the leaders of the Reformation", on "the most implacable of iconophobes", who "at one blow has withered both heart and soul". "Where and when do we see the author of the *Institutes* manifesting the least interest in any branch of art whatever?"

M. Münz is a Protestant. He is not, however, a pastor. Now, a pastor, M. Douen, writes: "The Pope of Geneva, that dry and hard spirit, Calvin, lacked the warmth of heart which makes Luther so loveable. . . . His theology without bowels . . . is the foe of all pleasure and of all distraction, even of the arts and of music. . . . Calvin is the type of authoritative dogmatism, anti-liberal, anti-artistic, anti-human, and anti-Christian."

If a Protestant layman and a Protestant pastor speak thus, the language on Geneva of a free-thinker like Voltaire should no longer astonish us:

Ah, noble city, rich and proud and shrewd,
Where men can reckon, but can never smile,
You take your pleasure in Genevan psalms,
The ancient concerts of the goody king,—
In faith that God delights in wretched verse.
By preachers of the dull and deadly sort
Is sadness stamped upon the brows of all.

And we shall be, if possible, still less astonished to hear Father Maimbourg repeat: "Calvinism is a skeleton of religion . . . having no life, no unction. . . . Calvin made a religion utterly dry and conformed to his own temperament."

Jesuits, Voltaireians, Protestants, even pastors, are all in accord: there is only one opinion, it is an axiom.

An axiom, or a legend? To reach a decision, let us ask to-day, first, what Calvin *thought* of art in general and of music in particular; then what Calvin *did* for music.

I.

What did Calvin think of art?

Well, gentlemen, to suppose that he gave it no thought at all—this absence of artistic preoccupation could find at least excuses.

I call the first of them, *the evil of the times*. Calvinism has sadness stamped on its brow. Its visage is pale. Sometimes all its being is tense with an inexpressibly heavy strain. It is even draped in weeds. It is all true. Calvinism is not the religion of the poor woman, mother of the gay Villon, who kneels in the midst of the gold and bright colours of a vaulted and brilliantly lighted chapel, and in her comfortable ignorance, addresses her prayers to the "exalted goddess". It is nevertheless the religion of a poor woman,—but the mother of the pastor Le Clerc, who, present at the torture of her son, at the moment when the red-hot iron scorched his brow, cried in the enthusiasm of her Biblical faith, "Hail to Jesus and His standard-bearers!" Calvinism is a religion of martyrs. And these Calvinists, able to meet, between two massacres, only in the forest or the desert, are asked why they have not ornamented their sanctuaries with statues and pictures, why they have not built Romanesque or Gothic Cathedrals!—I certainly feel the right to respond with the Dutch Calvinist, Dr. Abraham Kuiper, alluding to the death of Goudimel at Lyons on the night of St. Bartholomew: "The wood is reproached for its silence, when they have killed the nightingale."

There is, however, a second excuse of a different nature. I mean *the inevitableness of reaction*—not only from the abuse of ecclesiastical painting and sculpture, but from the abuse, less known but perhaps even more scandalous, of music.

Examples. While one portion of the choristers intoned a *Sanctus* or an *Incarnatus*, others, accompanied by the crowd, sang words like these: *Robin loves me, Love presses me too hard*. And in the Vatican, the choir-leader would speak to the Holy Father of the *Magnificat*, "Margot, in a garden", or of the Mass, "O Venus, the beautiful".

Moreover, the very decrees of the Council of Trent sufficiently attest these aberrations, in the attempt to correct them,—but without success, as the historians most favorable to that great assembly, recognize. The exertions of Palestrina against "the lascivious and impure music" (these are the expressions of the Fathers) were powerless. And how could it have been otherwise, when the Papacy itself continued to provide certain voices for its choir by the commission of a special and here unnamable crime?

A very significant proof of the persistence of these strange musical manners is found in a *Collection of Spiritual Songs*, taught by the royal missionaries to the converts of the diocese of Alais, in 1735, two hundred years after the Reformation. The booklet has no music, but in its place there are given in each instance such indications as these. At Songs V, VI, VII, the *Pater*, the *Ave Maria*, the *Credo*: "to the air of Birenne, my love." At Song XI, the Passion of Jesus Christ: "to the air of Follies of Spain." At Song XVI, in honor of the Holy Virgin: "to the air of Take my Phyllis, take thy Glass." At Song XXVIII, Paridise: "to the air of Charming Gabrielle." At Song XLV, Sentiments of a Converted Sinner: "to the air of Let us follow, follow Love." At Song LI, sentiments of a heart which finds nothing but God to love: "to the air of Big Gosier said to Gregory."

Was it not, indeed, in the full light of Louis XIV's century, in 1670, that Colletet composed "to airs often immodest" (these are his own expressions) Nowels like this:

"There was not great nor small
 Who did not bring his all,
 Who did not, not, not,
 Who did not give, give,
 And offer alway
 All he could pay."

These Nowels were reprinted throughout two centuries; even in 1874.

Assuredly, if Calvin had had the same feeling as many of the members (and those certainly not the least clear-sighted) of the Council of Trent, and had believed there was only one way to extirpate such abuses,—absolutely to proscribe modern music, to wit,—what reproach could be brought against him even—or particularly—by the Catholics?

I have pointed out these possible excuses, gentlemen, that you may feel more strongly the merit of Calvin in rendering them needless.

In his *Institutes* and in his *Commentaries* Calvin sets before us what is in effect a very original and very beautiful theory of art. This is it: Art is the gift of God's Common Grace to man.

Common Grace! So much has been said of special grace (that which is the result of predestination), that the theologians themselves have ended by ignoring common grace, which nevertheless is not less real, and the rôle of which is not less considerable. In effect, it is by this common grace that God dispenses "the excellent gifts of His Spirit to all the human race",¹ and "casts some rays of His light even upon unbelievers". Even the most accursed, the sons of Cain, are not deprived of this common grace, which, on the contrary, distributes to all "some gifts and graces", "graces which are to be highly prized", which enrich the pagans "liberally with excellent graces", "evident testimonies of the goodness of God", even with "the admirable light of truth"

¹ *Opera Calvini* (Brunswick ed.), xxiii, pp. 99, 100: *Commentarius in Genesin*, ch. vi, vers. 20.

the brilliancy of which astonishes.² Briefly, it is this common grace, distinct from special grace, which is the basis of civil society—distinct in its turn, and for this reason, from religious society—with its science, its industry, its philosophy, and its politics.

Theologians and historians, it has been said, have undertaken simply to amputate from Calvinism this common grace. And there certainly is no room for astonishment that, after two or three such amputations, nothing will remain in the sight of the public but a mutilated body, hideous and very repellent. Only, this is no longer Calvinism.

Very well, gentlemen, among the gifts of this common grace are the arts which are "instilled by God into our understandings", and which make us "contemplate the goodness of God". "God is the sole author and master of all these arts."³ "All arts proceed from God, and ought to be held as divine inventions."⁴

The objection is made, it is true, that by this word "arts" Calvin means only the liberal arts and the mechanical arts. But this is inexact. Calvin does not exclude from the number of arts the arts properly so-called, those which serve not only "common use" or "commodity", but simple pleasure. The declaration is formal: "Because the invention of the harp and other musical instruments serves rather for pleasure and delight than necessity, it is not nevertheless to be considered altogether superfluous and still less does it deserve to be condemned."⁵

You have fully understood, gentlemen? Calvin does not condemn either pleasure or delight: he even declares that pleasure and delight are not *superfluous* things. All that he condemns is "the pleasure which is not united with the fear of God, and the common needs of human society".

² *Opera Calvini*, iii, pp. 315, 316: *Institution Chrétienne*, II. ii. 15.

³ *Opp. Calv.* xxxvi, p. 483: *Commentarius in Isaiam prophetam*, xxviii. 29.

⁴ *Opp. Calv.* xxv, p. 58: *Commentarius in quinque libros Moysi*, Exodus, xxxi. 2.

⁵ *Opp. Calv.* xxiii, p. 100: *Com. in Gen.* iv. 20.

But there is no Christian socialist who would disavow such a restriction; and all other artistic pleasure is legitimate.

From art in general let us pass at once to music, and let us take into our hands the famous preface to the Psalter.

"In truth, we know by experience [by experience and not by theory] that singing has great force and power to *move* and *influence* the *heart* of men to invoke and praise God with more *vehement* and *ardent* zeal. . . . Among other things adapted for men's recreation and for giving them *pleasure* [artistic pleasure again], music is either the foremost, or one of the principal; and we must esteem it a gift of God designed for that purpose. . . . There is scarcely anything in this world which can more turn or bend hither and thither the ways of men. . . . And in fact we know by *experience* [the facts of experience again] that music has *a secret and almost incredible power to move hearts* [still, the heart]. . . . When melody goes with it, every bad word penetrates much more deeply into the *heart* . . . just as a funnel conveys the wine into the depths of the decanter, so venom and corruption *are distilled into the very bottom of the heart by melody*."⁶

The heart again, and always the heart! And in the dogmatic pages of the *Institutes*, the heart reappears, we must remark, with a frequency more and more singular. The word, it is said, and song are good on one condition,—“that they follow the sentiment of the heart”,—“that they come from the sentiment and the depths of the heart”. Then,—“Singing is a good means of *inciting* and *influencing* the *heart*”.⁷ But “the tongue without the *heart* is very displeasing to God”.

How could M. Douen speak of a theology without bowels? How could M. Münz ask: “Where and when do we see the author of the *Institutes* manifesting the *least* interest

⁶ *Opp. Calv.* vi, p. 120: *La forme des prieres et chantes ecclesiastiques*: Epistre au lecteur.

⁷ *Opp. Calv.* iv, pp. 418-421: *Institution chrétienne*, III. xx. 31, 32, 33.

in *any branch* of art whatever?" How could M. Brunetière contend: "Horror of art is and will remain one of the essential traits of the spirit of the Reformation in general, and of the Calvinistic Reformation in particular"? I cannot tell. And in place of seeking curiously to unravel it, I propose to you, as a transition between what Calvin *says* and what Calvin *did*, simply to listen to the music of Bourgeois for the Thirty-eighth Psalm. . . .

II.

What did Calvin *do* for art?

Calvin *made the Psalter*.

Before Calvin, the French Reformation had no ecclesiastical singing. The idea of the Psalter dates from 1537, and from the memorial which Calvin, with Farel, presented to the Council of Geneva. Finding that the prayers of the faithful were "so cold that it ought to turn to great shame and confusion", he asked that the Psalms might be sung, that *the hearts* of all might be *moved and incited*".

Troubles—exile—paralyzed the activity of the Reformers. But scarcely was Calvin established at Strasburg than he set himself to carry out his programme. Arrived in *September*, he announces to a friend, *in the month of December*, that he is about to send the Psalter to the press.

Whence did he obtain the words? He became a poet; and, finding in manuscripts more or less correct, a dozen Psalms translated by Clément Marot, he availed himself of them.

Whence did he obtain the music? Struck by the beauty of certain Strasburg melodies, which, he said, "pleased him very much", he availed himself of them also.

And this was the first Psalter, the Psalter of 1539, the single remaining copy of which, that is known, is now to be found in the library at Munich.

For the *further* translation of the words, Calvin adopted, as they appeared, the Psalms of Marot, whom he was accused of having "Calvinized" at Ferrara. Then Theodore

Beza finished the work of Marot, and Calvin, as impatient in 1551 as thirteen years before, in 1538, sent on the translations of his friend, one by one, "by the first courier", as he specifies.⁸

And, finally, for the *further* composition of the melodies? Ah, here we find a legend in possession, even in the most scientific Protestant books. According to it, the composer Bourgeois had to flee to Paris (but this erroneous; he withdrew to Lyons), to escape the bickerings of Calvin (this, too, is erroneous; he left because the Council refused to increase his insufficient salary), because Calvin was furious at Bourgeois for setting the Psalms in four parts (which also is erroneous, since, shortly afterwards, it was Calvin himself who requested the Council for an authorization for Bourgeois to publish a new work). To execute justice on this legend and to illustrate the relations of Calvin and Bourgeois, only one word is needed, a little word which I have found in the old records of your archives,—yellow, dust-covered, hard to read, but often so eloquent, so vivid.

Bourgeois had displeased the Council, who were unjustly incensed with him, and condemned him to prison. The Minutes note the decision, and then, at the same meeting, the same Minutes begin, a half-page further on, another paragraph: "Afterwards Master Calvin came in." *Afterwards!* Now, this is what this little word means. At once upon the Council's making its strange decision, one of the councillors, no doubt a friend of Calvin's, knowing his sentiments toward Bourgeois, left the court-room and ran to the Rue des Chanoines. He explained the situation in two words. Calvin, who was dictating a letter or some commentary, stopped in the middle of a sentence: his memory was sure to take it up again and complete it an hour or two later. In haste he put on his coat, seized his square cap, and in a few seconds was at the Hôtel de Ville. At once he had himself announced to the Council. At once he entered:

⁸ *Opp. Calv.*, xiv, p. 28.

"Afterwards Master Calvin came in." And it was he who explained that Bourgeois was not in fault. His interruption, however, only partly calmed the Council. Bourgeois remained in prison twenty-four hours, and when he was set at liberty the Council made "gracious remonstrances" . . . to Calvin himself.

It is not hard to understand, from this, how, in spite of Calvin's protection, Bourgeois left Geneva. But the Psalter was finished, the complete Psalter, that of 1562, the year of the massacre of Vassy; and here is Psalm 65, translated by Theodore Beza, with the melody of Bourgeois and the harmony of Goudimel. . . .

Here, gentlemen, my imagination reverts to that first, thin, volume of 1539, lying there isolated, exiled, in the Bavarian library, and I am filled with an inexpressible respect. I think of the little grain of mustard seed transformed into the immense tree, to the branches of which, growing ever stronger, the birds from every quarter of heaven gather to rest and sing. I think of the patriarch Abraham, alone, old, wasted, against all human prevision become the father of a people as the stars of the heavens for number. Growth, multiplication, veritably prodigious! It was from the Psalter of 1539 that, little by little, the Psalter of 1562 grew. The same year of its publication saw twenty-five editions of it issued. In four years sixty-two editions followed. The bibliographers tell us of fourteen hundred editions, and translations multiplied themselves as marvelously as editions. The Calvinistic Psalter was translated into English, Dutch, Danish, Polish, Bohemian, Rhaeto-Romanic, Ladin, Italian, Spanish, Portugese, Gascon, Béarnais, Malay, Tamil, Sessouto, Latin, Hebrew, Slavonian, Zend. In less than two centuries there were issued in Holland alone more than thirty editions, and Germany, the land of the admirable choral, jealous of what it calls "the siren of Calvinism", rivalled Holland.

The siren of Calvinism! This expresses the opinion of

enemies, systematic insulters like Florimond de Raemond. "Nothing", says he, "has so opened the way to the novelties of these new religions. . . . The new singing, sweet and insinuating, of these rhymed Psalms has been the chain and cordage . . . by which they have drawn souls."

The siren of Calvinism! Above all, this expresses the opinion of friends—friends as little sentimental as a professor, a professor of theology, and even of the theology of the seventeenth century, Moses Amyraud. "From the mingling of so many voices", he writes, "there is formed, I do not know what harmony, the sound of which has sometimes been enough to ravish passers-by—so melodious is the sound of this singing and so adapted is it to rouse in the mind *extraordinary emotions*. For ourselves, we may certainly speak of what we have experienced from it. There are times when the several words, animated in this manner, have *almost drawn our souls out of themselves*. In such sort that I do not believe there can be on earth a more beautiful image of what we hope for some day in Paradise."

In very truth, gentlemen, what book, except the Bible, has received such honor? And what imagination can picture the millions and millions of souls, of all countries and tongues, who have found consolation, joy, strength, heroism in these marvellous songs,—from the Calvinists of Geneva and France to those Calvinists of Scotland who sang them to the roar of the waves on the rocks of St. Andrews, and those Calvinists of Holland who sang them to the terrible onset of the old Spanish troopers, and those Calvinists of England who sang them on the ships sailing out to America,—down to those Calvinists who are singing them still down in the south of Africa, on the banks of the Orange River, or in the passes of the Drakenberg?

This is the Psalter which Calvin made, the Calvinistic Psalter.

III.

Here, gentlemen, let us stop and listen. Let us listen to the Psalm, not slow, dragging and lagging, monotonous,

cold, wearisome, stupid and stupifying,—not to the Psalm which, little by little, like a wornout piece of furniture, decrepit, displeasing, unsuited to our modern parlors, we have clipped, restored, mended, abridged and finally cast out of our apartments, and our books of songs, to relegate to some lumber-room,—but to the Psalm, true, vital, young, and strong, sung as a word which has a meaning, which expresses a deep and lively sentiment, which bursts from a heart vibrant with ardor, with assurance, with hope, with joy, with enthusiasm, . . . in short, let us listen to the true Psalm of Calvin.

Here we are, gentlemen, on a fine afternoon in May, 1558, on the great promenade of the students of Paris, the *Pré-aux-Clercs*, on the banks of the *Seine*. Some students are singing the Psalms, and their singing is so fine that their comrades gather and sing with them. The same scene is repeated the next day. Only, the lords of the court—*Chatillon*, *Condé*, the King of Navarre—mingle with the singers. It is a procession of seven or eight hundred people which unrolls itself, and the immense and delighted crowd listens with transport. What is it? The apparition of the Psalm, sung in chorus—"that unexpected harmony", as *Michelet* puts it, "that sweet, simple and strong singing, so strong as to be heard a thousand leagues away, so sweet that everyone thought he heard in it the voice of his mother". And while to the echoes of the *Pré-aux-Clercs*, there were answering the echoes of the *Pré Fichaut* of *Bourges* or of the promenades of *Bordeaux*, the old historian of the University of Paris, *Bulée*, said: "In the singing of the Psalms, the Protestants laid the foundations of their religion"; and *Florimond de Raemon*d said: "It is from this event [the apparition of the Psalms] that the Church of Calvin may be dated"—the Church of the Psalms.

Here is Psalm I, the melody and harmony by *Bourgeois*. . . .

From that moment, the Psalms have been indissolubly

bound up with the life, public and private alike, of Calvinists, and, as has been remarked, it would be possible to make a calendar, in which all the salient events of the history of French Protestantism should be recalled by a verse of a Psalm.

Here is that famous verse, for example, of Psalm 118:

This is the happy day
That God Himself did make;
Let us rejoice alway
And in it pleasure take.

Now, in describing the battle of Coutras (1587), won by Henry of Navarre, the son of Jeanne d'Albret, from the Duke de Joyeuse and the Catholic army, D'Aubigné expresses himself thus:

"Of the two artilleries, the last to come, that of Huguenots, was the first in position, and commenced to play before nine o'clock. Laverdin, seeing the damage which it did, rode towards his general and cried out, while still some distance off: 'Sir, we are losing by waiting: we must open up.' The response was: 'Monsieur the Marshal speaks the truth.' He returned at a gallop to his place, gave the word and charged.

"On the other side, the King of Navarre having had prayer offered throughout the army, some began to sing the Hundred-and-eighteenth Psalm: '*This is the happy day.*' Many Catholics of the White-Cap cried out loudly enough to be heard: 'S'Death! They are trembling, the poltroons; they are making confession.' Vaux, lieutenant of Bellegarde, who had more frequently rubbed knees with these people and who alone rallied for the combat, said to the Duke: 'Sir, when the Huguenots take this figure, they are ready to lay on with a will.'" And some hours later the victory was theirs.

But this same song, "*This is the happy day*", has sustained the Calvinists in other combats, more dangerous, more difficult. It is heroic to cast ourselves at a gallop

without fear into the midst of the battle. It is more heroic, laid on a bed of agony, to receive, calm and smiling, the assault of the last enemy which man has to conquer on this earth. Such a hero, the author whose narrative we have just read showed himself. His widow relates: "Two hours before his death, he said with a joyful countenance and a mind peaceable and content, '*This is the happy day*'." There is something more heroic still. Listen! Far from the excitement of the combat, unsustained by the affections and care of friends, face to face with the mob howling with rage and hate, on the scaffold, at the foot of the gallows, here are the martyrs of the eighteenth century,—the Louis Rancs, the François Bénézets, the François Rochettes,—who, with their glorious souls, raise towards the heavens where their Saviour listens to them, the song of triumph: "*This is the happy day!*"

Yes, gentlemen, Psalms and martyrs go together, just as the Word and the heart from which it flows; and it is through the sound of the Psalms that we are able to follow all this incomparable history.

The martyrs are arrested.—Here are the fourteen men of Meaux, who were surprised in the room where they were celebrating the Lord's Supper. They are hurried into carts: they are borne away to the most terrible sufferings. But, forgetful of everything but the outrage done to their God, trembling with a holy indignation, they cast to the fanatic people the words of the Seventy-ninth Psalm:

The heathen into Thine own heritage,
O Lord, have come; and by their foul outrage
Defiled Thy holy House; Jerusalem
Is made a heap of scattered stones by them.
Slain are Thy people, Lord,
Slain by the cruel sword,—
Their bodies, for the meat
Of ravening birds cast forth,
And to the beasts of earth
Their flesh flung out to eat.

The martyrs are in prison.—Anne du Bourg put upon bread and water, separated from all her friends, even shut up in a cage, set herself to sing Psalms; and it is the sigh of the Hundred and Thirtieth Psalm which escapes from her soul:

From the bottom of my heart,
 From all my sorrow's deep,
 To Thee I raise my plaint,—
 Lord, hear me as I weep:
 O, surely, Lord, 'tis time,—
 I cry both night and day—
 O bend Thy ear to hear
 The while to Thee I pray.

The martyrs are on the fatal cart.—Here are five young students, treacherously arrested on their return from Geneva to their post of evangelization. On the road which led from the dungeon to the funeral-pyre, what word could express their overflowing joy but that of the Ninth Psalm,—which the Psalter describes as “a triumphant song in which David returns thanks to God for a certain battle which he had won, and magnifies the righteousness of God, who avenges His people in His own good time and way”:

With all my heart I will proclaim,
 O Lord, my God, thy glorious name;
 Thy marvellous works no equals know,
 I fain their wondrousness would show.
 In Thee alone my joy I see,
 I have no comfort but in Thee;
 O God, Most High, I fain would raise
 To Thy great Name unending praise.

The martyrs are on the platform of the scaffold.—Here is Jean Bertrand, forest-watchman: “The hangman jerked the cord about his neck rudely. But Bertrand let this insult and violence pass, and said to him: ‘God forgive you, my friend’; and began to sing from the Twenty-fifth and the

Eighty-sixth Psalms, the verses suitable to the time and state he was in." He sang:

To Thee, my God, I lift my heart,
In Thee my hope is placed.

And again:

My God, bow down Thine ear to me,
And hearken to me graciously.
O answer me! for none can be
In sorer straits and poverty.

"His countenance was beautiful, and his eyes were lifted to heaven. He placed himself with high courage on the seat that was prepared for him on the end of a piece of wood, and said these words: 'What a fine place you have prepared for me!—O happy day!' And when the fire was lighted, he cried out and said: 'My God, give thy servant thy hand: I commend to Thee my soul.'" And holding God thus by the hand, he ascended to heaven.

The martyrs are in the flames.—They have been imprisoned, tortured; their tongues have been cut out. Here is Jean Rabec, of old a minor friar: "The criminal officer . . . and others . . . came to the jail . . . and commanded that his tongue should be cut out and he be prepared for execution. The executioner took him and fastened him to a hurdle behind a cart, a pitiable spectacle. And Rabec, raising his eyes to heaven, prayed to God, . . . the blood pouring from his mouth and he being much disfigured by this blood. He was stripped, and wrapped with straw before and behind, and a quantity of brimstone was spread on his flesh. Lifted into the air, he began the Psalm: 'The heathen have come into thine own heritage', quite intelligibly, despite his tongue having been cut out. . . . And being thus lifted up, he remained for quite a number of minutes, without the fire being lighted, continuing the Psalm. . . . When the fire was lighted Rabec continued his Psalm, and was lowered and raised again several times,

so that, his entrails having partly protruded, he still spoke on, though no longer having the figure of a man."

The heathen entered have Thine heritage . . .
 Unto the heavens, let the prisoner's sighs
 Into thy holy presence, Lord, arise:
 And oh, preserve by Thine almighty power
 Those who are brought to their appointed hour.

There remains, gentlemen, the most celebrated of our Psalms, that which has received the name of the *Battle-Psalm*, the Calvinistic Marseillaise, the Huguenot Luther-choral, that supreme cry of confidence which traverses and animates this whole epoch, as moving as it is grand:

Let God but only show His face,
 And all His enemies apace
 Afar shall scattered be.
 And those who hate Him, everywhere
 Shall of His dreadful wrath be ware,
 And from His presence flee.
 As smoke before the driving blast,
 So God shall drive them, flying fast,
 And none can cause them stay:
 As wax before the burning fire,
 So shall they melt before His ire
 Allutterly away.

The melody of this Psalm, in which we find to-day the rumbling of the storm, the crash of the lightning and the far-away rolling of the thunder, has a truly curious history. It was composed, about 1525, for the pacific Hundred and Nineteenth Psalm, by the gifted chorister of the Cathedral of Strasburg, Thomas Greiter, who had become a Protestant. Calvin, on becoming acquainted with it, was charmed with it, and set to this melody his own Psalm 36, which he soon replaced by that of Marot. And it was only in 1562 that Theodore Beza took this melody away from

Psalm 36 and gave it to his translation of Psalm 68. From that moment the *Battle-Psalm* was in existence.

The Huguenot armies adopted it: they took it to the battles of Dreux, St. Denys, Jarnac, Moncontour, Ivry. Then all fell silent. The Revocation, that hearts might be broken, began by closing mouths, until the time came when, the extremity of sufferings being reached, down there in our ever glorious Cévennes, men, women, maidens, children raised themselves up, seized by a mysterious enthusiasm. They heard voices, they fell into ecstasy; they prophesied. And all of a sudden, the *Battle-Psalm* sounded out on the summits of the Aigoual. Then the bravest soldiers of the great King stopped, turned their backs, seized with a sudden terror. It became necessary to treat with the insurgents, and, to human view, the Camisards, saving Protestantism, saved also liberty of conscience!

Let God but only show His face!

* * *

Such, gentlemen, is the art the theory of which Calvin laid down, and such is the song of which Calvin was the inspirer and the propagator. This is what Calvin thought of music, and did for music.

But the time has now come when a final offensive movement of the legend pushes us to a final and general conclusion.

But, in the end, cries this legend, is it not incontestable that Calvin was the foe of art, since, in his *Institutes*, this declaration is found in so many words: "The songs and melodies which are composed to please the ear *only*, as are all the quaverings and trills of Papistry and all that they call broken-music and composition, and four-part songs, in no wise accord with the majesty of the Church and cannot be other than gravely displeasing to God."⁹ Have we not here, in the end, the *confitentem reum*?

By no means, gentlemen, and decidedly the legend has been unfortunate here. This famous text is found only in

⁹ *Opp. Calv.*, iv, p. 420.

the French translation of 1560, a translation which abounds in errors, contradictions, even nonsense, and which, naturally, Calvin did not review. This text is absent from the Latin edition of 1559, the only one which has authority. Calvin said: "The songs and melodies which are composed to please the ear only in no wise accord with the majesty of the Church, and cannot be other than gravely displeasing to God." The author of the translation *intercalated*: "as are all the quaverings and trills of Papistry and all that they call broken-music and composition and four-part songs." What importance has this intercalation?

Moreover, even were the text authentic, the legend would not be advanced, for it does not at all mean what it has been made to mean. Calvin would not be condemning here *ex professo* either harmony in general, or four-part singing in particular, but only a certain harmony, which he would carefully specify—"the four-part singing . . . of Papistry". Nothing more.

In reality, gentlemen, Calvin, after the example of the Lutherans, whose musical sense is not contested, and on the advice of Goudimel, to whom no one denies artistic genius,—Calvin simply desired that in the churches, the Calvinists should sing "*all* and well", as M. Douen himself recognizes.

In other terms: singing in unison (this is for the music) and singing in the common tongue (this is for the words),—such is the democratic singing which Calvin confined himself to requiring with more energy and vigor than all the other Reformers. He has given expression to it himself thus: "We should sing with the heart and the tongue¹⁰ . . . not with the tongue without the heart, . . . not in the Greek language among the Latins, nor in Latin among Frenchmen and Englishmen . . . but in the *common language of the country*, which all the assembly understands."¹¹ , , . Spiritual songs *cannot be well sung*

¹⁰ *Opp. Calv.*, iv, p. 419.

¹¹ *Opp. Calv.*, iv, pp. 420, 421.

except from the heart. Now, the heart requires the understanding. And in this . . . lies the difference between the singing of men and that of birds. For a linnet, or a nightingale, or a popinjay will sing well, but it will be without understanding. Now the proper gift of man is to sing, knowing what he sings. On the intelligence ought to follow the heart and the affection."¹²

And, gentlemen, by these great words, full of heart and of good sense (as full of heart as of good sense, and as full of good sense as of heart), our Reformer did nothing less than draft the programme of a real artistic revolution,—which, thanks to the providential conjunction of these two geniuses, so well suited to understand one another, Calvin and Bourgeois, has transformed the Catholic, aristocratic, hierarchic singing, behind the screen of the choir, into a Protestant, democratic, lay singing of the whole congregation.

Catholic singing was, in effect, without measure. It was not proper, it was said, for the devil to beat time in the sanctuary. Bourgeois composed his melodies in a two-time movement, lively and animated.

Catholic singing made monotony its law: there was no tone in the plain-song but only modes. Bourgeois introduced the two distinctive modes of popular, fluent music, and gave birth to modern tonality.

Catholic singing, finally, made no account of the words. It mingled the religious words, in Latin, of the priests with the jovial words, in French, of the people. Bourgeois restored to the melody its importance, its gravity,—the gravity of the words themselves.

And it is in the face of this revolution, inaugurating modern, democratic music, that it is said: "The work of Calvin, the intellectualist, was that of an aristocrat!"

I keep, gentlemen, to artistic, even to musical ground. I do not respond: Calvin did not aristocratise religion, because he democratised doctrine — henceforth the divine

¹² *Opp. Calv.*, vi, p. 171.

election chooses believers without distinction of class or knowledge, princes and tailors, doctors and wool-combers, and, making them superior alike to the civil and ecclesiastical hierarchy, opens to this glorious democracy the gates of eternal felicity: because he democratised theological method—henceforth the basis of religious knowledge and certitude is no more scholasticism with its erudition and its syllogisms, but the testimony of the Holy Spirit which makes the humble woman, the artisan (Calvin would say, “not merely a man of the middle class, but the most stupid and rude swine-herd”)¹⁸ capable of confounding the Sorbonne, its monks and its doctors: because he democratised the Church—hencefore, in no other, even Protestant, Church, will the principle of universal priesthood be pressed so far, abolishing every distinction of superiority, establishing the equality of the pastor and the people, bringing under the censure of the simplest members of the Consistory, the members of the Council of Geneva, the son of Jean d’Albret, even the Duchess of Ferrara. . . .

No, at this time I limit myself to responding: “You are wrong and the sufficient proof is that Calvin democratised religious singing, that is to say, the very voice of religion.”

Before this capital fact, stop, then, a moment and inform yourselves, *et nunc erudimini*, O you professed critics, O you great historians of our social revolutions: it will reveal to you the secret which appears to be as yet unknown to you.

This was the moment when Calvin’s friend, Hotman, published at Geneva his *Franco-Gallia*, that pamphlet which proclaimed the imprescriptible sovereignty of nations over themselves with such vigour that it would be necessary to come down to the *Contrat Social* to find in our literature a republican political work of greater influence. It was the moment when Calvin’s friend, John Knox, published at Geneva that treatise which he himself entitled *The First Blast of the Trumpet against the Monstrous Regiment of Women*, which made Bloody Mary tremble, and which

¹⁸ *Opp. Calv.*, v, p. 405: *Responsio ad Sadoleti Epistolam*.

Elizabeth never forgave. It was the moment when Calvin's friend, Goodman, published at Geneva his *How Superior Powers ought to be Obeyed by their Subjects and Wherein they may Lawfully be by God's Word Disobeyed and Resisted*, expounding the right of obedience and of revolt, in which he wrote: "Kings and governors are a part of the people." It was the moment when Calvin's friend, Duplessis Mornay, published at Geneva his *Legitimate power of the Prince towards the People, and of the People towards the Prince*, and closed by summing up the aspirations of all democracy, present and future, in these two words, thenceforth prophetic: Justice and Charity. "Justice demands that hands be laid on tyrants who outrage right; charity requires that hands be extended to the oppressed." It was the moment, finally, when Calvin's friend, disciple, successor, Theodore Beza, published at Geneva his *Rights of Magistrates towards their Subjects*, and concluded: "the people are not born for the magistrates, but, on the contrary, the magistrates for the people."

Now, certainly, this was a good deal! There were formulated the principles of modern democracy, that truly immortal charter, which, conceived in the study of the Rue des Chanoines, and sent out, like our Martyrology, from the presses of Geneva, made its way through Europe, crossed the ocean with the Plymouth Fathers, and returned to France in the giberne of Lafayette, disfigured, no doubt, mutilated, but still recognizable under the title of "Declaration of the Rights of Man", in 1789. It was a good deal: but it was not enough.

For what makes social revolutions is not merely the head of intellectualists; it is especially the heart of peoples.

My thoughts go back to Jericho. The Israelites were assembled, with all their men, with all their forces. They were powerless. The trumpet of faith, the trumpet of the Lord, sounded, and the walls of Jericho fell down.

Stronger than Jericho was in the sixteenth century the citadel of absolutist and sacerdotal aristocracy. Weaker

than the ancient Israel was the hand of that new Israel whom frightful massacres were decimating, and kings and princes were humbling on land and sea. But a sound more powerful than that of all the pamphlets, a sound mysterious and loud, rose from the very bottom of the people's heart and soul,—the Calvinistic Psalms! The King of France heard the Huguenots singing them. The King of Spain heard the Gueux singing them. The King of England heard the Puritans singing them. The Christian democracy, the true democracy, the only democracy which can not merely destroy but rebuild, the Calvinistic democracy, re-awoke all the echoes of the old world, with its notes of vengeance and of triumph. And then,—this was the part of music in the work of Calvin—then, what crumbled was not Jericho,—it was Rome.

Montauban.

ÉMILE DOUMERGUE.

CALVIN'S DOCTRINE OF THE TRINITY.

When Calvin turns, in his discussion of the doctrine of God, from the Divine Being in general to the Trinity (ch. xiii), he makes the transition most skillfully by a paragraph (§ 1) which doubtless has the design, as it certainly has the effect, of quickening in his readers a sense of the mystery of the divine mode of existence.¹ The Scriptures, he tells us, speak sparingly of the divine essence. Yet by two "epithets" which they apply to it, they effectually rebuke not only the follies of the vulgar but also the subtleties of the learned in their thought of God. These epithets are "immensity" and "spirituality"; and they alone suffice at once to check the crass and to curb the audacious imaginations of men. How dare we invade in our speculations concerning Him either the spirituality or the immensity of this infinite Spirit, conceiving Him like the Pantheists as an impersonal diffused force, or like the Manichaeans limiting His immensity or dividing His unity? Or how can we think of the infinite Spirit as altogether like ourselves? Do we not see that when the Scriptures speak of Him under human forms they are merely employing the artless art of nurses as they speak to children? All that we can either say or think concerning

¹ Something like Calvin's mode of transition here is repeated by Triglandius when he arrives at this topic in his *Antapologia* (c. v.). "That God is most simple in His essence", writes Triglandius, "eternal, infinite, and therefore of infinite knowledge and power, has been sufficiently demonstrated in the preceding chapter. Whence it is clear that He is one and unique. But Scripture sets before us here a great mystery, namely that in the one unique essence of God, there subsist three hypostases, the first of which is called the Father, the second the Son, the third, the Holy Spirit. An arduous mystery indeed, and one simply incomprehensible to the human intellect; one, therefore, not to be measured by human reason, nor to be investigated by reasons drawn from human wisdom, but to be accredited solely from the Word of God; by going forward as far as it leads us, and stopping where it stops. Whenever this rule is neglected the human reason wanders in a labyrinth and cannot discern either end or exit."

God descends equally below His real altitude. Calvin thus prepares us to expect depths in the Divine Being beyond our sounding, and then turns at once to speak of the divine tripersonality, which he represents as a mysterious characteristic of the divine mode of existence by which God is marked off from all else that is. "But"—this is the way he puts it (xiii. 2, *ad init.*)—"He points Himself out by another special note also, by which He may be more particularly defined: for He so predicates unity of Himself that He proposes Himself to be considered distinctively in three Persons; and unless we hold to these there is nothing but a bare and empty name of God, by no means (*sine*) the true God, floating in our brain."

That we may catch the full significance of this remarkable sentence we should attend to several of its elements. We must observe, for example, that it ranges the tripersonality of God alongside of His immensity and spirituality as another special "note" by which He is more exactly defined. The words are: "But He designates Himself also by *another* special note, by which He may be more particularly distinguished",—the *another* referring back to the "epithets" of immensity and spirituality.² The tripersonality of

²We must not fancy, however, that Calvin conceived the personal distinctions in the Godhead as mere "epithets", that is, that he conceived the Trinity Sabellianwise as merely three classes of attributes or modes of manifestation of God. He does not say that the tripersonality of God is another "epithet" but another "note" along with His immensity and spirituality,—that is to say, another characteristic fact defining God as differing from all other beings. He explicitly denies that the personal distinctions are analogous in kind to the qualities of the divine essence. He says: "Yet in that one essence of God we acknowledge the Father, with His eternal Word and Spirit. In using this distinction, however, we do not imagine three Gods, as if the Father were some other entity (*aliquid*) than the Son, nor yet do we understand them to be mere epithets (*nuda epitheta*) by which God is variously designated, according to His operations; but, in common with the ecclesiastical writers, we perceive in the simple unity of God these three hypostases, that is, subsistences, which, although they coexist in one essence, are not to be confused with one another. Accordingly, though the Father is one God with His Word and Spirit, the Father is not the Word, nor the Word the Spirit."—*Adversus P. Caroli Calumnias, Opp.* VIII, p. 312.

God is conceived by Calvin, therefore, not as something added to the complete idea of God, or as something into which God develops in the process of His existing, but as something which enters into the very idea of God, without which He cannot be conceived in the truth of His being. This is rendered clearer and more emphatic by an additional statement which he adjoins,—surely for no other purpose than to strengthen this implication,—to the effect that “if we do not hold to these three Persons in the divine unity, we have nothing but a naked and empty name of God, by no means the true God, floating in our brain”. According to Calvin, then, it would seem, there can be no such thing as a monadistic God; the idea of multiformity enters into the very notion of God.⁸ The alternative is to suppose that he is speaking here purely *a posteriori* and with his mind absorbed in the simple fact that the only true God is actually

And again, in refuting the Sabellians he expressly draws the distinction: “The Sabellians do indeed raise the cavil that God is called now Father, now Son, now Spirit in no other sense than He is spoken of as both strong and good, and wise and merciful; but they are easily refuted by this,—that it is clear that these latter are epithets which manifest what God is *erga nos*, while the others are names which declare what God really is *apud semetipsum*.”—*Institutes*, edd. 2, and other middle edd., *Opp.* I, p. 491.

⁸ The idea of “multiformity”, not of “multiplicity”—which would imply *composition*. Hence Calvin, I. xiii. 6 *ad fin.*, declares that it is impious to represent the essence of God as “multiplex”; and at the beginning of that section he warns against vainly dreaming of “a triplex God”, and defines that as meaning the division of the simple essence of God among three Persons. The same warning had been given by Augustine, *De Trinitate*, VI. vii. 9: “Neither, because He is a Trinity, is He to be therefore thought to be triplex; otherwise the Father alone, or the Son alone, would be less than the Father and Son together,—although it is hard to see how we can say, either the Father alone, or the Son alone, since both the Father is with the Son and the Son with the Father always inseparably.” That is to say, God is not a compound of three deities, but a single deity which is essentially trinal. This mode of statement became traditional. Thus John Gerhard says: “That is triune which, one in essence, has three modes of subsistence; that is triplex which is compounded of three. We say God is triune; but we are forbidden by the Christian religion to say He is triplex.” So Hollaz: “We may speak of the trinal, but not of the triple deity” (Hase's *Hutterus* etc., p. 172). So Keckermann, *Syst.*, 71.

a Trinity, so that he means only to say that since the only God that is, is a point of fact, a Trinity, when we think of a divine monad we are in a mere matter of fact, thinking of a God which has no existence—which is a mere naked and empty name and not the true God at all. The simplicity of Calvin's speech favors this supposition; and the stress he has laid in the preceding discussion upon the necessity of concerning God only as He reveals Himself, in pain of the liability of inventing unreal gods for ourselves, adds weight to it. But it scarcely seems to satisfy the whole emphasis of the statement. The vigor of the assertion appears rather to invite us to understand that in Calvin's view a divine monad would be less conceivable than a divine Trinity, and certainly suggests to us that to him the conception of the Trinity gave vitality to the idea of God.⁴

This suggestion acquires importance from the circumstance that the Reformers in general and Calvin in particular have been sometimes represented as feeling little or no interest in such doctrines as that of the Trinity. Such doctrines, we are told, they merely took over by tradition from the old Church, if indeed they did not by the transference of their interest to a principle of doctrinal chrySTALLIZATION to which such doctrines were matters of more or less indifference, positively prepare for their ultimate discarding. Ferdinand Christian Baur, for example, points out that the distinctive mark of the Reformation, in contrast with Scholasticism with its prevailing dialectic or intellectualistic tendency, was that it was a deeply religious movement, in which the heart came to its rights and everything was there-

⁴ So in his *Instruction or Catechism* of 1537 and 1538 (*Opp.* xxii, p. 52) Calvin says: "The Scriptures, and pious experience itself, show us in the absolutely simple essence of God, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit; so that our intelligence is not able to conceive the Father without at the same time comprehending the Son in whom His living image is repeated, and the Spirit in whom His power and virtue are manifested." Cf. the Commentary on Gen. i. 26: "I acknowledge that there is something in man which refers to the Father and the Son and the Spirit": the exact meaning of which, however, is not apparent (see below, note 55, p. 590).

fore viewed from the standpoint of the great doctrines of sin and grace.⁵ He then seeks to apply this observation as follows: "The more decisively Protestantism set the central point of its dogmatic consciousness in this portion of the system, the more natural was the consequence that even such doctrines as that of the Trinity were no longer able to maintain the preponderating significance which they possessed in the old system; and although men were not at once clearly conscious of the altered relation—as, in point of fact, they were not and could not be—it is nevertheless the fact that the doctrines which belong to this category attracted the interest of the Reformers only in a subordinate degree; and, without giving themselves an exact account of why it was so, men merely retained with reference to them the traditional modes of teaching,—abiding by these all the more willingly that they could not conceal from themselves the greatness of the difference which existed between them and their opponents in so many essential points."⁶ They no doubt set themselves in opposition to the more radical spirits of their time who, taking their starting point from the same general principles, were led by their peculiarities of individuality and relations, of standpoint and tendency, to discard the doctrine of the Trinity altogether. But they could not stem the natural drift of things. "How could the Protestant principle work so thoroughgoing an alteration in one part of the system, and leave the rest of it unaffected?"⁷ And what was to be expected except that the polemic attitude with reference to the ecclesiastical doctrine of the Trinity, which was at first confined to small parties outside the limits of recognized Protestantism, should ultimately become a part of Protestantism itself?⁸

In accordance with this schematization, Baur represents Melancthon as, in the first freshness of his Reformation-

⁵ *Die christliche Lehre von der Dreieinigkeit*, III., 1846, pp. 6-7.

⁶ Pp. 9-10.

⁷ P. 10.

⁸ Pp. 10-11.

consciousness, passing over in his *Loci* such doctrines as that of the Trinity altogether as incomprehensible mysteries of God which call rather for adoration than scrutiny;⁹ and, though he returned to them subsequently, doing so with a difference, a difference which emphasized their subordinate and indeed largely formal place in his system of thought.¹⁰ While as regards Calvin, he sees in him the beginnings of a radical transformation of the doctrine of the Trinity. Calvin does, indeed, like Melancthon, present the doctrine as the teaching of Scripture, and attaches himself to the ecclesiastical definitions of it as merely a republication of the Scriptural doctrine in clearer words. "We perceive, however, that he does not know how to bring the doctrine itself out of its transcendental remoteness into closer relations with his religious and dogmatic consciousness. Instead, therefore, of speculatively developing the Trinitarian relation as the objective content of the idea of God, out of itself, he rather repels the whole conception as a superfluity which leads to empty speculation (*Inst.*, I. xiii. 19), or else where he enters most precisely into it, inclines to a mode of apprehending it in which the ecclesiastical *homousia* is transmuted into a rational relation of subordination."¹¹ "The intention was to retain the old orthodox doctrine unchanged; but it was internally, in the new consciousness of the times, already undermined, since there was no longer felt for it the same religious and dogmatic interest, as may be seen from the whole manner in which it is dealt with in these oldest Protestant theologians. Men could no longer find their way in the old, abstract form of the dogma. A new motive impulse must first proceed from the central point of the Protestant consciousness. The first beginnings of a transformation of the dogma are already discoverable in Calvin, when he locates the chief element of the doctrine of the Trinity in the practical consciousness of the operations in

⁹ P. 23.

¹⁰ Pp. 24 sq.

¹¹ Pp. 42-43.

which the Son and Spirit make themselves known as the peculiar principles of the divine life (I. xiii. 13, 14), and finds the assurance of the election in which the finite subject has the consciousness of his unity with God solely in the relation in which the individual stands to Christ."¹² That is to say, if we understand Baur aright, the new construction of the Trinity already foreshadowed in Calvin was to revolve around Christ; but around Christ as God-man conceived as the mediating principle between God and man, the unity of the finite and infinite, bearing to us the assurance that what God is in Himself that also He must be for the finite consciousness—in which mode of statement we see, however, a great deal more of Baur's Hegelianism than of Calvin's Protestantism.

So far as this representation implies that Calvin's interest in the doctrine of the Trinity was remote and purely traditional, it is already contradicted, as we have seen, by the first five lines of his discussion of the subject (I. xiii. 2, *ad init.*),—if, that is, as we have seen some reason to believe, he really declares there that vitality is given to the idea of God only by the Trinitarian conception of Him. It is indeed contradicted by itself. For the real meaning of the constitutive place given in Calvin's thought of the Trinity to "the practical consciousness of the operations in which the Son and Spirit make themselves known as the peculiar principles of the divine life", is that the doctrine of the Trinity did not for him stand out of relation to his religious consciousness but was a postulate of his profoundest religious emotions; was given, indeed, in his experience of salvation itself.¹³ For him, thus, certainly in no less measure than it had been from the beginning of Christianity, the nerve of the doctrine was its implication in the experience of salvation, in the Christian's certainty that the Redeeming Christ and Sanctifying Spirit are each Divine Per-

¹² Pp. 44-45.

¹³ In the *Catechism* of 1537, 1538 (*Opp.* xxii, p. 52) he says: "Scripture and *pious experience itself* show us in the absolutely simple essence of God, the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit."

sons. Nor did he differ in this from the other Reformers. The Reformation movement was, of course, at bottom a great revival of religion. But this does not mean that its revolt from Scholasticism was from the doctrines "of God, of His unity and His trinity, of the mystery of creation, of the mode of the incarnation"¹⁴ themselves, but from the formalism and intellectualism of the treatment of these doctrines at the hands of the Scholastic theologians. When Melanchthon demands whether, when Paul set down a compendium of Christian doctrine in his Epistle to the Romans, he gave himself over to philosophical disquisitions (*philosophabatur*) "on the mysteries of the Trinity, on the mode of the incarnation, on active and passive creation", and the like, we must not neglect the emphasis on the term "*philosophical disquisitions*".¹⁵ Melanchthon was as far as possible from wishing to throw doubt upon either the truth or the importance of the doctrines of the Trinity, the incarnation, crea-

¹⁴ This is Melanchthon's enumeration of the doctrines which he will not enter into largely in his *Loci*. Cf. Augusti's ed. of 1821, p. 8, as quoted by Baur, p. 20: Proinde non est, cur multum operae ponamus in locis supremis de Deo, de unitate, de trinitate Dei, de mysterio creationis, de modo incarnationis. How little Melanchthon was intending to manifest indifference to these doctrine is already apparent from the word *supremis* here. Baur's comment is: "It is precisely with these doctrines which the dialectic spirit of speculation of the Scholastics regarded as its peculiar object, and on which it expended itself with the greatest subtlety and thoroughness,—with the doctrines of God, of His unity and trinity, of creation, incarnation, etc,—that Melanchthon would have so little to do, that he did not even make a place for them in his *Loci*, and that not on the ground that it did not belong to the plan of that first sketch of Protestant dogmatics to cover the whole system, but on the ground of the objective character of those doctrines, as they appeared to him from the standpoint determined by the Reformation" (p. 20). Even so, however, there is not involved any real underestimate of the importance of these doctrines, but only a reference of them to a place in the system less immediately related to the experience of salvation. Nor must we forget the origin of the *Loci* in an exposition of the Epistle to the Romans and its consequent lack of all systematic form, or completeness.

¹⁵ *Loci*, as above, p. 9, quoted by Baur, p. 21. The point of Melanchthon's remark is that Paul did not give himself over to philosophical disquisition on abstruse topics, but devoted himself singleheartedly to applying the salvation of Christ to sinning souls.

tion. He only wished to recall men from useless speculations upon the mysterious features of these doctrines and to focus their attention no doubt on the great central doctrines of sin and grace, but also on the vital relations of such doctrines as the Trinity, the Incarnation and Creation to human needs and the divine provision for meeting them. The demand of the Reformers, in a word, was not that men should turn away from these doctrines, but that they should accord their deepest interest to those elements and aspects of them which minister to edification rather than to curious questions that furnish exercise only to intellectual subtlety. Any apparent neglect of these doctrines which may seem to be traceable in the earliest writings of the Reformers was, moreover, due not merely to their absorption in the proclamation of the doctrine of grace, but also to the broad fact that these doctrines were not in dispute in their great controversy with Rome, and therefore did not require insisting upon in the stress of their primary conflict. So soon as they were brought into dispute by the radicals of the age, we find the Reformers reverting to them and reasserting them with vigor: and that is the real account to be given of the increased attention given to them in the later writings of the Reformers, which seems to those historians who have misinterpreted the relatively small amount of discussion devoted to them in the earlier years of the movement, symptomatic of a lapse from the purity of their first love and of a reëntanglement in the Scholastic intellectualism from which the Reformation, as a religious movement, was a revolt. In point of fact, it marks only the abiding faith of the Reformers in doctrines essential to the Christian system, but not hitherto largely asserted and defended by them because, shortly, there was not hitherto occasion for extended assertion and defense of them.

In no one is the general attitude of the Reformers to the doctrine of the Trinity more clearly illustrated than in Calvin. The historian of Protestant Dogmatics, Wilhelm Gass, tells us that "Calvin's exposition of the Trinity is

certainly the best and most circumspect which the writings of the Reformers give us: surveying as it does the whole compass of the dogma and without any loss to the thing itself wisely avoiding all stickling for words".¹⁶ That this judgment is quoted by subsequent expounders of Calvin's doctrine of the Trinity,¹⁷ surprises us only in so far as so obvious a fact seems not to need the authority of Gass to support it. Apart, however, from the superiority of Calvin's theological insight, by which his treatment of the doctrine of the Trinity is made not only "the best and most circumspect which the writings of the Reformers have given us", but even one of the epoch-making discussions of this great theme, Calvin's whole dealing with the doctrine of the Trinity supplies an exceptionally perfect reflection of the attitude of the Reformers at large to it. At one with them in his general point of view, the circumstances of his life forced him into a fullness and emphasis in the exposition of this doctrine to which they were not compelled. The more comprehensive character of the work, even in its earliest form, coöperated with the comparative lateness of the time of its publication¹⁸ and his higher systematic genius, to secure the incorporation into even the first edition of Calvin's *Institutes* (1536) not only of a Biblical proof of the doctrine of the Trinity, argued with exceptional originality and force, but also of a strongly worded assertion and defense of the correctness and indispensableness of the current ecclesiastical formulation of it. No more than the earlier Reformers, however, was Calvin inclined to confound the essence of the doctrine with a particular mode of stating it; nor was he willing to confuse the minds of infantile Christians with the subtleties of its logical exposition. The main thing was, he insisted, that men should heartily believe that there is but one God, whom only they should serve; but also

¹⁶ *Geschichte d. prot. Dogmatik*, I., 1884, p. 105.

¹⁷ Köstlin, *Theologische Studien und Kritiken*, 1868, p. 420; Muller, *De Godsleer van Zwingli en Calvijn*, p. 31.

¹⁸ For example, Servetus' *De Trinitatis erroribus* appeared in 1531, and his *Dialogi de Trinitate* in 1532.

that Jesus Christ our Redeemer and the Holy Spirit our Sanctifier is each no less this one God than God the Father to whom we owe our being; while yet these three are distinct personal objects of our love and adoration.¹⁹ He was wholly agreed with his colleagues at Geneva in holding that "in the beginning of the preaching of the Gospel", it conduced more to edification and readiness of comprehension to refrain from the explanation of the mysteries of the Trinity, and even from the constant employment of those technical terms in which these mysteries are best expressed, and to be content with declaring clearly the divinity of Christ in all its fulness, and with giving some simple exposition of the true distinction between the Father, Son and Holy Spirit.²⁰ He acted on this principle in drawing up the formularies of faith with which he provided the Church at Geneva immediately after his settlement there, and he vigorously defended this procedure when it was called in question by that "theological quack", as he has been not unjustly called,²¹ Peter Caroli. This, of course, does not mean that he was under any illusions as to the indispensableness to the Christian faith of a clear as well as a firm belief in the

¹⁹ *Institutes*, I. xiii. 5 *init.*: "I could wish that they [the technical terms by which the Trinity is expressed and guarded] were buried, indeed, if only this faith stood fast among all: that the Father and the Son and the Spirit are one God; and yet neither is the Son the Father, nor the Spirit the Son, but they are distinct by a certain property."

²⁰ Cf. their defense of themselves, *Opp.* xi, p. 6.

²¹ Philip Schaff, *History of the Christian Church*, VII, p. 332: "Calvin was in his early ministry charged with Arianism by a theological quack (Caroli), because he objected to the damnatory clauses of the pseudo-Athanasian Creed, and expressed once an unfavorable opinion on the Nicene Creed. But his difficulty was only with the scholastic and metaphysical terminology, not with the doctrine itself." It would not, however, be easy to crowd more erroneous suggestions into so few words than Dr. Schaff manages to do here. Calvin did not object to the damnatory clauses in the Athanasian Creed: he did not express an unfavorable opinion on the Nicene Creed: he did not have difficulty with the scholastic or metaphysical terminology of the doctrine of the Trinity. Nor is the passage in which he speaks of a certain passage in the Nicene Creed as more suitable for a song than a creed to be found in the tract, *De Vera Ecclesiae Reformatione*, as Dr. Schaff adds in a note.

doctrine of the Trinity, or as to the value for the protection of that doctrine of the technical terms which had been wrought out for its more exact expression and defense in the controversies of the past. He was already committed to an opposite opinion by his strong assertions in the first edition of his *Institutes* (1536), which he retained unaltered through all the subsequent editions; and the controversies in which he was contemporaneously embroiled—with Anabaptists, Antitrinitarians, “theological quacks”—were well calculated to fix in his mind a very profound sense of the importance of stating this doctrine exactly and defending it with vigor. He was only asserting, as strongly as he knew how, the right of a Christian teacher, holding the truth, to avoid strife about words and to use his best endeavors to “handle aright the word of truth”. He never for one moment doubted, we do not say the truth merely, but also the importance for the Christian system, of the doctrine of the Trinity. He held this doctrine with a purity and high austerity of apprehension singular among its most devoted adherents. As we have seen, he conceived it not only as the essential foundation of the whole doctrine of redemption, but as indispensable even to a vital and vitalizing conception of the Being of God itself. He did not question even the importance of the technical phraseology which had been invented for the expression and defense of this doctrine, in order to protect it from fatal misrepresentation. He freely confessed that by this phraseology alone could the subtleties of heresy aiming at its disintegration be adequately met. But he asserted and tenaciously maintained the liberty of the Christian teacher, holding this doctrine in its integrity, to use it in his wisdom as he saw was most profitable for the instruction of his flock—not with a view to withdrawing it in its entirety or in part from their contemplation or to minimizing its importance in their sight or to corrupting their apprehension of it, but with a view to making it a vital element in their faith; first perhaps more or less implicitly—as implied in the very core of their creed—and then more or

less explicitly, as they were able to apprehend it; but never as a mere set of more or less uncomprehended traditional phrases. To him it was a great and inspiring reality: and as such he taught it to the babes of the flock in its most essential and vital elements, and defended it against gain-sayers in its most complete and strict formulation.

The illusion into which it is perhaps possible to fall in the case of the earlier Reformers, by which this double treatment of the doctrine of the Trinity is supposed to represent consecutive states of mind, is impossible in the case of Calvin. Circumstances compelled him to deal with the doctrine after both fashions contemporaneously. None can say of him, as Baur says of Melancthon—in our belief wrongly interpreting the phenomena—that he first passed by the doctrine of the Trinity unconcernedly and afterwards reverted to the Scholastic statement of it. At the very moment that Calvin was insisting on teaching the doctrine vitally rather than scholastically, he was equally insisting that it must be held in its entirety as it had been brought into exact expression by the ecclesiastical writers.

Calvin began his work at Geneva on the fifth day of September, 1536, and among the other fundamental tasks with which he engaged himself during the winter of 1536 and 1537 was the drawing up of his first catechism, the "*Instruction used in the church at Geneva*", as it is called in its French form, which was published in 1537, or the *Catechismus sive Christianae Religionis Institutio*, as it is called in the Latin form, which was published early (March) in 1538. Along with this Catechism, there had been prepared in both languages also a briefer *Confession of Faith*, written, possibly, not by Calvin himself, but by his colleagues in the Genevan ministry, or, to be more specific, by Farel,²² but certainly in essence Calvin's, and related to the *Catechism* very much as the *Catechism* was related to the *Insti-*

²² So the Strasburg editors and also A. Lang (*Die Heidelberger Katechismus*, 1907, p. xxxv-vi, *Johannes Calvin*, 1909, pp. 38 and 208). Doumergue (*Jean Calvin*, II, pp. 236-257) agrees with Rilliet (*Le Cat. Calv. publié en 1537*, 1878, pp. lii-lvii) in assigning it to Calvin himself.

tutes of 1536; that is to say, it is a free condensation of the *Catechism*. In this *Confession of Faith*, although it was the fundamental documentation of the faith of the Genevan Church to which all citizens were required to subscribe, there is no formal exposition of the doctrine of the Trinity at all: the unity of God alone is asserted (§ 2), and it is left to the mere recitation of the Apostles' Creed, which is incorporated into it (§ 6), supported only by a rare (§ 15) reference to Jesus as God's Son, to suggest the Trinity. Even in the *Catechism*²⁸ the statement of the doctrine, although explicit and precise, and supported by equally explicit assertions of the uniqueness of our Lord's Sonship ("He is called Son of God, not like believers, by adoption and grace, but true and natural and therefore sole and unique, so as to be distinguished from the others", p. 53, *cf.* pp. 45-46, 53, 60, 62), and of His true divinity ("His divinity, which He had from all eternity with the Father", p. 53), is far from elaborate. It is confined indeed very much to the assertion of the fact of the Trinity—although even here it is suggested that it enters by necessity into our conception of God; and even this assertion is made apparently only because it seemed to be needed for the understanding of the Apostles' Creed. In the general remarks on this Creed, before the exposition of its several clauses is taken up (p. 52), we read as follows: "But in order that this our confession of faith in the Father, Son and Holy Spirit may trouble no one, it is necessary first of all to say a little about it. When we name the Father, Son and Holy Spirit we by no means imagine three Gods; but the Scriptures and pious experience itself show us in the absolutely simple (*tres-simple*) essence of God, the Father, His Son and His Spirit.

²⁸ *Opp.* XXII, pp. 33 *sq.* The Latin edition of this *Catechism* (*Opp.* V, pp. 318 *sq.*) was not printed until 1538, but it must have been prepared contemporaneously with the French, since it was quoted by Calvin in the debate with Caroli as early as February, 1537 (see Bähler, *Petrus Caroli und Johannes Calvin*, in the *Jahrbuch für schweizerische Geschichte*, xxix, p. 64, note).

So that our intelligence is not able to conceive the Father without at the same time comprehending the Son in whom His living image is repeated, and the Spirit, in whom His power and virtue are manifested. Accordingly, we adhere with the whole thought of our heart to one sole God; but we contemplate nevertheless the Father with the Son and His Spirit." There is certainly here a clear and firm assertion of the fact of the Trinity; we may even admire the force with which, in so few words, the substance of the doctrine is proclaimed, and it is also suggested that it has its roots planted not only in Scripture but in Christian experience, and indeed is involved in a vital conception of God. Calvin assuredly was justified in pointing to it, when the calumnies raised by Caroli were spread abroad and men were acquiring a suspicion that his "opinion concerning the personal distinctions in the one God dissented somewhat (*non nihil*) from the orthodox consent of the Church", as a proof that he had from the first taught the Church at Geneva "a trinity of persons in the one essence of God".²⁴ But it is perhaps not strange that this should seem to some very little to say on the fundamental doctrine of the Trinity in a statement of fundamental doctrines which extends to some forty-two pages in length.²⁵ In its brevity it may perhaps illustrate almost as strikingly as the entire omission of all statement of the doctrine from the accompanying *Confession* (except as implied in the repetition of the Apostles' Creed) the feeling of Calvin and his colleagues that the elaboration of this doctrine belongs rather to the later stages of Christian instruction, while for babes in Christ it were better to leave it implicit in their general religious standpoint (seeing that it is implicated in the experience of piety itself) than to clog the unformed Christian mind with

²⁴ Preface to the Latin Translation, which was issued, in fact, precisely to meet these calumnies, which had obtained an incredible vogue. (*Opp.* V, p. 318).

²⁵ We may compare, however, the brevity with which the doctrine of the Trinity is dealt with in the Westminster Confession and Shorter Catechism.

subtle disputations about it. Meanwhile, at the very moment when Calvin and his colleagues were preparing these primary statements of faith, in which no or so small a space was given to the doctrine of the Trinity, they were also vigorously engaged in confuting and excluding from the Genevan Church impugners of that doctrine. For from the very beginning of his work at Geneva Calvin was brought into conflict with that anti-trinitarian radicalism the confutation of which was to draw so heavily upon his strength in the future. There were already in the early spring of 1537 Anabaptists to confute and banish, among whom was that John Stordeur whose widow was afterwards to become Calvin's wife.²⁶ And there was to deal with just before their appearance that poor half-crazy fanatic Claude Aliodi—once Farel's colleague at Neuchatel,—who had as early as 1534 been denying the preëxistence of Christ, and was in the spring of 1537 at Geneva, teaching his anti-trinitarian heresies.²⁷

Calvin's exact attitude on the doctrine of the Trinity and its teaching was, moreover, just at this time forced into great publicity by the assaults made upon the Genevan pastors by one of the most frivolous characters brought to the surface by the upheaval of the Reformation.²⁸ It was

²⁶ So Colladon tells us, *Opp. Calvini* xxi, p. 59; the registers of the Council of Geneva read the name, "Johan Tordeur". See N. Weiss, *Bulletin de la Société de l'Histoire du Protestantisme Français*, lvi. (1907), pp. 228-229.

²⁷ Cf. Doumergue, *Jean Calvin*, II, pp. 241-2. Herminjard, *Correspondance*, etc., ed. 2, III, *Index*. Cf. also the clear brief account of E. Bähler, *Petrus Caroli und Johannes Calvin* (in the *Jahrbuch für schweizerische Geschichte*, xxix [1904]), pp. 73 sq.

²⁸ The Strasburg editors (*Calvini Opera*, vii, p. xxx) characterize Caroli as "vir vana ambitione agitatus, opinionibus inconstans, moribus levis". Doumergue's judgment upon him is embodied in these words: "Unhappily his character was not as high as his intelligence, and if the new ideas attracted him they did not transform him" (II, p. 252). He quotes Douen's characterization of him as "a bold and adventurous spirit badly balanced, and more distinguished by talents than by rectitude of conduct" (p. 253, note 2). Kampschulte (*Johann Calvin*, I. 162) contents himself with calling him "a man of restless spirit and changeable principles"—who (p. 295) was not above playing on

precisely at this time (January, 1537) that Peter Caroli, who was at the moment giving himself the airs of a bishop as "first pastor" at Lausanne, conceived the idea of avenging himself upon the pastors of Geneva for what he thought personal injuries by bringing against them the charge of virtual Arianism. That the charge received an attention which it did not deserve was, no doubt, due in part to an old suspicion which had been aroused against Farel by the calumnies of Claude Aliodi.²⁹ These were founded on the circumstance that in his *Sommaire* (1524-5), Farel—with a purely paedagogical intent, as he explained in a preface prefixed to the edition of 1537-8, because he believed the doctrine of the Trinity too difficult a topic for babes in faith—had passed over the doctrine of the Trinity, just as the Genevan pastors did again in their *Confession* of 1537.³⁰

occasion a dishonorable part. A. Lang's (*Johannes Calvin*, 1909, p. 40) characterization runs: "Acute but also weak in character and self-seeking." The inevitable rehabilitation of Caroli has been undertaken by Eduard Bähler, Pastor at Thierachern in Switzerland, in a long article entitled *Petrus Caroli und Johannes Calvin: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte und Kultur der Reformationszeit*, published in the twenty-ninth volume of the *Jahrbuch für schweizerische Geschichte* (1904, pp. 39-168). Bähler's thesis is that Caroli belonged really to that large semi-Protestant party in the French Church which found its inspiration in Faber Stapulensis and its spiritual head in William Briçonnet, Bishop of Meaux; occupying thus a middle ground he could rest content neither in the Roman nor in the Protestant camp,—and from this ambiguous position is to be explained all his vacillations and treacheries. Granting the general contention and its explanatory value up to a certain point, it supplies no defense of Caroli's character and conduct, which Bähler's rehabilitation leaves where it found them. Cf. A. Lang's estimate of Bähler's lack of success: "There remains clinging to Caroli enough of wretched frivolity and of the most deplorable inconstancy. How great over against him stands out particularly Farel!" (*Johannes Calvin*, 1909, p. 209). On Caroli the historians of the Protestant movement in Metz should be consulted, *e. g.*, Dietsch, *Die evang. Kirche von Metz*, pp. 68-77, and Winkelmann, *Der Anteil der deutschen Protestanten an den kirchlichen Reformbewegungen in Metz bis 1543*, in the *Jahrbuch der Gesellschaft für lothringische Geschichte und Altertumskunde*, ix, 1897, pp. 229 sq.

²⁹ Cf. Doumergue, *Jean Calvin*, II. 258, note; and Bähler, *Petrus Caroli und Johannes Calvin*, p. 73.

³⁰ Cf. Bähler, as cited, p. 71.

It is difficult for us, in any event, however, at this late date, to understand the hearing which a man like Caroli obtained for his calumnies. The whole Protestant world was filled with suspicions of the orthodoxy of the Genevan pastors. It was whispered from one to another—at Bern, Basle, Zurich, Strasburg, Wittenberg—that they were strangely chary of using the terms ‘Trinity’, ‘Person’,—that they were even “heady” in their refusal to employ them in their popular formularies. It was widely reported that they were beginning to fall into Arianism, or rather into that worst of all errors (*pessimus error*) which Servetus the Spaniard was spreading abroad. Not only was a local crisis thus created, which entailed personal controversies and synods and decisions, but a widely-spread atmosphere of distrust was produced, which demanded the most careful and prompt attention. All the spring and summer Calvin was occupied in writing letters hither and thither, correcting the harmful rumors which had, as he said, been set going by “a mere nobody” (*homo nihili*), urged on by “futile vanity”.³¹ And after the conferences and synods and letters, there came at length treatises. The result is that all excuse is taken away for any misapprehension of Calvin’s precise position.

Throughout the whole controversy—in which Calvin was ever the chief spokesman, coming forward loyally to the defense of his colleagues, who, rather than he, were primarily struck at—two currents run, as they run through all his writings on the Trinity, and not least through his chapter (I. xiii) on that subject in the *Institutes*. There is everywhere manifested not only a clear and firm grasp of the doctrine, but also a very deep insight into it, accompanied by a determination to assert it at its height. Along with this there is also manifest an equally constant and firm determination to preserve full liberty to deal with the doctrine free from all dictation from without or even prescription of traditional modes of statement. There is nothing inconsistent in these two positions. Rather are they out-

³¹ Doumergue, II. 266-268.

growths of the same fundamental conviction: but the obverse and reverse of the same mental attitude. At the root of all lies Calvin's profound persuasion that this is a subject too high for human speculation and his consequent fixed resolve to eschew all theoretical constructions upon it, and to confine himself strictly to the revelations of Scripture. On the one hand, therefore, because he appealed to Scripture only, he refused to be coerced in his expression of the doctrine by present authority or even the formularies of the past: on the other, because he trusted Scripture wholly, he was insistent in giving full validity to all that he found there. It was the purity of his Protestantism, in other words, which governed Calvin's dealing with this doctrine; giving it an independence which is not yet always understood and has afforded occasion once and again for comment upon his attitude which betrays a somewhat surprising inability to enter into his mind.³²

³² An old instance is supplied by Bellarmine, who, on Caroli's testimony, seeks to intimate that Calvin's refusal at the Council of Lausanne to sign the Creeds resembled the conduct of the Arians at the Council of Aquileia (*Controversarium de Christo*, II. 19, near middle, in *Opp. Omnia*. Paris, 1870, I, p. 335). "Calvin", he says, "is not unlike the Arians in this: for at the Council of Aquileia, St. Ambrose never could extort from the two Arian heretics that they should say that the Son is very God of very God; for they always responded that the Son is the very Only-begotten, Son of the very God, and the like, but never that He is very God of very God, although they were asked perhaps a hundred times. And that from Calvin at the Council of Lausanne, it could never be extorted that he should confess that the Son is God of God, Petrus Caroli, who was present, reports in his letter to the Cardinal of Lorraine." Bellarmine is blind to the fact that Calvin was ready to confess all that the Creeds contained to the exaltation of the Son and *more*, while the Arians would not confess so much. Even F. W. Kampschulte (*Johannes Calvin*, u. s. w., ii. 171) permits himself to say that Calvin "in the controversy with Caroli expresses himself on the Athanasian symbol in a very dubious way (*in sehr bedenklichem Masse*)", and adds in a note: "It was not groundlessly that he was upbraided with this by his later opponents. 'Calvin waxes angry and employs the same taunts as the anti-trinitarians against the Symbol of Athanasius and the Council of Nice, when his opinion touching the Trinity is brought under discussion.' Cf. F. Claude de Saintes, *Declaration d'aucuns atheismes de la doctrine de Calvin*, Paris, 1568, p. 108." Cf. on Kampschulte, Doumergue, *Jean Calvin*,

For the matter, which has been thus vexed, was perfectly simple. Calvin refused to subscribe the ancient creeds at Caroli's dictation, not in the least because he did not find himself in accord with their teaching, but solely because he was determined to preserve for himself and his colleagues the liberties belonging to Christian men, subject in matters of faith to no other authority than that of God speaking in the Scriptures. He tells us himself that it was never his purpose to reject these creeds or to detract from their credit;³³ and he points out that he was not misunderstood even by Caroli to be repudiating their teaching; but Caroli conceded that what he did was — in Caroli's bad Latin, or as Calvin facetiously calls it, "his Sorbonnic elegance" — "neither to credit nor to discredit them".³⁴ He considered it intolerable that the Christian teacher's faith should be subjected to the authority of any traditional modes of statement, however venerable, or however true; and he refused to be the instrument of creating a precedent for such tyranny in the Reformed churches by seeming to allow that a

ii, p. 266. We have already had occasion to point out the uncomprehending way in which Dr. Schaff speaks of the matter (above, p. 563, note 21), in which, however, he is only the type of a great crowd of writers.

³³ *Adv. P. Caroli Calumnias, Opp.* vii, p. 315: Calvinus quidem et aliis propositum nequaquam erat symbola objicere aut illis derogare fidem. Compare what he writes on Oct. 8, 1539, to Farel of the discussion at Strasburg: Quamquam id quoque diluere promptum erat, nos non respuisse, multo minus improbasse, sed ideo tantum detrectasse subscriptionem, ne ille, quod captaverat, de ministerio nostro triumpharet (Herminjard, VI, p. 53).

³⁴ Do.: ego neque credo neque discredo. So Calvin tells Farel that Caroli had reported at Strasburg not that Calvin and his colleagues had denied the teaching of the three Symbols, but: nos vero non tantum detrectasse [subscriptionem], sed vexasse multis cachinnis symbola illa quae perpetua bonorum consentione auctoritatem firmam in Ecclesia semper habuerunt (Herminjard, VI, p. 52). And what when writing to the Pope Caroli charges the Protestant preachers with doing is "ridiculing, satirizing, defaming" the symbols and denying not their truth but their authority: eoque devenisse ut concilii Niceni et divi Athanasii symbola majori ex parte riderent, proscinderent, proculcarent, et ab ecclesia legitima umquam fuisse recepta negarent (Heminjard, IV, p. 249). Compare below, note 36, p. 573.

teacher might be justly treated as a heretic until he cleared himself by subscribing ancient symbols thrust before him by this or that disturber of the peace. There were his writings, and there was his public teaching, and he was ready to declare plainly what he believed: let him be judged by these expressions of his faith in accordance with the Word of God alone as the standard of truth. Accordingly, when he first confronted Caroli in behalf of the Genevan ministers, he read the passage on the Trinity from the new *Catechism* as the suitable expression of their belief. And when Caroli cried out, "Away with these new Confessions; and let us sign the three ancient Creeds", Calvin, not without some show of pride, refused, on the ground that he accorded authority in divine things to the Word of God alone.³⁵ "We have professed faith in God alone", he said, "not in Athanasius, whose Creed has not been approved by any properly constituted Church."³⁶ His meaning is that he refused to

³⁵ Cf. A. Lang (*Johannes Calvin*, 1909, p. 42): "There shows itself here Calvin's self-reliance and independence as over against every kind of ecclesiastical tradition. . . . Thus, in the Confession which he adduced at Lausanne in his and his colleagues' names, he explains: 'We cannot seek God's majesty anywhere except in His Word; nor can we think anything about Him except with His Word, or say anything of Him except through His Word.' . . . 'A religious Confession is nothing but a witness to the faith which abides in us; therefore it must be drawn only from the pure fountain of Scripture.'"

³⁶ *Opp.* X. ii, p. 84 (Herminjard, iv, p. 185): Ad haec Calvinus, nos in Dei unius fidem iurasse respondit, non Athanasii cuius Symbolum nulla unquam legitima ecclesia approbasset. Doumergue (*Jean Calvin*, II, p. 256) renders correctly: Nous avons juré la foi en un seul Dieu, et non en Athanase, dont le symbole n'a été approuvé par aucune Église légitime." Williston Walker (*John Calvin*, p. 197), missing the construction, renders misleadingly: "We swear in the faith of the one God, not of Athanasius, whose creed no true church would ever have approved." So also A. Lang (*Johannes Calvin*, p. 40): Wir haben den Glauben an den einen Gott beschworen, aber nicht an Athanasius, dessen Symbol eine wahre Kirche nie gebilligt haben würde." Calvin is not declaring the Athanasian Creed unworthy of the approbation of any true church; he is recalling the fact that it is a private document authorized by no valid ecclesiastical enactment. For Caroli's account of what Calvin said, see above, note 34, end. Nevertheless, the Athanasian Creed had attained throughout the Western Church a position of the highest reverence (for the extent of its "reception and use" see

treat any human composition as an authoritative determination of doctrine, from which we may decline only on pain of heresy: that belongs to the Word of God alone. At the subsequent Council of Lausanne he took up precisely the same position, and addressing himself more, as he says,³⁷ *ad hominem* than *ad rem*, turned the demand that he should express his faith in the exact words of former formularies into ridicule. He was, he tells us, in what he said about the Creeds just "gibing"³⁸ Caroli. Caroli had attempted to recite the creeds and had broken down at the fourth clause of the Athanasian symbol.³⁹ You assert, Calvin said, that we cannot acceptably confess our faith except in the exact words of these ancient symbols. You have just pronounced these words from the Athanasian Creed: "Which faith whosoever doth not hold cannot be saved." You do not yourself hold this faith: and if you did, you could not express it in the exact words of the Creed. Try to repeat those words: you will infallibly again stick fast before you

Ommaney, *A Critical Dissertation on the Athanasian Creed*, 1897, pp. 420 sq.), and was soon to be "approbated" by the Protestant churches at large. Zwingli in the *Fidei Ratio* (1530) and Luther in the Smalcald Articles (1537) had already placed it among the Symbols of the churches, whose authority they recognized: and the *Formula Concordiae* and many Reformed Confessions, beginning with the Gallican, were soon formally to accord it a place of authority in the Protestant Churches. See Loofs, *Herszog*⁴ II, p. 179; Schaff, *Creeds of Christendom*, ed. i, I, p. 40; E. F. Karl Müller, *Die Bekenntnisschriften d. reform. Kirche*, Index sub. voc., 'Athanasianum'; Ménégos, as cited in note 41. Calvin found at Strasburg that the manner in which he had spoken of the Creeds was offensive to his colleagues there. He writes to Farel (Herminjard, vi, p. 43): "It was somewhat harder to purge ourselves in the matter of the symbols: for this was what was offensive (*odiosum*), that we repudiated them, though they ought to be beyond controversy, since they were received by the suffrages of the whole Church. It was easy to explain that we did not disapprove, much less reject them, but only declined to subscribe them that he [Caroli] might not enjoy the triumph over our ministry which he longed for. Some odium, however, always remained."

³⁷ *Opp.* viii, p. 316: non tam ad rem quam ad hominem.

³⁸ *jocatus est* (*ibid.*, p. 315).

³⁹ "When he had recited three clauses of the Athanasian symbol, he was not able to recite the fourth . . ." (*ibid.*, p. 311, top).

get through the fourth clause. Now what would you do, if you should suddenly come to die and the Devil should demand that you go to the eternal destruction which you confess awaits those who do not hold this faith whole and entire, meaning unless you express this your faith in these exact terms? And as for the Nicene Creed—is it so very certain it was composed by that council? One would surely suppose those holy fathers would study conciseness in so serious a matter as a creed. But see the battology here: "God of God, Light of Light, very God of very God." Why this repetition—which adds neither to the emphasis nor to the expressiveness of the document? Don't you see that this is a song, more suitable for singing than to serve as a formula of confession?⁴⁰ We may or may not think Calvin's pleasantry happy. But we certainly cannot fail to marvel when we read in even recent writers that Calvin refused to sign the Athanasian Creed because of its damnatory clauses, "which are unjust and uncharitable", and expressed "an unfavorable opinion on the Nicene Creed".⁴¹

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 315-316. This manner of speaking of the Nicene Creed also impressed the Strasburg theologians unfavorably. Calvin writes to Farel Oct. 8, 1539 (Herminjard, vi, p. 54): "I had to give satisfaction about the battologies I could not by any effort convince them that there is any battology there. I admitted, however, that I should not have so spoken if I had not been compelled by that man's wickedness."

⁴¹ Schaff, *Hist. of the Christian Church*, vii, p. 322. E. Ménégoz is therefore in the essentials of the matter right, when he expresses his wonder that men can suppose that the circumstances that Calvin "once refused to obey an injunction to sign the Symbol", or "pronounced a judgment unfavorable to the literary form of this document"—M. Ménégoz is confusing for the moment the Athanasian and Nicene Creeds—prove that "in the depths of his heart he held these anathemas in aversion" (*Publications Diverses sur le Fidélisme*, 1900, p. 276). He adds with equal justice: "It is an infelicitous idea to appeal to Calvin as a witness that Protestantism, though receiving the Catholic Symbols, had no intention of approving their anathemas. And it is a historical error to imagine that the Reformers would have accepted these symbols, if they had not firmly believed them, if they had felt any scruples, or cherished any mental reservations regarding the damnatory clauses. There was no paltering in a double sense in that age. There was no practice of 'economy'. If the Protestants had felt any hesitation about the anathemas, they would have said so without ambiguity, and they

According to his own testimony, he did nothing of the kind: he "never had any intention of depreciating (*objicere*) these creeds or of derogating from their credit".⁴² His sole design was to make it apparent that Caroli's insistence that only in the words of these creeds could faith in the Trinity be fitly expressed was ridiculous.

Calvin's refusal to be confined to the very words of the old formulas in his expression of the doctrine of the Trinity did not carry with it, therefore, any unwillingness to employ in his definition of the doctrine the terms which had been beaten out in the Trinitarian controversies of the past. These terms he considered rather the best expressions for stating and defending the doctrine. That they were unwilling to employ them had indeed been made the substance of one of the charges brought by Caroli against the Genevan pastors. But the refutation of this calumny, so far as Calvin himself was concerned, was easy. He had only to point to the first edition of the *Institutes* (1536), in which he had not only freely used the terms in question, but had defended at large the right and asserted the duty of employing them, as the technical language by which alone the doctrine of the Trinity can be so expressed as to confound heretical misconstructions. When, then, Caroli expressed his wonder at "the pertinacity with which Calvin refused the terms 'Person', 'Trinity'", Calvin replied flatly that neither he nor Farel nor Viret ever had the smallest objection to these terms. "The writings of Calvin", he adds, "testify to the whole world that he always employed them freely, and even reprehended the superstition of those who either disliked or avoided them."⁴³ That the Genevan pastors passed them by in their *Confession*, and refused to employ them when this was violently demanded of them, he explains, was due to two reasons. They were unwilling to consent to such tyranny as that when a matter has been sufficiently and more would have purely and simply discarded the symbols. Nothing would have been easier."

⁴² *Opp.* vii, p. 315.

⁴³ *Opp.* vii, p. 318.

than sufficiently established, credit should be bound to words and syllables. But their more particular reason was, he adds, that they might "deprive that madman of the boast he had insolently made". "For Caroli's purpose was to cast suspicion on the entire doctrine of men of piety and to destroy their influence."⁴⁴ Though they felt to the full, therefore, the value of these terms, not only for confounding heresy, but also for consolidating churches in a common confession, when their use was contentiously demanded of them they followed a high example and refused to give place, in the way of subjection, even for an hour.

Calvin's attitude to the employment of this technical language is sufficiently interesting in itself to repay a pause to observe it. As we have intimated, it is fully set forth already in the first edition of the *Institutes* (1536) in a very interesting passage, which is retained without substantial alteration throughout all the subsequent editions. The position of this passage in the discussion of the doctrine of the Trinity, however, is changed in the final edition from its end (as in all the earlier editions) to its beginning. In the final edition, therefore, it appears as a preface to the discussion of the substance of the doctrine (I. xiii. 3-5), and it is strengthened in this edition by an introductory paragraph (§ 2), in which an attempt is made to vindicate for one of these technical terms direct Biblical authority. Calvin finds the term 'Person' in the *ὑπόστασις* of Heb. i. 3; and insists, therefore, that it, at least, is not of human invention (*humanitus inventa*). The argument in which he does this is too characteristic of him and too instructive, not only as to his attitude towards the terms in question, but also as to his doctrine of the Trinity and his exegetical methods, to be passed over in silence. We must permit ourselves so much of a digression, therefore, as will enable us to attend to it.

What Calvin does, in this argument, is in essence to subject the statement of Heb. i. 3 that the Son is "the very image of the hypostasis of God"—the *χαρακτήρ τῆς ὑποστά-*

⁴⁴ *Adv. P. Caroli Calumnias: Opp.* vii, p. 318.

σας αὐτοῦ—to a strict logical analysis. The term ὑπόστασις, he argues, must designate something the Son is not: for He could scarcely be said to be the *image* of something He is. When we say *image*, we postulate two distinct things: the thing imaged and the thing imaging it. If the Son is the *image* of God's hypostasis, then, the hypostasis of God must be something which the Son does not *share*; it must be rather something which He is *like*. The Son *shares* the Divine essence: hence hypostasis here cannot mean essence. It must be taken then in its alternative sense of 'person': and what the author of the Epistle says, therefore, is that the Son is exactly like the Father in person; His double, so to speak. This Epistle, therefore, expressly speaks here of two Persons in the Godhead, one Person which is imaged, another which precisely images it. And the same reasoning may be applied to the Holy Spirit. There is Biblical warrant, therefore, for teaching that there are three hypostases in the one essence of God—"therefore, if we will give credit to the Apostle's testimony, there are in God three hypostases",—and since the Latin 'person' is but the translation of the Greek 'hypostasis', it is mere fastidiousness to balk at the term 'person'. If anyone prefers the term 'subsistence' as a more literal rendering, why, let him use it: or even 'substance', if it be taken in the same sense. The point is not the vocable but the meaning, and we do not change the meaning by varying the synonyms. Even the Greeks use 'person' (πρόσωπον) interchangeably with 'subsistence' (ὑπόστασις) in this connection.

It is not likely that this piece of exegesis will commend itself to us. Nor indeed is it likely that we shall feel perfect satisfaction in the logical analysis, even as a piece of logical analysis. After all, the Son is not the image of the Father in His Personality,—if we are, like Calvin, to take the Personality here in strict distinction from the Essence. What the Son differs from the Father in, is, rather, just in His 'Personality', in this sense: as Person He is the Son, the Father the Father, and what we sum up under this 'Father-

hood' and 'Sonship' is just the distinguishing 'properties' by which the two are differentiated from one another. That concrete Person we call the Son is exactly like that concrete Person we call the Father; but the likeness is due to the fact that each is sharer in the identical essence. After all, therefore, the reason why the Son is the express image of the Father is because, sharing the divine essence, He is in His essence all that the Father is. He is the repetition of the Father: but the repetition in such a sense that the one essence in which the likeness consists is common to the two, and not merely of like character in the two. The fundamental trouble with Calvin's argument is that it seeks a direct proof for the Trinitarian constitution of the Godhead from a passage which was intended as a direct proof only of the essential deity of the Son. What the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews had in mind was not to reveal the relation of the Son to the Father in the Trinity—as a distinct hypostasis in the unity of the essence; but to set forth the absolute deity of the Son, to declare that He is all that God is, the perfect reflection of God, giving back to God when set over against Him His consummate image. The term 'hypostasis' is not indeed to be taken here, in the narrow sense, as 'essence': but neither is it to be taken, in the abstract sense, as 'person'. It means the concrete person, that is to say, the whole substantial entity we call God: which whole substantial entity is said to be in the Son exactly what it is in the Father. Nothing is said directly as to the relation of the Son to the Father, as distinct persons in the Trinity: the whole direct significance of the declaration is exhausted in the assertion that this 'Son' differs in no single particular from 'God': He is God in the full height of the conception of God.

It is not, however, the success or lack of success of Calvin's exegesis which most interests us at present. It is rather two facts which his exegetical argument brings before us with peculiar force. The one of them is that the developed doctrine of the Trinity lay so firmly entrenched

in his mind that he makes it, almost or perhaps quite unconsciously, the major premise of his argument. And the other is that he was so little averse to designating the distinctions in the Godhead by the term 'Persons' that that term was rather held by him to have definite Biblical warrant. His argument that *ὑπόστασις* in this passage cannot mean 'essence', but must mean 'person', turns on this precise hinge,—that the Father and Son are numerically one in essence, and can be represented as distinct only in person: "For since the essence of God is simple and indivisible (*simplex et individua*) He who contains in Himself the whole of it, not in apportionment or in deflection, but in unbroken perfection (*integra perfectione*) it would be improper or rather inept to call its image." In other words, the doctrine of the Trinity in its complete formulation is the postulate of his argument. And the outcome of the argument is that the Epistle to the Hebrews distinctly sets the Father and Son over against one another as distinguishable 'Persons', employing this precise term, *ὑπόστασις*, to designate them in their distinction. "Accordingly", says Calvin, "if the testimony of the Apostle obtains credit, it follows that there are in God three hypostases." This term as the expression of the nature of the distinctions in the Godhead is therefore not a 'human invention' (*humanitus inventa*) to Calvin, but a divine revelation.

Since, then, the Bible had obtained credit with Calvin, he could not object to the use of the term 'Person' to express the distinctions in the Trinity. But he nevertheless takes over from the earlier editions, in which the discovery of the term in Heb. i. 3 is not yet to be found, a defense of the use of this term on the assumption that it is not Biblical. And this defense is in essence the assertion of the right and the exposition of a theory of interpretation. There are men, says Calvin, who cry out against every term framed according to human judgment (*hominum arbitrio confictum nomen*) and demand that our words as well as our thoughts concerning divine things shall be kept within the limits of

Scripture example. If we use only the words of Scripture we shall, say they, avoid many dissensions and disputes, and preserve the charity so frequently broken in strifes over "exotic words". Certainly, responds Calvin, we ought to speak of God with not less religion than we think of Him. But why should we be required to confine ourselves to the exact words of Scripture if we give the exact sense of Scripture? To condemn as "exotic" every word not found in so many syllables in Scripture, is at once to put under a ban all interpretation which is not a mere stringing together of Scriptural phrases. There are some things in Scripture which are to our apprehension intricate and difficult. What forbids our explaining them in simpler terms,—if these terms are held religiously and faithfully to the true sense of Scripture, and are used carefully and modestly and not without occasion? Is it not an improbity to reprobate words which express nothing but what is testified and recorded by the Scriptures? And when these words are a necessity, if the truth is to be plainly and unambiguously expressed,—may we not suspect that the real quarrel of those who object to their use is with the truth they express; and that what they are offended by is that by their use the truth has been made clear and unmistakable (*plana et dilucida*)? As to the terms in which the mystery of the Trinity is expressed—the term Trinity itself, the term Person, and those other terms which the tergiversations of heretics have compelled believers to frame and employ that the truth may be asserted and guarded—such as *homoousios*, for example—no one would care to draw sword for them as mere naked words. Calvin himself would be altogether pleased to see them buried wholly out of sight—if only all men would heartily receive the simple faith, that the Father, Son and Spirit are one God and yet neither is the Son the Father, nor the Spirit the Son, but they are each distinguished by a certain property.⁴⁵ But that is just the trouble. Men will not accept the simple faith, but palter in a double sense. Arius was

⁴⁵ I. xiii. 5.

loud enough in declaring Christ to be God,—but wished to teach also that He is a creature and has had a beginning: he was willing to say Christ is one with the Father, if he were permitted to add that His oneness is the same in kind as our own oneness with God. Say, however, the one word *ὁμοούσιος* —“consubstantial”—and the mask is torn from the face of dissimulation and yet nothing whatever is added to the Scriptures. Sabellius was in no way loath to admit that there are in the Godhead these three—Father, Son and Holy Spirit; but he really distinguished them only as attributes are distinguished. Say simply that in “the unity of God a trinity of persons subsists”, and you have at once quenched his inane loquacity. Now, if anyone who does not like the words will ingenuously⁴⁶ confess the things the words stand for,—*cadit quaestio*: we shall not worry over the words. “But”—adds Calvin significantly—“I have long since learned by experience, and that over and over again, that those who contend thus pertinaciously about terms, are really cherishing a secret poison; so that it is much better to bear their resentment than to consent to use less precise and clear language for their behoof.”⁴⁷ Golden words! How often since Calvin has the Church had bitter cause to repeat them! When we read, for example, William Chillingworth’s subtle pleas for the use of Scriptural language only in matters of faith; his eloquent asseverations—“The Bible, I say, the Bible only is the religion of Protestants”—; his loud railing at “the vain conceit, that we can speak of the things of God better than in the words of God”, “thus deifying our own interpretations and tyrannously enforcing them upon others”,—we know what it all means: that under this cloak of charity are to lie hidden a multitude of sins. When we hear Calvin refusing to swear in the words of another, we must not confuse his defense of personal right with a latitudinarianism like Chillingworth’s. If he said, It is the Word of God, not the word of Athanasius, to

⁴⁶ non fraudulenter.

⁴⁷ I. xiii 5. *ad fin.*

which I submit my judgment, he said equally, The sense of Scripture, not its words, is Scripture. No ambiguous meanings should be permitted to hide behind a mere repetition of the simple words of Scripture, but all that the Scripture teaches shall be clearly and without equivocation brought out and given expression in the least indeterminate language.⁴⁸

Calvin's interest was, in other words, distinctly in the substance of the doctrine of the Trinity rather than in any particular mode of formulating it. It rested on the terms in which it was formulated only because, and so far as, they seemed essential to the precise expression and effective guarding of the doctrine. This was consistently his attitude from the beginning. Already in the *Institutes* of 1536, as we have seen, he had given this attitude an expression so satisfactory to himself that he retained the sections devoted to it until the end. It is indeed astonishing how complete a statement of the doctrine of the Trinity itself was already incorporated into this earliest edition of the *Institutes*, and how clearly in that statement all the characteristic features of Calvin's treatment of the doctrine already appear. The discussion was no doubt greatly expanded in its passage from the first to the last edition. In the first edition (1536) it occupies only five columns in the Strasburg edition; these

⁴⁸ Dorner's account of Calvin's attitude to these questions is not quite exact either in the motive suggested, or in the precise action ascribed to him, though it recognizes Calvin's contribution to a better understanding of the doctrine (*Doctrine of the Person of Christ*, E. T. II. ii, p. 158, note 1): "Even Calvin, about the time of his dispute with Caroli, asserted the necessity of a developing revision of the doctrine of the Trinity. On this ground he declined pledging himself to the Athanasian Creed, and wished to cast aside the terms 'persona', 'Trinitas', as scholastic expressions. At the same time he was so far from being inclined towards the Antitrinitarians, that he wished to carry out the doctrine of the Trinity still more completely. He saw clearly that in the traditional form of the doctrine, the Son had not full deity, because aseity (*aseitas*) was reserved to the Father alone, who thus received a preponderance over the Son, and was identified with the Monas, or the Divine essence. The Antitrinitarians, with whom he had to struggle, usually directed their attacks on this weak point of the dogma, and deduced therefrom the Antitrinitarian conclusions."

have grown to fifteen and a half columns in the middle editions and to twenty-seven and a half (of which eleven and a half are retained from the earlier editions and sixteen are new) in the final edition of 1559. That is to say, its original compass was tripled in the middle editions and almost doubled again in the final edition, where it has become between five and six times as long as in the first draft.⁴⁹ And in this process of expansion it has not only gathered increment but has suffered change. This change is not, however, in the substance of the doctrine taught or even in the mode of its formulation or the language in which it is couched or in the general tone which informs it. It is only in the range and the governing aim of the discussion.

The statement in the first edition is dominated by a simple desire to give guidance to docile believers, and therefore declines formal controversy and seeks merely to set down briefly what is to be followed, what is to be avoided on this great subject. Positing, therefore, at the outset that the Scriptures teach one God, not many, but yet not obscurely assert that the Father is God and the Son is God and the Holy Spirit is God; Calvin here at once develops, by combining Eph. iv. 5 and Mat. xxviii. 19, a Biblical proof of the Trinity which in its strenuous logic reminds us of the analytical examination of Heb. i. 3 which we have already noted. Paul, he says, connects together one baptism, one faith and one God; but in Matthew we read that we are to be baptized in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit,—and what is that but to say that the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are together the one God of which Paul speaks?⁵⁰ This is supported by Jere-

⁴⁹The *Institutes* as a whole were about doubled in length from the first edition (1536) to the second (1539), and again about doubled in the last edition (1559), so that the last edition (1559) is about four times as long as the first (1536). The treatment of the Trinity was, therefore, a little more expanded than the volume as a whole.

⁵⁰This argument is retained in the later editions and appears in its final form in the ed. of 1559, I. xiii. 16. In its earliest statement it

miah's (xxiii. 33) designation of the Son by "that name which the Jews call ineffable"⁵¹ and other Scriptural evidence that our Lord is one God with the Father and the Spirit. He has in mind to prove both elements in the

runs thus (1536, pp. 107-8: Strasburg ed., p. 58): "Paul so connects these three things, God, faith and baptism, that he reasons from one to the other (Eph. 4). So that, because there is one faith, thence he demonstrates that there is one God; because there is one baptism, thence he shows that there is one faith. For since faith ought not to be looking about hither and thither, neither wandering through various things, but should direct its view towards the one God, be fixed on Him and adhere to Him; it may be easily proved from these premises that if there be many faiths there should be many Gods. Again because baptism is the sacrament of faith, it confirms to us His unity, seeing that it is one. But no one can profess faith except in the one God. Therefore as we are baptized into the one faith, so our faith believes in the one God. Both that therefore is one and this is one, because each is of one God. Hence also it follows that it is not lawful to be baptized except into the one God, because we are baptized into faith in Him, in whose name we are baptized. Now, the Scriptures have wished (Mat. at end) that we should be baptized into the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost, at the same time that it wishes all to believe with one faith in the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit. What is that, truly, except a plain testimony that the Father, Son and Holy Spirit are one God? For if we are baptized in their name, we are baptized into faith in them. They are therefore one God, if they are worshipped in one faith."

⁵¹ This awkward periphrasis suggests that, when the *Institutes* were written—in 1534-1535—Calvin had no convenient expression at hand for the Tetragrammaton. This conjecture is supported by the circumstance that "Jehovah" does not seem to occur in the first edition; it is lacking even in the Preface to the First Commandment, where the customary *Dominus* takes its place. Already in the spring of 1537, however (*Opp.* vii. 313; xi. 704, 707, 708; x. 107, 121) it is used familiarly; and thenceforward throughout Calvin's life. During his sojourn at Basle (1535) Calvin had studied Hebrew with Sebastian Münster (Baumgartner, *Calvin Hébraïsant*, p. 18), and it was doubtless from him that he acquired the pronunciation "Jehovah" (see Münster on Ex. vi. 3 in *Critici Sacri*, Amsterdam ed., 1698, I. 107, 108; Frankfort ed., I. 447; cf. 32). From his own comment on Ex. vi. 3 we may learn the clearness of Calvin's conviction that "Jehovah" is the right pronunciation: "It would be tedious to enumerate all the opinions on the name 'Jehovah'. It is certainly a foul superstition of the Jews that they dare not either pronounce or write it, but substitute 'Adonai' for it. It is no more probable that, as many teach, it is unpronounceable because it is not written according to grammatical rule. . . . Nor do I assent to the grammarians who will not have it pronounced because its

doctrine of the Trinity, the unity of God and the true distinction of persons, and therefore introduces these citations with the words: "There are extant also other clear (*luculenta*) testimonies, which assert, in part, the one divinity of inflection is irregular. . . ." How fixed the pronunciation "Jehovah" had become at Geneva by 1570 is revealed by an incident which occurred at the "Promotions" at the Academy that year. The Hebrew Professor, Corneille Bertram, having declared in response to an inquiry that "Adonai" not "Jehovah" was to be read, he was rebuked therefor and compelled to apologize: "This M. de Bèze and all the Company found ill-said, and remonstrated with him for agitating this curious and idle question, and for affirming an opinion which very many great men of this age, of good knowledge, piety, and judgment, have held to be absurd, superstitious and merely Rabbinic" (*Reg. Comp.*, 31 May, 1570, cited by Charles Borgeaud, *Histoire de l'Université de Genève*, 1900, p. 228).—The history of the pronunciation "Jehovah" has not been adequately investigated. It has become the scholastic tradition to say that it was introduced by Peter Galatin, confessor of Leo X, and first appears in his *De Arcanis Catholicae Veritatis*, II. 10 (the first of two chapters so numbered) which was first published in 1516 (cf. Buhl's *Gesenius' Lexicon*, ed. 13, 1899, p. 311, "about 1520"; Brown's *Gesenius' Lexicon*, p. 218a, 1520; Kittel, *Herzog*⁸ viii. 530-1, 1518; Davidson, Hastings' B. D. art. 'God', 1520; A. J. Maclean, Hastings' One Vol. B. D., p. 300a, 1518; A. H. McNeile, *Westminster Commentary on Exodus*, 1908, p. 23, 1518; Oxford English Dictionary, sub. voc., 1516: cf. the very strong statement of Dillmann, *Alttest. Theologie*, p. 215). But this tradition is simply reported from mouth to mouth, from Drusius' tract on the Tetragrammaton (*Critici Sacri*, Amsterdam ed., vol. I, part ii, pp. 322 sq.: also in Reland *Decad. Exercitationum* . . . *de vera pronuntiatione nominis Jehova*). Since Drusius no one seems to have made any independent effort to ascertain the facts, except F. Böttcher, *Ausführliches Lehrbuch der Hebräischen Sprache*, 1866, § 88 (p. 49, note 2). In copying Drusius the scholars have failed to note that he himself points out in a later note, inserted on p. 355, that the form "Jehovah" occurs already in Porchetus, A. D. 1303: and it has been pointed out also that it occurs in Raimund Martini's *Pugio Fidei*, which was written about 1270 (Böttcher's suggestion that it may be an interpolation in the *Pugio Fidei* does not seem convincing.) It is not unlikely that Galatin, who draws heavily on Martini either directly or through Porchetti, may have derived it from him: and in any event he uses it not as a novel invention of his own, but as a well-known form. The origin and age of the pronunciation are accordingly yet to seek. The words of Dr. F. Chance (*The Athenæum*, No. 2119, June 6, 1868, p. 796) are here in point: "There is no doubt, I think, that the letters *jwh* were from the very introduction of the Hebrew points pointed as they now are . . . and if so, surely anybody that read what he had before him must have read Jehovah. If the word were

the three, and in part their personal distinction."⁵² Then comes the defense of the technical words by which the truth of the Trinity is expressed and protected, of which we have already spoken. The enlarged and readjusted treatment of the topic for the second edition of 1539 seems to have been composed under the influence of the controversy with Caroli. It is marked at least by the incorporation of a thorough proof of the Godhead of the Father, 'Son and Spirit, of the unity of their essence, and of the distinction between them, and a coloring apparently derived from this controversy is thrown over the whole discussion, in which liberty to formulate the doctrine in our own words and the value of the technical terms already in use are equally vigorously asserted. The material of 1539 remains intact throughout the middle editions (1543, 1550), although some short quotations from Augustine (§§ 16, 20) and from Jerome and Hilary (§ 24) were introduced in 1543. But it is very freely dealt with in the final edition (1559). Only some two-thirds of it (eleven and a half columns out of fifteen and a half) is preserved in that edition, while

never so *written* before the sixteenth century, it was probably because up to that time Hebrew was studied by very few people, except by Jews who could not write this holiest of God's names, and by Gentiles who, having learned their Hebrew from Jews, followed their example in substituting for it in reading and writing, Adonai, the Lord, etc."—No doubt the vogue of the form in the middle of the sixteenth century is due, not to its accidental occurrence in Galatin's book, but to the progress of Hebrew scholarship in sequence to the revival of letters, which looked upon the Jewish refusal to pronounce the name as mere superstition and attached an exaggerated importance to the Massoretic pointing. The debate about the proper pronunciation of the name is, in any event, a Humanistic phenomenon, and the form "Jehovah" is found in use everywhere where Hebrew scholarship penetrated, until it was corrected by this scholarship itself. Reuchlin indeed appears not to have used it; nor Melanchthon. But it is used by Luther (though not in his Bible), and by Matthew Tyndale in his Pentateuch of 1530, and so prevailingly by Protestant scholars that Romish controversialists were tempted to represent it as an impiety (so Genebrardus) of the "Calviniani et Bezani" following the example of Sanctes Pagninus (who, according to MS. but not printed copies did indeed use it).

⁵² *Opp.* I, p. 58.

sixteen new columns are added: about three-fifths of the whole is thus new.⁵⁸ Moreover, whole sections are omitted (§§ 10 and 15), a new order of arrangement is adopted, and much minor alteration is introduced. In this recasting and expansion of the discussion the chief place in the formative forces determining its form and tone is taken by the attack of the radical Antitrinitarians. The existence of these Antitrinitarian scoffers is recognized, indeed, from the first: they are explicitly adverted to already in the edition of 1536 as "certain impious men, who wish to tear our faith up by the roots": it is quite clear, indeed, that Servetus' teachings were already before his mind at this date. But it is only for the final edition (1559) that their assault assumes the determining position at the basis of the whole treatment: and it is only in this edition that Servetus, for example, is named. Now, Calvin not only arrays against them the testimony of Scripture in a developed polemic, but adjusts the whole positive exposition of the doctrine to its new purpose, shaping and phrasing its statements and modifying them by added sentences and clauses. The result is a polemic the edge of which is turned no longer against those who may have doubted Calvin's orthodoxy, as was the case in 1539, but rather against those who have essayed to bring into doubt or even openly to deny the mysteries which enter into the Christian doctrine of the Trinity. The sharp anti-scholastic sentences which are permitted to remain, serve to give a singular balance to the discussion, and to make it clear that the polemic against the Antitrinitarians has in view vital interests and not mere matters of phraseology.

The disposition of the material in this its final form follows the lines of its new dominant interest. The discussion opens, as we have seen, with a paragraph designed to bear in on the mind a sense of the mystery which must charac-

⁵⁸ The most notable additions are the argument on *ὑποστάσις* in Heb. i. 3 (§ 2); the definition of 'person' (§ 6); and the whole polemic against Servetus and Gentilis (§§ 22 to end). These sections contain nine of the sixteen new columns.

terize the divine mode of existence (§ 1). This is immediately followed by an announcement of the Trinitarian fact and a defense of the technical terms used to express and protect it (§§ 2-5). After this introduction the subject itself is taken up (§ 6, *init.*) and treated in two great divisions, by way first of positive statement and proof (§§ 6-20) and by way secondly of polemic defense (§§ 21-end). The positive portion opens with a careful definition of what is meant by the 'Trinity' (§ 6) and is prosecuted by an exhibition of the Scriptural proof of the doctrine in three sections: first the proof of the complete deity of the Son (§§ 7-13), then the proof of the deity of the Spirit (§§ 14-15), and then the proof of the Trinitarian distinctions, which includes a dissertation on the nature of these distinctions on the basis of Scripture (§§ 16-20). The polemic phase of the discussion begins with some introductory remarks (§ 21) and then defends in turn the true personality of the Son against Servetus (§ 22) and His complete deity against its modern impugners, Valentinus Gentilis being chiefly in mind (§§ 23-29).

This comprehensive outline is richly filled in with details, all of which are treated, however, with a circumspection and moderation which illustrate Calvin's determination to eschew human speculations upon this high theme and to confine himself to the revelations of Scripture, only so far explicated in human language as is necessary for their pure expression and protection.⁵⁴ We observe, for example, that he introduces no proofs or illustrations of the Trinity derived from metaphysical reasoning or natural analogies. From the example of Augustine it had been the habit

⁵⁴ Cf. Köstlin, *Studien und Kritiken*, 1868, p. 419, who speaks of "the circumspect, cautious moderation with which Calvin confines himself to the simplest principles of the Church conception and refuses to pass beyond the simple declarations of Scripture to a dogmatic formulation, much more to scholastic questions and answers, one step farther than seemed to him to be demanded for the protection of the Godhead of the Redeemer and of the Holy Spirit from the assaults of old and new enemies."

throughout the Middle Ages to make much of these proofs or illustrations, and the habit had passed over into the Protestant usage. Melancthon, for example, gave new currency alike to the old ontological speculations which under the forms of subject and object sought to conceive the Logos as the image of Himself which the thinking Father set over against Himself, and to the human analogies by which the Trinitarian distinctions were fancied to be illustrated, such, for example, as the distinctions between the intellect, sensibility and will in man. Calvin held himself aloof from all such reasoning, doubting, as he says (§ 18), "the value of similitudes from human things for expressing the force of the Trinitarian distinction", and fearing that their employment might afford only occasion to those evil disposed for calumny and to those little instructed for error.⁵⁵ What he desired was a plain proof from Scripture itself of the elements of the doctrine, freed from all additions from human speculation. This proof he attempted, in outline at least, to set down in his pages. It is interesting to observe how he conducts it.

He begins, as we have already pointed out, with a plain statement of what he means by the Trinity (§ 6). Such a "short and easy definition" (*brevis et facilis definitio*) had been his object from the outset (§ 2, *init.*), and it was in fact in order to obtain it that he entered upon the defense, which fills the first sections, of the term and conception of 'Person' as applied to the distinctions in the Godhead.

⁵⁵ Cf. I. xv. 4, *ad fin.* Cf. *Commentary on Genesis* i. 26, where, speaking of the human faculties, he remarks: "But Augustine, beyond all others, speculates with excessive refinement for the purpose of fabricating a trinity in man. For in laying hold of the three faculties of the soul enumerated by Aristotle, the intellect, the memory and the will, he afterwards out of one trinity derives many. If any reader, having leisure, wishes to enjoy such speculations, let him read the tenth and fourteenth books of *The Trinity*, also the tenth book of *The City of God*. I acknowledge indeed that there is something in man which refers to the Father, and the Son, and the Spirit; and I have no difficulty in admitting the above distribution of the faculties, . . . but a definition of the image of God ought to rest on a firmer basis than such subtleties." For the later Reformed attitude, see Heppe, p. 85.

Reverting to it after this defense, he carefully defines (§ 6) what he means by 'Person' in this connection, viz., "a subsistence in the Divine essence, which, related to the others, is yet distinguished by an incommunicable property". What he has to prove, therefore, he conceives to be that in the unity of the Godhead there is such a distinction of persons; or, as he phrases it, in a statement derived from Tertullian, that "there is in God a certain disposition or economy, which makes no difference, however, to the unity of the essence"; or, as he puts it himself a little later on (§ 20, *init.*), that "there is understood under the name of God, a unitary and simple essence, in which we comprise three persons or hypostases". In order to prove this doctrine, it would be necessary to prove that while God is one, there are three persons who are God, and Calvin undertakes the proof on that understanding. He does not pause here, however, to argue the unity of God at length, taking that for the moment for granted, though he reverts to it in the sequel to show that the distinction of persons which he conceives himself to have established in no respect infringes on it (§ 19), and indeed in his polemic against Valentinus Gentilis very fully vindicates it from the objections of the Arianisers and Tritheists (§ 23 *sq.*). His proof resolves itself, therefore, into the establishment of the distinctions in the Godhead; and in order to do this he undertakes to prove first that the Son and the Holy Spirit are each God, and then to show that the Scriptures explicitly recognize that there is such a distinction in the Godhead as their divinity (taken in connection with the Divine unity) implies.

The proof of the deity of the Son is very comprehensive and detailed, and is drawn from each Testament alike. The Word of God, by which, as God 'spake', He made the worlds, it is argued, must be understood of the substantial Word, which is also called in Proverbs, Wisdom (§ 7); and must accordingly be understood as eternal. In connection with this, the whole scheme of temporal prolation as applied to the Son is sharply assaulted. It is impious to suppose

that anything new can ever have happened to God in Himself (*in se ipso*), and there is "nothing less tolerable than to invent a beginning for that Word, who both was always God and afterwards became the maker of the world" (§ 8). To this more general argument is brought the support of a number of Old Testament passages, which, it is contended, advert to the Son with declarations of His deity: such as the Forty-fifth Psalm, "Thy throne, O God, is for ever and ever"; Is. ix. 6, "His Name shall be called Mighty God, Father of Eternity"; Jer. xxiii. 6, "The Branch shall be called Jehovah our Righteousness" (§ 9). And then the phenomena connected with the manifestations of the Angel of Jehovah are adduced in corroboration (§ 10). The New Testament evidence is marshalled under two heads: the divine names are applied to Christ by the New Testament writers (§ 11), and divine works and functions are assigned to Him (§§ 12-13). Not only are Old Testament passages which speak of Jehovah applied to Christ in the New Testament (Is. viii. 10, Rom. ix. 33; Is. xlv. 23, Rom. xiv. 10, 11; Ps. lxviii. 18, Eph. iv. 8; Is. vi. 1, Jno. xii. 41), but these writers themselves employ the term "God" in speaking of Christ (Jn. i. 1, 16; Rom. ix. 5; 1 Tim. iii. 16; 1 Jn. v. 20; Acts xx. 28; Jn. xx. 28), and the like. And what divine work do not the New Testament writers credit Him with, either from His own lips or theirs? They represent Him as having been co-worker with God from all eternity (Jn. v. 17), as the upholder and governor of the world (Heb. i. 3), as the forgiver of iniquities (Mat. ix. 6) and the searcher of hearts (Mat. ix. 4). They not only accredit Him with mighty works, but distinguish Him from others who have wrought miracles, precisely by this,—these others wrought them by the power of God, He by His own power (§ 13a). They represent Him as the dispenser of salvation, the source of eternal life and the fountain of all that is good: they present Him as the proper object of saving faith and trust, and even of worship and prayer (§ 13b).

The deity of the Spirit is similarly argued on the ground

of certain Old Testament passages (Genesis i. 1; Is. xlvi. 16) where the Spirit of God seems to be hypostatized; of the divine works attributed to Him, such as ubiquitous activity, regeneration, and the searching of the deep things of God on the one hand and the bestowing of wisdom, speech and all other blessings on men on the other; and finally of the application of the name God to Him in the New Testament writings (*e. g.*, 1 Cor. iii. 16, vi. 19; 2 Cor. vi. 16; Acts. v. 3; xxviii. 25; Mat. xii. 31).

Having thus established the deity of the Son and Spirit, Calvin turns to the passages which elucidate their deity to us by presenting to us the doctrine of the Trinity. These are all in the New Testament, as was natural (suggests Calvin), because the advent of Christ involved a clearer revelation of God and therefore a fuller knowledge of the personal distinctions in His being (§ 16). The stress of the argument here is laid upon Eph. iv. 5 in connection with Mat. xxviii. 19, which were already expounded at length, as we have seen, in the first edition of the *Institutes*, and are here only strengthened and clarified by a better statement. As we are initiated by baptism into faith in the one God and yet baptism is in the name of the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit, argues Calvin, it is "solidly clear" that the Father, Son and Spirit are this one God; whence it is perfectly obvious that "there reside (*residere*) in the essence of God three Persons, in whom the one God is cognized" (*cognoscitur*); and "since it remains fixed that God is one not many, we can only conclude that the Word and the Spirit are nothing other than the essence of God itself". The Scriptures, however, he proceeds (§ 17), no more thus identify the Son and Spirit with God than they distinguish them—distinguish, not divide them. He appeals to such passages as Jno. v. 32, viii. 16, 18, xiv. 16, "another";⁵⁸ xv. 26, ix. 16, "proceeding", "being sent": but this part of

⁵⁸In ed. 1 (1536) he remarks (*Opp.* I, p. 59) that "that the Holy Spirit is 'another' than Christ is proved by more than ten passages from the Gospel of John (John xiv, xv)".

the subject is lightly passed over on the ground that the passages already adduced themselves sufficiently show that the Son possesses a "distinct property" by which He is not the Father,—for, says he, "the Word could not have been *with* God unless He had been another than the Father, neither could he have had His glory *with* the Father, unless He was distinct from Him": the distinction noted in which passages it is plain, further, is not one which could have begun at the incarnation, but must date from whatever point He may be thought to have begun to be "in the bosom of the Father" (Jno. i. 18). The determination that there is a personal distinction between Father and Son and Holy Spirit leads Calvin to inquire what this distinction carries with it. He finds it to be Scriptural to say that "to the Father is attributed the *principium agendi*, as fountain and source of all things; to the Son, wisdom, counsel and the actual dispensation of things to be done; but to the Spirit is assigned the power and efficiency (*virtus et efficacia*) of the action"—that is to say, if we may be permitted to reduce the definitions to single words, the Father is conceived as the Source, the Son as the Director, the Spirit as the Executor of all the divine activities; the Father as the Fountain, the Son as the Wisdom emerging from Him, the Spirit as the Power by which the wise counsels of God are effectuated (§ 18).⁵⁷ Only now when his argument is finished and his conclusion drawn (§ 19) does Calvin pause formally to point out that "this distinction in no way impedes the absolutely simple unity of God"—since the conception is that the "whole nature (*natura*) is in each hypostasis", while "each has its own propriety". "The Father", he adds, "is *totus* in the Son, and the Son *totus* in the

⁵⁷ This passage is already found in ed. 1 (1536) (*Opp.* I, p. 62): "The Persons are so distinguished by the Scriptures that they assign to the Father the *principium agendi*, and the fountain and origin of all things; to the Son the wisdom and *concilium agendi*; to the Spirit the *virtus et efficacia actionis*; whence also the Son is called the Word of God, not such as men speak or think, but eternal and unchangeable, as emerging in an ineffable manner from the Father."

Father"—as Christ Himself teaches in Jno. xiv. 10. We are here, however, obviously passing beyond the proof to the exposition of the Trinity,—a topic which occupies some later sections (§§ 19 and 20).

It will have already become apparent from the citations incidentally adduced that in his doctrine of the Trinity Calvin departed in nothing from the doctrine which had been handed down from the orthodox fathers. If distinctions must be drawn, he is unmistakably Western rather than Eastern in his conception of the doctrine, an Augustinian rather than an Athanasian.⁵⁸ That is to say, the principle of his construction of the Trinitarian distinctions is equalization rather than subordination. He does, indeed, still speak in the old language of refined subordinationism which had been fixed in the Church by the Nicene formularies; and he expressly allows an "order" of first, second and third in the Trinitarian relations. But he conceives more clearly and applies more purely than had ever previously been done the principle of equalization in his thought of the relation of the Persons to one another, and thereby,

⁵⁸ Cf. L. L. Paine, *The Evolution of Trinitarianism*, p. 95: "It is a remarkable fact that the Protestant Reformation only increased the prestige of Augustine. . . . The question of the Trinity was not a subject of controversy and the Augustinian form of trinitarian doctrine became a fixed tradition. The Nicene Creed, as interpreted by the Pseudo-Athanasian Creed, was accepted on all sides and passed into all the Protestant Confessions. It is to be noted that Calvin insisted on the use of the term 'person' as the only word that would unmask Sabellianism. He also held to numerical unity of essence. This would seem to indicate that Calvin believed that God was one Being in three real persons, and, if so, he must have allowed that in God nature and person are not coincident. Yet he nowhere raises the question, and I am inclined to think he was not conscious of any departure from the views of Augustine." Calvin does, however, repeatedly raise the question whether 'nature' and 'person' are coincident and repeatedly decides that they are, in the sense that the person is the whole nature in a personal distinction. "The whole nature (*tota natura*)" is affirmed to be "in each hypostasis" (*in unaquaque hypostasi*), though there is present to each one its own propriety (I. xiii. 19). Hence there is no such thing as "a triplex God", the simple essence of God being divided among the three Persons" (xiii. 2); the essence is not multiplex, and the Son contains the whole of it in Himself (*totam in se*), etc. (*ibid.*).

as we have already hinted, marks an epoch in the history of the doctrine of the Trinity. That he was enabled to do this was a result, no doubt, at least in part, of his determination to preserve the highest attainable simplicity in his thought of the Trinity. Sweeping his mind free from subtleties in minor matters, he perceived with unwonted lucidity the main things, and thus was led to insist upon them with a force and clearness of exposition which throw them out into unmistakable emphasis. If we look for the prime characteristics of Calvin's doctrine of the Trinity, accordingly, we shall undoubtedly fix first upon its simplicity, then upon its consequent lucidity, and finally upon its elimination of the last remnants of subordinationism, so as to do full justice to the deity of Christ. Simplification, clarification, equalization—these three terms are the notes of Calvin's conception of the Trinity. And, of course, it is the last of these notes which gives above all else its character to his construction.⁵⁹

⁵⁹ It is the same thing that is meant by G. A. Meier, *Lehre von der Trinität*, etc. (1844), II, p. 58, where, after remarking that the Reformed were prone to emphasise especially the unity of God (which involves what we have called "equalization"), he proceeds: "External circumstances early led to the sharp emergence of this peculiarity. In the controversy with Gentilis, who maintained that the essential being of the Son was from the Father, Calvin was compelled to contend that in His Godhead and in His nature, the Son is of Himself, and without principium, and only in His personal subsistence, has His principium in the Father." Catholic theologians, especially Petau, have charged him with heresy for this, though he was only enunciating with increased sharpness the conviction of the Church, and rightly recalling that otherwise a plurality of Gods would be introduced.⁶⁰ At the points indicated the following notes are added. "1. 'Since the name Jehovah is used in the passages cited above, it follows that the Son of God is with respect to His deity solely of Himself,' *Val. Gentilis impietatum brevis explic.* (*Calv. Opp.* Amsted. 1667, VIII, p. 572). 'The essence of the Son has no principium, but the principium of the Person is God Himself' (*loc. cit.*, p. 573). 'We concede that the Son takes origin from the Father, so far as He is Son, but it is an origin not of time, nor of essence, . . . but of order only' (*l. c.*, p. 580)." "2. 'Unless moreover the Son is God along with the Father, a plurality of Gods will necessarily be brought in' (*Ep. ad Fratres Polonos*, p. 591). Accordingly Calvin called the "Deus de Deo" a "hard saying". Against him see Petau, *de theol. dogm.*, II,

The note of simplification is struck at the outset of the discussion when Calvin announces it as his intention to seek "a short and easy definition which shall preserve us from all error" (I. xiii. 2, *ad init.*). What the short and easy definition which he had in mind included is suggested when he tells us later (20) that "when we profess to believe in one God, under the name of God is to be understood the single and simple essence in which we comprehend three persons or hypostases". He accordingly expresses pleasure in the definition of Tertullian, when properly understood, that "there is in God a certain disposition or economy, which in no respect derogates from the unity of the essence" (6, *ad fin.*); and frankly declares that for him the whole substance of the doctrine is included in the simple statement "that the Father and the Son and the Spirit are one God; and yet neither is the Son the Father nor the Spirit the Son, but they are distinct by a certain property" (5). Similar simple forms of statement are thickly scattered through the discussion. "God so predicates Himself to be one", he says at its outset, "that He propones Himself to be considered in three Persons" (2, *ad init.*). "There truly subsist in the one God, or what is the same thing, in the unity of God", he says again, "a trinity of Persons" (4, *ad fin.*). "There are three *proprietaes* in God" (*ibid.*). "In the one essence of God, there is a Trinity of Persons, and these are consubstantial" (5, *ad fin.*). "In the divine essence there exist three Persons, in whom the one God is cognized" (16). "There is a Trinity of Persons contained in the one God, not a trinity of Gods" (25). It is quite clear, not only from the frequency with which he lapses into such brief formulas, but also from the distinctness with which he declares that they contain all that is essential to the doctrine of the Trinity (*e. g.*, § 5), that in Calvin's habitual thought of the Trinity it lay summed up in his mind in these simple facts: there is

lib. III, c. 3, §§ 2, 3. On the other hand, Bellarmine acknowledges that in the maintenance of the *ἀνθρωπότης* of the Son there is no real departure from the doctrine of the Church."

but one God; the Father, the Son, the Spirit is each this one God, the entire divine essence being in each; these three are three Persons, distinguished one from another by an incommunicable property.⁶⁰

Calvin's main interest among the elements of this simple doctrine of the Trinity obviously lay in his profound sense of the consubstantiality of the Persons. Whatever the Father is as God, that the Son and the Spirit are also. The Son—and, of course, also the Spirit—contains in Himself the whole essence of God, not part of it only nor by deflection, but in complete perfection (§ 2). What the Father is, reappears therefore in its totality (*se totum*) in the Son and in the Spirit. This is a mere corollary of their community in the numerically one essence. If the "entire nature" (*tota natura*, § 19) is included in each, it necessarily carries with it all the qualities by which it is made this particular nature which we call divine. Calvin is accordingly never weary of asserting that every divine attribute, in the height of its meaning, is manifested as fully in the Son—and, of course, also in the Spirit—as in the Father. In this indeed lay for him the very nerve of the doctrine of the Trinity. And in it, consistently carried out, lies the contribution which he made to the clear apprehension and formulation of that doctrine. For, strange as it may seem, theologians at large had been accustomed to apply the principle of consubstantiality to the Persons of the Trinity up to Calvin's vigorous assertion of it, with some at least apparent reserves. And when he applied it without reserve it struck

⁶⁰ Cf. *Adv. P. Caroli Calumnias* (*Opp.* vii, p. 212): "Yet in that one essence of God we acknowledge the Father with His eternal Word and Spirit. In using this distinction, however, we do not imagine three Gods, as if the Father were some other thing than the Son, nor yet do we understand them to be naked epithets, by which God is variously designated from His actions; but, along with the ecclesiastical writers, we perceive in the simple unity of God these three hypostases, that is subsistences, which although they coexist in one essence are not to be confused with each other. Accordingly, though the Father is one God with His Word and Spirit, the Father is not the Word, nor the Word the Spirit."

many as a startling novelty if not a heretical pravity. The reason why the consubstantiality of the Persons of the Trinity, despite its establishment in the Arian controversy and its incorporation in the Nicene formulary as the very hinge of orthodoxy, was so long in coming fully to its rights in the general apprehension was no doubt that Nicene orthodoxy preserved in its modes of stating the doctrine of the Trinity some remnants of the conception and phraseology proper to the older prolationism of the Logos Christology, and these, although rendered innocuous by the explanations of the Nicene fathers and practically antiquated since Augustine, still held their place formally and more or less conditioned the thought of men—especially those who held the doctrine of the Trinity in a more or less traditional manner. The consequence was that when Calvin taught the doctrine in its purity and free from the leaven of subordinationism which still found a lurking place in current thought and speech, he seemed violently revolutionary to men trained in the old forms of speech and imbued with the old modes of conception, and called out reprobation in the most unexpected quarters.

Particular occasion of offense was given by Calvin's ascription of "self-existence" (aseity, *αὐτοουσία*) to the Son, and the consequent designation of Him by the term *αὐτόθεος*. This term, which became famous in later controversy as designating Calvin's doctrine of Christ, seems, however, to have come forward only in the latest years of his life, in the dispute with Valentinus Gentilis (1558, 1561); and indeed to be rather Gentilis' word than Calvin's. Calvin, indeed, does not appear to have himself employed it, but only to have reclaimed it for Christ (and the Spirit) when Gentilis asserted that it was exclusively God the Father who could be so designated. "The Father alone", said Gentilis, "is *αὐτόθεος*, that is, essentiated by no superior divinity; but is God *a se ipso*"; "the *λόγος* of God is not that one *αὐτόθεος* whose *λόγος* it is; neither is the Spirit of God that immense and eternal Spirit whose Spirit it is".⁶¹ Such assertions,

⁶¹ *Expositio impietatis Valentini Gentilis*, 1561 (*Opp.* ix, pp. 374, 380).

declares Calvin, are against all Scripture, which makes Christ very God: for what is more proper to God than to exist (*vivere*), and what else is *αὐτοουσία* than this?"⁶² But the thing represented by the term—"self-existence"—Calvin asserts of Christ from the beginning of his activity as a Christian teacher. It does not seem to be explicitly declared of Christ that He is self-existent, indeed, in the first edition of the *Institutes* (1536), although it is already implied there too, not only in the general vigor with which the absolute deity of Christ is asserted with all its implications, but also in the identification of Christ with Jehovah, which was to Calvin the especial vehicle of his representation of Him as the self-existent God. "That name which the Jews call ineffable is attributed to the Son in Jeremiah" (Jer. xxiii. 33),⁶³ he already here tells us. In the spring of the following year,⁶⁴ however, at the councils held within a few days of one another respectively at Lausanne and Bern, our Lord's self-existence was fairly enunciated in so many words in the statement of his faith which Calvin made in rebuttal of the charges of Caroli. He begins with a very clear exposition of the doctrine of the Trinity, and then comes to speak of what peculiarly concerns Christ, adverting especially to His two natures. "For", he continues, "before He assumed flesh He was the eternal Word itself, begotten by the Father before the ages, very God, of one essence, power, majesty with the Father, and indeed Jehovah Himself, *who has always had it of Himself that He should be and has inspired the power of subsisting in others.*"⁶⁵

⁶² *Ibid.*, Preface, p. 368. Cf. Beza in his Life of Calvin, who speaks of Gentilis under the year 1558 and describes him as wishing to make the Father alone *αὐτόθεος* (*Opp.* xxi, p. 154). These four references (ix. 368, 374, 380; xxi. 154) are all that are given in the Index to the Strasburg ed. (xxii. 493—this word does not occur in the Index of voll. xxiii sq.) of Calvin's works under the word *αὐτόθεος*.

⁶³ *Opp.* i, p. 58, at bottom of column.

⁶⁴ May 14 and 31, 1537.

⁶⁵ *Opp.* vii, p. 314: qui a se ipso semper habuit ut esset, et aliis subsistendi virtutem inspiravit. Cf. ix. 707; x. 107, 121. Cf. Ruchat, *Histoire*

Caroli at once seized upon this declaration, and complained that therein "Christ was set forth as Jehovah, as if He had His essence of Himself (*a se ipso*)".⁶⁶ From this beginning rose the controversy. For in this one of his "calumnies" Caroli found some following, and Calvin was worried by petty attacks upon this element of his teaching through a series of years.⁶⁷

Calvin apparently was somewhat astonished by the pother which was raised over an assertion which seemed to him not only a very natural one to make, but also a very necessary one to make if the true deity of our Lord is to be defended. He calls this particular one of Caroli's assaults the "most atrocious" of all his calumnies, and he betrays some irritation at the repetition of it by others. One effect of it was, however, to make him see that, although it might seem to him a matter of course to speak of Christ as the self-existent God, it was not a matter which could be taken for granted, but needed assertion and defense. He inserted, therefore, in the *Institutes* of 1539 (second edition) a clear declaration on the subject, which, with only the adduction of some additional support chiefly drawn from Augustine (inserted in 1543 and 1559), was retained throughout the subsequent editions. "Moreover", says he in this passage, "the absolutely simple unity of God is so far from being impeded by this distinction, that it rather affords a proof that the Son is one God with the Father, because He possesses one and the same Spirit with Him: while the Spirit is not another Being diverse from the Father and the Son, because He is the Spirit of the Father and of the Son. For *de la reformation de la Suisse*, 1727 sq., V., pp. 27-28; Bähler, as cited, p. 75; and also Merle D'Aubigné, *Hist. of the Ref. in Europe in the Time of Calvin*, E. T., VI, p. 316.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 315.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 322: "But the most atrocious calumny of all is where he impugns this statement: that Christ always had it of Himself that He should be; in which he has been followed by some others, men of no account, who, however, worry good men with their improbity; in the number of whom is a certain rogue (*furcifer*) very like himself (Caroli), who calles himself Cortesius."

in each hypostasis the whole nature is understood, along with that which is present to each one as His propriety. The Father is as a whole (*totus*) in the Son, the Son as a whole in the Father, as He Himself also asserts: 'I in the Father and the Father in me'; and that one is not separated from another by any difference of essence is conceded by the ecclesiastical writers.⁶⁸ By this understanding the opinions of the fathers are to be conciliated, which otherwise would seem altogether at odds with one another. For they teach now that the Father is the principium of the Son; and now they assert that the Son has from Himself (*a se ipso*) both divinity and essence.⁶⁹ When, however, the Sabellians raise a cavil that God is called now Father, now Son, now Spirit, in no way differently from His being named both strong and good and wise and merciful, they may easily be refuted from this,—that these manifestly are epithets which show what God is with respect to us, while the others are names which declare what He is really with respect to Himself. Neither ought anyone to be moved to confound the Spirit with the Father and the Son, because God announces Himself as a whole to be a Spirit (Jno. ix. 24). For there is no

⁶⁸ References to Augustine and Cyril are given in the margin: and in 1543 the following is inserted here in the text: "'By these appellations which denote distinctions', says Augustine, 'what is signified is a reciprocal relation; not the substance itself which is one.'"

⁶⁹ In 1543 there was added: "and therefore is one principium with the Father. The cause of this diversity, Augustine explains well and perspicuously in another place, speaking as follows: 'Christ with reference to Himself (*ad se*) is called God; with reference to the Father (*ad patrem*) is called Son.' And again 'The Father *ad se* is called God, *ad filium* is called Father'. What is called Father *ad filium* is not the Son; what is called Son *ad patrem* is not the Father: what is called Father *ad se*, and Son *ad se* is the same God.' When therefore we speak *simpliciter* of the Son without respect to the Father, we well and properly assert Him to be *a se*, and therefore call Him the unique principium. When, however, we are noting the relation in which He stands to the Father, we properly make the Father the principium of the Son." To this there is further added in 1559: "To the explication of this matter the fifth book of Augustine's *De Trinitate*, is wholly devoted. It is far safer to rest in that relation which he teaches, than by more subtly penetrating into the divine mystery to wander through many vain speculations." And with these words the paragraph closes in 1559.

reason why the whole essence of God should not be spiritual, and in that Spirit the Father, Son and Spirit be comprehended. And this very thing is made clear by the Scriptures. For as we hear God called a Spirit in them, so also we hear the Holy Spirit spoken of, and that both as God's Spirit and as from God."⁷⁰

Calvin was not permitted, however, to content himself with this brief positive declaration. A running fire was kept up upon his assertion of self-existence for Christ by two pastors of Neuchatel and its neighboring country, Jean Chaponneau (Capunculus) and Jean Courtois (Cortesius)—the latter of whom had married the daughter of Chaponneau's wife.⁷¹ Calvin was disposed at first to treat their criticism lightly, but was ultimately driven to give it serious attention. Writing to the Neuchatel ministers regarding certain articles which Courtois had drawn up,—with the help, as was understood, of Chaponneau,—Calvin remarks that he sees no reason for supposing them directed as a whole against him. One of them, however, he recognizes as having him in view,—that one in which, "as from a tripod", the writer pronounces heretics those who say that "Christ, as He is God, is *a se ipso*". "The answer", he declares, "is easy. First let him tell me whether Christ is true and perfect God. Unless he wishes to parcel out the essence of God, he must confess that the whole of it is in Christ. And Paul's words are express: that 'in Him dwelleth the fullness of the Godhead'. Again I ask, 'Is that fullness of the Godhead from Himself or from some other source'? But he will object that the Son is of the Father. Who denies it? That I, for one, have not only always acknowledged, but even proclaimed. But this is where these donkeys deceive themselves: because they do not consider

⁷⁰ *Opp.* i, p. 491.

⁷¹ See Haag, *sub. nom.*, "Chaponneau", ed. 2, vol. iii, p. 1084: "Shortly afterwards Chaponneau married; he married a widow whose daughter soon became the wife in turn of the Pastor John Courtois, known by some disputes that he had with Calvin. Chaponneau no more than his son-in-law hesitated to enter the lists with Calvin. The quarrel had its rise from a question relating to the person of Jesus . . . "

that the name of Son is spoken of the Person, and therefore is included in the predicament of relation, which relation has no place where we are speaking simply (*simpliciter*) of the divinity of Christ."⁷² In support of this distinction he then quotes Augustine, and proceeds to cite Cyril on the main point at issue,—passages to which we shall revert in the sequel. This letter was written at the end of May, 1543, and later in the year we find Calvin holding a conference with Courtois, the course of which he reports to the Neuchatel ministers in a letter written in November.⁷³ Courtois went away, however, still unconvinced, and Calvin found himself compelled not many months later (opening of 1545) to write to the Neuchatel pastors again at length on the subject, under considerable irritation.⁷⁴ "This", he here declares, "is the state of the controversy (*status controversiae*): Whether it may be truly predicated of Christ, that He is, as He is God, *a se ipso*?" This Capunculus denies. Why? Because the name of Christ designates the Second Person in the Godhead, who stands in relation to the Father. I confess that if respect be had to the Person, we ought not so to speak. But I say we are not speaking of the Person but of the essence. I hold that the Holy Spirit is the real (*idoneum* = proper) author of this manner of speaking, since He refers to Christ all the declarations in which *αὐτοουσία* is predicated of God, as in other passages, so in the first chapter of the Epistle to the Hebrews. . . . He (Capunculus) contends that Christ, because He is of the substance of the Father, is not *a se ipso*, since He has a principium from another. This I allow to him of the Person. What more does he want? . . . I confess that the Son of God is of the Father. Accordingly, since the Person has a cause (*ratio*), I confess that He is not *a se ipso*. But when we are speaking, apart from consideration of the Person, of His divinity or simply of the essence, which is

⁷² *Opp.* xi, p. 560, Letter 474.

⁷³ *Opp.* xi, p. 652, Letter 521.

⁷⁴ *Opp.* xii, p. 16, Letter 607; cf. the letter of Capunculus, *Opp.* xi, p. 781, Letter 590.

the same thing, I say that it is rightly predicated of Him that He is *a se ipso*. For who, heretofore, has denied that under the name of Jehovah, there is included the declaration of *αὐτοουσία*?" . . .

It was, however, in his *Defence Against the Calumnies of Peter Caroli*, which was sent out in 1545 in reply to a new "libel" put forth by Caroli early that year,⁷⁵ that Calvin speaks most at large on this subject, gathering up into this one defense, indeed, all the modes of statement and forms of argument he had hitherto worked out. He regards Caroli's strictures upon his assertion of Christ's self-existence as the most atrocious of all his calumnies, and prefixes to his discussion of them a citation of his own explanation of the matter, which he calls a "brief and naked explication". This runs as follows: "When we are speaking of the divinity of Christ all that is proper to God is rightly ascribed to Him, because respect is there had to the Divine essence and no question is raised as to the distinction which

⁷⁵ The *Defensio* was pseudonymously published under the name of Nicholas des Gallars, Calvin's secretary. Bähler, as cited, pp. 153 *sq.*, judges it very unfavorably and sharply criticises the advantage taken of its pseudonymity and its inaccuracies, as well as its harshness of tone. "The number of Calvin's polemical writings", says he, "is great, and they are all master-works of their order. . . . No other, however, surpasses the *Defensio* in harshness and bitterness. It is all in all, scarcely a happy creation of Calvin's. . . . From the standpoint of literary history the *Defensio* indisputably deserves unrestricted praise. The elegant, crisp style, the skill with which the author not only morally annihilates his opponent, but puts upon him the stamp of an impertinent person not to be taken seriously, and permeates all with the most sovereign scorn, makes the reading of this book, now nearly four hundred years old, an aesthetic enjoyment, which obscures the protest of righteous indignation at the startling injustices and glaring untruths which the author has permitted himself against Caroli. No doubt Calvin's conduct, if it cannot be excused, may yet to a certain degree be understood, when we reflect that Caroli, through almost ten years, had brought to the Reformer of Geneva incessant annoyances and the most bitter mortification, and by his accusations had imperilled his life-work as perhaps no other antagonist had been able to do" (p. 159). Compare the more measured censure of A. Lang (*Johannes Calvin*, 1909, p. 42) of the harshness of tone and opprobrious language used towards Caroli, in contrast with the high praise given the three Reformers—"when, although it was questionless written by Calvin himself, it was published in the name of his amanuensis, Nicholas des Gallars".

exists between the Father and the Son. In this sense it is true to say that Christ is the One and Eternal God, existing of Himself (*a se ipso existantem*). Nor can it be objected to this statement,—what certainly is also taught by the ecclesiastical writers,—that the Word or Son of God is of the Father (*a Patre*), even with respect to His eternal essence; since there is a notation of Persons, when there is commemorated a distinction of the Son from the Father. But what I have been speaking of is the divinity, in which is embraced not less the Father and the Spirit than the Son. So Cyril, who is often wont to call the Father the principium of the Son, holds it in the highest degree absurd for the Son not to be believed to have life and immortality of Himself (*a se ipso*). He also teaches that if it is proper to the ineffable nature to be self-existent (*a se ipso*), this is rightly ascribed to the Son. And moreover in the tenth book of his *Thesaurus*, he argues that the Father has nothing of Himself (*a se ipso*) which the Son does not have of Himself (*a se ipso*).⁷⁶ From this beginning, he proceeds to elucidate the whole subject, drawing freely upon all that he had previously written upon it. The note of the discussion is given in the words: "I assert both truths—both that Christ is of the Father as He is the second Person, and that He is of Himself (*a se ipso*) if we have respect to the Divine essence *simpliciter*"—a declaration which he supports from the Fathers, particularly Augustine, thus: "Similarly Augustine (*Sermo*. 38 "de tempore"): 'Those names which signify the substance or essence of God, or whatever God is said to be in Himself (*ad se*), belong equally to all the Persons. There is not, therefore, any name of nature which can so belong to the Father that it may not belong also to the Son, or Holy Spirit.'" The whole is brought to a conclusion by a passage the substance of which we have already had before us, but which seems worth quoting again that its force may be appreciated in its new setting: "I confess that if respect be had to the Person we ought not so to speak, but I say we are not speaking of the Person but of the

⁷⁶ *Opp.* vii, p. 322.

essence. I hold that the Holy Spirit is the real author of this manner of speaking, since He refers to Christ all the declarations in which *αὐτοουσία* is predicated of God, as well in other passages, as in the first chapter of the Epistle to the Hebrews. . . . They contend that Christ, because He is of (*ex*) the substance of the Father, is not of Himself (*a se ipso*), since He has His principium from another. This I allow to them of the Person. What more do they ask? I acknowledge, then, that the Son of God is of the Father, and when we are speaking of the Person I acknowledge that He is not of Himself. But when, apart from consideration of the Person, we are speaking of His divinity, or which is the same thing *simpliciter* of the essence, I say that it is truly predicated of it that it is *a se ipso*. For who hitherto has denied of the name Jehovah, that it includes the declaration of *αὐτοουσία*? When, then, they object that the Son is of the Father, that I not only willingly acknowledge, but have even continually proclaimed. But here is where these donkeys are in error,—that they do not consider that the name of Son is spoken of the Person, and is therefore contained in the predication of relation; which relation has no place when we are talking of Christ's divinity *simpliciter*. And Augustine discourses eloquently on this matter" . . . quoting the passages from Augustine to which we have already made reference.⁷⁷

That Calvin let the paragraph he had prepared on this subject for the second edition of his *Institutes* (1539) stand practically unchanged—strengthened only by a couple of passages cited from Augustine—in the editions of 1543 and 1550, may be taken as indication that he supposed that what he had brought together in his *Defense against the Calumnies of Caroli* (1545), incorporating as it does the essence of former expositions and defenses, was a sufficient exposition of the subject and defense of his point of view. In the meantime, however, the troubles in the Italian church in Geneva had broken out, culminating after a while in the

⁷⁷ *Opp.* vii, p. 323.

controversies with Valentinus Gentilis (1558), in which new occasion was given for asserting the self-existence of Christ, and this brought it about that something more on this subject was incorporated into the *Institutes* of 1559. The positive statement was left, indeed, much as it had been given form in the *Institutes* of 1539 (§ 19): but in the long defense of the doctrine of the Trinity against Gentilis and his congeners with which the discussion of the doctrine closes in this edition much more is added on the self-existence of Christ. As over against these opponents the especial point in the doctrine of the Trinity which required defense was the true deity of the second and third Persons. On this defense Calvin entered *con amore*, for he ever showed himself, as he had himself expressed it, a "detester as sacrilegious of all who have sought to overturn or to minimise or to obscure the truth of the divine majesty which is in Christ".⁷⁸ The God whom Isaiah saw in the Temple (vi. 1), he says, John (xii. 14) declares to have been Christ; the God whom the same Isaiah declares shall be a rock of offense to the Jews (viii. 14) Paul pronounces to be Christ (Rom. ix. 33); the God to whom the same Isaiah asserts every knee shall bow (xlv. 23), Paul tells us is Christ (Rom. xiv. 11); the God whom the Psalmist proclaims as laying the foundations of the earth and whom all angels shall worship (Ps. cii. 25, xlvii. 7) the Epistle to the Hebrews identifies with Christ (i. 6, 10). Now, continues Calvin, in every one of these passages it is the name "Jehovah" which is used, and that carries with it the self-existence of Christ with respect to His deity.⁷⁹ "For if He is Jehovah, it cannot be denied that He is the same God who elsewhere cries through Isaiah (xliv. 6), 'I, I am, and besides me there is no God'. We must also weigh", he adds, "that declaration of Jeremiah (x. 11): 'the gods which have not made the heaven and the earth shall perish from the earth which is under heaven'; while on the other hand

⁷⁸ *Opp.* vii, p. 314.

⁷⁹ *Opp.* ii, p. 110; *Institutes*, 1559, I. xiii. 23: nam quum ubique ponatur nomen Jehovah, sequitur deitatis respectu ex se ipso esse.

it must be acknowledged that it is the Son of God whose deity is often proved by Isaiah from the creation of the world. But how shall the Creator who gives being to all things not be self-existent (*ex se ipso*) but derive His essence from another? For whoever says the Son is essentiated by the Father, denies that He is of Himself (*a se ipso*). But the Holy Spirit cries out against this by naming Him Jehovah." "The deity, therefore, we affirm", he says a little later,⁸⁰ "to be absolutely self-existent (*ex se ipso*). Whence we acknowledge the Son, too, as He is God, to be self-existent (*ex se ipso*), when reference to His Person is not present: while, as He is Son, we say He is of the Father. Thus the essence is without principium; but the principium of the Person is God Himself."

It does not seem necessary, however, to multiply citations. Enough have already been adduced, doubtless, to illustrate the clearness, iterance and emphasis with which Calvin asserted the self-existence of Christ as essential to His complete deity; and at least to suggest his mode of conceiving the Trinity in accordance with this emphasis on the absolute equality, or rather, let us say, identity of the three Persons of the Godhead in their deity. His conception involved, of course, a strongly emphasized distinction between the essence and the Personality. In essence the three Persons are numerically one: the whole essence belongs to each Person:⁸¹ the whole essence, of course, with all its properties, which are only its peculiarities as an essence and are inseparable from it just because they are not other substances but only qualities. In person, however, the three Persons are numerically three, and are as distinct from one another as the distinguishing qualities by which one is the Father, another the Son and the third the Spirit. In these facts Calvin found the essence of the doctrine of the Trinity, and in accordance with his professed purpose to find a brief and

⁸⁰ P. 113: I. xiii. 25.

⁸¹ Cf. I. xiii. 2: The Son contains in Himself the whole essence of God: not a part of it only, nor by deflection only, but *in integra perfectione*.

easy definition of the Trinity we may say that in these facts are summed up all he held to be necessary to a doctrine of the Trinity.

Nevertheless Calvin's conception of the Trinity, if we cannot exactly say necessarily included, yet in point of fact included, more than this. It included the postulation of an "order" in the Persons of the Trinity, by which the Father is first, the Son second, and the Spirit third. And it included a doctrine of generation and procession by virtue of which the Son as Son derives from the Father, and the Spirit as Spirit derives from the Father and the Son. Perhaps this aspect of his conception of the Trinity is nowhere more succinctly expressed than in a passage in the eighteenth section of this chapter (xiii). Here he explicitly declares that "although the eternity of the Father is the eternity of the Son and Spirit also, since God could never be without His Wisdom and Power,—and in eternity there is no question of first and last,—it is nevertheless not vain or superfluous to observe an *order* [in the three Persons], since the Father is enumerated as the first, next the Son *ex eo*, and afterwards the Spirit *ex utroque*. For everyone's mind instinctively inclines to consider God first, then the Wisdom emerging from Him, and finally the Power by which He executes the decrees of His counsel. For this reason the Son is said to come forth (*exsistere*) from the Father (*a Patre*), the Spirit alike from the Father and the Son." The intimations which are here brought together are often repeated. Thus, for example: "For since the properties in the Persons bear an order, so that in the Father is the *principium et origo* . . . the *ratio ordinis* is held, which, however, in no respect derogates from the deity of the Son and Spirit" (§ 20). Again: "But from the Scriptures we teach that *essentialiter* there is but one God, and therefore the essence as well of the Son as of the Spirit is unbegotten (*ingenitum*). Yet inasmuch as (*quatenus*) the Father is first in order and has begotten His own Wisdom *ex se*, He is justly (as we have just said) considered the

principium et fons of the whole divinity" (§ 28). Again, although he "pronounces it a detestable figment that the essence is the property of the Father alone as if He were the *deificator* of the Son", he yet "acknowledges that *ratione ordinis et gradus*, the *principium divinitatis* is in the Father" (§ 24). "The Father is the fountain of the deity, not with respect of the essence, but the order" (§ 26). And because the Father is thus the *fons et principium deitatis* (§ 23) from whom (*ex quo*, § 18) there have come forth (*existere*, § 18) the Son and afterwards from the Son along with the Father the Spirit (§ 18 *ex utroque*), there is involved here a doctrine of an eternal generation of the Son and procession of the Spirit. Both are repeatedly asserted. Of the Son, for example, we read: "It is necessary to understand that the Word was begotten of the Father (*genitum ex Patre*) before time (*ante secula*) (§ 7); "we conclude again, therefore, that the Word, before the beginning of time, was conceived (*conceptum*) by God (§ 8); "He is the Son of God, because He is the Word begotten of the Father (*genitus a Patre*) before the ages (*secula*)" (§ 23); "He is called the Son of God, . . . inasmuch as He was begotten of the Father (*genitus a Patre*) before the ages (*secula*)" (§ 24).⁸²

Although such passages, however,—and they are very numerous, or we may perhaps better say, pervasive, in Calvin's discussion of the Trinity,—make it perfectly plain that he taught a doctrine of order and grade in the Persons of the Trinity, involving a doctrine of the derivation—and that, of course, before all time—of the second and third Persons from the first as the fountain and origin of deity, it is important for a correct understanding of his conception

⁸² Already in the *first* edition of the *Institutes* this phraseology is fixed; *Opp.* I, p. 64: "By which we confess that we believe in Jesus Christ, who, we are convinced, is the unique Son of God the Father, not like believers by adoption and grace only, but naturally as begotten from eternity by the Father." So p. 62: "The Word of the Father—not such as men speak or think, but eternal and unchangeable, as emerging in an ineffable manner from the Father."

that we should attend to the distinctions by which he guarded his meaning. Of course, he did not teach that the essence of the Son or of the Spirit is the product of their generation or procession. It had been traditional in the Church from the beginning of the Trinitarian controversies to explain that generation and procession concerned only the Persons of the Son and Spirit;⁸³ and Calvin availed himself of this traditional understanding. "The essence, as well of the Son as of the Spirit, is unbegotten (*ingenitum*)" (§ 25). "The essence of the Son has no *principium*, but God Himself is the *principium* of His Person" (§ 25). The matter does not require elaboration here, both because this is obviously the natural view for Calvin to present and hence goes without saying, and because his mode of presenting and arguing it has been sufficiently illustrated in passages already cited.⁸⁴ There is another distinction he ap-

⁸³ Cf. De Moor, in *Marckii Compend.*, I, p. 735: "The Nicene fathers had reference to nothing but the personal order of subsistence when they said the Son is 'God of God, Light of Light'; while, considered absolutely and essentially, the Son is the same God with the Father." This is expressed by Dr. Shedd with his wonted clearness and emphasis as follows (*A History of Christian Doctrine*, 1873, I, pp. 339 sq.): "The Nicene Trinitarians rigorously confined the ideas of 'Sonship' and 'generation' to the hypostatical character. It is not the essence of the Deity that is generated, but a *distinction* in that essence. And, in like manner, the term 'procession' applied to the Holy Spirit pertains exclusively to the third hypostasis, and has no application to the substance of the Godhead. The term 'begotten' in the Nicene trinitarianism is descriptive only of *that which is peculiar to the second Person, and confined to Him*. The Son is generated with respect only to His Sonship, or, so to speak, His individuality (*ἰδιότης*), but is not generated with respect to His essence or nature. . . . The same *mutatis mutandis* is true of the term 'procession'. . . . Thus, from first to last, in the Nicene construction of the doctrine of the Trinity, the terms 'beget', 'begotten', and 'proceed', are confined to the hypostatical distinctions, and have no legitimate or technical meaning, when applied to the Trinity as a whole, or, in other words, to the Essence in distinction from the hypostasis." . . . Calvin was fully entitled to avail himself of this distinction, as he fully did so.

⁸⁴ His later Trinitarian controversies with Gentilis and his companions brought out many strong assertions precisely in point. For example, in the discussion in the *Institutes* (I. xiii. 23 sq.), he defines the precise thing he wishes to refute as the representation of the Father as "the

pears to have made, however, which is not so clear. Although he taught that the Son was begotten of the Father, and of course begotten before all time, or as we say from all eternity, he seems to have drawn back from the doctrine of "eternal generation" as it was expounded by the Nicene Fathers. They were accustomed to explain "eternal generation" (in accordance with its very nature as "eternal"), not as something which has occurred once for all at some point of time in the past,—however far back in the past,—but as something which is always occurring, a perpetual movement of the divine essence from the first Person to the second, always complete, never completed.⁸⁵ Calvin seems to have

sole essentiator" who "in forming the Son and the Spirit has transfused His own deity into them" (§ 23); to whom therefore alone the "essence of God belongs" and to whom as "essentiator" the Son and Spirit owe their essence. In opposition to this he declares that "although we confess that in point of order and degree the *principium divinitatis* is in the Father, we nevertheless pronounce it a detestable figment that the essence is the property of the Father alone, as if He were the deificator of the Son; because in this way either the essence would be multiplex or the Son would be called God only in a titular and imaginary sense. If they allow that the Son is God but second from the Father, then the essence will be in Him *genita et formata*, which is in the Father *ingenita et informis*" (§ 24, near end). "We teach from the Scriptures", he explains (§ 25, beginning) "that there is one God in point of essence (*essentialiter*), and therefore the essence of both Son and Spirit is *ingenita*. But inasmuch as the Father is first in order and has begotten from Himself (*genuit ex se*) His own Wisdom, He is rightly considered, as I have just said, the *principium et fons totius divinitatis*. Thus God indefinitely is *ingenitus*; and the Father with regard to His Person also is *ingenitus*." Calvin's weapon against the tritheists, therefore, was precisely that the essence of God, whether in the first, second or third Person, is not generated: that it is only the Person which is generated, and that, strictly speaking, only the Person of the Son,—the Person of the Father being ingenerate, and it being more proper to speak of the Person of the Spirit as 'proceeding'. This is merely, however, the traditional representation, utilized by Calvin, not a new view of his own.

⁸⁵ Cf. Sheldon, *Hist. of Christian Doctrine*, I, p. 202: "Like Origen, the Nicene fathers seem to have conceived of the generation, not as something accomplished once for all, but as something parallel with the eternal life of the Son, ever complete and ever continued." Also, Shedd, *A History of Christian Doctrine*, I, p. 317: "Eternal generation is an immanent perpetual activity in an ever existing essence."

found this conception difficult, if not meaningless. In the closing words of the discussion of the Trinity in the *Institutes*⁸⁶ he classes it among the speculations which impose unnecessary burdens on the mind. "For what is the profit", he asks, "of disputing whether the Father always generates (*semper generet*), seeing that it is fatuous to imagine a continuous act of generating (*continuus actus generandi*) when it is evident that three Persons have subsisted in God from eternity?" His meaning appears to be that the act of generation must have been completed from all eternity, since its product has existed complete from all eternity, and therefore it is meaningless to speak of it as continually proceeding. If this is the meaning of his remark, it is a definite rejection of the Nicene speculation of "eternal generation". But this is very far from saying that it is a rejection of the Nicene Creed—or even of the assertion in this Creed to the effect that the Son is "God of God". We have just seen that Calvin explicitly teaches the "eternal generation" of the Son, in the sense that He was begotten by the Father before all time. It manifestly was a matter of fixed belief with him. He does indeed refuse to find proof texts for it in many of the passages which it had been the custom to cite in evidence of it.⁸⁷ But he does not therefore feel that he lacks adequate proof of it. There is one argument for it,

⁸⁶ I. xiii. 29, *ad fin.*

⁸⁷ Of this Scholten, *De Leer der Hervormde Kerk*, ed. 4, II, p. 237 (*cf.* I. 24, II. 229) makes great capital. In the middle edd. of the *Institutes*, I, p. 483, however, Calvin in the very act of discarding these texts as proof asserts his firm belief in the fact of the Divine Sonship of our Lord, as is immediately to be shown. On Calvin's clear-sightedness and critical honesty in dealing with such texts Baumgartner has some good remarks (*Calvin Hébraïsant*, 1889, pp. 37, 38). He illustrates the scandal it created at the time among those accustomed to rely on these texts by citing Aegidius Hunnius' book with the portentous title: *Calvinus judaizans, hoc est: Judaicae glossae et corruptelae quibus Johannes Calvinus illustrissima Scripturae sacrae loca et testimonia de gloriosa trinitate, deitate Christi et Spiritus Sancti, cum primis autem vaticinia prophetarum de adventu Messiae, nativitate ejus passione et resurrectione, ascensione in coelos et sessione ad dextram Dei, detestandum in modum corrumpere non exhorruit. Addita est corruptelarum confutatio* (Wittenberg: 1593).

he tells us, which seems to him worth a thousand distorted texts. "It is certain that God is not a Father to men except through the intercession of that only begotten Son, who alone rightly vindicates to Himself this prerogative, and by whose beneficence it derives to us. But God always wished to be called upon by His people by His name of Father: whence it follows that there was already then in existence the Son through whom that relationship was established."⁸⁸ That the Son is "God of God" he is therefore as fully convinced as the Nicene fathers themselves. When, then, he criticises the formulas of the Nicene Creed, "God of God, Light of Light, very God of very God", as repetitious, this is a criticism of the form, not of the content of this statement.⁸⁹ And when he speaks of the "Deus de Deo" of the Creed as a "hard saying" (*dura locutio*), he by no means denies that it is "true and useful", in the sense its framers put on it, in the sense, that is, that the Son has His *principium* merely as Son in the Father, but only means that the form of the statement is inexact—the term "Deus" requiring to be taken in each case of its occurrence in a non-natural personal sense—and that, being inexact, it is liable to be misused in the interests of a created God, in the sense of Gentilis, and must therefore be carefully explained.⁹⁰ His position is, in a word, that of one who

⁸⁸ Middle edd. of *Institutes*, *Opp.* I, p. 483.

⁸⁹ *Opp.* vii, p. 315, where it is explicitly declared that he had no intention of derogating from the symbol: *cf.* p. 316.

⁹⁰ Preface to the *Expositio impietatis Val. Gentilis*, 1561 (*Opp.* ix, p. 368): "But the words of the Council of Nice run: Deum esse de Deo. A hard saying (*dura locutio*), I confess; but for removing its ambiguity no one can be a more suitable interpreter than Athanasius, who dictated it. And certainly the design of the fathers was no other than to maintain the origin which the Son draws from the Father in respect of Person, without in any way opposing the sameness of the essence and deity in the two, so that as to essence the Word is God *absque principio*, while in Person the Son has His principium from the Father." Petavius' criticism is therefore wide of the mark when (*De Trinitate*, III. iii. 2, ed. Paris, 1865, pt. II, p. 523; *cf.* also Bellarmine, *De Christo*, Preface, *Opp.* as cited, i, p. 244) he declares that Calvin "speaks rashly and altogether untheologically (*temere et prorsus atheologēτως*)" when

affirms the eternal generation of the Son, but who rejects the speculations of the Nicene Fathers respecting the nature of the act which they called "eternal generation" It is enough, he says in effect, to believe that the Son derives from the Father, the Spirit from the Father and the Son, without encumbering ourselves with a speculation upon the nature of the eternally generating act to which these hypostases are referred. It is interesting to observe that Calvin's attitude upon these matters is precisely repeated by Dr. Charles Hodge in his discussion in his *Systematic Theology*.⁹¹ It seems to be exactly Calvin's point of view to which Dr. Hodge gives expression when he writes: "A distinction must be made between the Nicene Creed (as amplified in that of Constantinople) and the doctrine of the Nicene Fathers. The creeds are nothing more than the well-ordered arrangement of the facts of Scripture which concern the doctrine of the Trinity. They assert the distinct personality of the Father, Son and Spirit; their mutual

he calls this locution '*hard*', because he supposes that Christ, as He is God is *a se ipso*, i. e., *αὐτῷθεῷ*." But Calvin (who certainly does believe that Christ is self-existent God and therefore may properly be called *αὐτῷθεῷ*), does not find the locution *Deus de* (or *ex*) *Deo* "*hard*" (*dura*) on that account: he thoroughly believes both in the *θεὸς ἐκ θεοῦ* of the Creed and in the *αὐτοθεΐτης* of Christ, and found no difficulty whatever in harmonizing them. When he pronounces this locution '*harsh*' his mind is on the possibility of its misuse by the Anti-trinitarians as if it meant that the Son was *made God* by the Father. When, therefore, Petavius adds (§ 3, p. 524): "So then, the locution, *God is from God*, is not only true but useful (*proba*) and consentaneous to Christian teaching; not as the Autotheani and Calvinists ignorantly babble, *hard*"—he says no more for the substance of it than Calvin had himself said in the very passage in which he called the locution '*harsh*',—that is to say, that it expresses an important truth, this, to wit, that the Son draws His origin, with respect to His Person, from the Father. No doubt Calvin may also suggest that there might wisely have been chosen a less ambiguous way of saying this than the '*harsh*' locution *Deus de Deo*—which certainly is capable of being misunderstood as teaching that the Son owes His divinity to the Father—as Gentilis taught. See below, note 95.

⁹¹*Systematic Theology*, vol. I, 1874, pp. 462 sq. On pp. 466, 467 he gives a very clear statement of Calvin's position, of which he expresses full approval.

relation as expressed by these terms; their absolute unity as to substance or essence, and their consequent perfect equality; and the subordination of the Son to the Father, and of the Spirit to the Father and Son, as to the mode of subsistence and operation. These are Scriptural facts, to which the creeds in question add nothing; and it is in this sense that they have been accepted by the Church Universal. But the Nicene Fathers did undertake in a greater or less degree to explain these facts. These explanations relate principally to the subordination of the Son and Spirit to the Father, and to what is meant by generation, or the relation between the Father and the Son. . . . As in reference to the subordination of the Son and Spirit to the Father, as asserted in the ancient creeds, it is not to the fact that exception is taken, but to the explanation of that fact, as given by the Nicene fathers, the same is true with regard to the doctrine of Eternal Generation."

The circumstance that Dr. Charles Hodge, writing three centuries afterwards (1559-1871), reproduces precisely Calvin's position may intimate to us something of the historical significance of Calvin's discussion of the Trinity. Clearly Calvin's position did not seem a matter of course, when he first enunciated it. It roused opposition and created a party. But it did create a party: and that party was shortly the Reformed Churches, of which it became characteristic that they held and taught the self-existence of Christ as God and defended therefore the application to Him of the term *αὐτόθεος*; that is to say, in the doctrine of the Trinity they laid the stress upon the equality of the Persons sharing in the same essence, and thus set themselves with more or less absoluteness against all subordinationism in the explanation of the relations of the Persons to one another. When Calvin asserted, with the emphasis which he threw upon it, the self-existence of Christ, he unavoidably did three things. First and foremost, he declared the full and perfect deity of our Lord, in terms which could not be mistaken and could not be explained away. The term *αὐτόθεος* served the

same purpose in this regard that the term *ὁμοούσιος* had served against the Arians and the term *ὑπόστασις* against the Sabellians. No minimizing conception of the deity of Christ could live in the face of the assertion of aseity or *αὐτοθεότης* of Him. This was Calvin's purpose in asserting aseity of Christ and it completely fulfilled itself in the event. In thus fulfilling itself, however, two further effects were unavoidably wrought by it. The inexpugnable opposition of subordinationists of all types was incurred: all who were for any reason or in any degree unable or unwilling to allow to Christ a deity in every respect equal to that of the Father were necessarily offended by the vindication to Him of the ultimate Divine quality of self-existence. And all those who, while prepared to allow true deity to Christ, yet were accustomed to think of the Trinitarian relations along the lines of the traditional Nicene orthodoxy, with its assertion of a certain subordination of the Son to the Father, at least in mode of subsistence, were thrown into more or less confusion of mind and compelled to resort to nice distinctions in order to reconcile the two apparently contradictory confessions of *αὐτοθεότης* and of *θεὸς ἐκ θεοῦ* of our Lord. It is not surprising, then, that the controversy roused by Caroli and carried on by Chaponneau and Courtois did not die out with their refutation; but prolonged itself through the years and has indeed come down even to our own day. Calvin's so-called innovation with regard to the Trinity has, in point of fact, been made the object of attack through three centuries, not only by Unitarians of all types, nor only by professed Subordinationists, but also by Athanasians, puzzled to adjust their confession of Christ as "God of God, Light of Light, very God of very God" to the at least verbally contradictory assertion that in respect of His deity He is not of another but of Himself.

The attack has been especially sharp naturally where the assailants were predisposed to criticism of Calvin on other grounds, as was the case, for example, with Romanists, Lutherans and afterward with Arminians. As was to be ex-

pected, it is found in its most decisive form among the Romanists, and we are afraid we must say with Gomarus that with them it seems to have been urged in the first instance, rather because of a desire to disparage Calvin and the Calvinists than in any distinct doctrinal interest.⁹² The beginning of the assault seems to have been made by Genebrardus, who "in the first book of his treatise on the Trinity, refutes what he calls the heresy of those denominated *Autotheanites*, that is of those who say that Christ is God of Himself (*a se ipso*), not of the Father, attributing this heresy to Calvin and Beza and in the Preface to his work (mistakenly) surmising that Francis Stancarus was the originator of it."⁹³ The way thus opened, however, was largely followed by the whole crowd of Romish controversialists, the most notable of whom in the first age were probably Anthony Possevinus, Alphonsus Salmeron, William Lindanus, Peter Canisius, Dionysius Petavius,⁹⁴ all of whom exhaust the resources of dialectics in the endeavor to fix upon Calvin and his followers a stigma of heresy in the fundamental doctrine of the Trinity. A more honorable

⁹² *Diatrise de Christo autheo*, printed by Voetius, in *Selectae Disputationes Theologicae*, Part I, 1648, p. 445: *calumniandi potius libidine quam erroris cum Arianis societate*.

⁹³ We are quoting from Bellarmine, *De Christo*, II, cap. xix, *ad init.* (*Opp.* as cited, i, p. 333). Cf. the opening words of Petavius' discussion, *De Trinitate*, VI. xi. 5 (*Opp.* as cited, iii, p. 251b): "With respect to more recent writers, there exists a far from small altercation of the Catholics with heretics, especially with Calvin, Beza and their crew (*asseclis*). For Genebrardus in the first book of his *de Trinitate* very sharply upbraids (*insectatur*) them and gives them the name of *autotheanites*, because they say the Son has His divinity and essence of Himself; an error mentioned also by William Lindanus."

⁹⁴ Voetius, *Dispt.* I, pp. 453, 454, gives an account of the opponents of the Reformed ascription of *autotheōtēs* to Christ. There are three classes: Romanists, Lutherans, and Arminians, to which he adds as fourth and fifth classes Peter Caroli, and the Antitrinitarians (Crell and Schlichting). The Romanists he subdivides into two classes, those who find that Calvin taught heresy and those who object to his language only. The latter sub-class includes only Bellarmine and Gregory of Valentia. Under the former, however, he enumerates a long list of writers with exact references. Cf. also De Moor in *March. Comp.* I, pp. 773-4 (V. x).

course was pursued by probably the two greatest Romish theologians of the time, Gregory of Valentia and Robert Bellarmine. Although in no way disinclined to find error in the teaching of Calvin and the Calvinists, these more cautious writers feel compelled to allow that Calvin in his zeal to do full justice to the deity of Christ has not passed beyond Catholic truth, and blame him therefore only for inaccuracy of phrase. Gregory of Valentia, whom Gomarus calls "the Coryphaeus of Papal theologians", speaking of the error of the Autotheanites, remarks: "Genebrardus has attributed this error to Calvin (*Inst.*, I. xiii), but, in point of fact, if he be read attentively, it will be seen that he [Calvin] meant merely that the Son, as He is indeed essentially God, is *ex se*, and is *ex Patre* only as He is a Person; and that is true. For although the Fathers and Councils assert that He is *Deus ex Deo* most truly, by taking the term [God] personally, so that it signifies the Person itself at once of the Father and of the Son;⁹⁵ nevertheless the Son, as He is essentially God, that is, as He is that one, most simple Being which is God, is not from another, because as such He is an absolute somewhat. If this were all that were meant by the other heretics who are called 'Autotheanites', there would be no occasion for contending with them. For it was in this sense that Epiphanius, *Haer.* 69, seems to have called the Son *αὐτοθεός*."⁹⁶ Bellarmine's candor scarcely stretches so far as Gregory's. While he too

⁹⁵ That is to say, the phrase "God of God" is interpreted to mean "God the Son, of God the Father"—God in the first instance meaning (not the essence but) the Person of the Son, and in the second instance (not the essence but) the Person of the Father. Only on this supposition, as Gregory allows, can the phrase "God of God" be applied to Christ in exactness of speech. That is to say, Gregory finds the phrase as inexact as Calvin does when he calls it a *dura locutio*.

⁹⁶ We repeat the passage from Gomarus' citation in Voetius' *Disputat.* I, p. 448. Gomarus cites Gregory *ad summae Thomae* part I, disp. 2, quaest. 1, punct. 1, p. 718. The passage is found also, however, in Gregory's treatise *De Trinitate*, II. 1. (to which Voetius refers us, p. 454, adding appropriate references also to I. 17 and II. 22). See Gregorii de Valentia . . . *de rebus fidei hoc tempore controversis Libri*, Paris, 1610, p. 205, first column, B and C.

feels compelled to allow that Calvin's meaning is catholic, he yet very strongly reprobates his mode of stating that meaning and declares that it gives fair occasion for the strictures which have been passed upon him. "When", says he, "I narrowly look into the matter itself, and carefully consider Calvin's opinions, I find it difficult to declare that he was in this error. For he teaches that the Son is of Himself (*a se*), in respect of essence, not in respect of Person, and seems to wish to say that the Person is begotten by the Father [but] the essence is not begotten or produced, but is of itself (*a se ipsa*); so that if you abstract from the Person of the Son the relation to the Father, the essence alone remains, and that is of itself (*a se ipsa*)."

But on the other hand Bellarmine thinks "that Calvin has undoubtedly erred in his manner of expressing himself, [and] given occasion to be spoken of as he has been spoken of by our [the Romish] writers". This judgment is supported by the following specifications: "For he [Calvin] says, *Inst.*, I. xiii. 19: 'The ecclesiastical writers now teach that the Father is the principium of the Son, now assert that the Son has both divinity and essence of Himself (*a se ipso*)' And below this: 'Accordingly, when we speak of the Son *simpliciter* without respect to the Father, we may well and properly assert that He is of Himself (*a se*).' And in the twenty-third section, speaking of the Son, 'How,' he asks, 'shall the creator who gives being to all things not be of Himself (*a se ipso*), but derive His essence from another?' And in his letter to the Poles and in his work against Gentilis, Calvin frequently asserts that the Son is *αὐτόθεος*, that is, God of Himself (*a se ipso*), and [declares] the expression in the Creed 'God of God, Light of Light' an improper and hard saying."

The gravamen of Bellarmine's charges we see from a later passage (p. 738 b, near bottom) turns on Calvin's assertion that "the Son has [His] essence from Himself (*a se*)". This, Bellarmine declares, is to be "repudiated *simpliciter*", as he undertakes to demonstrate, on the grounds that it is

repugnant to Scripture, the definitions of the Councils, the teaching of the Fathers, and reason itself, and as well to Calvin's own opinions; and is not established by the arguments which Calvin adduces in its behalf. In Bellarmine's view, however, in so speaking Calvin merely expressed himself badly: he really meant nothing more than that the Son with respect to His essence, which is His as truly as it is the Father's, is of Himself (*a se ipso*). He thinks this is proved by the fact that Calvin elsewhere speaks in terms which infer his orthodoxy in the point at issue. He speaks of the Son, for example, as begotten of the Father, which would be meaningless, if He does not receive His nature, or essence, from the Father, since "it is not a mere relation which is called the Son, but a real somewhat subsisting in the divine nature", and the Son is "not a mere propriety but an *integra hypostasis*". He even plainly says in so many words (I. xiii. 28) that the essence is communicated from the Father to the Son: "If the difference is in the essence, let them reply whether He has not shared it (*communicaverit*) with the Son. . . . It follows that it is wholly and altogether (*tota est in solidum*) common to the Father and Son." And he does not embrace the errors which would flow from ascribing to the Son His essence of Himself: for example, he ascribes but a single essence to the Persons of the Trinity, and he does not distinguish the essence from the Persons *realiter* but only *ratione*.

Petavius does not find it possible to follow Bellarmine in this exculpating judgment. For his part, he willingly admits that Calvin sometimes speaks inconsistently with himself, but he cannot doubt that he means what he says, when he declares that the Son has His essence not from the Father but from Himself—and this is a thing which, says he, is not only false, but impious to say, and cannot be affirmed by any Catholic. For it stands to reason, he argues, that everyone "has his essence from him by whom he is begotten; since generation is just the communication of the nature,—whether, as in created things, in kind, or, as in

the divine production of the Word, in number. It is indeed impossible to form any conception of generation without the nature, and some communication of the essence, occurring to the mind." The whole question of Calvin's orthodoxy, between these writers, it will be seen, turns on their judgment as to his attitude towards the doctrine of "eternal generation". Bellarmine judges that, on the whole, though he has sometimes expressed himself inconsistently with regard to it, Calvin soundly believes in the doctrine of "eternal generation"; and therefore he pronounces him orthodox. Petavius judges that, though he sometimes expresses himself in the terms of the doctrine of "eternal generation", Calvin does not really believe in it; and therefore he pronounces him heretical. To both authors alike the test of orthodoxy lies in conformity of thought to the Nicene speculation, and they cannot conceive of a sound doctrine of the Trinity apart from this speculation and all the nice discriminations and adjustments which result from it.⁹⁷ And it can scarcely be denied that Calvin laid himself open to suspicion from this point of view. The principle

⁹⁷It is interesting to observe how constantly the argument hangs formally on the suppressed premise of the Nicene doctrine of generation. Thus Bellarmine argues (p. 334b) that "those who assert that the Son has His essence *a se ipso* err because they are compelled either (1) to make the Son ingenerate *and the same person with the Father*, or (2) to multiply the essences, or at least (3) to distinguish the essence from the person *realiter* and so introduce a quaternity." As Calvin does none of these things, he is pronounced orthodox in meaning. But the point now to be illustrated lies in the assumption under (1) that to make the Son ingenerate is to make Him the same person with the Father. It does not occur to Bellarmine as possible that one should deny the Son to be generated and yet not make Him the same person with the Father, while holding free from (2) and (3). Similarly, when replying to Danaeus, who asks: "If He is not God *a se*, how is He God?", Petavius (p. 256) declares that so to speak is perfidious and ignorant,—"*for*", says he, "it either robs the Son of His deity or denies that He is God begotten of the Father". The one seems to him as intolerable as the other. Neither Bellarmine nor Petavius seems fairly to have faced the possibility of a doctrine of a true Trinity of Persons in one essence which did not hang on the doctrine of "eternal generation", which seemed to them, thus, equipollent with the doctrine of the Trinity.

of his doctrine of the Trinity was not the conception he formed of the relation of the Son to the Father and of the Spirit to the Father and Son, expressed respectively by the two terms 'generation' and 'procession': but the force of his conviction of the absolute equality of the Persons. The point of view which adjusted everything to the conception of "generation" and "procession" as worked out by the Nicene fathers was entirely alien to him. The conception itself he found difficult, if not unthinkable; and although he admitted the facts of 'generation' and 'procession', he treated them as bare facts, and refused to make them constitutive of the doctrine of the Trinity. He rather adjusted everything to the absolute divinity of each Person, their community in the one only true Deity; and to this we cannot doubt that he was ready not only to subordinate, but even to sacrifice, if need be, the entire body of Nicene speculations. Moreover, it would seem at least very doubtful if Calvin, while he retained the conception of 'generation' and 'procession', strongly asserting that the Father is the *principium divinitatis*, that the Son was "begotten" by Him before all ages and that the Spirit "proceeded" from the Father and Son before time began, thought of this begetting and procession as involving any communication of essence. His conception was that, because it is the Person of the Father which begets the Person of the Son, and the Person of the Spirit which proceeds from the Persons of the Father and Son, it is precisely the distinguishing property of the Son which is the thing begotten, not the essence common to Father and Son, and the distinguishing property of the Spirit which is the product of the procession, not the essence which is common to all three persons. Of course, he did not hold, as Bellarmine phrases it, that "the Son is a mere relation", "a mere property": the Son was to him too, as a matter of course, "*aliquid subsistens in natura divina*", "*integra hypostasis*". But he did hold that Sonship is a relation and that the Son differs from the Father only by this property of Sonship which is expressed

as a relation (I. xiii. 6); and it looks very much as if his thought was that it is only in what is expressed by the term Sonship that the second Person of the Trinity is the Son of the Father, or, what comes to the same thing, has been begotten of the Father. His idea seems to be that the Father, Son and Spirit are one in essence, and differ from one another only in that property peculiar to each, which, added to the common essence, constitutes them respectively Father, Son and Spirit; and that the Father is Father only as Father, the Son, Son only as Son, or what comes to the same thing, the Father begets the Son only as Son, or produces by the act of generation only that by virtue of which He is the Son, which is, of course, what constitutes just His Sonship.

The evidence on which Bellarmine relies for his view that Calvin taught a communication of essence from Father to Son is certainly somewhat slender. If we put to one side Bellarmine's inability to conceive that Calvin could really believe in a true generation of the Son by the Father without holding that the Son receives His essence from the Father, and his natural presumption that Calvin's associates and pupils accurately reproduced the teaching of their master—for there is no doubt that Beza and Simler, for example, understood by generation a communication of essence—the evidence which Bellarmine relies on reduces to a single passage in the *Institutes* (I. xiii. 20). Calvin there, arguing with Gentilis, opposes to the notion that the Father and Son differ in essence, the declaration that the Father "shares" the essence together with the Son, so that it is common, *tota et in solidum*, to the Father and the Son. It may be possible to take the verb "communicate" here in the sense of "impart" rather than in that of "have in common", but it certainly is not necessary and it seems scarcely natural; and there is little elsewhere in Calvin's discussion to require it of us. Petavius points out that the sentence is repeated in the tract against Gentilis,—but that carries us but a little way. It is quite true that there is nothing absolutely clear

to be found to the opposite effect either. But there are several passages which may be thought to suggest a denial that the Son derives His essence from the Father. Precisely what is meant, for example, when we are told that the Son "contains in Himself the simple and indivisible essence of God in integral perfection, not *portione aut deflexu*", is no doubt not clear: but by *deflexu* it seems possible that Calvin meant to deny that the Son possessed the divine essence by impartation from another (I. xiii. 2). It is perhaps equally questionable what weight should be placed on the form of the statement (§ 20) that the order among the Persons by which the *principium* and *origo* is in the Father, is produced (*fero*) by the "proprieties": or on the suggestion that the more exact way of speaking of the Son is to call Him "the Son of the Person" (§ 23)—the Father being meant,—the term God in the phrase "Son of God" requiring to be taken of the Person of the Father. When it is argued that "whoever asserts that the Son is essentiated by the Father denies that He is self-existent" (§ 23), and "makes His divinity a something abstracted from the essence of God, or a derivation of a part from the whole", the reference to Gentilis' peculiar views of the essentiation of the Son by the Father, *i. e.*, His creation by the Father, seems to preclude a confident use of the phrase in the present connection. Nor does the exposition of the unbegottenness of the essence of the Son and Spirit as well as of the Father, so that it is only as respects His Person that the Son is of the Father (§ 25) lend itself any more certainly to our use. A survey of the material in the *Institutes* leads to the impression thus that there is singularly little to bring us to a confident decision whether Calvin conceived the essence of God to be communicated from the Father to the Son in 'generation' and from the Father and Son to the Spirit in 'procession'. And outside the *Institutes* the same ambiguity seems to follow us. If we read that Christ has "the fulness of the Godhead" of Himself (*Opp.* xi, p. 560), we read equally that the fathers taught that the Son is of the Father

even with respect to His eternal essence (vii, p. 322), and is "of the substance of the Father" (vii, p. 232). In this state of the case opinions may lawfully differ. But on the whole we are inclined to think that Calvin, although perhaps not always speaking perfectly consistently, seeks to avoid speaking of generation and procession as importing the communication of the Divine essence; so that Petavius appears to be right in contending that Calvin meant what he says when he represents the Son as "having from Himself both divinity and essence" (I. xiii. 19).

We have thought it worth while to dwell with some fullness on this matter, because, as we have suggested already, it is precisely in this peculiarity of Calvin's doctrine of the Trinity that the explanation is found of the widespread offense which was taken at it. Men whose whole thought of the Trinity lived, moved and had its being in the ideas of generation and procession, that is, in the notion of a perpetual communication of the Divine essence from the Father as the *fons deitatis* to the Son, who is thereby constituted the Son, and from the Father and Son to the Spirit, who is thereby constituted the Spirit, could not but feel that the Trinity they had known and confessed was taken away when this conception was conspicuous only by its absence, or was at best but remotely suggested, and all the stress was laid on the absolute equality of the Father, Son and Holy Spirit. Such a conception of the Trinity would inevitably appear to them to savor of Sabellianism or of Tritheism, according as their minds dwelt more on the emphasis which was laid upon the numerical unity of the essence common to all the Persons or on that which was laid upon the distinctness of the Persons. Dissatisfaction with Calvin's Trinitarian teaching was therefore not confined to Romish controversialists seeking ground of complaint against him, but was repeated in all whose thought had run strictly in the moulds of Nicene speculation. Despite an occasional defender like Meisner or Tarnov,⁹⁸ the Lutheran theologians,

⁹⁸ It is to be hoped that modern Lutherans in general will subscribe

for example, generally condemned it. Many, like Tilemann Heshusius and Aegidius Hunnius and, later, Stechmannus, hotly assailed it, and the best that could be hoped for at Lutheran hands was some such firm though moderately worded refusal of it as is found, for example, in John Gerhard's *Loci Communes*. "The Greek doctors", he tells us,⁹⁹ "call only the Father *αἰρόθεος καὶ αἰροούσιος*, not because there is a greater perfection of essence in the Father than in the Son, but because He is *ἀγέννητος* and *a se ipso* and does not have deity through generation or spiration. Bucanus, *Loc. I, De Deo*, p. 6, responds thus: 'The Son is *a se ipso* as He is God; from the Father as He is Son.' This he got from Calvin, who, Book I, c. 13, § 25, writes: 'The Son as He is God we confess is *ex se ipso*, considered apart from His Person, but as He is Son we say that He is of the Father; thus His essence is without principium, but of His Person God is Himself the principium.' We are not able, however, to approve these words, but confess rather with the Nicene Creed that 'the Son is begotten of the Father, God of God, Light of Light', and follow the saying of Christ, Jno. v. 26 . . . Prov. viii. 24. . . . Zacharias Ursinus¹⁰⁰ therefore is right to separate from his preceptor here, writing in *Catech.*, p. II. 9. 25, p. 179: 'The Son is begotten of the Father; that is, He has the Divine Essence in an ineffable

the excellent remarks of Prof. Milton Valentine, *Christian Theology*, 1906, I, p. 309: "Emphasis must be laid on the attitude of *aseity* as belonging to the whole Godhead, to the divine Being as such. . . . It cannot therefore be allowable to think of God as originating the Trinality of the Godhead, as though there was a time when He was not Tripersonal in His Being. . . ." Accordingly he ascribes Self-existence to the Son (p. 322).

⁹⁹Ed. Cotta, I. Tübingen, 1762, p. 29 (Loc. IV. pars ii, v, § 179).

¹⁰⁰It must not be supposed, however, that Ursinus separated himself from Calvin as to the Self-existence of the Son as He is God: his language is: "the Son is begotten of the Father, of the essence of the Father, but the essence of the Son is not begotten, but, existent of itself (*a se ipso existens*), is communicated to the Son at His begetting (*nascenti*) by (a) the Father." "And what is said concerning the generation of the Son", he adds, "is to be understood also of the procession of the Spirit" (*Loci*, p. 542).

manner communicated to Him from the Father.' D. Lobe-chius, *disp.* 3 in *Augustinum Conf.* th. 26, says: 'The essence should be considered in a two-fold way, either with respect to itself or with respect to its own being, or else with respect to its communication: it has no principium with respect to its own being; but with respect to its communication we say that the essence has as its principium, to be from the Father in the Son, for it has been communicated from the Father to the Son.'” Nevertheless, Gerhard, of course, does not deny that, when properly explained, the Son may fitly be called *αὐτόθεος*; since that would be tantamount to denying His true divinity. Accordingly he writes elsewhere:¹⁰¹ “The term is ambiguous: for it is either opposed to communication of the divine essence and in that sense we deny that Christ is *αὐτόθεος*, because He receives the essence by eternal generation from the Father; or it is opposed to the inequality of the Divine essence, and in that sense we concede that Christ is *αὐτόθεος*. Gregory of Valentia, *De Trinitate*, I. 22: ‘The Son as He is a Person is from another; as the most simple being, is not from another.’ Christ is verily and in Himself God (*vere et se ipso Deus*), but He is not of Himself (*a se ipso*) God.” One would think Gerhard was skating on very thin ice to agree with Gregory of Valentia,—who agrees with Calvin and uses his very mode of statement,—and yet not agree with Calvin.

The subordinationism¹⁰² of the Arminians was of quite a

¹⁰¹ III. Tübingen 1764, p. 395 (Locus IV, cap. 5, § 67).

¹⁰² Cf. H. Bavinck, *Geref. Dogmatiek*, ed. 1, vol. II, p. 263. Remarking that the tendency which finds its typical form in Arianism, has manifested itself in various forms in the Church for centuries: “First of all in the form of Subordinationism: the Son is to be sure eternal, generated out of the essence of the Father, no creature, and not made of nothing; but He is nevertheless inferior to or subordinated to the Father. The Father alone is *ὁ θεός, πηγὴ θεότητος*, the Son is *θεός*, receives His nature by communication from the Father. This was the teaching of Justin, Tertullian, Clement, Origen, etc., also of the Semi-Arians, Eusebius of Caesarea and Eusebius of Nicomedia, who placed the Son *ἐκτὸς τοῦ πατρὸς* and declared Him *ὁμοιούσιος* with the Father; and later of the Remonstrants (Conf. Art. 3; Arminius *Op. theol.* 1629, p. 232 sq.; Episcopius, *Instit. theol.* IV, sect. 2, c. 32;

different quality from that of the Lutherans. The dominant note which the Lutheran Christology sounded was the majesty of Christ; nothing that tended to exalt Christ could be without its appeal to Lutherans; they drew back from Calvin's assertion of His *αὐτοθεότης* only in the interests of the traditional Nicene construction of the Trinity. The Arminians had, on the other hand, a distinct tendency to the proper subordinationism of the Origenists; and in the later members of the school, indeed, there was present a strong influence from the Socinians. To them, of course, the Father alone could be thought of as *αὐτόθεος* and the Son was conceived as in His very nature, because God only by derivation, less than the Father. As in his whole theological outlook, Arminius himself was here better than his successors. He fairly saves his orthodoxy, indeed; but he emphatically denies the *αὐτοθεότης* of the Son. The Son may just as well be called Father, he intimates, as be represented as "having His essence *a se* or *a nullo*"; and the employment of such language cannot be justified by saying that to affirm that the Son of God, as God, has his essence *a se ipso*, is only to say that the divine essence is not *ab aliquo*: there can, in fact, be no reason for calling the Son *αὐτόθεος*.¹⁰⁸ On the other hand, nevertheless, he recognizes that the word *αὐτό-*

Limborch, *Theol. Christ.* II, c. 17, § 25), of the Supranaturalists (Bretschneider, *Dogm.*, I⁴ 602f.; Knapp, *Glaubenslehre*, I. 260; Muntinghe, *Theol. Christ.* pars theor. § 134 sq., etc.), and of very many theologians of recent times (Frank, *Syst. d. chr. Wahr.*, I. 207, Beck, *Chr. Gl.* II. 123 sq., Twisten, II. 254, Kahnis, I. 383, 398; van Oosterzee, II, § 62, Doedes, *Ned. Gel.* 71 sq.)." Cf. also H. C. Sheldon, *History of Doctrine*, II. 9: "The Arminians, while they held to the doctrine of three Divine Persons in the Godhead, diverged from the current teaching on the subject by an express emphasis upon the subordination of the Son and the Spirit. Arminius was not specially related to this development, and contented himself with denying, in opposition to Calvin's phraseology, the propriety of attributing self-existence to the Son. But Episcopius, Curcellaeus, and Limborch were very pronounced in the opinion that a certain preëminence must be assigned to the Father over the Son and the Spirit."

¹⁰⁸ *Declaratio sententiae suae ad ordines Holl. et Westr.* (pp. 60-65). See E. T. *Works*, translated by James Nichols London, Vol. I, 1825, pp. 627-631.

θεος may be taken in two senses. It may describe the one to whom it is applied either merely as *vere et se ipso* God, or else as God *a se*. In the former usage it is as applied to the Son tolerable; in the latter not.¹⁰⁴ He argues that we must distinguish between saying that the essence which the Son has is from none, and that the Son which has this essence is from none: "for", says he, "the Son is the name of a person, which has a relation to the Father, and therefore cannot be defined or contemplated apart from this relation; while the essence, on the other hand, is an absolute somewhat."¹⁰⁵ "To contend", he urges, "that to say 'He is God' and 'He has His essence from none' are equivalent statements, is to say either that the Father alone is God, or else that there are three collateral Gods."¹⁰⁶ He cheerfully allows that neither of these assertions expresses the meaning of Calvin or Beza: but he contends that they use misleading language when they call Christ *αὐτόθεος*, and he appeals to Beza's admission, when excusing Calvin, that "Calvin had not strictly observed the discrimination between the particles *a se* and *per se*".

The gravitation of Arminianism was, however, downward; and we find already taught by Episcopius, no longer a certain subordination in order among the Persons of the Trinity in the interests of the Nicene doctrine of "eternal generation" and "procession", but rather a generation and procession in the interests of a subordination in nature among the Persons of the Trinity. "It is certain" from Scripture, says he, "that this divinity and the divine perfections are to be attributed to these three persons, not collaterally and coördinately, but subordinately." "This subordination", he adds, "should be carefully attended to, because of its extremely great usefulness, since by it not only is there fundamentally overthrown the *τριθεότης* which collateralism almost necessarily involves, but also the Father's glory is

¹⁰⁴ *Resp. ad xxxi Articulos*, p. 137 (E. T. *Works*, vol. II, 1828, pp. 29-32).

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 139.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 140.

preserved to Him unimpaired." Wherefore, he continues, "they fall into perilous error who contend that the Son is *αὐτόθεος*, in such a manner that as He is God He is of Himself, as He is Son of the Father; because from this point of view, the true subordination between the Father and the Son is taken away."¹⁰⁷ It is scarcely necessary to pause to point out with Triglandius¹⁰⁸ that to say that the Son and Spirit are not collaterally or coördinally divine with the Father is to say they are not equally divine with Him, and to say that it is injurious to the Father's glory to call the son *αὐτόθεος*, even as He is God, is to say that He is inferior to the Father even in His essence. No doubt Episcopius says in the same breath that "one and the same divine nature" is to be attributed to the three Persons. But this is not easy to conciliate with his argument, except on the supposition that in saying "one and the same nature", his thought wavered somewhat between numerical oneness and specific oneness,¹⁰⁹ or else that he conceived the relation of the several Persons to this one nature to differ among themselves,—one possessing it of Himself, the others by derivation from—shall we even suggest, by favor of?—another.

The path thus opened by Episcopius was eagerly walked in by his successors. All that may be thought to be latent in Episcopius came to light in Curcellaeus. We will, however, permit another hand to describe to us his teaching with regard to the Trinity. "If you take his own account", writes Robert Nelson, in his *Life of Dr. George Bull*,¹¹⁰ there would be no man more orthodox and catholic" than Curcellaeus is "in the doctrine of the Trinity, as also in that of the Incarnation of Christ. And he insisted, that both from the pulpit and from the chair, he had always taught and vindicated that faith, into which he had been baptized,

¹⁰⁷ Cf. Episcopius' theological works, printed at Amsterdam, 1650-1665; esp. his *Instit. Theolog.*, lib. iv, § 11, de Deo, capp. 32-36. But we cite from Triglandius.

¹⁰⁸ Triglandius, *Antapologia*, cap. v, pp. 77 sq.

¹⁰⁹ Cf. Triglandius, pp. 579, 580.

¹¹⁰ London, 1713, pp. 290 sq.

and which he had publicly professed in the congregation, according to the form generally received; and did even teach and vindicate the same at that very time, when the charge of Anti-trinitarianism was brought against him. Yea, he expressed so great a zeal for the orthodox doctrine in this great fundamental, as he would seem forward to seal the truth thereof, even with his blood; if, as he said, God would vouchsafe him this honor. Notwithstanding all this, it is notoriously known, and that from his own very Apology, that he was no less an enemy to the Council of Nice than his Master before him, if not more than he; that he was no friend at all to the use of the word 'Trinity'; that he so explained himself concerning that mystery as to assert no more than a 'specific unity' in the divine Persons; that he defended the cause of Valentinus Gentilis, beheaded at Bern in Switzerland for Tritheism, maintaining his doctrine to have been the same with that of the primitive fathers, particularly of Ignatius, Justin Martyr, Irenaeus, Athenagoras, Tertullian, and Clemens Alexandrinus; that he impeached the common (which he called the Modern and Scholastic) doctrine of the Trinity for approaching so very near Sabellianism, as hardly to be distinguished from it, and charged it to be a thousand years younger than that which was taught by Christ and His apostles; that he exploded the notion of consubstantiality, in the sense in which it is now generally taken, when applied to the Father and Son; that he was very much afraid to have his mind perplexed with the 'divine relations', or with the manner of 'generation' and 'procession' in the Deity, or with modes of 'subsistence' and 'personalities', or with 'mutual consciousness', and the like; and therefore was for discarding at once all such terms and phrases as are not 'expressly legitimated' by the sacred writers; that he fully believed the Godhead of the Father to be more excellent than that of the Son, or of the Holy Ghost, even so far as to look upon this superiority as a thing unquestionable, and to appeal to the consentient testimony of the primitive Church for evidence; and lastly that

he took care to recommend Petavius, and the author of *Irenicum Irenicorum*,¹¹¹ a learned physician of Dantzick . . . to the perusal of his readers, for the sake of that collection of testimonies which is to be found in them, as wherein they might easily find 'an account of the primitive faith' in these great articles." A subordinationism like this, of course, could not endure Calvin's Trinitarianism, of which the cornerstone was the equality of the Persons in the Trinity—which equality it was that was safeguarded by the ascription of *αὐτοθεότης* to Christ.

Indeed, this ascription was equally unacceptable to a subordinationism of far less extreme a type than that of Curcellaeus and his Remonstrant successors. It is the biographer of George Bull to whom we have appealed to bring Curcellaeus' trinitarian teaching before us: and George Bull is perhaps the best example of that less extreme, convinced, no doubt, but well-guarded, subordinationism which we have now in mind,—the subordinationism which entrenched itself in the Nicene definitions and the explanations of the Nicene fathers, interpreted, however, rather from the tentative and inadequate constructions out of which they were advancing to a sounder and truer trinitarianism, than from this sounder and truer trinitarianism of which they were the expression. It can scarcely be doubted that Bull's subordinationism owed much to the Arminian movement, from the extremes of which, on this point at least, he drew back. The Arminianism flowing in from the continent had been a powerful co-factor in the production of that Catholic reaction of seventeenth century England of which Bull was, in its post-Restoration days of triumph, one of the representatives and ornaments. It is interesting to note that the *Theological Institutes* of Episcopius, at the time that Bull was contemplating writing his *Defence of the Nicene Creed*, was "generally in the hands of students of divinity in both universities, as the best system of Divinity that had appeared",¹¹² and that Bull himself speaks of Episcopius with

¹¹¹ Daniel Zwicker. See *Allgem. deutsche Biog.*, XIV, p. 533.

¹¹² Nelson, as cited, p. 301.

high respect in all except his attitude towards the Nicene fathers.¹¹³ Indeed, when he comes to state the subordinationism which he professes to defend as commended by Catholic antiquity, he avails himself of Episcopius' precise phrase, declaring that all "the Catholic Doctors, those that lived before and those that lived after the Council of Nice", "with one consent have taught that the divine Nature and Perfections do agree to the Father and Son, not collaterally or coördinately, but subordinately".¹¹⁴ But the particular form which Bull's subordinationism took was determined, naturally, by that special appeal which the neo-Catholic party to which he belonged made to primitive antiquity, by which he was led—with some insular exaggeration of the importance of his own position—to suppose that the design of Petavius in his exposition of the unformed trinitarianism of the ante-Nicene fathers was to help "the cause of the Pope" by showing that "there is very little regard to be had to the Fathers of the three first ages, to whom the Reformed Catholics"—that is to say, the Catholicizing party of the Church of England—"generally do appeal".¹¹⁵ Whatever may be said of this conjecture, it cannot be doubted that Bull's design was to show that the appeal to the "first three ages" yielded in the matter of the Trinity the self-same doctrine which the Nicene Fathers formulated. In order to do this, however, he was compelled to saddle upon the Nicene doctrine a subordinationism which, of the very essence of the Logos Christology of the second and third centuries, was in the Nicene construction happily in the act of being transcended. In the interests of this subordinationism Calvin's equalization of the Son with the Father through the ascription to Him of *αὐτοθεότης* was necessarily distasteful to Bull. That the Son is "Very God" and in that sense may fitly be called *αὐτοθεός* he is, indeed, frank to

¹¹³ *Defence*, Proem., § 5. Ralph Cudworth was at the moment teaching a doctrine of the Trinity indistinguishable from that of Episcopius and his followers.

¹¹⁴ Nelson, p. 315, Bull, Book 4, cap. 1, § 1 (E. T. p. 557).

¹¹⁵ Nelson, p. 287: Bull, Proem, § 8.

allow, for he is himself, with all the fathers, a true and firm believer in the Godhead of Christ: but that the Son is *αὐτόθεος*, "God of Himself", he repudiates with decision as inconsistent with "catholic consent" which pronounces Him rather *θεὸς ἐκ θεοῦ*. For, depending here on Petavius, he will not allow that it is possible to say "that the Son is from God the Father, as He is Son, and not as He is God; that He received His Person, not His essence, or Divine Nature, from the Father"; on the ground that begetting means just communication of essence.¹¹⁶ It is a little amusing to see Bull, from his Anglican tripod, as Calvin would himself have said, patronizing Calvin. He graciously allows that Calvin has deserved well of us "for the service which he rendered in purging the Church of Christ from the superstition of popery"; but he "earnestly exhorts pious and studious youths to beware of a spirit from which have proceeded such things" as Calvin's unreverential allusions to the Nicene Creed, which he had dared to speak of as containing harsh expressions and 'vain repetitions'.¹¹⁷ "Even the zeal of Mr. Bull" thus, as his admiring biographer tells us, "hath not here hindered him from treating with esteem the author of so dangerous an opinion" as that Christ is God of Himself, the self-existent God, "while at the same time he is confuting it, for the sake of some laudable qualifications which he discerned in him, and was endeavoring to excuse him as well as the matter could bear, against the insults of the most learned writer of his whole order, so famous for learning"¹¹⁸—by which we suppose Nelson means to intimate that Bull defended Calvin against injurious imputations of Petavius; though we have failed to observe this feature of Bull's discussion.

In England, too, however, the downward movement fulfilled itself. After Bull came Samuel Clarke and his fellow Arians in the established Church, matched by the Socinian

¹¹⁶ *Defense of the Nicene Faith*, IV. i. 7 sq.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*, § 8.

¹¹⁸ Nelson, p. 319 sq.

drift among the dissenters. To these, naturally, Calvin's *αὐτόθεος* was as far beyond the range of practical consideration as it was to Crell¹¹⁹ or Schlichting,¹²⁰ who did him the honor to express their dissent from it. Clarke, however, may claim from us a moment's notice, not so much on his own account, as for the sake of a distinction which Waterland was led to make in refuting him. Clarke was willing to admit that the Son may have been begotten of the essence of the Father, though he wished it to be allowed that it was equally possible that He may have been made out of nothing. "Both are worthy of censure", he said,¹²¹ "who on the one hand affirm that the Son was made out of nothing, or on the other affirm that He is self-existent substance." In his response, Waterland exhibits afresh the difficulties which lie in wait for those who take their starting-point from even the measure of subordinationism which is embalmed in the language of the Nicene formularies, when they seek to do justice to the full deity of Christ. In the interests of the Nicene doctrine of eternal generation, he proposes to distinguish between necessary existence and self-existence, and, denying the latter, to claim only the former for the Son. The Second Person of the Godhead, he says, participates in the one substance of the Godhead, and is therefore necessarily existent; but He participates in it by communication from the Father, not of Himself, and therefore He is not self-existent. "*We* say", he explains,¹²² "the Son is not self-existent, meaning He is not unoriginate. *You*"—that is, Clarke—"not only say the same, but contend for it, meaning not *necessarily existing*." "*Self-existence* as distinct from *necessary existence*, is expressive only of the *order* and *manner* in which the perfections are in the Father,

¹¹⁹ *Tract. de uno Deo Patre*, Book I, sect. 2, cap. 2.

¹²⁰ *Contra Meisnerum*.

¹²¹ *On the Trinity*. Cf. ii, § 5. An interesting account of Clarke may be found in Nelson, as cited, pp. 322sq.

¹²² *Vindication*, etc., Q. xiii.

and not of any distinct perfection."¹²³ That is to say, in Waterland's view, the Son is all that the Father is, but not in the same manner: the Father is all that He is in this manner, viz., that He is it of Himself; the Son, in this manner, viz., that He is it of the Father. Both are necessarily all that they are, and therefore both are necessarily existent: but only the Father is all that He is of Himself, and therefore self-existence can be predicated of Him alone. What is really declared here is obviously only that the generation of the Son is a necessary and not a voluntary movement in the divine nature: and all that is affirmed is therefore merely that the existence of the Son is not dependent on the divine will. Is this all that need be affirmed, however, in order to vindicate to the Son true deity? We must bear in mind that it is not impossible to conceive creation itself as necessary: the history of theology has not been a stranger to the idea that the world is the eternal and necessary product of the divine activity. In order to vindicate true deity to the Son it is not sufficient, therefore, to affirm that He is equally with the Father "necessary in respect of existence".¹²⁴ That might be true of Him even were He a creature. What must be affirmed of Him if we would recognize His true deity is not merely that He could not but exist, but that the ground of His existence is in Himself. It is self-existence, not necessary existence, in other words, which really imports deity, and it is a degradation of this great and fundamental attribute to attempt to reduce it to a mere synonym of "ingenerate". It is rather the synonym of necessary existence as applied to deity, describing this necessary existence in its deeper significance and implications. The artificial distinction which Waterland wishes to make between the two as applied to the Son, seems thus merely an invention to "save the face" of the Nicene doctrine of "generation". Let us admit, says he, in effect, that the Son is equally with the Father "necessary in respect of existence". That is, of course, "self-existent" according to

¹²³ *Second Defense*, Q. iii. ¹²⁴ *Ibid.*

the proper significance of the term in its application to a Divine Being. But let us agree to say that we will not use the term "self-existence" but "necessarily existing" in this sense, and will reserve "self-existence" for another sense, distinct from "necessary existence". Now, "*as distinct from necessary existence*", "self-existence" can express only "the order and manner in which the perfections are in the Father" and not "any distinct perfection". Granted. If we are to use the term "self-existence" to express some other idea than self-existence—then it may express something which the self-existing, *i. e.*, necessarily existing God who is the Son is not. But then it remains true that this necessarily existing God who is the Son is at this very moment confessed to be the self-existent God—under its synonym of "necessarily existent". In a word, if we will agree to use the term "self-existent" in the sense of "ingenerate"—which it does not in the least mean—we may, of course, deny that the Son who is "generate" is "self-existent": but if we employ that term in the sense of "necessarily existent",—which is just what it means in the full reach of that term as applied to God,—why, then we must say that the Son is "self-existent". To put the thing in a nutshell: the Nicene doctrine that the generation of the Son and the procession of the Spirit are necessary movements in the divine essence and not voluntary acts of God the Father, carries with it the ascription of necessary existence, in the sense of that term applicable to God, that is of "self-existence", to the Son and Spirit and requires that each be spoken of as *αὐτόθεος*. To deny to them the quality of *αὐτοθεότης* is thus logically to make them creatures of the Father's power, if not of His will; by which their true deity is destroyed. Thus the tendency among the so-called strict Nicenists to deny to our Lord that He is, as God, *a se ipso* betrays a lurking leaven of subordinationism in their thought. It indicates a tendency to treat the Nicene doctrine of eternal generation, not, as it was intended by its framers, as the safeguard of the absolute equality of the Son with the Father, but rather as the procla-

mation of the inferiority of the Son to the Father: the Son because generate must differ from the ingenerate Father,—must differ in this, that He cannot be, as is the Father, self-existent God, which is, of course, all one with saying that He is not God at all, since the very idea of God includes the idea of self-existence.¹²⁵

It was, therefore, a very great service to Christian theology which Calvin rendered when he firmly asserted for the second and third persons of the Trinity their *αὐτοθεότης*. It has never since been possible for men to escape facing the question whether they really do justice to the true and complete deity of the Son and Spirit in their thought of the Trinitarian distinctions. It has not even been possible since for men who heartily believe in the deity of the Son and Spirit to refuse to them the designation of *αὐτοθεός*. They may have distinguished, indeed, between *αὐτόθεος* and *αὐροθεός* —Self-Existent God and Very God—and allowed the

¹²⁵ De Moor in *Marck. Compend.* I, p. 772, seems to prefer the word "independence" for the expression of the aseity of God and of the Son as God: "By parity of reasoning, it is certain that if the Son be *true* God, He is *independent* God; for independence is easily first among the attributes of God, and is inseparable from the essence of God. . . . And this being true, the title *αὐτόθεος* or *αὐροθεός* (for the theologians accent it differently) cannot be denied to the Son, nor to the Spirit, as if this title were suitable to the Father only." . . . "By independence", he continues, "God is, as we have seen at ch. iv, § 20, *a se* in the negative sense, not in the sense of a proper causality of Himself, and it is this that the title *αὐροθεός* expresses. 1. If then the Son is the supreme and independent God He is *αὐροθεός*. 2. And since the reality of the Divine essence cannot exist without independence, the Son would not be true God unless He was at the same time *αὐροθεός*. 3. If the Father be acknowledged to be *αὐροθεός*, the Son must also be such, unless the Son be denied to be the same God with the Father and a plurality of Gods is erected, a numerical plurality of divine essences. For the same God and the same Divine essence cannot at the same time be *a se ipso* and not *a se ipso*. The Son is not, of course, *αὐροθεός Son a se ipso*; but He certainly is *αὐροθεός, God a se ipso*. He is of the Father relatively to His being Son, but He is *a se* considered absolutely as He is God: as He has the Divine essence existing *a se*, and not divided or produced by another essence; but not as if having that essence *a se ipso*. He is 'God *a se*'; not, 'He is *a se*, God', or, what is the same thing, He is not Son *a se*."

latter to the second and third Persons while withholding the former.¹²⁶ But in the very act of drawing such a distinction, they have emphasized the true deity of the second and third Persons, and have been deterred from ascribing *αὐτοθεότης* to them in the sense of self-existence only by confusing it with 'ingeneration'. It is, however, a part of the heritage, particularly of the Reformed Churches, that they have learned from Calvin to claim for Christ the great epithet of *αὐτόθεος*.¹²⁷ and their characteristic mark has therefore become the strength of the emphasis which they throw on the complete deity of the Lord. Whatever differences may have existed among them have not concerned the true deity of Christ, but rather the attitude taken by their teachers

¹²⁶ The debate on the *αὐτοθεότης* of the Son caused the theologians to enter into long disquisitions on the force of *αὐτός* in composition and the proper sense or senses of *αὐτόθεος*. Voetius, for example (pp. 449-451) argues that *αὐτός* in composition has five senses. It either (1) emphasises singularity; or (2) distinguishes as *κατ' ἐξοχήν*; or (3) means *a se*; or (4) *per se*, intrinsically, essentially; or (5) *per se* and operating with a proper and sufficient principial force, producing somewhat. Accordingly it is improper to assume that theologians always mean the *third* sense, when they employ the term *αὐτόθεος*. Any one of five senses may be intended: (1) God *κατ' ἐξοχήν*; (2) The only, sole God; (3) God essentially, not by participation, *per se* and not *per accidens*, *in se* and essentially, not in some external respect or denomination; (4) God *a se* and not *ab alio*, *ἀναρχος*, that is to say, *καὶ ἀνατρίτος*; (5) God, the *primus agens*, *primus motor*, dependent on none, but the first cause.

¹²⁷ Voetius, *Disp.* I. 400, gives a characteristic list of Reformed doctors who previous to himself (1648) had taught that Christ is properly to be called *αὐτόθεος*,—lest anyone should think that the *αὐτοθεότης* of Christ had been proclaimed only by one here and there, zealous for their own notion or loving novelty, rather than by all in the necessary defense of the common truth. His list includes, besides Calvin, Beza, Simler, the whole mass of representative Reformed teachers: Danaeus, Perkins, Keckermann, Trelcatius, Tilenus, Polanus, Wollebius, Scalcobrigius, Altingius, Grynaeus, Schriverius, Zanchius, Chamierius, Zadeel, Lectius, Pareus, Mortonius, Whittaker, Junius, Vorstius, Amesius, Rivetus. Heppe, *Dogmat. d. ref. Kirche*, p. 84, records: "And moreover the Son is as such not created or made by God, or adopted out of favor or on account of desert, but He is according to His nature God the Son, and is therefore like the Father and the Holy Spirit veritably *αὐτόθεος*."

towards the Nicene speculation of "eternal generation". Concerning this speculation differences early manifested themselves. Immediate successors of Calvin, such as Theodore Beza and Josiah Simler, were as firm and exact in their adhesion to it as Calvin was dubious with reference to it. "The Son", says Beza, "is of the Father by an ineffable communication from eternity of the whole nature."¹²⁸ "We deny not", says Simler, "that the Son has His essence from God the Father; what we deny is a begotten essence".¹²⁹ And no less or less prejudiced an authority than Bellarmine pronounces these declarations "Catholic".¹³⁰ Indeed, despite the influence of Calvin, the great body of the Reformed teachers remained good Nicenists. But they were none the less, as they were fully entitled to be, good "Autotheanites" also. They saw clearly that a relation within the Godhead between Persons to each of whom the entire Godhead belongs, cannot deprive any of these Persons of any essential quality of the Godhead common to them all.¹³¹ And they were determined to assert the full and complete Godhead of them all. Of course, there have been others, on the other hand, who have followed Calvin in sitting rather loosely to the Nicene tradition. Examples of this class are furnished by Trelcatius, Keckermann, Maccovius.¹³² Keckermann,

¹²⁸ *Axiomat. de Trinitate*, Axiom 14.

¹²⁹ *Epist. ad Polon. or Lib. de Filio Dei*.

¹³⁰ *Op. cit.*, p. 334b.

¹³¹ Cf. the remark of De Moor, in *Marck. Compend.* I. 775: "Distinctions in *mode of subsistence*, and the personal order which flows from this, cannot affect the equality of essence; and inferiority and inequality cannot consist with numerical oneness of essence."

¹³² Cf. Voetius, as cited, p. 465: "Trelcatius, *Loc. Com.*, and Keckermann, *Syst. Theol.*, seem to deny the communication of the essence: and Maccovius, in his *Metaphysica*, c. 8, follows them, when, against Arminius, he determines that not the essence, but the personality, is communicated from the Father." "Strictly speaking, however, we must say", adds Voetius, "that the Person is begotten by the communication of the essence: though these authors are to be excused because they took the word 'communication' too physically and had Valentinus Gentilis in view." Voetius' own view is expressed in the "maxims" (p. 461) that: "The essence *in divinis* neither begets nor is begotten, but the person of the Father begets *in, de* and *ex* His essence which is

for example, while not denying that many have preferred to say that "the Son has His essence communicated from the Father", yet considers that this can be said only in a modified sense and must be accompanied by certain important explanations,—for, says he, "it is false if spoken of the essence considered absolutely, since the Son (as also the Holy Spirit) has this *a se ipso*". For himself he prefers, therefore, to say that "the second mode of existence in the Trinity, which is called the Son, is communicated from the Father".¹³³ This is, as we have seen, apparently Calvin's own view, while the more advanced position still which rejects, or at least neglects, the conception of "communication" altogether, whether of essence or of mode of existence,¹³⁴ although it cannot find an example in Calvin, may the same with the essence of the Son": "the essence may therefore be said to be communicated, given, by the Father, and received, and had, by the Son from that communication or gift. Briefly, the Person of the Father begets the Person of the Son by the communication of the essence."

¹³³ *Systema SS. Theologiae*, Colon. Allobrogum, 1611, p. 86.

¹³⁴ This position was taken by Herman Alexander Roëll, professor at Franeker, at the end of the seventeenth century. The idea of "eternal generation" he held to be wholly unscriptural and at war with the perfect nature of God,—whether as Father or as Son. The designation of the Second Person of the Trinity as Son he at first found to rest on His consubstantiality with the Father ("By the words 'Son' and 'Generation' is signified, in emphasis, that the Second Person has the same essence and nature with the First, and has coëxisted with Him from eternity",—*De Generatione Filii*, 1689, p. 5), but afterwards to be expressive rather of His divine mission, and the clear relation existing between God the Sender and God the Sent. A good account is given of his views by Ypreij and Dermout, *Geschiedenis der Nederlandsche Hervormde Kerk*, ii, 1822, pp. 544 sq. The idea of Herman Muntinghe, professor at Hardewijk, at the end of the next century (see Ypreij and Dermout, iv, 1827, pp. 291 sq.) was similar. Much the same notions were introduced into the Congregational Churches of New England by Nathaniel Emmons. "We feel constrained to reject the eternal generation of the Son, and the eternal procession of the Holy Spirit, as such mysteries as cannot be distinguished from real absurdities, and as such doctrines as strike at the foundation of the true doctrine of three equally divine persons in one God" (*Works*, iv, 1842, p. 114). "The Scripture teaches us that each of the divine persons takes His peculiar *name* from the peculiar *offices* which He sustains in the economy of redemption. . . . The first person assumes the name of Father,

yet be said to have had its way prepared for it by him. The direct Scriptural proof which had been customarily relied upon for its establishment he destroyed, refusing to rest a doctrinal determination on "distorted texts". He left, therefore, little Biblical basis for the doctrine of "eternal generation" except what might be inferred from the mere terms 'Father', 'Son' and 'Spirit', and the general consideration

because He is by office the Creator or Author of all things, and especially of the human nature of Christ. The second person assumes the name of Son and Word, by virtue of his incarnation and mediational conduct. . . . The third person in the Trinity is called the Holy Ghost on account of His peculiar office as Sanctifier" (p. 109). This view became thereafter the common view among the New England churches, finding its complete expression in Moses Stuart (*Letters on the Eternal Generation of the Son*, 1822) and Horace Bushnell (*God in Christ*, 1849). Cf. George P. Fisher, *Discussions in History and Theology*, 1880, p. 273: "Hopkins was the last to hold to the Nicene doctrine of the primacy of the Father and the eternal Sonship of Christ. The whole philosophy of the Trinity, as that doctrine was conceived by its great defenders in the age of Athanasius, when the doctrine was formulated, had been set aside. It was even derided; and this chiefly for the reason that it was not studied. Professor Stuart had no sympathy with or just appreciation of the Nicene doctrine of the Son." It should be noted, however, that the "eternal primacy" of the Father and the "eternal generation" of the Son do not necessarily go together. Neither Roëll nor Emmons, for example, while decidedly denying the "eternal generation" of the Son, doubted that the Father is first in the Trinity, not only in office but also in order—as Emmons (p. 137) expresses it, is "the head of the sacred Trinity". They do deny, however, that the Father is superior to the Son in nature; and they take their starting point from the absolute deity of the Son, in the interests of which it is largely that they deny the doctrine of "eternal generation". When Dr. Fisher says, "The eternal fatherhood of God, the precedence of the Father, is as much a part of the orthodox doctrine of the Trinity as is the divinity of the Son", by the orthodox doctrine of the Trinity he means the doctrine as it was formulated by "the Nicene Fathers who framed the orthodox creed". The rejoinder lies ready at hand that the Nicene Fathers overdid the matter from the point of view of "the precedence of the Father", and left the way open for doing less than justice to "the divinity of the Son"—which therefore requires reassertion and better guarding. In point of fact, it is around these two foci—"the precedence of the Father", which in its exaggeration becomes Arianism, and "the divinity of the Son", which in its exaggeration becomes Sabellianism,—that the Trinitarian constructions have revolved. The Trinitarian problem is, to find a mode of statement that does full justice

that our own adoption into the relation of sons of God in Christ implies for Him a Sonship of a higher and more immanent character, which is His by nature and into participation in the relation of which we are admitted only by grace.¹⁸⁵ Certainly other explanations of these facts are

to both. To do this it must of course be carefully ascertained from Scripture in what sense "the Father" has "precedence" of the Son; and in what sense the Son is God. Roëll and Emmons deny that the Scriptures accord such "precedence" to the Father as is expressed by the phrase "God of God": they affirm that the Scriptures ascribe absolute deity to the Son. On the New England doctrine of the Trinity from Emmons down see L. L. Paine, *The Evolution of Trinitarianism*, 1900, pp. 103 sq.

¹⁸⁵ Cf. the striking passage, already alluded to in part, which is found in the middle editions of the *Institutes*, at the opening of the discussion (*Opp.* i, pp. 482-3): "But since everything follows from the proof of the divinity [of the Son], we shall lay our chief stress on the assertion of that. The Ancients, whose idea was that the Son existed (*exstittisse*) by eternal generation from the Father, endeavored to prove it by the testimony of Isaiah (Is. liii. 8), 'Who shall declare His generation?' But it is clear that they were under an illusion in citing this text. For the prophet does not speak there of how the Father generated the Son but by how numerous a posterity His kingdom should be increased [so 1539: but 1550 sq.: "but through how long a period His kingdom should endure"]. Neither is there much force in what they take from the Psalms: 'from the womb before the morning star have I begotten Thee'; for that version is by no means consonant with the Hebrew, which runs thus (Ps. cx. 3): 'From the womb of the morning is to thee the dew of thy nativity.' The argument, then, which seems to have special plausibility, is taken from the words of the Apostle in which it is taught that the worlds were made by the Son; for unless there had already been a Son, His power could not have been put forth. But little weight can attach to this argument either, as appears from similar formulas. For none of us would be affected if anybody sought to take the word 'Christ' back to that time, in which Paul says that 'Christ' was tempted by the Jews (1 Cor. x. 9) [where Calvin evidently reads 'Christ']. For its particular application belongs properly to the humanity [of Christ]. Similarly, because it is said (Heb. xiii. 8) that 'Jesus Christ' was yesterday, is to-day, and shall be forever, if anybody should contend that the name of 'Christ' belonged to Him always, he has accomplished nothing. What do we do but expose the holy and orthodox doctrines of religion to the cavils of heretics, when we contort texts after this fashion, which, when taken in their proper sense, serve our cause either not at all or very little? To me, however, this one argument is worth a thousand for confirming my faith in the eternity of the Son of God. For it is certain that God is not a Father to men,

possible;¹³⁶ and the possibility—or preferability—of other explanations was certain sooner or later to commend itself to some. Nothing, meanwhile, could illustrate more strikingly the vitality of the ecclesiastical tradition than that in such a state of the case the Nicene construction of the Trinity held its ground: held its ground with Calvin himself in its substantial core, and with the majority of his followers in its complete speculative elaboration. We are astonished at the persistence of so large an infusion of the Nicene phraseology in the expositions of Augustine, after

except through the intercession of that only begotten Son, who alone rightly vindicates this prerogative to Himself, and by whose favor it comes to us. But God always wished to be worshipped by His people under the name of Father; from which it follows that already then [*i. e., semper*] He was Son, through whom that relationship is established." Similarly in his Commentaries he explains Mich. v. 1, 2 of the eternal decree of God not of the eternity of the generation of Christ: and on Ps. ii. 7 prefers to follow Paul (Acts xiii. 33) to referring it to the eternal generation of Christ by "subtly philosophizing on the word 'to-day'." In the New Testament he follows the rule (with few exceptions) "that the writers of the New Testament, and especially Jesus Himself, speak of Christ not as the absolute Logos but as the God-man. . . . Especially in the Gospel of John, the declarations of Jesus concerning Himself are expounded not out of an absolute logos-consciousness but out of the theanthropic consciousness of Jesus, so that after John i. 14 there is no further reference to the Logos *λογος* or to the *nuda divinitas Christi* except only in Jno. viii. 58 and xvii. 5" (Scholten, *De Leer der Hervormde Kerk*, ed. 4, II. 231; cf. 229 and I. 24). Similarly of the Holy Spirit (p. 237) he refuses to get proof for His trinitarian relation either from Jno. xiv. 16 or I Cor. ii. 10.

¹³⁶ As, for example, that the terms "Son", "Spirit" are not expressive of "derivation" (by "generation" or "spiration") but just of "consubstantiality". The Son is the repetition of the Father; the Spirit is the expression of God. So Roëll in his first view; and even Stuart remarks, justly: "The Hebrew idiom calls him the son of any person or thing, who exhibits a resemblance in disposition or character" (*op. cit.*, p. 105). More broadly, W. Robertson Smith (*The O. T. in the Jewish Church*, ed. 1, p. 42) remarks: "Among all Semites membership in a guild is figured as sonship." That is to say, in the Semitic view, sonship denotes broadly oneness of kind, class; more specifically likeness; at the height of its meaning, consubstantiality; and does not suggest derivation. As the son of a man is a man, the Son of God is God. It is the Indo-European consciousness which imparts to the terms Son, Spirit the idea of derivation.

that phraseology had really been antiquated by his fundamental principle of equalization in his construction of the Trinitarian relations: we are more astonished at the effort which Calvin made to adduce Nicene support for his own conceptions: and we are more astonished still at the tenacity with which his followers cling to all the old speculations.¹⁸⁷

The repeated appeals which he makes to the fathers is, as we have just hinted, a notable feature of Calvin's discussion of the Trinity and especially of his defense of his construction of the Trinitarian relationships. The citations he drew from the fathers for this purpose were naturally much striven over. One instance seems worth scrutinizing, as on it was founded an accusation that Calvin did not know the difference between the two Latin prepositions 'ad' and 'a', or else chose to "play to the gallery", which he counted upon not to know it. That the best Latinist of his day, whose Latin style is rather classical than mediæval, could fail to feel the force of the common prepositions of that language is, of course, absurd: that a reasoner conspicuous for his fair-mindedness in his argumentation could have juggled with ambiguous phrases is even more impossible. An attentive reading of the passages in question will, as was to be expected, quickly make it clear that it is not Calvin but his critics who are at fault. Bellarmine, arguing that the reasons which Calvin assigns for calling our Lord *αὐτόθεος* are not valid, adduces his appeal to the passages in which

¹⁸⁷ When during the first weeks of its sessions, the Westminster Assembly was engaged on the revision of the Thirty-Nine Articles, and Article 8, on the Three Creeds, came up for discussion, objection was made to the *ἐκ θεοῦ* clauses. It does not appear that there was any pleading for the subordinationist position: the advocates for retaining the Creeds rather expended their strength in voiding the credal statement of any subordinationist implications. Thus Dr. Featley's reply to the current objection was that "although Christ is God of God, it doth not therefore follow that the deity of the Son is from the deity of the Father, as it does not follow *quia Deus passus est ergo Deitas passa est*, or *quia Maria mater Dei, ergo est Maria mater deitatis*" (see his speech printed in his *Dippers Dipt*). Were this taken literally it would explain the Sonship of our Lord wholly from the side of His humiliation and identify His filiation with the incarnation.

Augustine remarks that our Lord "is called Son, with reference to the Father (*ad patrem*) and God with reference to Himself (*ad seipsum*)". "But", he adds, in rebuttal, "it is not the same thing to say that the Son is God *ad se*, and that He is God *a se*." "For", he somewhat superfluously argues, "the first signifies that the name of God is not relative and yet belongs to the Son: and this Augustine says and says truly, for although the Son is a relative, it is nevertheless a relative which exists, is divine, and accordingly includes the essence which is absolute. But [to say] that the Son is God *a se* signifies that the Son of God is not the Son of God, but is unbegotten, which Augustine never said, but Calvin falsely attributes to him."¹³⁸ "It is either", writes Petavius,¹³⁹ improving even on Bellarmine, "a remarkable piece of chicanery or else a remarkable hallucination in Calvin, when he seems to take as equivalents these two terms *ad se* and *a se*: as also these two, *ad alium* and *ab alio*, which" [*i. e.*, *ad se* and *ad alium*] "Augustine makes free use of in explaining the mystery of the Trinity." Then, after quoting Calvin's citation of Augustine, he concludes: "Unless Calvin had supposed *ad se* to be the same as *a se*, and *ad alium* to be the same as *ab alio*, he would not have employed these passages from Augustine."¹⁴⁰ In point of fact, however,

¹³⁸ *Op. cit.*, p. 335.

¹³⁹ *Op. cit.*, p. 282.

¹⁴⁰ We suppose Arminius scarcely intended to repeat Bellarmine's and Petavius' accusation of confusion between *a se* and *ad se* when (*Works*, E. T., II, p. 32) he remarks on the modified manner in which *advocatus* is used when applied to Christ, and adds: "But this explanation does not agree with the phraseology they employ. For this reason Beza excuses Calvin and openly confesses 'that he had not with sufficient strictness observed the difference between these particles, *a se* and *per se*.'" The remark of Beza is referred to his *Praef. in Dialog. Athanasii*. We have not access to Beza's edition of this Pseudo-Athanasian tractate and cannot assure ourselves of his meaning. We assume that he was not criticizing Calvin's philological equipment but his doctrinal construction; and we suspect that what he says is that Calvin in insisting that Christ is God *a se ipso* was not sufficiently carefully distinguishing between saying He is God *per se*—in and of Himself, and that He is God *a se*—from Himself. In that likely case Beza is only explaining the differences between himself and Calvin which are

Calvin does not confuse "ad" and "a" and he does not cite Augustine's use of the one as if he had employed the other. His citations are not intended to show that Augustine taught that the Son is not of the Father but of Himself: but only to show that we may—or rather must—speak in a twofold way of the Son, absolutely, to wit, as He is in Himself and relatively, as He is with reference to the Father. It is his own statement, not Augustine's, when he proceeds to say that when we thus speak of our Lord absolutely as He is in Himself, we are to say that He is *a se*, and only when we speak of Him relatively as He is with reference to the Father are we to speak of Him as *a Patre*. It is marvellous that anyone could confuse this perfectly clear argument: more marvellous still that, on the ground of such a confusion, anyone should venture to charge Calvin with

expressed in Calvin's denial that the Son has His essence from the Father and Beza's affirmation that He has His essence from the Father. Calvin here, he says, is not sufficiently considering the difference between being God *a se* and being God *per se*. In this case Beza's distinction is much like Waterland's between self-existent and necessarily-existent God and makes *αὐροθεότης* mean merely ingenerateness; and we note that if our conjecture is right, there is involved a testimony from Beza that Calvin's real thought of the Trinity denied the communication of essence from Father to Son. In his letter to Prince Radziwil on *The Unity of the Divine Essence and the three Persons subsisting in it*, against the Polish Unitarians, Beza declares (*Tractat. Theolog.*, 1552, p. 64) that it is inept to say that "the Father alone is *αὐροθεός*, that is, as they interpret it, has His Being *a se ipso* and therefore can be called God",—and gives his reason: "For to be *a se* and *ab alio*, do not constitute different kinds of nature; and therefore the Father cannot on that ground be said to be the sole and unique God, nor ought He to be, but rather the sole and unique Father, as the Son is sole and unique because 'only-begotten'." Can we really say that "to be *a se* and *ab alio* do not constitute different kinds of nature (*aliam naturae speciem*)? If the contrast is that of self-existing and derived Being it can scarcely be said. But if the contrast is between ingenerate and generate Being—it is true enough. Every father and son are consubstantial, and the very point of the usage of Father and Son in this connection seems to be to assert their consubstantiality. Beza has this latter contrast in view and only means to say that the ascription of *αὐροθεότης* to the Son is in no way interfered with by the fact that He is "generate"—for the generate and the generator are ever the same in kind.

gross ignorance of the meaning of the simplest Latin words or else of "remarkable chicanery" in his use of Latin texts. Here is what Calvin actually says: "By these appellations, which denote distinction, says Augustine, that is signified by which they are mutually related to one another: not the substance itself by which they are one. By which explanation, the sentiments of the ancients which otherwise might seem contradictory may be reconciled with one another. For now they teach that the Father is the principium of the Son; and now they assert that the Son has His divinity and essence alike of Himself, and is therefore one principium with the Father. The cause of this diversity is elsewhere well and perspicuously explained by Augustine when he speaks as follows: Christ is called God with respect to Himself, He is called Son with respect to the Father. And again, the Father is called God with respect to Himself, with respect to the Son He is called Father. What is called Father with respect to the Son is not the Son; what is called Son with respect to the Father is not the Father: what is called Father with respect to Himself and Son with respect to Himself is God. When, then, we speak of the Son, simply, without respect to the Father, we rightly and properly assert that He is of Himself; and we therefore call Him the sole (*unicum*) principium; but when we are noting the relation in which He stands to the Father, we justly make the Father the principium of the Son."¹⁴¹ A simple reading of the passage is enough to refute the suggestion that Calvin makes Augustine assert that Christ is "of Himself" when he is merely asserting that Christ is God when considered with respect to Himself and not relatively to the Father. If a matter so clear in itself, however, can be made clearer by further evidence, it is easy enough to adduce direct evidence. For Calvin has incorporated into the *Institutes* here material he uses often elsewhere. And in more than one of these instances of its use elsewhere, he distinctly tells us that he did not understand Augustine in these pas-

¹⁴¹ *Institutes*, I. xiii. 19.

sages to be asserting the aseity of the Son. We may take, for example, a letter to the Neuchatel pastors, written in October, 1543, with respect to Cortesius, with whom he had been having a discussion on our Lord's aseity—or as Calvin puts it, *περὶ αὐτοουσίας Christi*. In the course of the discussion, he says, "we came to that difficulty that he did not think he could speak of the essence of Christ without mention of the person. I opposed to this first the authority of Augustine, who testifies that we can speak in a twofold way (*bifariam*) of Christ, as He is God—according to relation, that is, and simply (*simpliciter*). And that the discussion might not be prolonged, I adduced certain passages of Cyril, where in so many words (*dissertis verbis*) he pronounces on what we were discussing."¹⁴² That is to say, the passages of Augustine were appealed to not as direct witness to the *αὐτοουσία* of Christ, but only to prove the subordinate point that we can speak of our Lord in a twofold way: the passages from Cyril alone "expressly" declare on the point at issue. The declaration that Cyril was adduced as pronouncing on the point itself in so many words, is a declaration that Augustine was not so adduced.

In his assertion of the *αὐτοθεότης* of the Son Calvin, then, was so far from supposing that he was enunciating a novelty that he was able to quote the Nicene fathers themselves as asserting it "in so many words". And yet in his assertion of it he marks an epoch in the history of the doctrine of the Trinity. Not that men had not before believed in the self-existence of the Son as He is God: but that the current modes of stating the doctrine of the Trinity left a door open for the entrance of defective modes of conceiving the deity of the Son, to close which there was needed some such sharp assertion of His absolute deity as was supplied by the assertion of His *αὐτοθεότης*. If we will glance over the history of the efforts of the Church to work out for itself an acceptable statement of the great mystery of the Trinity, we shall perceive that it is dominated

¹⁴² *Opp.* xi, p. 454.

from the beginning to the end by a single motive,—to do full justice to the absolute deity of Christ. And we shall perceive that among the multitudes of great thinkers who under the pressure of this motive have labored upon the problem, and to whom the Church looks back with gratitude for great services, in the better formulation of the doctrine or the better commendation of it to the people, three names stand out in high relief, as marking epochs in the advance towards the end in view. These three names are those of Tertullian, Augustine and Calvin. It is into this narrow circle of elect spirits that Calvin enters by the contribution he made to the right understanding of the doctrine of the Trinity. That contribution is summed up in his clear, firm and unwavering assertion of the *αὐτοθεότης* of the Son. By this assertion the *ὁμοουσιότης* of the Nicene fathers at last came to its full right, and became in its fullest sense the hinge of the doctrine.

Princeton.

BENJAMIN B. WARFIELD.

REVIEWS OF RECENT LITERATURE

PHILOSOPHICAL LITERATURE.

GOD. AN ENQUIRY AND A SOLUTION. By PAUL CARUS. Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Company. 1908.

The list of the titles of the published works of Dr. Paul Carus is astounding in this day when "encyclopedic philosophers" of the Aristotle and Leibnitz type, who have "taken all knowledge to be their province", are currently reputed to be an extinct genus. There are few subjects within the range of universal encyclopædia upon which Dr. Carus is not at all times prepared, it would seem, to deliver himself, with equal ease and authority.

Our prime regret is that in approaching the loftiest of all subjects the omniscient and facile author should have permitted himself a jaunty, flippant tone of treatment such as to our mind certainly mars this little book. The very title, considering the merely utilitarian ends which a title is intended to subserve, will, at least in many minds, offend the highest sense of reverence by its unrelieved boldness. This, however, is only a detail, and might be ignored if on pressing beyond the title we found ourselves—if not meeting satisfactory conclusions, at least breathing an atmosphere congenial to the sublimity and solemnity of the theme.

In both desires, however, we are disappointed. God is "the totality of all the uniformities of nature". These are "intrinsically necessary". "Neither law nor a 'good Father' governs the world", for "there is no governing at all except by pure allegory." God is "the authority of conduct" in the sense that "every man who regulates his conduct regulates it by intelligent consideration of consequences". Religion is "panpathy", "cosmic emotion".

It goes without saying that such a construction of the ultimate realities makes no answer possible to the question of salvation from sin. Responsibility itself is only a figment of the imagination if all that is is "intrinsically necessary". There is no "moral obligation" without a "moral Obliger". Nor is there on this conception any possibility of escape from the power of what experience has shown to be the terrific and overwhelming downward drag of human sin upon the human heart.

There are, however, certain things well said in this volume. For example, "If God is to be of any account at all his existence must not

belongs to things hypothetical. A God whose existence has to be postulated is worse(?) than no God at all. We must trace God in the facts of our experience. If he is not there . . . his existence is of no account and we might as well do without him." This is very true; but human experience in its totality witnesses to the presence and activities of a God very different from the God of Dr. Carus's conception. A God which is only the sum-total of all abstractions has never satisfied the human heart's thirst for communion with a living God. And the prospect of only such an immortality as consists in the memory and good influences of our words and deeds in the lives of posterity is a prospect that will comfort no dying bed or lonely mourner. George Eliot's hope of joining

"the choir invisible
Of those immortal dead who live again
In lives made better by their presence"

is a noble hope. But whether such a hope would survive as an ethical power in individual life if the confidence of a literal continuance of self-conscious, personally-identical existence were destroyed—this may well be doubted.

EDWIN HENRY KELLOGG.

PSYCHOLOGIE DE L'INCROYANT. Par ZAVIER MOISANT. Paris: Gabriel Beauchesne & Cie, Editeurs; Ancienne Librairie Delhomme & Briquet, 117 Rue de Rennes. 1908.

This is the title of a book devoted to the endeavor to discover and tabulate some of the chief factors in the attitude of mind commonly known as unbelief. The author avoids the beaten track of deductions drawn from *a priori* positions, and goes for his material to the concrete field where intellectual positions evince themselves in the fibre of life and character.

The whole field is represented by three types, distinct yet similar. The names that stand for these types are Voltaire, Auguste Comte and Charles Renouvier. Voltaire is the apostle of mere negation. His joy is complete when he can effectually unsettle the reader, and set him adrift without chart or compass on the ocean of existence. To this end, no buffoonery is too gross, no comparison too base for his use. His entire polemic may be summed up in the words misrepresentation, superficiality and raillery.

Auguste Comte may pass as either the adversary or friend of Catholicism. Positivism differs widely from blank atheism. The foundations of things elude our search. Yet after denying the significance of all spiritual reality the positivist lapses into gross inconsistency in setting up the cult of "l'ange preponderant" Clotilde de Vaux. He is at once the most radical of unbelievers and the active defender of social Catholicism.

Renouvier is a Huguenot; a rationalist with protestant mentality.

Such is the result of judgment at a distance; but closer study reveals the fact that he was a Platonic philosopher. With all his eager desire for clearness, for reform, for justice, he never experienced the largeness of the Christian's hope. He was the philosopher of immortality it is true; yet when he came to die, it was the end of a belated Grecian philosopher in a Christian land.

The book is written from the standpoint of a devout son of the Church of Rome; and yet in his delimitations of unbelievers, our author has carried with him considerable charity and breadth of view. He objects to putting into the same category with "unbelievers" the Protestant who, refusing to adhere to Catholicism, nevertheless does not reject the principle of revelation.

Mastery of the material in hand and thoroughness of execution are two impressions that will be left upon the mind of the reader in reference to the book when he rises from its completion. It has the double advantage of a lucid presentation of the three eminent thinkers in question, and of laying bare at the same time many of the factors that lie at the basis of modern unbelief.

Chazy, N. Y.

WM. M. JACK.

GENERAL THEOLOGY.

THE NEW SCHAFF-HERZOG ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RELIGIOUS KNOWLEDGE.

Based on the Third Edition of the *Realencyklopädie* founded by J. J. HERZOG, and edited by ALBERT HAUCK. Prepared by more than six hundred scholars and specialists under the supervision of SAMUEL MACAULEY JACKSON, D.D., LL.D., with a distinguished staff of associate and department editors. To be complete in twelve volumes, large quarto. Funk & Wagnalls Company, New York and London. \$5.00 per volume in cloth. Volume III. Chamier-Draendorf.

The third volume of this Encyclopedia sustains the reputation established by the first two volumes. Some important subjects are postponed to a later place in the alphabet, for instance Chronology and Confession of Faith. "Church", with its many subordinate articles, such as "Church and School", "Church and State", occupies about forty of the large pages. Among other prominent articles are those on China, Christology, Communism, Comparative Religion, Concordances, Concordats, and Delimiting Bulls, Congregationalists, Constantinopolitan Creed, Councils and Synods, Crusades, Cyprian, the Cyrils, the Dionysii, Deacon and Deaconess, the Didache, Divorce, Dogma. This random list may indicate the wide variety of the subjects treated.

The Encyclopedia is rich in the biographies of men of all types and opinions who have been interested in religion. In the third volume one of the earliest names is William Ellery Channing, and one of the latest is John Alexander Dowie. In the beginning of the volume, as in the be-

ginning of the second, is a list of books that have been published too recently to have been used in the body of the work.

Of course it is impossible here to notice particular articles; but three or four may be mentioned as indicating characteristics that mark the Encyclopedia as a whole.

A marked excellence is its introduction of some topics not heretofore much discussed in religious books of reference. Such a topic is "Church and School". One effect of the sixteenth century reformation was that the churches came mainly to control the schools, and religion was treated as a dominant factor in education. Within the past century the Protestant churches of Christendom have mainly relinquished to the state their hold upon the schools, with the result, where church and state are separated, that religion becomes a relatively unimportant matter in literary education. The article has no solution to propose. It is written from a point of view which regards the separation of church and school as an "emancipation" for the school. But the problem is a vital one; the presentation of it is thoughtful; its presence indicates the emphasis placed by the editors on live current problems.

The article on "Creation" presents, not very adequately, the attempts that have been made to identify the cosmology of Genesis with that of modern science. It mentions among others Hugh Hiller and Dana, but not Guyot, Hitchcock, Taylor Lewis, Warrington, or Dawson's *Earth and Man*. None of these appear in the bibliography at the end of the article. And the best book on the subject, Mr. David L. Holbrook's *Panorama of Creation*, published in 1908, does not appear either in the article, the bibliography, or the list at the opening of the volume.

The article on Daniel illustrates the way in which the Encyclopedia presents some subjects from different points of view. The principal treatment is by D. F. Buhl, who regards the book of Daniel as Macca-bean in date, and its statements of fact as fabricated, but the final paragraph, with the title "Critical objections answered", is by Dr. Joseph D. Wilson. The Encyclopedia ignores the illuminating and on many questions decisive work on Daniel recently done by Dr. Robert Dick Wilson, on the basis of papyri found in Egypt. Dr. Joseph D. Wilson's positions are mainly sound, and he makes out his case, though some of the points might be simplified. Half a dozen alleged difficulties, for example, turn on the fact that, though Nebuchadnezzar's first year was the fourth year of Jehoiakim, the book of Daniel says that Nebuchadnezzar carried away Daniel and his friends the third year of Jehoiakim, and put them in training for three years, the three years terminating in his own second year. All these difficulties are solved by simply paying attention to the usual Babylonian (and biblical) way of counting. A sovereign's first year was the calendar year that began with the new year's day next after his succession. The three years of the training of Daniel were Nebuchadnezzar's accession year and his first year and his second year; the first of the three years, and perhaps the third, being fragmentary. These were the third, fourth, and fifth years of Jehoiakim.

It is not necessary to raise the question of a co-reign, nor to seek other explanations. Again, the account in Daniel does not say that Belshazzar died in battle at the taking of Babylon by the army of Cyrus, and therefore there is nothing in it that needs to be reconciled with the testimony of the old documents to the effect that the city was taken without fighting. According to the division made in the Hebrew bibles, confirmed by the phenomena of the literary values, the story in Daniel closes with the statement, "In that night Belshazzar the Chaldean king was slain". The words that follow, "And Darius the Mede received the kingdom", are the opening clause of the next story. There is nothing to indicate what the writer in Daniel thought as to the connection between the stories. For centuries men have interpreted Daniel in the light of Greek narratives which we now know to be fabulous, and the idea that Belshazzar died at the capture of Babylon is a part of this ungrounded interpretation.

Necessarily, in examining details in a work of this kind, one finds matters for both approval and disapproval. But the point is that this Encyclopedia meets an actual need, and meets it exceedingly well.

Auburn, N. Y.

WILLIS J. BEECHER.

APOLOGETICAL THEOLOGY.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF REVELATION, The Stone Lectures for 1908-1909, Princeton Theological Seminary. By HERMAN BAVINCK, Doctor of Theology, Professor in the Free University of Amsterdam. 8vo.; pp. x, 349. Longmans, Green & Co., 91 and 93 Fifth Avenue, New York. London, Bombay, and Calcutta. 1909.

In this goodly volume Dr. Bavinck has not only sustained his reputation as a theologian of the first rank and rendered the Stone Lectureship of Princeton Theological Seminary even more prominent as a bulwark of the Reformed Theology, but he has made a distinct and valuable contribution to theological science.

His contribution is distinct because its subject is so. We do not mean by this that the conception of a philosophy of revelation which would trace the idea of revelation, both in its form and in its content, and correlate it with the rest of our knowledge and life is new. As our author says, "Theological thought has always felt the need of such a science. Not only Origin and the Gnostics, but also Augustine and the Scholastics, made it their conscious aim both to maintain Christianity in its specific character and to vindicate for it a central place in the conception of the world as a whole. And after Rationalism had set historical Christianity aside as a mass of fables, the desire has reasserted itself in modern theology and philosophy to do justice to the central fact of universal history, and to trace on all sides the lines of connection established by God himself between revelation and the several spheres of the created universe."

All this, however, does not affect the distinctness of the work before us. The philosophy of revelation which is presented is a new one in that it proceeds entirely from the standpoint of "empirical reality". Dr. Bavinck does not assume to show what revelation should be or how it should be connected with the world. His position is that "precisely because Christianity rests on revelation, it has a content which, while not in conflict with reason, yet greatly transcends reason; even a divine wisdom which appears to the world foolishness. If revelation did not furnish such a content, and contained nothing but what reason itself could sooner or later have discovered, it would not be worthy of its name. Revelation is a disclosure of the *μυστήριον τοῦ θεοῦ*. What neither nature nor history, neither mind nor heart, neither science nor art, can teach us, it makes known to us,—the fixed, unalterable *will* of God to rescue the world and save sinners, a will at variance with well-nigh the whole appearance of things. This will is the secret of revelation. In creation God manifests the power of his mind; in revelation, which has redemption for its center, he discloses to us the greatness of his heart." Now it is from this reality that Dr. Bavinck's philosophy of revelation takes both its idea and its method. In the first place, it does not make "the mystery of God fit in with its own system. It rather 'broadens itself so that it can embrace revelation, too, in itself. And doing this, it brings to light the divine wisdom which lies concealed in it'. In the next place, the philosophy of revelation "seeks to correlate the wisdom which it finds in revelation with that which is furnished by the world at large". It does not conceive of revelation as "isolated in nature and history", but as intimately connected with "the whole of nature, with the whole of history, with the whole of humanity, with the family and society, with science and art". In these two respects does the distinctness of Dr. Bavinck's conception of philosophy appear.

The value of his contribution to theological science becomes evident as he traces this connection. Thus philosophy rests on because it presupposes revelation. Monism in its various forms and pragmatism are acutely criticized and are shown to be equally unsatisfactory. "The only path by which we are able to attain reality is that of self-consciousness." This, however, is not an assertion of idealism, but only of what is true in idealism. "Perception on the part of the subject renders a double service; it is at once the condition and the instrument of the perception of the object. None the less, there is a great difference between the view that subjective perception is the means and origin, and the other view that it is the principle and source of the knowledge of the object. The mistake of idealism lies in confounding the act with its content, the function with the object, the psychological with the logical nature of perception." Thus consciousness depends on revelation. It is itself a revelation. "In consciousness our own being, and the being of the world, are disclosed to us antecedently to our own thought and volition; that is, they are *revealed* to us in the strictest sense of the word." In man's consciousness even more is implied. "In

self-consciousness God makes known to us man, the world, and himself." Hence, "we do not create the truth, and we do not spin it out of our brain: but, in order to find it, we must go back to the facts, to reality, to the sources"; and the ultimate source is and must be revelation.

So, too, is it as regards the relation of revelation to nature. The latter is inexplicable without the former. "Physical science which thinks through its own conceptions"—even such an hypothesis as evolution—, "and fathoms its own nature, issues in metaphysics and rises straight to God." By herself, science is "ignorant as to the origin, essence, and movement of things, has an inadequate view of the laws of nature, and is silent as to the final cause of the world". As she must learn all this, so she can learn it only from divine revelation; and the proof is that if she rejects revelation, she falls back into superstition or pantheistic deification of the creature. "History shows still more plainly the necessity and the significance of revelation." "Historical facts are too rich to be subsumed under one formula"—even one so comprehensive as evolution. There is "the same difficulty in the attempt to distinguish a succession of periods and to discover the laws of history." "The greatest difficulty of all appears in the inquiry into the meaning and purpose of history." "An objective norm is required for this," and it can be found only in divine revelation. In the true sense there can be no history without metaphysics, without belief in a divine wisdom and power." Indeed, we must have Christ himself, or history has "lost its heart, its kernel, its center, its distribution". It is not otherwise as regards revelation and religion. The latter cannot be explained "historically and psychologically through study of primitive man and the child". Hence, there is a revival of the idea of a "religio insita". "Inquiry into the essence of religion leads to the same conclusion." Every religion presupposes a revelation. Nor is this all. With reference to its truth and validity also is religion founded in revelation. "Without revelation religion sinks back into a pernicious superstition."

The argument is strengthened when we consider "the course of development through which mankind has passed, and which has led it from paradise to the cross and will guide it from the cross to glory". There has been such a development. "The human race is a unit with a common origin, a common habitat, and a common tradition." The Old Testament attaches itself to this tradition. Yet it is peculiar. This peculiarity does not consist exclusively or primarily in its ethical monotheism. It does appear "primarily and principally in the promise, in the covenant of grace, and in the Gospel". This it was that made Israel God's "peculiar people" and that through Israel has guided the progress of mankind and will issue in the redemption of the race. But that "God forgives sin by grace, for his name's sake—the knowledge of this mystery we owe wholly to the special revelation which God granted unto Israel". Religious experience teaches the same lesson. Theology may not be regarded as religious anthropology. "Religious

experience is not fitted to serve as a heuristic principle." "The psychology of religion, however important in its own sphere, cannot judge of the right of existence and value of religious phenomena." This is specially apparent in the study of the phenomena of conversion. This is "Christianity's own way to fellowship with God". Yet experience of conversion does not come first, after which interpretation follows; but revelation precedes, and is experienced in faith." Unless such revelation furnished the norm, we could not be sure that the fact was real or the conversion genuine. Thus the "Scriptural conception of conversion points back to a supernatural factor, notwithstanding all psychological and historical mediation". Not otherwise is the relation of revelation to culture. This relation is "the problem of the ages". The early Christian position, the Romanist and Protestant conceptions, Tolstoi and Nietzsche, recent hyper-eschatological views about the person of Jesus—these and other widely differing conceptions emphasize the necessity of clear definition of culture and particularly of modern culture in order to determine their relation to Christianity. As soon as this is done, however, it becomes evident that culture is "rooted in metaphysics and founded in revelation. It rests on data which God has himself established and is certain of its rights and value only because God is creator, regenerator, and consummator of all things." Moreover, the Gospel is heir to all true culture. "All is ours if we are Christ's." Finally, the importance of revelation appears in its relation to the future. Christianity is not "a negligible factor in future development". On the contrary, she is our only guide and hope. "Neither science nor philosophy, neither ethics nor culture, can give that security with regard to the future which we have need of, not only for our thought, but also for our whole life and action." "Religion alone is able to do this, especially Christianity, because it *reveals* to us God as the Creator, Reconciler and Restorer of all things."

Such is a brief and imperfect outline of this noble argument. To characterize it fittingly were as difficult as adequately to reproduce it. Perhaps what strikes the reader first is the writer's encyclopædic and up-to-date knowledge. As Herder ransacked the universe for his *Philosophy of History*, so to an even more conspicuous degree would Dr. Bavinck seem to have done for his *Philosophy of Revelation*. Unlike Herder, however, he has not been overwhelmed by his material. On the contrary, he marshals it as Napoleon did his armies. Remarkable for the extent and variety of his learning, he is yet more remarkable for his philosophic grasp of it.

Probably equally impressive is his breadth of sympathy. His *Philosophy of Revelation* is a beautiful example of what the highest, because Christian, culture ought to be. The author is evidently no recluse, no scholar merely. His work shows him to be in the best sense a man of the world. Believing that God is the author of everything except sin, there is no right interest that does not interest him.

Most significant is the religious spirit of these lectures. Dr. Bavinck is preëminent as a theologian. The Reformed Theology has no pro-

founder teacher, no abler defender. But it is from the heart that he writes; and his argument persuades as well as convinces because it throbs with the experience of the sovereign grace of God. Princeton Seminary will ever treasure these lectures as among the most notable given on her "Stone Foundation". All who heard them will remember even more clearly the lecturer's genial, serious, forceful personality; and all who love the Lord Jesus in sincerity must wish, for the sake of his whole church, as well as of the Dutch branch of it, that Dr. Bavinck, and also his eminent compatriot and predecessor as Stone Lecturer, Dr. Kuyper, will long be spared to "contend earnestly for the faith which was once for all delivered unto the saints".

The reviewer takes pleasure in adding that both the translators and the publisher have done their part in a manner not unworthy of the great man whom they have thus introduced to the English speaking world, and that his work is being issued, too, in Dutch and in German.

Not the least valuable section of the volume are the "Notes" at the close, which give numerous and discriminating references to the literature of the subject.

Princeton.

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

THE PRECINCT OF RELIGION IN THE CULTURE OF HUMANITY. By Prof. CHARLES GRAY SHAW, B.D., Ph.D., Professor of Philosophy in New York University. London: Swan, Sonnenschein & Co., Lim.; New York: The Macmillan Co. 1908.

Under the above title we are conducted across a well-worn field, where the author has struck out on a track of his own.

The field is divided into four sections: The essence of Religion, The Character of Religion, The Reality of Religion, The Religious World Order; and a carefully detailed Table of Contents furnishes a helpful conspectus of the matter treated.

Some of the salient features of the book are as follows: "The main-spring of religion is the necessary affirmation of the self in opposition to the world." Religious assurance is not to be limited by the powers of demonstration at the command of the pure intellect. Religion must have an object; is not to be resolved into any sort of subjectivism. Religion and Theology must be united in order to constitute what may be justly termed an absolute or universal religion, such as Christianity.

One or two points will not pass unchallenged by careful readers. The essence of religion, we are told, is the being redeemed away from the world. This is fortified by the saying of Jesus: "I have overcome the world." The basic position here in the mind of the professor is an irreducible antagonism between the world of nature and the world of spirit. We are not aware that Christ ever uttered a single word of reproach against the "world of nature". His spirit pronounced it "very good", up to the point where nature was vitiated by the introduction of the powers of another "world".

But strangest of all will strike the average religious student the

strictures, advanced by the Professor, on Theism. He has evidently striven to throw the whole Theistic Argument into a new light. He has succeeded. It is surely a "new thing" in philosophic thinking when the Professor brands Theism as an invalid manner of argumentation, because "it runs counter to our fundamental principle of reasoning: *principium identitatis*" (221). He denounces it as lacking in logical consistency because "it makes God so immanent in nature that the various features of physical activity may be identified with his will" (221). One feels like rubbing his eyes on reading such a statement. We had been laboring under the delusion that that is just what Theism cannot for a moment tolerate, the conception which is in short the heart and life-blood of Pantheism. We are holding no brief for Theism here. It may be that that doctrine is doomed to be stowed away in the philosophical old-clothes press of a misfitting illogicality. But if that end is to be attained, or if the Professor sees any wide and enduring benefits that would accrue to religion from its demolition, we venture the opinion that the end will need to be achieved by a species of argumentation radically different from that before us at this point in Professor Shaw's otherwise scholarly production.

Chazy, N. Y.

WM. M. JACK.

EXEGETICAL THEOLOGY.

A STANDARD BIBLE DICTIONARY. Edited by MELANCTHON W. JACOBUS, D.D., EDWARD E. NOURSE, D.D., and ANDREW C. ZENOS, D.D., in association with American, British and German scholars. Large quarto, pp. xxiv, 920, with 300 illustrations and 11 new maps in colors. Cloth, \$6.00 net. Indexed, 50 cents extra. Carriage charges, 47 cents. Funk & Wagnalls Co., 1909.

This is in many respects a most excellent work. But from a genuinely conservative point of view it is a work which it would not be honest to commend without also calling specific attention to certain features in it which are objectionable.

Its own description of the "critical position" to which it "is necessarily committed" is as follows: "One of acceptance of the proved facts of modern scholarship, of openmindedness toward its still-debated problems, and of conservatism of the fundamental truths of the Christianity proclaimed and established in the message and mission of Jesus Christ."

By way of defining this platform the publishers explain that its position "differs materially from that of speculative criticism", and especially from that of certain works which "have been edited in a radical spirit attracted by novelty and so opposed to tradition that it may be said that they seek to build a new faith on the ruins of the acknowledged historical facts of Christianity".

These statements of the men of the Standard Bible Dictionary offer

reasonably good phraseology in which to sum up its objectionable features. Its work so much resembles that of building a new structure "on the ruins of the acknowledged historical facts of Christianity" that the builders are conscious that they need to proclaim that there is a difference between the two. They are not mistaken in their apprehensions. A large and characteristic portion of their work has the effect of an attempt to lay in ruins "the acknowledged historical facts of Christianity". This is the worst that can be said concerning the Dictionary; the best that can be said concerning it is that yet larger parts of their work are of an utterly different type.

Any one's estimate of their platform must depend on the question whether he agrees with the editors in their ideas concerning "the proved facts of modern scholarship" and "the fundamental truths of" Christianity.

Bulking large among their alleged facts of scholarship we find the familiar theory that the earliest parts of the Pentateuch were written some centuries later than Moses, that the Pentateuch itself was written later than Nehemiah, and that inasmuch as all parts of the Pentateuch are presupposed in the books of Judges and Samuel and Kings, and in the books of Isaiah and Amos and Hosea and the other prophets, and in particular Psalms and in the book of Psalms as a whole, we must hold that practically all the Old Testament writings were either written or reworked at dates not earlier than those assigned to the latest parts of the Pentateuch.

If this were merely a question of the date and authorship of books, it would not be unimportant; but its importance becomes vital when we find that the acceptance of these ideas involves a very extensive discrediting of the Bible as a source of information. The theory treats the witnesses who testify in the Bible as not merely open to suspicion, but as actually giving false testimony. It rejects their statements on the ground of very slight probabilities to the contrary, or even on the ground of mere lack of corroboration. It rejects as a whole the Old Testament history of the religion of Jehovah, and rejects a large proportion of the details; and that not on the basis of evidence, real or alleged, but on the basis of inferences from precariously grounded theories. A large part of the chronological data of the Old and New Testaments it either rejects or simply ignores as unworthy even to be considered. In its assertions concerning the authors of the Old Testament books it discredits the hundreds of important Old and New Testament statements that testify to the contrary. And more serious than these and other groups of classifiable instances is the fact that the advocates of the theory, including these contributors, have the habit of treating ordinary biblical statements of fact as of less than par value. The objectionable thing is not their proposition that "mistakes as to fact may be found in the Bible, yet its essential value remain"; it is their excessive readiness to assert that statements found in the Bible are mistaken. Our generation boasts that it is seeking the truth. For it the "essential value" of the Bible will not remain if it forms the

habit of counting ordinary Bible statements as inferior in credibility to slightly probable inferences from a theory.

If the contributors to the *Encyclopaedia Biblica* were to reply to what the *Standard Bible Dictionary* circular says concerning "speculative criticism", they would perhaps say that they have had the courage to carry principles to their inevitable results, and that this fact constitutes the main difference between them and the contributors to the *Standard*. Possibly they would say that the *Standard* contributors are compromisers, and not thorough-going seekers after truth. If they should say this, their logic would be correct. There is no tenable halfway position between that of an agnostic and that of a person who holds that the Scriptures are trustworthy in their statements.

The attitude of the *Standard Bible Dictionary* toward "modern scholarship" necessarily affects its attitude toward "the fundamental truths of the Christianity proclaimed and established in the message and mission of Jesus Christ". In the records we have of "the message" of Jesus no topic occupies more space than the Scriptures, and no teachings are presented as more fundamental than those concerning the Scriptures. He and the New Testament disciples regard the Scriptures themselves as among the fundamental things, and base other fundamental things upon the Scriptures. The *Standard Bible Dictionary* follows their example only in part.

Of the truth which men have actually received by revelation through the Scriptures a large part could doubtless be now verified, from human experience and other forms of evidence, without recourse to the Scriptures; but for other large parts we are still as dependent on the Scriptures as men ever were. What do we really know on such themes as immortality, the person of Jesus Christ, the offices of the Spirit of God, prayer and its answer, the fatherhood of God, save as we accept the information offered in the Scriptures? One cannot drop out the Scriptures from his conception of the fundamental facts of Christianity without having his convictions as to other truths seriously affected thereby. This is as true of the writers of the *Standard Bible Dictionary* as it is of other men.

The task of speaking these plain words has not been an agreeable one, but it has prepared the way for saying honestly things that are pleasanter to say. The *Standard Bible Dictionary* is critically no more objectionable than the Dictionaries that are most naturally thought of as its rivals. There are single-volume Bible dictionaries that are less likely to mislead, but they are either less full than the *Standard*, or less recent and therefore less well up to date, or less desirable in quality or makeup. Its faulty critical position is not a sufficient reason why one should refuse to avail himself of its help, though it is a reason why one should be cautious in using it.

Its thirty-seven contributors are a homogeneous group of men. They are distinguished in scholarship, and are evangelical in spirit. There is no hackwork in the volume. It is made up of signed articles, for which the writers expect to be held responsible.

Its use of the products of modern intellectual activity is not confined to theories of biblical criticism. Modern scholarship has illuminated the Bible through archaeological discoveries, lexical and grammatical and metrical researches, text criticism, investigations geographical, geological, ethnological, biological; and the Standard Bible Dictionary has availed itself of the materials thus provided.

In the case of most of the contributors the adherence to the Wellhausen critical theories is mainly a matter of tradition, something which they have accepted from the reading of other men's writings, and not a product of their own investigation of the phenomena. They are evidently not aware of the surprisingly large number of instances in which their traditional conclusions, as stated in some articles, are in contradiction with their conclusions reached by research, as expressed in other articles. In more ways than one their work is the better for its inconsistencies of this kind. Many of them, in particular the writers of the New Testament articles, are careful students of the Bible text for the purpose of finding out just what is in it; and there is nothing that equals this habit as a corrective of critical misapprehensions. They have a practical and sympathetic interest in the Scriptures, which renders them appreciative, and has guarded them against errors into which mechanical critics fall. They have an understanding as to the matters on which a minister or S. S. worker needs information, and in their treatments of subjects they actually give the information that is needed. The vice of several recent books of reference is that the articles have degenerated into mere propaganda of some critical theory. To a remarkable extent the Standard Bible Dictionary is free from this vice. The editors have had the good judgment to cut down most of the articles to a minimum, thus gaining space for a satisfactorily full treatment of the more important subjects. And in makeup, illustrations, maps, and the like, this Dictionary excels. Those who strictly accept its critical position should regard it as the best of the Bible Dictionaries, and others will regard it as one of the best.

Auburn, N. Y.

WILLIS J. BEECHER.

THE EARLY TRADITIONS OF GENESIS. By ALEX. R. GORDON, D.Litt., Professor of Old Testament Literature and Exegesis, Presbyterian College, Montreal. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 38 George Street. 1907. 8vo.; pp. xii, 348. Imported by Charles Scribner's Sons.

This treatise differs from its recent predecessors in the same field on the one hand in that the author partitions the Hebrew narrative still more minutely and detects the fragments of a larger number of documents, and on the other hand in that he ascribes greater historical value to the Hebrew tradition regarding Abraham and the children of Israel. The author has not surveyed the field thoroughly, even where matters are concerned of supreme importance to his main attempt at constructive work. 1. He has failed to note that the Babylonian account of

creation which corresponds with the first chapter of Genesis and also with the report of the philosopher Damascius is found on the first tablet of the series (*Presbyterian and Reformed Review*, iii. 454-456; iv. 746-748). The attempt to connect Gen. i with the sun-myth of the later tablets of the series has led Professor Gordon, in the interest of his theory, to fill gaps and assume agreements (p. 51; comp. *Presbyterian Review*, x. 670f.). 2. The author identifies the Habiri of the Tell el-Amarna tablets with the Hebrews. He may be right in this view; but he has neglected to mention the philological argument against it, perhaps first formulated by Professor Jastrow, which still remains unanswered.

Princeton.

JOHN D. DAVIS.

PREHISTORIC ARCHÆOLOGY AND THE OLD TESTAMENT. Being the Donnellan Lectures delivered before the University of Dublin in 1906-1907. Enlarged, and with Notes and Appendices. By H. J. DUKINFIELD ASTLEY, M.A., Litt.D., F.R.Hist.S., F.R.S.L., Fellow of the Royal Anthropological Institute, Late Hon. Editorial Secretary of the British Archæological Association, etc., etc., Vicar of East and West Rudham, Norfolk. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 38 George Street. 1908. 8vo.; pp. xi, 314. Imported by Charles Scribner's Sons. \$2.00 net.

The fabric of these lectures is erected on the theories: 1. That the early narratives of the Bible are stories, eternally true to poetry, and enshrining the ideas which possessed a special people at a special time as to the progress of creation and man's place in nature; and 2. That in the acceptance of critical results [secured by the school of Wellhausen] an eirenicon may be found for the anthropological and religious views of the origin and constitution of man. The lectures traverse familiar ground. They are pleasantly written, but bring nothing new into the discussion and make no contribution.

Princeton.

JOHN D. DAVIS.

LIGHT FROM THE EGYPTIAN PAPYRI ON JEWISH HISTORY BEFORE CHRIST. By the Rev. CHARLES H. H. WRIGHT, D.D., Trin. Coll., Dub.; M.A., Exeter Coll., Oxon; Ph.D. of the University of Leipzig; Donnellan Lecturer in the University of Dublin (1880-1); Bampton Lecturer (1878); Grinfield Lecturer on the Septuagint (18903-7) in the University of Oxford; Knight of the Order of the North Star of Sweden. London: Williams & Norgate, 14 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden. 1908. 8vo.; pp. xvii, 123. 3 shillings net.

An unimportant book. The first thirty-four pages only treat of the subject which gives the title to the work. The main contents of the Jewish documents discovered at Elephantine in Egypt are published,

with no attempt at thorough discussion. The fourth chapter repays perusal. It lists the numerous "events which occurred in the early Maccabean period", but which are "not alluded to in the Book of Daniel". From this catalogue it appears that "the Book of Daniel does not exhibit marks of having been written in Maccabean times, save as regards a small portion of ch. xi".

Princeton.

JOHN D. DAVIS.

HAND-BOOK OF PROPHECY. By JAMES STACY, D.D. Richmond: Presbyterian Committee of Publication. Cloth. 12mo., pp. 149. Price 60 cents.

This volume contains a brief outline of the prophecies of Daniel and John, together with a critical essay on the Second Advent. The writer belongs to the "historical school" of interpreters, and holds the Post-Millennial view of the Coming of Christ. His treatment of Scripture is reverent, and his statements, while not convincing, are definite. The Papacy is the Anti-Christ, "the Beast"; and the number of his name, 666, means "Lateinos", or "The Latin man", 'whether the name is written in Greek or Hebrew'. The "trumpets" and "seals" and "vials" are all interpreted to designate definite historic events,—invasions of Goths and Vandals, conquests by Turks and Saracens, the Reformation and the French Revolution, etc., etc. "The millennium" is scheduled to begin in A. D. 2000.

For a discussion of these same problems from a different point of view, we cordially commend the scholarly and concise volume on the Apocalypse recently published by President Wm. G. Moorehead, D.D., of Xenia Theological Seminary.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

DIE RELIGIÖSEN UND SITTlichen ANSCHAUUNGEN DER ALTTESTAMENTLICHEN APOKRYPHEN UND PSEUDEPIGRAPHEN. Von LUDWIG COUARD, Pfarrer in Klinkow bei Prenslau. Gütersloh: Druk und Verlag von C. Bertelsmann. 1907. 8vo.; pp. vi, 248. 4 M. geb. 4.80 M.

The author of this book in the preface calls attention to the fact that, notwithstanding the intensive study devoted of late years to the apocryphal and pseudepigraphical literature of Judaism, and the prominent rôle this study has come to play in New Testament science, there has not hitherto appeared any compendious yet complete survey of the religious and moral conceptions embodied in these writings. He offers his work as an attempt to supply this desideratum. It is constructed after a stereotyped topical plan, as the headings of the successive chapters, God, The Angels, God in his Relation to the World, Man and Sin, Ethics, The Messianic Hope, Eschatology, indicate. This method of treatment has the advantage that it facilitates quick reference to any particular point of investigation, but perhaps the index would have

sufficed to insure this. On the other hand, the pressing of the material into these fixed categories would have prevented the author from giving us an insight into the inner organism of the Jewish world of religious and moral thought and from clearly exhibiting its moving principles and interacting forces, even if it had lain within his plan to undertake this. As it is, the writer purposely refrains from such a task, and confines himself to the purely statistical one of ascertaining and grouping the facts. The only thing that goes slightly beyond these limits are the hints interspersed through the various chapters, as to the extent in which Judaism marks a modification of Old Testament belief either in the line of advance or retrogression. The greater and far more pressing problem of the influence of these documents and the movements of which they were the exponents on the rise of Christianity is nowhere touched upon. Quite exceptional is a remark as that found on p. 100: "Out of the wisdom of Pseudo-Solomon grew the Johannine Logos." If thus the book lacks the interest attaching, *e. g.*, to Baldensperger's brilliant constructions, it is for that very reason a safer guide for the ordinary student who needs above all else to have the bare facts placed before him. With reference to the pending debate as to whether the characteristic developments appearing in this literature are an indigenous Jewish growth or of foreign origin, on which hinges the even more important question in how far such foreign influences indirectly contributed towards the shaping of Christianity, Couard does not profess to render any formal decision. Where the question emerges in a concrete form he usually contents himself with rendering a verdict of not-proven. So in regard to predestinarianism and its alleged Babylonian origin (p. 80), the derivation of the daemon-name Asmodeus from the Persian Aeshma-daeva (p. 72), the hierarchy of archangels (p. 58), the hypostatizing of wisdom (except in so far as in the description of its all-penetrating character in Sap. vii. 22 a Stoic influence is recognized), the combination of the cosmical aspect of the Messianic figure with the Indo-germanic myth of Yima, the "Ur-man" (p. 216), the alleged Persian origin of the doctrine of a universal resurrection (p. 231), the tracing back of the idea of a final world-conflagration to the same source (p. 227). Still the author's refusal to commit himself to these modern theories is not due to dogmatic prepossession, for in regard to other less problematical points he freely grants the presence of foreign influence, *e. g.*, in regard to the representation of the body as a prison and burden (Platonic, p. 102), the preëxistentianism of Sap. Sol. (Platonic-Pythagorean, p. 108), the Stoical coloring of the ethics of IV Maccabees (p. 154), the Platonic influence perceptible in the ethical views of Sirach and Sap., the eschatological war of the constellations (Oriental Mythology, p. 227).

Perhaps the book would not have suffered if the author had reduced its contents to still narrower limits. To quote for half a page the references for the occurrence of $\delta \bar{\iota} \psi \iota \sigma \tau \alpha \varsigma$ as a divine name, as is done in Ch. i, § 6, would seem to be a work of supererogation. The recapitulations of O. T. doctrine in cases where no essential difference between

it and the standpoint of Judaism appears, is equally superfluous. Besides these faults of excess there occur blemishes in the line of inexact or unclear statements. What is said (pp. 34, 35) about the quasi-hypostatizing of the name of Jehovah fails to give a true account of this remarkable phenomenon. How "in the name of God" can possibly mean "to his honor", as it is proposed to render in Ps. Sol. xi. 8, En. lxi. 13, and possibly Sir. xlv. 26, the author has not even made an attempt to explain, and after Heitmüller has so thoroughly discredited this and similar vague renderings, it would seem time that they were relegated to oblivion. A sentence like the following: "To antiquity the name is not a mere combination of letters but an integral part of the individual; it represents its bearer," only covers up the problem, which consists precisely in this, how the name comes to be "an integral part of the individual", for between this and the conception that the name represents the person there is a great difference. The author's reasoning, confused and inconsequential as it is on this point, certainly does not warrant the summary rejection of the hypothesis that the name of God appears occasionally as a sort of hypostasis side by side with God, as a duplicate of the deity. Confusing also is the distinction implied on p. 95 between "personification" and "*dichterische Einkleidung*" unless by "personification" be meant downright hypostatizing, which the author obviously does not intend, since he affirms that Baruch, Sirach and Sap. Sol. advance from the "personification" of wisdom found in Prov. and Job to a hypostatical conception of the same, and yet maintains that the "personifying" in Prov. i-ix is more than a poetical form of representation. Where the two-fold conception of the Messiah as Son of David and as a preëxistent heavenly being are compared, the query ought to have been more distinctly put, whether these two are incompatible, or may perhaps have been reconciled in the mind of theological Judaism, either through the idea of an incarnation or through the assumption of a preëxistence in the form of an embodied spirit. Even though such questions admit of no definite answer, it is necessary to raise them or to indicate the pretended solution they have received at the hands of others, *e. g.*, Harnack and Dalman, who deny that the preëxistent Jewish Messiah was capable of human birth.

The one erratum we have noticed occurs on p. 228, where "früher" stands for "später".

Princeton.

GEERHARDUS VOS.

THE SERMON ON THE MOUNT. A STUDY. By J. B. SHEARER, D.D., LL.D. Richmond, Va.: Presbyterian Committee of Publication. 12mo. Cloth. Pp. 146. Price 60 cents.

The author treats the Sermon on the Mount as an exhaustive discussion of Phariseeism, and shows how it rebukes the four characteristic errors of Literalism, Formalism, Covetousness, and Censorious-

ness. The reader is given new views of certain truths, and cautioned against many popular misinterpretations of these familiar chapters.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

THE JOHANNINE WRITINGS. By PAUL W. SCHMIEDEL, Professor of Theology at Zürich. Translated by Maurice A. Canney, M.A. London: Adam and Charles Black. 1908. Pp. xi, 287. (New York: The Macmillan Company. \$1.50 net.)

This book is a translation of three parts (1. Reihe, 8, 10. u. 12. Heft) of the *Religionsgeschichtliche Volksbücher*, but incorporates changes and additions that have been made by the author since the booklets originally appeared in 1906. The alterations affect details only; the general character of the work is the same. Though intended not for specialists but for the general public, it is a notable expression of the author's views with regard to the Fourth Gospel.

Part I, comprising pp. 1-166, is devoted to a comparison of the Fourth Gospel with the Synoptics. The author first seeks to establish the irreconcilable difference between the two accounts, and then argues for the absolute rejection of the Johannine account as an historical narrative. Such a line of argument would seem to be impressive by its very simplicity. But, unfortunately, the comparison can often not be made between the Fourth Gospel taken as a whole and the Synoptics taken as a whole, but only between one element in the Fourth Gospel (regarded as the fundamental element) and one element in the Synoptics (again regarded as the fundamental element). Take as an example the supposed difference in the view held of the person of Jesus. If it could be said that the Synoptics present a human Christ, and John a divine Christ, the matter would be quite simple. As a matter of fact, however, "the Synoptics agree with John in sketching" the picture of Jesus "with a grandeur which raises Jesus to a marked extent above the standard of what is human" (p. 25). On the other hand, the true humanity of Jesus cannot really be eliminated from John. "I thirst" (John xix. 28), and "Jesus wept" (John xi. 35) might seem to preclude the attempt. According to Schmiedel, however, we are not "meant to suppose that Jesus was really thirsty", for the Evangelist "says expressly that Jesus spoke the word in order that a prophecy of the Old Testament (Ps. xxii. 16) might be fulfilled" (p. 28). This bit of exegesis will repay examination. In the first place, the author mentions Ps. xxii. 16 as the Old Testament passage referred to, whereas others who regard the thirst as the fulfilment of a definite prophecy think of the much more obvious passage, Ps. lxix. 22. The common view should certainly have been noticed, even (or perhaps especially) in a popular discussion. In the second place, the view of many scholars (including Meyer and Holtzmann) that *ἵνα τελεσθῇ ἡ γραφή* goes with *τελεσται* rather than with *λέγει Δεσώ* has been altogether ignored. And finally, quite aside from such details, Schmiedel has arrived at a view

of the passage which needs only to be clearly stated in order to be recognized as absurd. When Jesus said, "I thirst", he was not really thirsty at all. Therefore the prophecy was not really fulfilled, and the only purpose of Jesus' words was to make the people suppose that the prophecy had been fulfilled—a prophecy, moreover, the real fulfilment of which would have been prejudicial to the divine dignity of Jesus. Surely such was not the meaning of the Evangelist. As to the other passage, Schmiedel supposes that, in the mind of the Evangelist, Jesus wept, not out of any sympathy for the relatives of Lazarus, "but simply because they did not believe in his power to work miracles". Schmiedel is particularly offended because Jesus waits two days after the news of Lazarus' death has arrived. In reality, however, that waiting displays not lack of human sympathy but the same subordination of human sympathy to higher ends which the Jesus of the Synoptists demands with even greater sharpness. "If any man cometh unto me, and hateth not his own father, and mother, and wife, and children, and brethren, and sisters, yea, and his own life also, he cannot be my disciple". The modern elimination of what may be called the catastrophic in Christianity, the modern subordination of Christianity to good citizenship, is fully as much opposed to the Synoptics as to John. On the other hand, it is significant that it is John who emphasizes the special love that Jesus felt for definite individuals.

In Schmiedel's refutation of attempts at harmonizing the Fourth Gospel with the Synoptics, the discussions of Matt. xxiii. 37 (Lk. xiii. 34) and of Matt. xi. 27 (Lk. x. 22) perhaps deserve special mention. Matt. xxii. 37 seems to confirm the Johannine account by presupposing several journeys of Jesus to Jerusalem. This conclusion Schmiedel avoids by denying the authenticity of the verse as an utterance of Jesus. "An utterance put into the mouth of the Wisdom of God by a Jewish author has been wrongly regarded as a saying of Jesus" (p. 61). The course of reasoning by which the words are assigned to the "Wisdom of God" cannot here be reviewed. But what gave rise to the first suspicion was the third person occurring where the second might have been expected: "O Jerusalem, Jerusalem, that *kills* the prophets and *stones* them that are sent unto *her*", etc. "Jerusalem is therefore apostrophised only in the second half of the sentence; in the first something is said about the city without the city itself being addressed. No one who has a thought clearly in his mind, and intends to write it down in an equally simple sentence, would express himself in this way" (p. 58). The difficulty is solved, Schmiedel continues, by the hypothesis that our Evangelists or rather their source used a book in which the sentence appeared without any apostrophe, and then introduced the apostrophe "without noticing that, having made this alteration, the sentence should have been made to read differently at the beginning" (p. 59). But perhaps an easier explanation of the linguistic difficulty is sufficient—"Πρὸς αὐτήν for πρὸς σε is to be explained by the Semitic preference for the third person in attributes and relative clauses which

belong with a vocative" (Wellhausen, *das Evangelium Matthaei*, p. 121). And even a transition from exclamation to direct address would not be so harsh as to justify Schmiedel's far-reaching conclusions.

Matt. xi. 27 seems to teach a christology very much like the Johannine. Here Schmiedel has recourse to textual criticism (*cf.* the same author's fuller discussion in *Protestantische Monatshefte*, 1900, pp. 1-20). A translation of our Greek manuscripts reads: "All things have been delivered unto me of my Father: and no one knoweth the Son, save the Father; neither doth any know the Father, save the Son, and he to whomsoever the Son willeth to reveal him." But "all ecclesiastical and heretical writers of the second century, who give us any information about this passage, entirely or in part support the following version: 'All things have been delivered to me of my Father, and no one *hath known* the Father save the Son, neither the Son save the Father, and he to whomsoever the Son willeth to reveal him'" (p. 62). According to Schmiedel, this is the original text. The important variants are *ἔγω* for *ἐπιγινώσκει* (*γινώσκει* in Luke) and the transposition of the clauses. By the aorist *ἔγω*, "a definite point is fixed at which the knowledge first began . . . and since the knowledge spoken of first [*i. e.* Jesus' knowledge of the Father] was not gained earlier than during the earthly life of Jesus, we cannot suppose that the knowledge referred to in the second clause belongs to an earlier date" (p. 63). The meaning, Schmiedel concludes, is simply this: that Jesus alone has learned that God is a loving Father; He alone can feel himself to be a Son of God; His sonship is as yet unknown to all save the Father, and He himself must tell others of it. But even if Schmiedel's text were correct, it is doubtful whether metaphysics would be eliminated. For if Jesus' unique knowledge of God as Father is the sum and substance of the passage, whereas His unique position as Son is a mere inference from that, why should the Son rather than the Father appear in the second clause as the subject of the Son's revelation to other men? To suit Schmiedel's interpretation perfectly the passage should have read simply *οὐδεὶς ἔγω τὸν πατέρα εἰ μὴ ὁ υἱὸς καὶ οὗτος ὁ υἱὸς ἀποκαλύψῃ*, which, indeed, is approximately what Wellhausen and Harnack suppose to have been the original form of the saying. This text, however, lacks even such attestation as can be adduced for Schmiedel's text. And even if it should be adopted, the similarity to the teaching of the Fourth Gospel would still be apparent (*cf.* Chapman in *Journal of Theological Studies*, 1909, p. 565). As a matter of fact, however, the reading of all Greek manuscripts (except U) cannot be so easily set aside. The second-century attestation of Schmiedel's text, even after it has been discounted by the considerations adduced by Chapman (*op. cit.*, pp. 552-566), is very interesting, it is true. But there is also second-century patristic evidence for both peculiarities of our canonical text, and indeed Irenaeus in one passage (despite his inconsistency elsewhere) distinctly expresses his preference for this text and lays the other text to the charge of those who denied the existence of all true knowledge of God before the coming of Christ. Irenaeus may be

correct in saying that that other text was due to dogmatic correction. But more probably the corruption had a more innocent origin. The substitution of the aorist for the present may have been due to the aorist *παρεδδθη* immediately before: the transposition may have arisen from the feeling that the Father would naturally be mentioned before the Son (Weiss in Meyer's *Kommentar*, 9^{te} Aufl., on Matt. xi. 27). It is hardly necessary to have recourse to the hypothesis of an extra-canonical gospel (cf. Bousset, *die Evangelienzeit Justins des Märtyrers*, pp. 100-103).

Schmiedel not only does not regard the Fourth Gospel as a true record of facts, but also does not believe that the author himself was much concerned about reporting facts. In Jn. iii. 22, we are told that Jesus baptized; whereas in iv. 2, we read, "and yet Jesus himself baptized not, but his disciples". From this, the conclusion is deduced that John "is not an author who is anxious to report nothing false; where it suits his purpose, he reports it" (p. 55). But if the author was thus going to add "a touch which, in reality, as he himself knows, does not at all harmonize with the truth", he would hardly contradict himself expressly and carefully a few lines further down. The apparent self-correction exhibits rather the simplicity and artlessness of the writer, and creates a decided presumption in his favor. Again, Schmiedel is so firmly convinced of the originally symbolic meaning of the miracles of the Fourth Gospel (as of such a Synoptic miracle as the feeding of the five thousand), that he can even argue gravely the question as to whether the miracles were facts for the author himself.

Schmiedel regards the author of the Gospel as influenced by Gnosticism positively as well as negatively, but what he adduces in proof can hardly be called convincing. The thought that matter is essentially evil is effectually excluded by John i. 14, *καὶ ὁ λόγος σὰρξ ἐγένετο*—a weighty utterance to which Schmiedel has done but scant justice. (p. 152). Schmiedel himself admits that the Gnostic division between God and the world has been softened by the Fourth Gospel. As for the Gnostic ineradicable dualism between the children of God and the children of the devil, that is excluded by the *δεῖ ὑμᾶς γεννηθῆναι ἄνωθεν* of John iii. 7. The third verse of that chapter cannot exclude the possibility that that which is born of the flesh may become spirit (p. 60). For the new birth is such a change.

In Part ii (pp. 169-277) the author discusses the "origin and value of the Gospel, Epistles, and Revelation of John". The Gospel is assigned to the period between 132 (date of Bar Cochba's insurrection) and 140. Such an extremely late dating can be arrived at only by neglecting the weight of convergent lines of independent testimony. Whether the unknown writer intended to have his book regarded as the work of John the Apostle (in other words, whether the Fourth Gospel is a pseudonymous writing), Schmiedel is unable to say. At any rate, he regards this as a matter of indifference.

The First Epistle of John, according to Schmiedel, stands in somewhat the same double relation to Gnosticism as does the Gospel. Its

main purpose is to oppose the Gnostics, yet it agrees with them to a very large extent, though it stands nearer than the Gospel to the ordinary faith of the Church. By an even more extreme exercise of the same kind of criticism that has set up an opposition between the Fourth Gospel and the Synoptics, Schmiedel concludes that the author of the Epistle was not the same as the author of the Gospel. In the Epistle, the second coming of Christ is expected to take place on a definite day; the death of Christ is represented as His most important redemptive act; the dualism between God and the world is not so extreme as in the Gospel; "the Word of Life" appears instead of the designation "Logos". In no one of these particulars can an absolute opposition be set up. The coming of Christ, for example, as Schmiedel admits, appears in John v. 28f. clearly as an objective event in the future. To regard this as inconsistent with Christ's presence in the hearts of believers is to lose sight of one of the deepest and most fruitful ideas of Christianity—the idea, namely, that the Christian already has in principle the blessings that will be fully realized only in heaven. If the difference between the Gospel and the Epistle is one of emphasis merely, surely that is not inconsistent with identity of authorship.

The Second and Third Epistles Schmiedel assigns to an unknown writer who probably wished them to be ascribed to John the Presbyter. They were probably earlier than the Gospel and the First Epistle.

The most important sections of the Apocalypse are assigned to the years 68-70; the final redaction may not have been far from the date fixed by Irenaeus (95 or 96). Schmiedel does not exclude with absolute positiveness the view that it was John the Presbyter who published the work in its completed form.

Much of Schmiedel's book is highly instructive. There are real difficulties in the Fourth Gospel, which need to be viewed from many angles. But unfortunately our author's lack of logical perspective has led him so to confuse the important things with the unimportant, that the ordinary reader will hardly gain any very clear idea of the real questions at issue. Schmiedel's book does not give the impression of any very deep understanding of the Gospel as a whole.

The translation is only moderately successful—the harsh literalness has not always been combined with perfect accuracy. On p. 215, "*Wir brauchen aber nicht einmal dabei stehen zu bleiben dass*" is translated "We need not stop to think, as regards this matter, that"—to the serious confusion of the reader.

Princeton.

J. GRESHAM MACHEN.

GESCHICHTE DES NEUTESTAMENTLICHEN KANONS. Von Lic. theol. Dr. phil. JOHANNES LEIPOLDT, Privatdozent an der Universität Halle-Wittenberg. Erster Teil. Die Entstehung. Leipzig. J. C. Hinrichs'sche Buchhandlung. 1907. Pp. viii, 288. Marks 3.60, geb. 4.50. Zweiter Teil. Mittelalter und Neuzeit. 1908. Pp. iv, 181. Mark 2.40, geb. 3.30.

Dr. Leipoldt has written an informing and useful book on the history of the New Testament Canon. It is convenient in size, yet sufficiently supplied with the texts of the more important sources. The care and discrimination with which these texts have been chosen, having been gathered,—especially in the second volume—from volumes not readily accessible to many, greatly increase the value of the book and deserve the warm appreciation of all who are interested in the subject. The proof-reading has been done with unusual accuracy. There are some additions but few corrections noted by the author; it is only unfortunate that the Eusebian text of Schwartz was not available when the first volume was passing through the press.

The material of the first volume is organized under the rubrics of the ordinary sections or divisions of the New Testament, beginning, however, with the Apocalypse in accordance with Dr. Leipoldt's view that this section first attained canonicity; then follow the Gospels, the Apostolic Epistles and Acts. This method of arrangement has its advantages and its disadvantages. It brings together the data from Patristic and other sources bearing on the use and estimate of the books entering into, or by nature or usage associated with, the several sections of the New Testament and in this way supplements the discussion of the external evidence for the individual books of the New Testament usually presented—but not always with sufficient fullness—in the Introductions; but the consequence of this is considerable repetition, and at times even some inconsistency. The first volume covers the period extending from the Apostolic age to the sixth century. In the second volume the material falls naturally into two sections: The Canon in the Catholic Church, and The Canon in the Evangelical Church.

Dr. Leipoldt begins his discussion with an investigation of the authorities of the early Christians. The treatment of the attitude of the Christians to the Old Testament is prefaced by a section dealing with the relation of Judaism to the Old Testament,—discussing the extent of the Old Testament Canon, Palestinian (Josephus) and Hellenistic (LXX); the theory of inspiration and the resultant allegorical interpretation. The early Christians possessed, it is true, no book written by the Founder of their faith; but still Christianity was from the beginning a book-religion, for the Christians received the Old Testament as Holy Scripture. This was at first sufficient for them and they felt no immediate need of a New Testament. Their Canon was the Canon of the Palestinian Jews. Jesus had reaffirmed its authority and His view continued to be the view of the Church, although the use of the LXX among the Gentile Christians influenced their attitude toward the extent of the Old Testament Canon. The Jewish theory of inspiration was retained and as the Old Testament became primarily a book of Messianic prophecy the allegorical interpretation common among the Jews was not only retained but extended.

The first authority recognized by the early Christians—after Jesus and the Old Testament—was not the Apostles as such but the Spirit, and the Spirit was manifest more immediately in the Christian prophets:

(but *cf.* Eph. ii:20; iv:11). Hence the writings of the prophets—which took the form of Apocalypses—were highly regarded and formed the earliest element in the New Testament Canon. I Cor. vii:40, *cf.* xii. 28f. is adduced to show that even Paul grounded his claim to authority on the possession of the Spirit. “The Apostle is authoritative (*Autorität*), because he possesses of the Spirit” (p. 29, n. 5; *cf.* pp. 106, 183)—surely an inadequate account of the source of the specific authority claimed by an Apostle. The principal evidence adduced for the early preëminence of the Apocalypse is Pseudo-Cyprian, *de aleatoribus*, in which beside the Old Testament only two books are cited as Holy Scripture, viz., the Apocalypse of John and the Shepherd of Hermas. The evidence for the presence of the Apocalypse in the Sahidic-Coptic version (pp. 81f., *cf.* 93 n.3) is important because it corrects an earlier and a rather wide-spread view.

The highest authority of the early Christians was the words of Jesus. At first the Christians were content with the oral tradition of Jesus’ words but before 70 this tradition had become fixed in written form, i. e., in Gospels. But our four Evangelists did not regard their sources as canonical and neither did they regard their own work as canonical (p. 112). In fact the work of the Evangelists was not so regarded by others until the middle of the second century (p. 113). Even Marcion did not attribute canonical authority to his Gospel and consequently can have found no such Gospels at Rome (pp. 120f, *cf.* 173, 192, 203). Papias preferred oral to written tradition of Jesus’ words (pp. 123, *cf.* 145 n. 3, 157, 190). Justin occupies an intermediate position: the Gospels are about to become canonical—the transition taking place between the Apologies and the Dialogue (pp. 129f.). The fourfold Gospel Canon was widely current in the Church by the end of the second century (pp. 139-161), although forms of expression occur at a later time which are to be regarded merely as survivals of an earlier usage (pp. 161-165). Only in Syria the Diatessaron of Tatian—earlier in its Syriac form (whether this was original or derivative)—than the Curetonian and Lewis forms of the Syriac version—was used instead of the separate Gospels (pp. 165-173).

The recognition of the authority of the Apostles underlies the canonization of their writings. This authority had its origin in the intention of Jesus (p. 182), but even Paul did not claim special authority or regard his Epistles as Holy Scripture (p. 183). Paul’s Epistles were at first read only in the several churches to which they were addressed—the Epistle from Laodicea (Col. iv:16) is an exception. They were not regarded, however, as canonical. The early Christian conception of an Apostle was a very broad one. It was not limited to the Twelve and Paul but included others, especially travelling Evangelists. How then did Apostolic Epistles become canonical? During the post-Apostolic age the prestige of the Apostles was increasing, but even in the age of the Apologists Apostolic Epistles were not regarded as canonical. So also in regard to the book of Acts. These all became

canonical between the time of the Apologists and the Catholic Fathers.

After reviewing the situation in regard to the Canon about the year 200 and later in the different Church-regions, Dr. Leipoldt discusses the various formulae that have been proposed to explain the origin of the Canon (pp. 266ff.) and states the grounds upon which his, or in his view, the Evangelical estimate,—its high valuation of the New Testament—rests (p. 269): first, the New Testament contains the most valuable historical information about Jesus; and second, Evangelical Christians have the conviction that the Spirit of God speaks to them in the New Testament. In contrast with this, the Catholic view of the New Testament rests on an external authority,—the authority of the Church. The principle of the Evangelical view was stated by Luther: "Heilige Schrift ist, was Christum treibt."

In his second volume, Dr. Leipoldt points out that the history of the Canon was not concluded in the fifth century. The extent of the Canon has indeed remained the same, but changes have been made in the order of the books, and the judgment of individuals has differed in regard both to the authority of its several elements and the principle or ground of this authority. The so-called disputed books—the seven whose canonicity was questioned in parts of the early Church—were discussed by Humanists like Erasmus and by the Reformers. The ground of the authority of the Canon entered into the debate between the Catholic Church and the Reformers. Dr. Leipoldt manifests sympathy with Luther, and discusses his view and that of his followers with instructive fullness. The concluding section on "Modern Times" is all too brief and, as it seems to me, also too narrow in the conception of its theme.

There are many places, especially in the first volume, where Dr. Leipoldt's interpretation of the evidence is open to question. Reference has been made to his view of the priority of the Apocalypse and of the nature of the authority of the Apostles. His argument in regard to Marcion and the Canon in Rome and his interpretation of Papias (pp. 123, 145, n. 3, 157, 190) are equally uncertain. Dr. Lightfoot's discussion of Papias' attitude toward written documents seems to me the more reasonable view. In fact, Dr. Leipoldt here as elsewhere appears to be hampered by the so-called "critical tradition". At times this seems to influence him so strongly that his discussion has the appearance of explaining away the evidence, for resort is had to arguments which in other connections are definitely set aside as invalid. For example, the evidence for the use of the Gospel of St. Luke in I Tim. v. 18 is dismissed with the remark: "In accordance with what we otherwise know we must assume that this is a slip of memory (*Gedächtnisfehler*): the word of the Lord, which indeed has a thoroughly Old Testament ring (*Klang*), has been taken erroneously for an Old Testament saying" (p. 112, Zusatz 1). But when it is argued by others that the word of Jesus quoted as Scripture in Barnabas iv: 14 has an Old Testament ring (*Klang*) and might therefore have been mistaken for an Old Testament saying, Dr. Leipoldt says: "I can see in this assertion only an

evasion" (*eine Ausflucht*, p. 126; cf. the similar argument p. 186 Zusatz, "Es liegt eine ungenaue Ausdrucksweise vor", and p. 191 "oder Polycarp hat irrthümlicherweise gemeint"; cf. also p. 218). Moreover, parts of Dr. Leipoldt's argument are constructed on the basis of the results of the work of other scholars which will hardly commend themselves equally to all,—as for example the conclusions of Rohrbach in regard to the ending of Mark (p. 116 n. 2) or of Schwartz in regard to the early date of the Fourth Gospel implied in the Canon Muratori (pp. 146, 152). On page 131 it is argued that Justin's infrequent use of the Fourth Gospel is not an indication that he esteemed it less highly than the Synoptic Gospels (cf. also p. 153), and yet on page 148 n. 3 it is said that "the Apologete Justin probably had a dislike (*Abneigung*) for the Fourth Gospel." The connection also between conclusion and premise in Dr. Leipoldt's argument is at times a little loose, as when, for example, from the premise (p. 164) "When men like Clement of Alexandria and Sarapion of Antioch, who certainly or probably knew and acknowledged the fourfold-Gospel Canon, yet cite with regard other Gospels beside the four Gospels" it is concluded "therefore the fourfold Gospel Canon was not in their eyes a thing definitely circumscribed for all time". The facts of the premise only show that the recognition of the fourfold-Gospel Canon on the part of these men did not exclude or prevent a high regard for and citation of other Gospels. (Other instances of faulty interpretation are pointed out by A. E. Brooke, *Journal of Theological Studies*, 1907-8, p. 607f.). Dr. Leipoldt manifests a tendency also to argue that a certain hypothesis "is not excluded" or to emphasize the fact that when something is said, it is "only" that and not something else that might have been said and from such considerations to draw important historical conclusions (cf. p. 238 where what is "*nicht ausgeschlossen*" appears in the next paragraph as an accepted fact; cf. also the qualification of the statement in the text on p. 248 by foot-note 3; for an undue emphasis upon "*nur*" cf. p. 164). Although generally careful to distinguish fact from opinion (p. 5), Dr. Leipoldt occasionally confuses them (Vol. ii, p. 73).

Princeton.

WILLIAM P. ARMSTRONG.

HISTORICAL THEOLOGY.

Cambridge Patristic Texts. General Editor: A. J. Mason, D.D., Master of Pembroke College, Cambridge.—THE CONFESSIONS OF AUGUSTINE. Edited by JOHN GIBB, D.D., Professor of Church History at Westminster College, Cambridge, and WILLIAM MONTGOMERY, B.D. Cambridge: At the University Press. 1908. (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons.) 8vo.; pp. lxxiv, 480.

Dr. Gibb and Mr. Montgomery have given us an excellent edition

of Augustine's *Confessions* in this beautifully printed and appointed volume.

The text they print is, of course, Pius Knöll's; and, of course, Pius Knöll's in its revised form (Teubner, 1898). They tell us they have departed from Knöll's text in a few readings; but they give us no list of these new readings. We have noted the following instances (which are probably nearly all of them):

I. viii. 13 (p. 13, 13) *omnibus, pensabam memoria:* for *omnibus. pensabam memoria:* (punctuation).

I. xviii. 29 (p. 31, 3) *omines* for *hominibus* (but *omines* in Addenda et Corrigenda).

VI. iii. 4 (p. 142, 12) *te terminatum* for *determinatum*.

VIII. ii. 3 (p. 205, 5) *spirabat prodigia* for *inspirabat populo* (but *spirabat prodigia* in Addenda and Corrigenda).

IX. viii. 18 (p. 254, 11) *reprobos*, for † *praepositos* (but *reprobos* in Addenda et Corrigenda).

X. ix. 16 (p. 285, 13) *earum* for *eorum*.

X. xx. 29 (p. 296, 4) "*sat, est illic*", *ubi* for "*sat, est illic*". *ubi* (punctuation).

X. xxiv. 35 (p. 300, 23) *inveni* for *invenio*.

X. xxviii. 39 (p. 303, 13) *prosperis* for *prospera*.

X. xxxi. 44 (p. 307, 2) *quid* for *quod*.

X. xxxi. 45 (p. 308, 4), *miles* for *milex*.

X. xxxv. 55 (p. 316, 8), *luceat* for *lucet*.

X. xxxv. 55 (p. 317, 1), *est* for *non est*.

X. xxxv. 55. (p. 317, 1), *operta* for *operata*.

X. xxxvii. 60 (p. 321, 13) *supervacanea* for *supervacuanea*.

X. xxxviii. 63 (p. 324, 3), *homo* after *saepe* for omit.

X. xl. 65 (p. 325, 11), *nuntiantibus* for *nutantibus*.

XI. xix. 25 (p. 350, 20), *non* for *nec*.

XII. xxii. 31 (p. 387, 29), *praescriptum* for *perscriptum*.

XIII. iii. 4 (p. 405, 15), *tu* before *es* for omit.

XIII. xix. 24 (p. 425, 23), *offocaverunt* for *suffocaverunt*.

XIII. xxi. 29 (p. 429, 1), *regnum* for *regno*.

XIII. xxi. 29 (p. 429, 9), *ut* for *et*.

The question naturally arises how far this best text of the *Confessions* rests on good MS. authority. It will be remembered that Knöll considers that the MS. transmission goes back to a single archetype of, say, the fifth or sixth century, and derives his text mainly from a single codex of the seventh or eighth century,—which he cites as S (*Codex Sessoriana*, now in the Library Vittorio Emanuele, at Rome), the nearest congener to which is a Viennese MS. which he cites as W. The text of Knöll may be said, then, to be based on the readings of SW to which the remaining MSS. bring very little real help. In these circumstances it is not surprising that a number of passages have been transmitted to us corruptly and the precarious aid of conjecture requires to be called in for their correction. It is reassuring, however, to observe how few such passages there are. We

have observed the following conjectural readings in Dr. Gibb's and Mr. Montgomery's text:

- I. xi. 18 (p. 19, 14), *potius* (Knöll) for MSS. *per eos*.
- I. xiv. 23 (p. 23, 11), *texuerat* (Knöll) for SW *texerat*.
- I. xiv. 23 (p. 23, 23) *id quod* (Knöll) for MSS. *et qua*.
- I. xviii. 29 (p. 31, 3), *omines* (Knöll) for MSS. *homines*.
- III. viii. 16 (p. 71, 3), *cui* (Knöll) for SW *sive*.
- IV. iii. 6 (p. 84, 3), *sortem* (Knöll) for SW *sortes*.
- V. xiii. 23 (p. 133, 5), *sermonis suavitatem* (Knöll) for SW *sermone suavitatis*.
- VI. iii. 4 (p. 142, 12), *te terminatum* (Benedictines) for MSS. Knöll, *determinatum*.
- VIII. ii. 3 (p. 205, 5), *prodigia* (Knöll) for MSS. *popilios*.
- VIII. iii. 9 (p. 210, 16), *fragra* (Knöll) for MSS. *fragla*.
- IX. viii. 18 (p. 254, 11), *reprobos* (Knöll) for MSS. *praepositos*.
- X. xviii. 27 (p. 294, 3), *non nidos suos* (Knöll) for S *non nidosue*.
- X. xx. 29 (p. 296, 25), *solo sono* (Knöll) conflating S *solo* and MSS. *sono*.
- X. xxi. 3 (p. 297, 7), *vidi* (Knöll) for MSS. *vidit*.
- XI. ix. 11 (p. 341, 11), *fecisti, deus* (Knöll) for reverse order of words in most MSS.
- XI. xv. 18 (p. 346, 10), *an ante* (Knöll) conflating S and other MSS.
- XII. xii. 15 (p. 376, 1), *possent* (Knöll) for MSS. *possunt*.
- XII. xxviii. 38 (p. 395, 13), *variationes* (Louvain.) for MSS. *narrationes*.

All of these conjectures except two, it will be noted, are Knöll's own, and all of them with the exception of the *te terminatum* of VI. iii. 4, have been simply taken over with Knöll's text. In this single instance Dr. Gibb and Mr. Montgomery desert Knöll's guidance, reverting to an old emendation of the Benedictines, which was approved also by Dr. Pusey. Clearly the text of the *Confessions* has been transmitted to us very soundly and we may look upon it as presented by Knöll as in a very satisfactory state.

Our new editors, though following Knöll closely, have not followed him blindly, and have discussed in their notes, as they say, "the comparatively few cases in which the text is uncertain, or the variants of special interest". As these discussions are not listed in the index, we note the following instances for the benefit of the interested reader:

- [I. ii. 2 (p. 3, 6), *invocabo*.]
- I. viii. 13 (p. 13, 13), *pensabam*.
- I. xviii. 29 (p. 31, 3), *omines*.
- I. xx. 31 (p. 33, 9), *ceteris*.
- II. iii. 6 (p. 39, 20), *ima*.
- II. iii. 9 (p. 42, 4), *prodiebat*.
- II. iii. 9 (p. 42, 10), *nec penuria et fastidio*.
- III. vi. 10 (p. 64, 2), *phantismatis*.
- III. vii. 13 (p. 69, 9), *hic serviunt*.
- IV. iii. 6 (p. 85, 1), *castus*.

- IV. viii. 13 (p. 92, 14), *flagrare*.
 IV. xv. 24 (p. 101, 11), *sexu*.
 V. i. 1 (p. 108, 1), *adtransiens*.
 V. iii. 4 (p. 111, 15), *se*.
 VI. i. 1 (p. 137, 4), *offerebat*.
 VI. iii. 4 (p. 142, 12) *te terminatum*.
 VII. xx. 26 (p. 197, 7), *quisque*.
 VIII. ii. 3 (p. 205, 5), *prodigia*.
 VIII. xi. 26 (p. 227, 22), *vanitantium*.
 IX. iii. 5 (p. 236, 12), *anxitudine*.
 IX. iii. 5 (p. 237, 11), *virtutis*.
 IX. iv. 20 (p. 243, 11), *lambiunt*.
 IX. viii. 18 (p. 254, 11), *reprobos*.
 IX. viii. 18 (p. 255, 9), *ordinate*.
 IX. ix. 19 (p. 256, 12), *condicionis*.
 IX. ix. 27 (p. 262, 17), *ponitis*.
 IX. xiii. 34 (p. 268, 10), *discutias*.
 IX. xiii. 37 (p. 271, 2), *hanc vitam*.
 X. xxxiv. 53 (p. 314, 20), *sacrificatori*.
 X. xxxvii. 62 (p. 323, 8), *tu*.
 XII. xi. 14 (p. 374, 21), *infimarum*.

It should be remarked, however, that most of these notes, though attached to readings, are not strictly speaking textual notes, but concern questions of form, grammar and interpretation.

The editors have very properly inserted between the Introduction and the Text a brief "summary of the history of the text". Though the details are filled in from other sources, the outline of this summary has unfortunately been taken from Knöll. We say "unfortunately", for the section in Knöll which has been drawn upon is not a summary of the history of the text but only an account of the editions which he selected for use in the preparation of his own text. Accordingly he cites the readings of these (four) editions in the digests of readings which he prints beneath his text. Strange to say, in the digest of selected readings which Dr. Gibb and Mr. Montgomery print beneath their text citations of these editions are taken over from Knöll without any indication to the reader of what the symbols stand for. The reader accordingly meets repeatedly with "*edd.*" with no intimation that just these four editions are intended, and with such symbols as *m*, *o*, *mo*, without any clue to their significance. There may be good and sufficient reasons for selecting just these four editions,—Amerbach 1506, Louvain (Paris) 1651, Benedictine, 1689, Pusey 1838—for collation in presenting the text. But what reason is there for considering their enumeration to constitute a "summary of the history of the text"? In point of fact, the *Confessions* had been printed at least four times (first, apparently at Milan, 1475) before the *editio princeps* of Augustine's works was printed by Amerbach at Basle in 1506. And how can a summary of the history of the text of the *Confessions* pass over in silence the long series of editions which bear the name of Sommalius.

(beginning apparently 1607)? Or the series which Wagnareck inaugurated in 1630? Or that begun by Du Bois in 1687—which lies at the base of Pusey's and von Raumer's texts?

Perhaps this is the place to express doubt also whether the statement with which the preface opens may not be misleading. There we are told that, "with the exception of Dr. Pusey's edition of the year 1838, which contains a number of parallel passages and a few notes in Latin, no annotated text of Augustine's *Confessions* has hitherto been published in this country, and only one in Germany, which appeared as far back as the year 1856 under the editorship of Karl von Raumer". The phrase, "in Latin", seems to contrast Dr. Pusey's notes with those of the present edition in the matter of the language in which they are presented. But Dr. Gibb and Mr. Montgomery have not avoided Latin in their notes, but freely cite illustrative passages from other authors in that language, as they are clearly entitled to do when annotating a Latin author. They also cite passages in Greek, which also seems entirely proper. We have more doubt of the desirability of citing German, French and Italian authors in their own languages, as they also do,—if, that is, their book is designed as a handbook for students, as it seems to be. But this aside, though the main assertion of the statement in question may be formally true, it would be misleading if it were understood to affirm that annotated editions of the *Confessions* are confined to those enumerated. We may not hold Wagnareck's extended commentary on the *Confessions* in very high esteem, but it is part of the history of the annotation of the *Confessions*, and is still, after two centuries and a half being reprinted (Turin, 1891) and (very much indeed) "modified" (by M. Pihan, Paris, c. 1902) for modern consumption. And certainly the "notes" with which Du Bois (1687) "illustrated" his text—which formed the mine from which Dr. Pusey drew—are by no means negligible. And other elaborately annotated editions have been published.

We have thought it right to call attention to these petty inexactnesses of statement or treatment. They are, however, of no great importance. What is of importance is that our editors, having adopted the best extant text of the *Confessions* and, beautifully reprinting it, have accompanied that text with the best extant series of notes upon it. Former annotations on the *Confessions* have dealt almost exclusively with its matter, and have had as their object to explain, illustrate or even to apply Augustine's teaching. Wagnareck's elaborate commentary is very properly described by Portalé as a body of "excellent ascetic notes". Dr. Pusey's notes, representing another line of descent, are mainly concerned to elucidate Augustine's meaning either by the adduction of parallel passages from his other writings or by didactic explanation. Much of this annotation is valuable; but we have lacked hitherto a good hand-edition of the *Confessions* provided with notes which should be broadly explicative in the pedagogical sense,—should supply, in other words, just the aid the inexperienced student needs to help him over the hard places of the text and to enable him to read it intelli-

gently. It is this that Dr. Gibb and Mr. Montgomery have undertaken to supply: and they have done it admirably. Their notes are strictly confined to aids to the understanding of the text and supply information and guidance in textual, lexical, grammatical, rhetorical, logical, archæological, historical and philosophical difficulties. Every chapter is begun with a brief statement of its contents, and then the editors accompany the readers through it, clause by clause, helping him over the difficulties and seeing that he understands each clause exactly and appreciates it fully. It is no light praise to say that the editors have done this work well, with adequate knowledge, good judgment, restraint and sound pedagogical instinct. We should like it better, if, as we have said, passages quoted from German, French and Italian writers had been rendered into English: for the book is distinctly for, not the learned, but learners. But this is a small matter and is worth mention only because the passages quoted are always so appositely quoted that we feel regret that many of those who will use the book will miss their aid. It is astonishing with what full and sound knowledge of Augustine and his teaching, the customs and thought of the times, and the course of Christian history these notes are informed.

There is prefixed to the volume an adequate Introduction, which supplies the reader with what he needs to know of the origin, literary form and character of the *Confessions* and their place in Augustine's development, that he may proceed profitably to their study. The same competent knowledge and sane judgment exhibited in the notes are manifested in this Introduction also. We should have liked a fuller discussion of the literary form which the *Confessions* exemplify—with perhaps a sketch of the development of autobiography in the ancient world and its culmination in the *Confessions*, and an indication of the essential differences which separate them from all simple autobiographies strictly so called. The editors, however, simply decline the task of determining the precise literary *genre* of the *Confessions*: "It seems best to leave the *Confessions* in a separate category of their own, and not to attempt to bring them into relation to works of a different age and of a different spirit." No doubt. Yet we cannot help thinking it would be useful in introducing students to them to set them into relation to works of a similar general character in their own age and of the same spirit in different ages, that the category to which they belong may be intelligently apprehended. It is in connection with this somewhat perfunctory discussion of the literary congeners of the *Confessions* that there occurs the only serious slip in a matter of fact which we have observed in the volume. How the editors came to write "Paulinus of Nola" for Paulinus of Pella when speaking of the latter's *Eucharisticos Deo* as a possible parallel (in one aspect) to the *Confessions*, it is difficult to imagine.

A "table of dates" in the life of Augustine down to the writing of the *Confessions*, and three excellent Indices—of Subjects, Scriptural Texts, and Latin words—add to the usefulness of the volume. Every teacher who has ever read the *Confessions* with a class and hopes to read it

again—and who that has once done it will not hope to do it again?—will be grateful for this admirable class-edition of the book.

Princeton.

B. B. WARFIELD.

MEN OF THE KINGDOM. ERASMUS: THE SCHOLAR. By JOHN ALFRED FAULKNER, Professor of Historical Theology in Drew Theological Seminary. Cincinnati: Jennings & Graham. New York: Eaton & Mains. 1907. Pp. 249. Price, \$1.00 net.

To publish volumes on such men as Cyprian and Erasmus in successive years is no light task, but Professor Faulkner has accomplished it. What was said in this REVIEW, (Vol. VI, p. 677) of the former volume is applicable also *mutatis mutandis* to the one on Erasmus. The volume before us is intended for laymen and those beginning their historical studies,—for those who have to be informed what rhetoric was, or that the popes of the fifteenth century were temporal rulers. Professor Faulkner is nothing if not modern. As he could not write of Cyprian without reflections on Philadelphia under the Quay ring, much less could Erasmus fail to condemn our modern faults. We are told opportunely that we fall short of Erasmus' ideal "with our robber tariffs and our huge monopolies building up our multi-millionaires, and creating conditions which have in them the seed-plots of revolutions" (p. 140); that the degree of Doctor of Theology was conferred on Erasmus "for the same reason that our honorary degrees are *sometimes* granted, viz., as a recognition of special attainments in theological science" (p. 80); and that the Sorbonne condemned the "colloquies" like the "contemptible censorship of Russia's despot" (p. 166). Indeed, the whole volume is pervaded with a breezy modernity of style that is but ill adapted to portray the graceful repose sought after by the leaders of Humanism. It may not be inexact to say that the Inquisition "nabbed" Laurentius Valla (p. 23), but somehow the word does not seem in keeping with the dignity of the Holy Office; and when we read that the author does not take "much stock in" a certain statement of Erasmus (p. 85), or that the great scholar exhorts the church "to sidetrack her abuses" (p. 228) our feelings are somewhat exacerbated at being thus incontinently jerked out of the dim quiet of a sixteenth century study and hurtled on to the floor of a wheat exchange, or into the shunting yard of a railroad terminal. By "bursarship" (p. 36) is meant "bursary".

Professor Faulkner has read widely both in the writings of Erasmus and in the literature concerning him, and the little volume contains a great deal that is interesting and informing. We look in vain, indeed, for a unified, clearly thought out portrait of the greatest scholar of his age, with his foibles, idiosyncrasies, learning and popularity. They are mentioned, indeed, but they are not woven into the texture of the book in such a way as to bring the reader into touch with the living personality. What the author gives us is rather a more or less chronological, running account of Erasmus' life and labors, with frequent

excerpts from his works. Controversial points are avoided, or briefly disposed of by the citation of the opinion of the author, who is not always consistent, or more frequently, that of other writers. Thus, in speaking of the modern controversy over the state of the monasteries at the end of the fourteenth century we are told that Erasmus "may be assumed to speak without prejudice" (p. 101), but that sometimes he is to be suspected of laying "on the brush with too dark colors". In discussing the creed of Erasmus, it is said that he regarded the Bible as the "pure fountain of evangelical doctrine" of which the "Holy Spirit is the author", but "this does not mean that it does not contain minor errors which do not touch its authority" (p. 201); but also "without blemish of error is no book except the Bible." As nothing is said of the inconsistency being Erasmus', we must throw the blame on the writer. In an appendix in which Professor Faulkner, depending chiefly on Lezius, comes to the conclusion that Erasmus was probably the author of the Pseudo-Cyprianic *De duplici martyrio*, we have the remarkable statement "nor with one of Erasmus' training does the forgery reflect on his character, not at least till Ecclesiastes is thrown out of the canon" (p. 238).

But although the work has its shortcomings, it must be repeated that those for whom it is intended will find much of interest in it. The "Praise of Folly", the "Colloquies", the "Adages" as well as the Enchiridion, the Greek New Testament, the "Paraphrases", and the controversy with Luther are all briefly discussed, while chapters on Erasmus as a "Pioneer of Peace", "Erasmus and Pedagogy", and "Contemporary and Later Judgments", enable the reader to feel, to some extent, the greatness and importance of the much vilified scholar.

KERR D. MACMILLAN.

SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.

THE ATONEMENT. By the REV. JAMES STALKER, D.D., Professor of Church History and Christian Ethics in The United Free Church College, Aberdeen. New York: A. C. Armstrong & Son. 1909. Pp. 138.

This little volume contains three lectures on the Atonement, delivered by Dr. Stalker at Inverness, in October 1908. The first lecture is entitled "The New Testament Situation". Dr. Stalker states in the preface that he "goes straight to the New Testament, as the fountain and authority, yet not so much to collect its statements as to find out the position of the death of Christ in its presentation of Christianity as a whole; and therefore the first lecture is entitled The New Testament Situation." These words describe this lecture precisely. It deals with the central place in Christianity given by the New Testament writers to the death of Christ, and with the light which the Resurrection

of Christ throws on His death; and it manages to do this without betraying what Dr. Stalker regards as the New Testament teaching as to the meaning of the death of Christ or the nature of the Atonement, beyond the most general statements which might be interpreted in a number of different ways.

Practically the same defects are found in the second lecture entitled "The Old Testament Preparation", although it might appear from some statements that Dr. Stalker regards the Old Testament sacrifices as apocryphal, and the sufferings of the Messiah as vicarious and penal—ideas, however, of which he makes little or no use in his own statement of the doctrine of the Atonement. It thus appears that the author's own view, which he states in the third and last lecture entitled "The Modern Justification", is given without any serious attempt to give it a biblical basis.

Dr. Stalker prefaces his own statement of the doctrine by some historical discussion in which he takes up chiefly the views of modern writers such as Bushnell, McLeod Campbell, and Ritschl. This occupies most of the third lecture, only a few pages being devoted to the statement of his own view.

Dr. Stalker's theory is as follows: the extent or reference of the Atonement is universal. Its necessity lies in the fact that God's love is holy love. In regard to the nature of the Atonement, Dr. Stalker relates his view to that of McLeod Campbell. He makes no reference to Moberly's book, "Atonement and Personality", 1901, in which a view similar to that of McLeod Campbell is very fully developed. In point of fact, however, Dr. Stalker's view more nearly resembles that set forth by the Andover Professors in a volume entitled "Progressive Orthodoxy", published in 1886. A theory of the Atonement similar to this has also been developed independently in Germany by Professor Haering, though he has since abandoned it in his later writings on the subject, and in his book on Dogmatics.

McLeod Campbell taught that Christ, by sympathetically identifying Himself with men, felt so keenly the sins of humanity that He could repent of them for men, and so could offer to God a perfect repentance, which is all that God requires in pardoning sin. Thus sympathy takes the place of substitution, and repentance of expiation.

The Andover theory, on the other hand, laid more stress on the influence of Christ's life and death upon men. What God demands in pardoning sin is simply true repentance. Christ reveals God's love and hatred of sin, thus inducing the sinner to repent. Since man's repentance is imperfect and inadequate, Christ by His sympathetic identification of Himself with humanity, Himself repented for the sins of mankind, which repentance supplements ours, thus making atonement for sin.

Dr. Stalker's theory resembles the Andover theory. We give it in his own words:

"Repentance is a most interpretative word, combining both the recon-

ciliation of God to man and the reconciliation of man to God, as a true doctrine of Atonement must. God is reconciled when Christ offers, on behalf of the race, a representative and universal repentance, which literally breaks His heart, so that He dies of it. This takes us so far into His actual experiences that here, if anywhere, we capture, the heart of the mystery, though it remains a mystery still. On the other hand, man is reconciled when he makes Christ's act on the cross his own, repenting of his own sin, but doing so only with a depth and thoroughness only to be learned from the mind and example of Christ. And here commences the new life of victory over self and over the world, which, while it may derive some of its rules from Mount Sinai or even from Mars Hill, must ever continue to imbibe at Calvary the spirit of humility and gratitude which is the unique and enduring quality of Christian holiness" (pp. 136, 137).

Thus the atoning fact is repentance; and Christ's work consists in offering to God a repentance for man's sin, and in inducing man to repent.

This is an unsuccessful attempt to make room for the idea of substitution and for an objective element in the Atonement, after having eliminated the guilt of sin and the justice of God. Moreover, Dr. Stalker has not even attempted to show how the sinless Jesus could enter into sympathy with the sin of man, much less how, being sinless, Jesus could repent of sin; *i. e.*, turn from it to God. Nor has he attempted to ground the enormous assumption that repentance, even though perfect, can atone for sin and remove past guilt, since in the lectures on the Old and New Testament doctrine no attempt is made to show that the author's theory of the Atonement is Scriptural. Indeed, even such general points of the Scripture doctrine as are touched upon are not in harmony with the above theory. Thus it will be seen that this book is very unsatisfactory, as is also the theory of the Atonement which it advocates.

Princeton.

C. W. HODGE.

A HANDBOOK OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS. By J. CLARK MURRAY, LL.D., F. R. S. C., Emeritus Professor of Philosophy, McGill University, Montreal. 8vo.; pp. xiv, 328. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 38 George St. 1908. Imported by Charles Scribner's Sons.

We judge that in this volume Dr. Murray has given us in finished form his class-room lectures on Christian ethics. The simplicity of analysis, the clearness and the conciseness of expression, the wealth and the aptness of illustration,—all stamp his book as the work, not of a day or of a year, but of a lifetime. In matter, too, no less than in form, its excellencies are many. It repudiates any psychology that would refer morality to physical causation. It views ethics as a normative and not an historical science. It regards Christian love as a

"rational habit" rather than a mere impulse. It discusses Old Testament ethics briefly, but justly. It teaches that enjoyment is an essential feature of life, and that it is because it is so that there is "room for temperance." It indicates the psychological possibility of everlasting punishment. It exposes the folly of the attempt to make men moral "by act of Parliament": and yet it shows that legislative enactments are important; for they may create "social conditions which are favorable or unfavorable to virtue or to vice." It represents Jesus as a religious teacher and not at all as a social or even a moral reformer. Its treatment of social evils, for example gambling, is always discriminating and often illuminating. Nor would we take serious exception to its position with regard to the originality of Christian ethics. We believe that it has original elements, and valuable ones, which our author does not recognize; but we believe, too, with him, that "for the earnest purposes of life the question with regard to any teaching is not whether it is original, but whether it is true": and we think, also with him, that a strong proof of the divine origin of the Christian system of thought is that it has been able to "absorb into itself the finest thought of all the ages." Indeed, it is in the richness and variety of the references to the Classics with which Dr. Murray illustrates "the identity of Christian truth with the best teaching of the pre-Christian world" that we find one of the best features of his work.

And yet, admirable though it is in these and in other respects, we can not regard it as an adequate, or even as a correct but partial, exposition of Christian ethics. Besides failing to recognize the symmetry of Christian ethics, its profound view of sin, its spirituality, its practical aim, and above all its motive power, as original, it misrepresents it in the following essential particulars:

1. It identifies justice and goodness. "It may well be", it says, "that love is merely the highest evolution of justice, justice merely an undeveloped love." This, however, to say no more, is an unscriptural conception. The Bible always distinguishes between the two. The atonement loses its meaning, if they are the same. God gave his Son to die for our sins, that he might express his grace in accepting us as righteous and yet might establish his law's demand for our punishment. Nor is this identification of justice with love unimportant. It vitiates our author's entire system. Kindness may be the all-embracing duty, but it must be kindness which is according to truth. "Love is the fulfilling of the law", but it is only love which is holy as God is holy of which this can be said.

2. It ignores the first commandment. Our author would seem to regard religion as concerned with love for God and ethics as summed up in love to man. True, it teaches that in love to his neighbor man's love for God is realized. This, however, is not the way that either Christ or John puts it. Christ makes love to God himself the first and great commandment. This commandment is, of course, the indispensable foundation of the second. Man cannot love his neighbor as he ought unless he does so for God's sake, but this does not mean that

love for God is exhausted in love for one's neighbor. A man would not pass out of the domain of ethics if he were cast on a desert island. That experience might and should make him realize all the more keenly his obligation to God himself. So, too, when John says that he who does not love his brother whom he hath seen cannot love God whom he hath not seen, he does not mean that love for one's brother is the only duty, but that it is the easiest one. No; what may be called our religious duties, our duties directly to God himself as our Father, Redeemer, and Friend, are first, are most important, and are most difficult; and our author's omission to discuss or even to refer to this great class of duties is a serious blemish as well as a serious defect in his book.

3. His conception of sin is distinctly unchristian. "Sin", he says, "is the personal act of a moral being, and can not be attributed to any person at the origin of his existence before he has done any moral action. Even if sin be understood in the sense of sinfulness as denoting chronic inclinations rather than any single action, still in so far as these are original or unborn, they can not be called sinful in any accurate use of the term; they become sinful only when they are sinfully indulged" (p. 151). Our limits preclude the criticism of this statement from the standpoint of psychology or even of dogmatics. Simply to give it, moreover, is sufficient to show our author's essential lack of sympathy with the Bible. Such fundamental teaching as that of Eph. ii, 3: "We also were by nature the children of wrath, even as others", he must repudiate.

4. Yet more significant is his silence with regard to the sacrifice of the cross. It would seem to have no bearing in his view on the moral life. Of its unique power as an ethical dynamic he would appear to think and, so far as we can see, to know nothing. Yet when Paul would secure the performance of the duties of the Christian life he says: "I beseech you, therefore, brethren, by the mercies of God; and these mercies he has just shown in eleven noble chapters come to expression and realization in Christ's death for sinners.

5. Equally striking is the absence of all reference to the Holy Spirit. The Christian life, even when spoken of as involving a regeneration, is represented as beginning and developing of itself. It would seem to be self-originating and self-sufficient. Of course, it may be said that the work of the Holy Spirit is not excluded because it is not alluded to, that the discussion of this subject belongs to dogmatics and not to ethics. Is this so, however, in the case of Christian ethics? Christian virtue is the "fruit of the Spirit." Can, then, its development be set forth without even mention of the Spirit?

6. In a word, our author's standpoint is that of the natural man; it is not that of the man redeemed by the blood of Christ and regenerated by his Spirit. What he has tried to give us is Christian ethics with the Christianity left out; and the result is a partial and not always true representation of the form of godliness without its power.

Princeton.

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

PRACTICAL THEOLOGY.

INDIA, ITS LIFE AND THOUGHT. By JOHN P. JONES, D.D. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1908. Cloth; crown 8vo; illustrated. Pp. 448. Price, \$2.50 net.

This is a fascinating volume. Its attractive pages, large type and beautiful illustrations are suggestive of its engaging style, its clear statements, its illuminating discussions. The view of the writer is most comprehensive, yet even when brevity is demanded he never fails to make his subject vivid, nor the treatment of it interesting. The task he has undertaken is a difficult one. As he suggests, the inhabitants of India are the least understood and the most easily misunderstood of all men. This is due in large measure to their peculiar modes of thought and to their natural secretiveness. Thirty years of missionary experience in southern India have given to the author a special fitness for his work, and he affords the reader a most enjoyable and helpful insight into the life and thought of the people with whom he has so long lived in close contact.

The attention is immediately aroused by the first chapter of the book, which is entitled "India's Unrest". It makes us realize at once the present and pressing importance of such a study. "The Land of Quiet Repose" is seen to be throbbing with discontent. This spirit of unrest is due in part to the victory of Japan over Russia and the influence of Western education and Christian ideals, to the discussions of the National Congress, to the growing power of the vernacular press, and is in fact a part of the new awakening of the East. While it is the expression of a desire for independence, the people are unprepared for self-government and are rather to be congratulated upon the beneficent rule of Great Britain.

Having thus fixed our thought upon India, the writer at once gratifies us with a brief tour of the land, which enables us to form some conception of the religious systems of this "home of many faiths". A visit to the temples and mosques of Madura, Bombay, Delhi, Agra and Amritsan, as well as to the pagodas of "Burma the Beautiful", suggests to us the vast extent of the empire and the diverse forms of belief with which we are here concerned.

The two following chapters give us a realistic picture and also a careful discussion of the Hindoo caste system, revealing its incalculable power and its malign influence over the people.

"The Bhagavad Gita" is designated "The Hindu Bible", and its conceptions of God, of the soul, and of salvation are contrasted with the polytheism, the idolatry, the devil worship and the fetichism of popular Hindooism and its religious ideals of God, of incarnation, of human life and of ultimate salvation.

The chapter on "The Home Life of Hindus" reveals to us the unspeakable degradation of woman and yet suggests a rather unexpected power enjoyed by her in the home circle. We cannot fail, however, to be moved by the pitiful condition of the child wife, and the widow, nor

to feel the great need of social reform in India. The pessimism of the people is discussed in a chapter of unusual interest. It is shown to be inseparably connected with the chronological system which is in vogue, and, therefore, to be most difficult to meet or to dispel.

The chapter on "Islam in India", which reviews briefly the history and the present condition of the Mohammedan faith, is followed by a discussion of Buddhism in which there is found an admirable contrast drawn between Christ and the Buddha. Of the modern religious movements in India special mention is made of the Brahmo Somaj, of the Arya Somaj, and of the Theosophical Society.

The last chapter discusses the progress of Christianity in India. After two centuries of faithful work less than one three-hundredth part of the population are professing Christians. The author is not pessimistic, but states his firm belief in the ultimate triumph of Christianity. He suggests that it may be of an Eastern type corresponding in its institutions and even in its creedal statement, to the oriental mind.

No one can read this book without being convinced of the tremendous obstacles and peculiar difficulties which surround those who seek to bring to Christ a people whose characteristics of life and thought are such as are here described.

Princeton.

CHAS. R. ERDMAN.

THE CHURCH OF TO-DAY. A PLEA. By JOSEPH HENRY CROOKER, Boston: The Pilgrim Press. New York, Chicago. 1908. Pp. 177.

This little volume comes to us well heralded, and after careful perusal we have to acknowledge the praise it has won from the religious and secular press to be deserved. The author sounds a call for the "clearer understanding and deeper conviction of the need and work of the Christian Church as an institution". He is deeply impressed with the decay of the Church's influence in America to-day, reviews briefly the reasons given for it, and states succinctly what good has come to civilization in the past from the organized church, and how important she is to the America of today from both a religious and an economic standpoint. Every true son of the church must sympathize with this, and rejoice that Dr. Crooker has entered such an eloquent—for it is an eloquent—plea for the institution that he loves so well. It is to be hoped too that the book will find its way into the hands of those whose love has grown faint, or who have never loved at all, for it cannot fail to stimulate thought on the meaning of the presence among us of a great institution claiming to stand for all that is best, and on the attitude which one should assume toward such an institution. If it does no more than this, it will have done much.

It is not to be expected that any two men should agree in detail in enumerating the agencies and influences at work against the church. Dr. Crooker gives us a round dozen of them. We confess that we do not find these adequate. We should prefer grouping them under fewer and more general topics. Among these we should place the effect of

immigration, the rapid increase of wealth and luxury and the desire for the same, and the growth of disbelief in authority. By the effect of immigration we do not mean the new ideas and ideals brought from their native lands by the arrivals of the last twenty or thirty years, but the derangement and disturbance of ideas and ideals that inevitably follow on any considerable change in place of abode, customs or language. Such a disturbance may be delayed, but if it does not appear in the first it will in the second or third generation. There is necessarily a period of confusion—of carelessness we may say—while old traditions and sanctions are dying, and new ones forming to take their place. The German or Irishman of the second or third generation returning "home" for a visit, finds he has little in common with his cousins. This, we think, is one of the main causes of the disorder and carelessness that is to be seen not only in the church but in every department of life in America. The second is closely related to it. There has practically never been a time when wealth was so easily acquired as during the last fifty years in our country, and the greed of the masses has been inflamed by the sight and hearing of the fortunes of others of their own rank and, apparently, abilities. And God and Mammon agree no better to-day than two thousand years ago. The third obstacle in the way of the church, the growth of disbelief in authority, is indeed mentioned by Dr. Crooker, but only incidentally. We may be wrong, but we think it worthy of a larger place. There seems to be a widespread feeling that religion is to be put on the same sort of basis as the natural sciences and philosophy, *i. e.*, observation and experiment. This is the thought that is back of much of the work being done on Comparative Religion, Religious Psychology, Psychical Research and Higher Criticism. We are told that the sixteenth century saw the death of the belief in the authority of the church and the councils, our own century will see the death of the belief in the authority of the Scriptures and Jesus Christ.

But if we disagree with Dr. Crooker in our analysis of the causes of the decline of the church's influence, we hasten to add that we are on the whole in hearty agreement with what he has to say of the necessity and power of the organized church as the expression of the corporate religious life of a community, and as the representative of Jesus of Nazareth on earth. We agree with him that not one word of the Master's should be forgotten, and that the best way to conserve his teachings and to make his example felt is for those who are his followers to come together for worship and to work together for the advancement of his cause;—in other words, to use the organized church.

We are delighted to find in Dr. Crooker something of the Puritan. We have no more sympathy than he has with sensational sermons, operatic music, over-decoration, and the other things that are being used to bolster up moribund churches. He has done a timely and a bold thing in decrying these and other such things that do not contribute toward spirituality in worship.

The reader must not forget that Dr. Crooker is always speaking of

the church *as an institution*, and regarding it from the standpoint of the good it does for man and society. Discussion of creeds, of authority in religion, of the relation of the visible to the invisible church, and other such problems does not enter into his plan. While reading the first chapter and occasionally elsewhere, where he speaks of the comparative unimportance of creed and creed revision, or of the mistake the church made in opposing Higher Criticism, (though what is meant by this last is not clear), we were tempted to think that he attached no importance whatever to such matters. In this, however, we were mistaken. Dr. Crooker, although writing from a humanitarian standpoint, is not one of those who, like the Romans that insisted on the ancient religious ceremonies being observed when belief in the reality of the gods was dead, now tell us that though the foundations of our faith are undermined the organized church should be continued for the sake of its influence on the masses. Dr. Crooker knows as well as anyone that where men act together in politics, business, pleasure or religion, there must be some basis of agreement, and that such a basis in religion is called a creed, and that such a creed must necessarily exclude some. Nor have we to look very far in order to find the creed which he presupposes in the organized church of which he speaks. He believes in and apparently insists on the sovereignty and fatherhood of God, in a divine law and judgment bar, in Jesus of Nazareth (whom he rarely calls Jesus Christ), as the revealer of God's will, as a "transcendent religious genius", as a "divine Person" whose very words we have in our Gospels. This is a great deal. In holding to this Dr. Crooker at once takes his stand as positively hostile to the results of such schools of Higher Criticism as those of Kalthoff, Schmiedel, and even others of the so-called historico-religious school, and puts himself on the side of those who are fighting for the church along other lines.

There can be no church without a creed, and there can be no creed without a fight. Dr. Crooker knows this, but he has allowed his enthusiasm for the organized church to drive it into the background, and perhaps obscure it. Thus he tells us in one place that "the Puritan consecration that made the Puritan character possible was produced by the Church of God." As Dr. Crooker throughout the volume uses the word "Church" in the sense of the "church as an institution" this statement is open to misinterpretation. So far was the Puritan consecration and Puritan conscience from being the product of the organized church, that the Puritan fathers felt themselves constrained by the opposition of the organized church to leave their native land. Puritanism was the child of a peculiar conception of God's relation to man, and man's relation to God, and the organized church or churches of New England was its child and not its father. If, however, Dr. Crooker means that the Puritan church when once organized contributed toward the maintenance and extension of Puritan belief and Puritan ideals, we heartily concur with him; and in the light of his book as a whole we believe this to be his real meaning. For this is one of the functions of the church, one of her most important functions, to conserve the truth

of God as she has received it from her founder, Jesus Christ. Hence, it follows that the church is to be regarded not only as a humanitarian agency, but as the repository of divine truth; to be what the ancient Babylonians called their temple, "the link of heaven and earth".

KERR D. MACMILLAN.

THE WHY AND HOW OF FOREIGN MISSIONS. By ARTHUR JUDSON BROWN, author of *The New Era in the Philippines*, *New Forces in Old China*, *The Foreign Missionary*. Educational Department, The Board of Foreign Missions of the Presbyterian Church in the U. S. A. 8vo. 1908. Pp. xii, 286.

Here is a study of the foreign mission issue that is brief and practical. It amounts to a condensed rationale. Mission study classes are wont to take up a definite country, and recent missionary literature has been exceedingly prolific with valuable helps. But these have for the most part been descriptive rather than argumentative, so that, being instructed and entertained, the reader has perhaps not always been definitely convinced. The real issue was not sufficiently directly attacked. Prejudices, deeply rooted in a complacent and inexcusable ignorance, superficiality and selfishness, account for much of the missionary apathy and stagnation in some of our churches. Dr. Brown's book is addressed to such persons. It aims to arouse the dormant church at home. Its chief value is, that it clears up some of the popular misconceptions that have already too long monopolized the settled opinions of the busy church member.

The book impresses the reader with the absolute frankness of the missionary enterprise. Nothing is done in a corner. The administration of the Board at home, the selection of candidates, the prosecution of the work on the field—all is open to scrutiny. Throughout, the book may be said to be semi-polemic. The author has his objector constantly before him, and he frankly confutes him without offending him. If any one has time to read only one chapter, let it be the seventh, on "The Missionary Enterprise and its Critics". The whole book is especially adapted for mission study classes. The question is this: Will the persons who *ought* to read this book read it? We hope so.

Langhorne, Pa.

BENJAMIN F. PAIST, JR.

THE COIGNE OF VANTAGE. By WILLIAM T. HERRIDGE, D.D. New York: Fleming H. Revell Company. 16mo., pp. 160. Price, \$1.00 net.

This attractive little volume of brief essays suggests culture, thoughtfulness, insight. The author views the problems of life as explicable only by regarding the underlying ethical and spiritual realities. In so far as the discussion is at all religious, it is moulded by the following liberal creed:

"I believe in the love of God, and in its power to inspire and purify human life; and I promise to love God with all my heart, and my neighbor as myself." The chapters are entitled as follows: "On Keep-

ing Abreast of the Times"; "The Profit of Failure"; "Criticism"; "Secret Inspirations"; "God's Gentleman"; "The Human Touch"; "Concerning Heresy"; "The Complex Life"; "The Ethics of Work"; "A Christmas Dream".

Princeton.

CHAS. R. ERDMAN.

NATIONAL IDEALISM AND THE BOOK OF COMMON PRAYER. An Essay in Re-Interpretation and Revision. By STANTON COIT, PH.D. London: Williams & Norgate. 1908. 8vo.; pp. xxv, 467.

The normal attitude for a reviewer is sympathetic. To put yourself at the author's point of view, and to estimate his work from that standpoint, is the only course that satisfies a real critic or promises any real influence for his criticism. In the present instance, however, the reviewer experiences great difficulty in fulfilling his own ideal. He cannot share Dr. Coit's point of view, nor can he see any good reason why, from that point of view, the present book should have been written. And the review must necessarily suffer from the reviewer's limitations.

There is no difficulty in determining Dr. Coit's point of view. He lacks nothing of frankness, and shows no disposition to compromise. He is the professed advocate of a system of ethics purely naturalistic in basis, purely social in aim. "The only true and living God is nothing more and nothing less than righteousness" (14): "God and the social cause are identical" (4): "God is the idealistic cohesive principle of all human society" (79): "the whole concern of religion is the establishment of social justice here on earth" (14): this "social justice is a jealous God, and will not tolerate one heart-beat of yearning towards the realization of any other good" (14): least of all "the use of supernatural means toward some salvation of individual souls in a life beyond death" (viii).

From this standpoint Dr. Coit has proposed and, in the present volume, offered a re-interpretation and re-expression of the prayer book of the Church of England in terms of a purely humanistic ethics. The question that at once arises is, why? As we understand the matter, the necessity of re-interpretation is common to all earlier documents of religion that are in anywise "animistic", whether Christian Scriptures or pagan mythologies, or books of service and prayer, in order that the truth in them may be discerned beneath the terms and phrasings of an outworn faith.

But for the re-interpretation of the Book of Common Prayer and its revision, there is a special hopefulness and a peculiar need. The hopefulness lies in the fact that as compared with Missal and Breviary the Prayer Book was originally a bold move away from supernaturalism, it marked a trend toward social democracy, and it gave a new emphasis to morality as a factor in religion. And the need lies in the fact that in the three centuries since the last Prayer Book revision thought has gone in these directions by far beyond the beliefs embodied in that book. The significant facts in modern Anglican thought being the new identification of Christian faith with devotion to the communal cause

as being the essence of Christ's gospel, and its readiness for the last step away from supernaturalism.

With these views and with this outlook Dr. Coit through 452 pages proceeds to re-interpret and revise the Prayer Book. Taking the Ten Commandments as a most prominent feature, he undertakes at a chapter's end to rewrite them. Passing to the Lord's Prayer, he concludes that it is worthy of retention as part of a national scheme of moral instruction and edification; but with the understanding that "Jesus Christ, in using the term, 'Our Father,'" was designating "the idealistic cohesive principle of all human society" (79). Similar studies from the point of view of social utility follow, on the Creeds and Articles, Prayers, Psalms and Lessons, Baptism, the Communion, marriage and burial services.

As we follow him, there are times when we feel that Dr. Coit is simply using the Prayer Book as a convenient foil upon which to display his own ideals: there are times when we feel that he really considers the revision of the book upon the lines indicated as imminent, and he seems to be earnestly counselling an actual "committee of revision"; and there are times when, to use the words of a critic (Mrs. Husband) of an earlier work of Dr. Coit's, we "wonder whether, after all, Dr. Coit is serious, or whether he is 'getting at' us in a huge joke".

But through it all there never comes a time when we are able to agree with him as to the necessity or the propriety of the work he has undertaken. Admitting that the national Church is still to stand as the expression of a national idealism purely humanistic, why should it need a prayer book at all? Admitting that there is still need of a national manual of edification, why must it be in terms of the Scriptures professing to contain a revelation, and why in the forms of a Prayer Book made by men who received the revelation and sought to embody the Scriptures? Is such a system of re-interpretation as is here illustrated a dealing with words and thoughts that is consistent with true "culture"? And is it at heart "ethical"?

Philadelphia.

LOUIS F. BENSON.

CHRISTIAN WORSHIP: ITS PRINCIPLES AND FORMS. By REV. J. W. RICHARD, D.D., LL.D., and REV. F. V. N. PAINTER, D.D. Second Edition, revised. Philadelphia: Lutheran Publication Society, n. d. [1908]. 8vo. Pp. viii, 368.

The first edition of this book appeared in 1902; its publishers then as now failing to put the date upon the title-page. The volume is plainly got up, with large print and in strong binding, and with the edges shaved down in text-book fashion.

It is indeed from the text-book standpoint that the book is to be regarded, whose purpose we judge to be that of furnishing theological students with an introduction to practical and historical liturgics. A work of the kind, not designed to serve as an *apologia* for the Book of Common Prayer, was much needed. But we were not able to feel that the publication of the present book altogether fulfilled the opportunity;

and the impression is confirmed upon re-reading it in the new edition, which remains substantially unchanged.

The scheme of the book is this: the opening chapter deals with the principles of worship; those following with the history of worship from Apostolic times to our own; two final chapters (by Dr. M. Valentine) with "The Word in relation to other means of grace", and "The Ministry in relation to worship".

We venture to think the opening chapter too homiletical in method and manner, and that the "Principles of Worship" are framed in such a way as to deprive the succeeding history of its rightful interest. Worship is conceived of as a purely spiritual, inward act: "all the elements of acceptable worship on the part of man—love, trust, reverence, gratitude—are affections of the soul. Unfortunately with our carnal affections . . . there is a constant tendency to substitute external ceremonies and the outward service of the lips for the high spiritual exercises of the soul in worship" (13). The authors do add that "not all outward worship is to be condemned as formalism", and that when Christians come together, "the spiritual worship of the assembly naturally assumes an outward form."

Now, this position may be sound enough. But this grudging admission that all outward worship is not necessarily to be condemned, and this recognition of the grim necessity of forms, do not make a cheerful platform from which to survey liturgies. Christian experience is one thing, congregational worship another. And we think the outward expression is of the very essence of congregational worship. Moreover, the authors do not bring to their study any real sympathy with the liturgical spirit. Their study of Apostolic times convinces them that "the great object of social worship, as contemplated by the Apostles, was edification" (41). Of the conception of worship as an act of pure devotion, apart from utilitarian ends, a rendering to God of the glory due unto His name, the authors have no recognition. But this ideal of worship lies at the roots of the historic liturgies, controls their form, animates and explains their spirit. And really, with all respect to the authors, these "complicated ceremonies" do witness to something more than the degradation of the Church.

Coming to the main part of this book, the history of Christian worship, we shall only refer to the homiletical atmosphere which still pervades it. At no point or period is the student in danger of forgetting the authors' point of view. But we must say more at length that as a history of worship these chapters are inadequate, especially:

(1) On account of their omissions. What we have in chapters 2-5 is more like a history of the administration of the Eucharist in the Eastern and Western Churches. Of the daily devotions, developing into the Divine Office, with its Psalmody and Hymnody, its diversion to the monasteries, the attempts to modify it, its contribution to Church of England worship in Morning and Evening Prayer,—of all this we have no account at all. The Office and the Breviary do not even figure in the index.

We may instance also marked omissions in the chapter dealing with "Recent Liturgical Movements and Tendencies." The Oxford Movement, so far reaching in its influences, is hardly made to appear in any relation whatever with these movements and tendencies outside Anglicanism. The world-wide movement among Presbyterian Churches, Scottish, English, Australian, Canadian, American, toward a more liturgical type of worship, is not traced, and only in a general way can be said to be indicated. There is, however, mention of the new American *Book of Common Worship*. The long liturgical strife in the (German) Reformed Church, important in its actual results, but also affording ideal material for studying different "principles of worship" in a face-to-face conflict, does not appear to be so much as mentioned. The same thing is true of the recent revision of the standard of worship of the (Dutch) Reformed Church. In regard to the Lutheran Church alone is there any real attempt to trace recent developments.

(2) On account of the lack of proportion in dealing with the historical materials. The whole history of worship from Constantine to the Reformation occupies 95 pages, that of the Lutheran reconstruction occupies 133 pages, that of the Reformed occupies only 29. The Anglican reconstruction occupies 6 pages as against the 133 of the Lutheran, and is treated merely as a sub-head of the Reformed reconstruction. In the case of Anglican psalmody such a classification would be correct, but surely the Anglican Prayer Book belongs in an outside region of compromise. Even for English-speaking Lutheran theological students the treatment of this subject is hopelessly inadequate.

(3) On account of a deficiency of such bibliographical references as would put the reader in the way of becoming a student, rather than one who "only sits and listens." Even the Union Seminary Lectures on *Christian Worship*, slight as they were, were provided with bibliographies of the subjects treated, thus making materials for further study available. From the present book the student would hardly ever learn how obscure the early history of worship really is; and the stimulating quality of the method of study followed in such a book as Bishop John Wordsworth's *Ministry of Grace* is quite wanting here.

The method of the book is on the contrary dogmatic throughout. The homilies are not even hortatory, and they leave the student without an opportunity of appeal. We find, for example, such dicta as these: "To say that without responsive worship the congregation 'only sits and listens' is ridiculous" (16); "The world will never be converted by fixed forms of prayer, nor by the men that habitually use them" (26). Must we infer that liturgics is not one of the theological disciplines that tends to enlarge the heart?

Philadelphia.

LOUIS F. BENSON.

THE PREACHER. By the REVEREND ARTHUR S. HOYT, D.D., Professor of Homiletics and Sociology in the Auburn Theological Seminary. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1909. Cloth, 12mo., pp. 380. Price \$1.50 net.

This volume is the companion to the book published by Dr. Hoyt in 1905, entitled "The Work of Preaching". The latter lectures deal more particularly with the technique of sermon preparation. This present series of lectures deals with the person, the message and the method of the preacher. Part First suggests the supreme importance of personality, and especially in preaching. Its second chapter deals with the enrichment of personality; the remaining chapters with the physical, intellectual and spiritual life of the preacher. They contain most helpful suggestions in the method of developing the intellectual and spiritual life.

Part Second deals with the message of the preacher, suggesting its authority, its aim and its contents. This part will be less satisfactory to some than the preceding chapters. This will be due to a divergence of theological view. They may question what is said as to the source of the preacher's "authority"; they may give another definition to the aim of his message, and differently describe its content; yet all will agree with the author's insistence upon a prophetic spirit, upon the need of preaching a living Christ, upon the aim of securing the more abundant life, and upon the present need of emphasizing the social teachings of our Lord.

The Third Part of the book may perhaps be judged as most helpful of all. It deals with Evangelistic, Expository and Doctrinal Preaching, with two appended chapters upon Ethical Sermons and the Ethics of Pulpit Speech. The suggestions in relation to Evangelistic preaching, while few, are practical: the lecture on Expository preaching is most admirable, and its substance should be presented to every class of theological students. What the author has to say as to Doctrinal Preaching and Ethical Sermons is likewise timely. In the matter of "The Ethics of Pulpit Speech", the truthfulness of the message, the truthfulness of the person and the demand for practical speech, summarize the content of a brief but interesting discussion.

All in all this second volume will prove to be of equal value with that which dealt with the work of preaching, and will prove to be a helpful book both for the class room and the study.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

TRAINING THE TEACHER. By A. F. SCHAUFFLER, D.D., ANTOINETTE A. LAMOREAUX, B.L., MARTIN G. BRUMBAUGH, Ph.D., LL.D., MARION LAWRENCE. Philadelphia: The Sunday School Times Company. Cloth, 16mo, pp. 270. Price \$0.50 net.

The Sabbath School is practically the only agency to which is now entrusted the religious education of the young. Its most difficult problem is that of securing a sufficient number of properly qualified teachers. To meet this great need classes are being established in various schools for teacher training. It is for the use of such classes that this hand book has been prepared. Its authors are well qualified, by wide experience, for the task undertaken; and their work has been

approved as a "first standard course" by the Committee on Education of the International Sunday School Association.

The first half of the book is by Dr. Schauffler, and consists of instruction relative to the Bible presented in twenty lessons in the Old and New Testaments, and closing with a brief chapter on "How the Bible came to us", by Dr. Ira M. Price. The second section is entitled "The Pupil" and is in essence a brief study in psychology, in which Mrs. Lamoreaux describes the working of the mind at various ages and under different conditions. In the third section, Dr. Brumbaugh speaks of "The Teacher", and gives a suggestive study in pedagogy, outlining and applying certain fundamental educational principles. The fourth section is a study of the modern Sabbath School, by Marion Lawrance, whose long service enables him to write helpfully of the equipment and organization and work of "The School".

Altogether the volume will be found of great value, not only for teacher training classes, but to every teacher and officer of the Sabbath School.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

GENERAL LITERATURE.

SAINT PETER. By RICHARD ARNOLD GREENE. Boston: Sherman, French & Company. 1909. Cloth, 12mo. Pp. 47.

This little book is dedicated by the author, "with love and gratitude", to his brother, William Brenton Greene, Jr., D.D. It evidently is designed to be a companion volume to the famous poem, by Frederic W. H. Myers, entitled "Saint Paul". Not only is it printed and bound in the same style as the Macmillan, 1905, edition of the latter poem, not only does the writer adopt the same scheme of versification, rhyme, stanzas, and grouping of stanzas, but there is a certain successful imitation of the general design and scope of the poem. Saint Peter is made to reveal his own heart, his conscious unworthiness, his passionate devotion to Christ. Glimpses are given of his personal experiences, from his call to "catch men", to the anticipation of his predicted crucifixion, and of the triumph of his Master's name. Among these episodes are the feeding of the multitude, the rebuke, the transfiguration, the resurrection, the commission, Pentecost, the scene at the Beautiful Gate, the punishment of Ananias, the vision at Joppa. All are treated with a light and delicate touch, and together form a sketch of the life and an interpretation of the character of the Simon who becomes Peter the Saint. These thoughtful verses will be especially interesting to those who are most familiar with the poem by Mr. Myers.

Princeton.

CHAS. R. ERDMAN.

HOW TO DEVELOP POWER AND PERSONALITY IN SPEAKING. By GRENVILLE KLEISER. Funk & Wagnalls Company. New York. 1909. Pp. 421. 8vo. \$1.25 net.

Professor Kleiser has given in this book clearly and concisely some helpful suggestions and exercises for developing the power of the public speaker in a rational, normal way. He recognizes that the speaker's power depends upon his personality, and the adequate expression of that personality; and gives practical directions for training the voice, memory, imagination and sympathy, and for acquiring a vocabulary and a fund of illustrations. The book contains a large amount of well chosen literature for practice.

H. W. SMITH.

BIOLOGY AND ITS MAKERS; with Portraits and other Illustrations; by WM. A. LOCY, PH.D., LL.D., Professor in Northwestern University. New York: Henry Holt & Co. 1908.

This is the best up-to-date general summary of what has become the most popular of all the sciences. For the public at large, as well as for the specialists, it is the most beautiful, the most readable and interesting, and the most useful work that has recently appeared in its field. Here are presented to us in historical parade, the great problems that puzzled and fascinated humanity, the men who helped, or sometimes hindered and retarded their solution, the inner merits of the questions at issue, and the methods which succeeded; struck off in brief, and with charming portraits, with finger-nail biographies, so that we can grasp the problems, and at the same time know face-to-face the great men, and know what each did for science, and what science or politics did for or against the man.

The questions thus treated are those which are now, and shall always be, dominant in humanity's struggle for intelligence and for existence. Well may we wonder why good men in olden time opposed such investigations, and long time arrested science at its very birth, often in the name of religion. As a lover of the Bible I should express my satisfaction that it never was responsible for such pietistic savagery; it honors the scholarship of Moses and Daniel, and the "experimental research" of King Solomon; and we know who said, "Consider the lilies of the field, how they grow; they toil not, neither do they spin; yet I say unto you that even Solomon in all his glory was not arrayed like one of these."

The most difficult steps in Biology were the first: What is life? (not yet answered). Why do men eat, drink, breathe? Why do they get sick, and why should medicine be taken? Much time was necessarily spent in studying the structure of the human body, and in comparative anatomy, preliminary to the study of physiology. And then came the problem of the blood, and its movements; the meaning of heart, liver, pancreas, nerves, etc., microscopic work; and growth in its varying stages; sexuality, embryology, heredity; the relations of animals and plants with each other; of all with man, and thus coming close to man's relation with his Maker, and with eternity; also, disease-infection, and its relations to germs, and bacteriology. In our time all the problems are more or less connected with Evolution, which forms the second, and not the least interesting part of the volume.

Very little criticism is needed for such a book; but we are sorry that so little mention is made of the older American workers; true theirs was largely field-work, and America was not hospitable to the publication of elaborate and expensive books. But Asa Gray, and Leidy, and Reilly, and many others were worthy of mention; due honor is paid to Cope. And the younger Americans, of the experimental science Faith, are duly heralded. We observe only one erratum, p. 266, where "sarcode" gets a wrong explanation; it means flesh-like substance. Whilst the book is very severe on mediaeval hostility to science, on the part of ecclesiastics, it does not rub in this sort of criticism as to later times; though it gives enough to show that nobody helps religion by hindering scientific speculation, whilst it is equally true that investigators hurt their own cause when they make it an occasion for attacks upon faith or morality.

Princeton.

G. MACLOSKIE.

PEACE AND HAPPINESS. By THE RIGHT HON. LORD AVEBURY, P.C.
New York: The MacMillan Company, 1909. Pp. 386. Price \$1.50 net.

Lord Avebury, who has a quarter of a page of titles, honorary degrees, and other honors, is better known to the public as Sir John Lubbock, the author of the well known book on "The Pleasures of Life". His latest book, written in his old age, is intended for popular reading, and it gives full evidence of the sanity, common sense, learning and genuinely religious feeling in the possession of which he has long been recognized as preëminent. It comprises essays on such subjects as "The Body," "The Mind," "Kindness," "Education," "The Dread of Nature," "The Peace of Mind," and "The Peace of Nations." The book is worth having if only for the wise counsel it offers in its concluding chapter on "The Peace of Nations," which we wish every school-boy and school-girl in America might read. The wealth of quotations and allusions in the book is amazing. Perhaps the author, in his attempt to reach the average mind, sometimes approaches too near the trite and commonplace; but his book in its general scope and make-up is excellent, and we venture modestly to offer our word of high commendation concerning it.

Cranford, N. J.

GEORGE FRANCIS GREENE.

THE MILLER AND THE TOAD. By RICHARD CLIFTON. Boston: Sherman, French & Co., 1909. Pp. 220. Price, \$1.20 (net.)

This is one of those books that are hard to classify. One does not know whether to regard it as fiction or theology. It is of little value from either point of view. Viewed as fiction it is unpleasing, without the slightest ray of real humor; and viewed as theology it is radically and hopelessly heretical. As nearly as we can make out the author is a peculiar sort of Unitarian, who regards Jesus as the only Deity, His divinity being merely the consummate natural product of the perfections

that reside in humanity and that are gradually being brought to light through evolution. The person of the Father is to him a myth; he does not mention the Holy Spirit; there are in his view no miracles, and no prophecy worthy the name; he regards the Old Testament as a mass of superstitions; he scoffs at the doctrine of atonement through the shedding of blood; he pronounces the doctrine of predestination as "cruel"; he denies the virgin birth of Jesus. And so on. More need not be said. Our summary of the work is the oft-quoted remark ascribed to Lincoln: "Doubtless by those who like this sort of thing this thing will be very well liked."

Cranford, N. J.

GEORGE FRANCIS GREENE.

THE LOGICAL AND HISTORICAL INACCURACIES OF THE HON. BOURKE COCKRAN In His Review of the Lutheran Letter of Protest to President Roosevelt. By PROF. W. H. T. DAU. Pamphlet; pp. 40. Concordia Publishing House; St. Louis. 1908. Ten cents.

This is an able and trenchant reply to the speech of Mr. Cockran delivered before the First American Catholic Missionary Congress in Chicago last November in which the speaker defended the thesis that the Roman Catholic creed does not militate against loyalty to the American Constitution and American institutions on the part of our citizens who in matters of faith are subject to the authority of the Roman Pontiff. We cannot but feel, however, in spite of the logical inconsistency in the patriotism of an American citizen who yields a paramount submission to a foreign potentate who theoretically claims a temporal as well as spiritual control over his subjects, that the fear of Professor Dau of the dire effects to the American Commonwealth of the possible ascendancy of Romish influences on the soil of the United States is practically unwarranted. What would happen if the majority of our citizens were devout Roman Catholics seems to us somewhat like the question "If the sky were to fall would we all catch larks?" We have no fear whatever that the days of Boniface VIII or of Philip II are ever to return, and particularly to the people of the United States. However, Professor Dau's pamphlet is well worth reading by those who believe that there is a Roman Catholic problem in the United States.

Cranford, N. J.

GEORGE FRANCIS GREENE.

A WORKING GRAMMAR OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE. By JAMES C. FERNALD, L.H.D. Funk & Wagnalls Co. New York and London. 1908.

The title of this book is suggestive, inasmuch as it aims to obviate many of the errors of antecedent English grammars by making the volume, in the best sense, an available one for the needs of the English student. Avoiding the error of preventing a treatment of the subject purely theoretical, technical and formal, and, also, the error of reducing the treatment to one adapted only to the demands of the kindergarten, it offers a discussion sufficiently scientific to answer the claims of schol-

arship, and sufficiently practical to answer the claims of the average man. It is the same helpful and wholesome aim which Dr. Fernald has exhibited in his "Students Standard Dictionary" and his "English Synonyms" to enable, as he says, "any intelligent person to find his own way, by its teachings, to a correct working knowledge of English".

What Professor Whitney called, "The Essentials of English Grammar" are presented with "the least possible encumbrance of grammatical machinery". Rightly excluding the traditional topics of Orthography and Prosody, as properly outside the province of grammar proper, the author discusses the subject under the two cardinal divisions—The Parts of Speech, and, The Building of the Sentence, or, using the old nomenclature, Etymology and Syntax.

Under the first of these Divisions, the discussion of the verb is especially satisfactory, while, in the second Division—The Building of the Sentence—there is an admirable combination of the rhetorical and purely grammatical.

There is another feature of the book which is deserving of special emphasis and praise—the numerous and carefully selected lists of references from the best English and Classical authors, illustrating the respective topics presented, and connecting the whole province of Etymology and Syntax with the best native and foreign literature. Nothing is better calculated to awaken the interest of the ingenuous student as well as to show that all the various departments of English study—grammatical, textual, rhetorical, linguistic and literary, stand upon a common foundation, are pervaded by a common spirit, and, with some legitimate independence of method, seek to subserve the same great end—the making of an English scholar.

Dr. Fernald's treatise is thus to be commended as a valuable contribution to English studies.

Princeton.

THEODORE W. HUNT.


A PARABLE OF THE ROSE and other Poems. By LYMAN WHITNEY ALLEN. Pp. 146. \$1.25 net. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons.

The author of the forty or fifty poems comprised in this collection is the honored pastor of a Reformed Church in Newark, N. J., and he achieved some distinction a number of years ago by securing a prize of \$1,000 from the New York *Herald* for a poem on Lincoln which has recently appeared in its third edition. While Dr. Allen is not of course to be considered a poet of the first order, he is, in our judgment, a true poet, and the present little volume deserves to be taken seriously. If it be universally true, as Plato is reported to have said, that "poets utter great and wise things which they do not themselves understand", it may not necessarily involve an impeachment of our own wit that we are occasionally at a loss to determine what our author's precise thought is. There is sometimes a reminder of Browning's frequent obscurity—or perhaps we ought to say *profundity*—in Dr. Allen's lines.


Cranford, N. J.

GEORGE FRANCIS GREENE.

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